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

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

LONDON
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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

VOL. VI

JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1911

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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

WITH SANCTION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL, AND UNDER DIRECTION OF
GENERAL SIR J. D. P. FRENCH, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FORCES
ASSISTED BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
AND MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY, C.B., INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY

Vol. VI

JANUARY to OCTOBER

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(See p. 19.)

THE CHARGE OF THE BLACK HUSSARS.

GROSS-JÄGERSDORF.

(30th August, 1757.)

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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY 1911

PREFACE

By General Sir J. D. P. French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
(Colonel 19th Q.A.O.R. Hussars), Inspector-General of the Forces

A YEAR ago Major-General the Honourable Julian Byng, who had lately relinquished command of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was urged to take up the editorship of the Cavalry Journal. He agreed to do so, but the calls of an appointment which he has just taken up now necessitate his resigning the task.

The work he has done, and the help he has given, speak for themselves in the pages of this book, and the Editor for 1910 has earned our warmest gratitude.

It is satisfactory to be able to announce that the Army Council have now consented to make the editorship of the Cavalry Journal a part of the regular duties of the Commandant of the Cavalry School.

The original conception and subsequent establishment of the Cavalry Journal are due to the energy and foresight of Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, when acting as Inspector of Cavalry in 1905, and he would be the first to acknowledge the valuable help which he and others have received throughout from Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Leetham, the Managing Editor of the Cavalry Journal and Secretary of the Royal United Service Institution.

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The status of the Journal being thus assured by the stamp and seal of official recognition, it is hoped that subscribers and readers of all grades will bring grist to the mill, and secure for its pages a full measure of all that intellectual vigour and searching thought which abound throughout the Army. In proof of the existence of this ability it is only necessary to search through the back numbers of the Journal throughout the course of its existence.

Cavalry soldiers should realise, more perhaps than they do, that this Journal has the first claim upon their literary efforts, and they should give it the foremost place in promulgating their ideas.

In these days of vast armies, using weapons of scientific manufacture and great precision, and when the practice of war demands skill and brain-power in a greater degree than it has ever done before, the value is apparent of a medium through which thoughts and ideas can be freely exchanged among all who are engaged in the study of war, a study which is daily growing more intricate and difficult.

We live in a time when very divergent views are being expressed in regard to the duties and employment of Cavalry in the field. Some of these views, though put forward with considerable force and ability, appear to be based on theory rather than on war experience and practical training, and if hastily adopted might reduce our mounted forces to impotence when opposed to highly trained civilised enemies.

This Journal is well adapted for the expression of individual views on Cavalry subjects, especially such subjects as have not been dealt with in detail in official publications, and are consequently open to free discussion. But contributors should bear in mind that the principles which should govern the training of the Army have received, and are receiving, the consideration of the responsible authorities, and that the embodiment of those principles in the training manuals must be loyally accepted. Mutual understanding and co-operation amongst all ranks of the Cavalry, and confidence in their leaders, their weapons, and themselves, can only be achieved by adherence to a common doctrine. On the other hand, such a doctrine must be progressive; it cannot be

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regarded as infallible or final. New factors come into play, and recent scientific developments, such as those relating to wireless telegraphy and aeronautics, are likely to affect the tactics of Cavalry perhaps even more than those of the other Arms. It follows, therefore, that contributors to this Journal can render valuable service by carefully studying the changing conditions of modern warfare, and by suggesting the most suitable methods of applying those conditions to the accepted principles of Cavalry training.

(We are indebted to Mr. Harry Payne for the above illustration, which will also be utilised for the front page of cover of the four numbers of the present volume.)

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CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE

By 'Notrofe'

Protective mounted troops, whether Cavalry or Mounted Infantry, are more or less tied to the force under protection. The patrolling work of such mounted troops is for a protective object—*i.e.* to prevent the enemy from compelling the main body to come into action under unfavourable conditions. The movements of protective mounted troops must be regulated by the movements of the main body to which they are tied.

It is desired rather to discuss the reconnaissance work of Cavalry, which is not tied down in this way to a less mobile main body. This subject requires very special study and thought. On the one hand, the Cavalry leaders must understand Cavalry work thoroughly; but, on the other hand, it is just as important that commanders of mixed forces should understand equally well exactly how to employ their Cavalry properly. It is commonly believed that this means that the commander of a mixed force should have clear ideas about the powers of endurance of a horse, the distances and frontage over which a body of Cavalry may usefully be spread out, the use or misuse of shock tactics, and a smattering of Cavalry drill and evolutions thrown in. But the subject to be discussed has no direct connection with these points. It is a peculiar trait of the British officer that he secretly prides himself on his knowledge of horseflesh. To cast aspersions on this knowledge is an insult. To approach the subject from this standpoint is to set up a feeling of antagonism at once. Let us rather state the case like this:—

'Between the thoughts and intentions of the commander, and the thoughts and intentions of his Cavalry leader, there should be absolute harmony. If their ideas are not expressed in the same sort of language, differences of opinion may, and assuredly will, lead to misconceptions regarding the mission to be performed. Cavalry are soon

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out of sight and often beyond recall, and then references cannot be made, and mistakes cannot be rectified.'

This harmony and knowledge will *not* be acquired 'by intuition,' nor by the mere exercise of 'common sense.' The only way is to make a special study of how the greatest commanders have used their Cavalry.

Perhaps no great commander has understood better than Napoleon how to make the best use of Cavalry. Napoleon realised that the important factors in reconnaissance for the purpose of obtaining military information are:—

1. That the information sought for is the information most important at the time *to the Commander-in-Chief*.

2. That this particular item of information should be obtained quickly, and conveyed quickly *direct to the Commander-in-Chief*.

The main decisions in the strategical movements of a campaign, or the grand tactics of a big battle, lie with the commander of the whole force. Items of important information should, therefore, be quickly conveyed direct to the commander of the whole force. Napoleon realised that information obtained by or through his subordinate commanders would generally be delayed in transmission, and occasionally might not reach him at all. He therefore instituted large bodies of Cavalry (divisions and corps), under the most capable Cavalry leaders, which he designated 'Reserve Cavalry.' These bodies of Reserve Cavalry were never intended by Napoleon to be kept *in reserve*, in our usual meaning of this expression, but were Cavalry '*reserved for the sole use of the Commander-in-Chief, and only taking orders direct from the Commander-in-Chief.*'

After the Napoleonic wars there was a long period of peace in Europe free from great wars. European Cavalry continued to be organised on Napoleon's system, and the name 'Reserve Cavalry' was retained. The study of Cavalry, as a special and most important branch of military study, was neglected. In the 1866 campaign in Bohemia both the Prussians and the Austrians had several 'Reserve Divisions of Cavalry.' In 1866 it was considered a common-sense view to retain 'Reserve Cavalry' in reserve. So both armies concentrated towards Königgrätz with practically all their Cavalry marching *behind* the other arms. Just before the battle of Königgrätz the two forces were within a march of each other, with their outposts only

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four miles apart, *and neither side knew it.* Now the Prussian generals, von Moltke and von Roon, were men of very great abilities, and we cannot doubt that they had plenty of common sense. Yet, having overlooked the necessity of a special study of the training and handling of Cavalry, the Prussian Cavalry was entirely misused by von Moltke.

A nation may have a well-trained Cavalry, and may also have one or more great Cavalry leaders, but this powerful weapon will be wasted to a very great extent if the Commander-in-Chief and the army commanders do not understand how to use it.

If the Commander-in-Chief *can* define exactly the task he wishes his Cavalry to perform, it is sufficiently difficult already for a good Cavalry leader to perform that task. If the Commander-in-Chief *cannot* define this task exactly, the best Cavalry leader in the world will probably not be able to perform his duties satisfactorily.

The 'Reserve' Cavalry of Napoleon we now designate 'Independent' Cavalry. Let us try and find a definition of Independent Cavalry. The term 'Independent' Cavalry may, perhaps, be applied to any body of Cavalry (from a patrol upwards) which is despatched under the special instructions of any commander (however junior) on a definite mission, and whose duty it is to report the result of that mission direct to the commander who sent it out; provided that the leader of this body of (Independent) Cavalry is allowed to cut himself entirely loose from the less mobile portion of the force which is under the commander who sends him out, and that the leader of this body of (Independent) Cavalry is freed from any responsibility of a protective nature. For Independent Cavalry should be untrammelled Cavalry. The following is a very favourite form of order for Cavalry:—

'Move out towards the north and cover our front in that direction. Get touch with the enemy's forces.'

N.B.—'Getting touch' implying 'keeping touch.'

In most cases it would be found practically impossible to carry out these orders, which leave out of consideration *what the enemy may do all this time.* The first sentence makes the Cavalry 'protective Cavalry,' and ties them down to the main force; it also necessitates the maximum permissible dispersion of the Cavalry. The second sentence allots a task which is only reasonably possible to be carried out by 'Independent Cavalry,' which can cut loose from their own

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main force; and contact work demands the maximum permissible concentration of the Cavalry.

For instance, in this case the Cavalry move out, and get touch with the enemy (say) fifteen miles away towards the north. The enemy is found to be moving towards the east. If the Cavalry follow the enemy and keep touch, they will no longer be protecting the front of their own army. If they continue to protect the front of their own army, they must lose touch at once.

In our army it is usually accepted as a hard-and-fast rule, that whenever Cavalry gains contact with the enemy, that contact *must* be preserved. But cases will frequently arise when a body of Cavalry is despatched on some special and important duty, where, by avoiding any enemy encountered *en route,* Cavalry will better be able to carry out that special mission. The chief *rôle* of Independent Cavalry is to be sent on special and important missions.

Take another example order:—

'Your squadron will proceed to the river Thames and reconnoitre the fords between Reading and Oxford. You will send back at once any information of the enemy's forces in that locality.'

If such a written order were delivered to a squadron leader he might find himself in the greatest difficulties. The commander has really given him two separate tasks to perform, and has omitted to say which task is the all-important one. What *the enemy may be doing is again rather left out of consideration.* Suppose it is all-important to the Commander-in-Chief's plan for some big flanking movement to know for certain whether one or more fords *existed* there, but a matter of only secondary importance to know that two or three squadrons of the enemy's Cavalry were in that neighbourhood. The squadron leader, on approaching Reading, finds hostile Cavalry on his left flank. He decides that he ought to reconnoitre in that direction and ascertain their strength, and has to concentrate his squadron for this purpose. The enemy concentrate towards Salisbury. He follows them carefully, to keep touch. He is finally attacked by the enemy, and with his squadron is pursued back to Basingstoke, where he reports his adventures. But the commander gets no information about the fords.

Whereas, if the commander's order had been worded to the following effect, a better result might be expected:—

'It is all important for me to know by noon to-morrow what

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facilities exist for all arms to cross the river Thames between Reading and Oxford. You will start as soon as possible with your squadron. You will make your own arrangements for sending back the required information to the White Hart Hotel, Basingstoke.'

The squadron leader should now clearly understand the important portion of his mission. His action on meeting a small or a large body of the enemy should be left to his discretion. Ordinarily he would avoid all parties of the enemy, and devote all his attention to the reconnaissance of the river crossings. He would have to use his own judgment as to departing from the spirit or the letter of his instructions. For instance, if he found about two divisions of the enemy moving from Reading towards Salisbury, he might consider this a sufficient justification to keep touch with them, instead of carrying out the river reconnaissance. But he will not be able to say he was misled by the orders he received. Possibly his best course would be to send back a message at once to Basingstoke, to report the presence of this body of the enemy, and then to carry out the river reconnaissance without attempting to keep contact with the enemy.

Short field days give rise to situations which tend to inculcate bad habits regarding orders to Cavalry. The two forces usually soon come to grips, and remain in close contact with one another. Before long they have their noses towards home. This leads to a very common form of field-day order to Cavalry:—

'You will send one troop to watch our right flank, and to keep touch with any bodies of the enemy which may try to turn our right flank.'

One troop is soon dispersed in its protective observation duties, and does not need to go far away. Finally, it gets and maintains contact with the enemy, but only because 'the enemy' is on his way home round our right flank. In reality, on these occasions, it is the enemy himself who is doing the 'maintaining contact' part of the business.

Here is an example of scouting duties, from the Cavalry manœuvres of 1907, on the Wiltshire Down:—

North of the river Thames is Blueland.

South of the river Thames is Redland.

Both sides are mobilising and concentrating.

Red, covered by one Cavalry brigade, which is fifty miles south of the river, knows that Blue is concentrating about twenty miles north of the river, covered by one Blue Cavalry brigade.

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Red Cavalry Brigadier sent forward about ten parties of cyclist-scouts, one to each bridge over the river Thames, along a front of about thirty miles. These cyclists reached their bridges within about seven hours, and got there before Blue. Cyclist despatch-riders were to bring back information as to where the Blue Cavalry crossed the Thames.

No supporting squadrons were sent to support the line of observation posts of scouts.

The Red Cavalry brigade did a march of about thirty-five miles towards the Thames and bivouacked.

Next morning absolutely no information came in, and the Red brigade concentrated, moved cautiously northwards across the Lambourne Downs.

About mid-day the Red brigadier, riding in front of his brigade, sighted the Blue brigade on some rising ground about two miles off on his right front. This was the first information the Red brigadier got of the enemy.

It transpired that when the Blue brigade scouts arrived at one or two of the bridges they were fired on by Red cyclist-scouts. Blue had supporting squadrons behind, and the umpires put those Red scout-parties out of action. Blue patrols crossed at these one or two bridges, pushed on to towns where all the roads meet, which lead south from the Thames, and at these points they intercepted all Red cyclists who were trying to get south with their information. The Red cyclist-scout parties were all tied down to roads, and were all captured during the day.

There are two lessons to be learnt here:—

(1) That these cyclist-scout parties should *not* have given themselves away by firing on the approaching Blue. They misjudged their mission entirely in thinking they had to *defend* the river-crossings. It would have been a wise precaution to have warned these isolated scout-parties to 'observe' only, from concealed positions, and on no account to fight.

(2) That small patrols, pushed fifty miles or so ahead, will always find the greatest difficulty in sending back any information they do acquire.

The parties of observation scouts of each locality should be backed up by a supporting troop or a supporting squadron. This squadron

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should take up a concealed position (say, in a hollow or in a wood) as close up to the line of scouts as possible. This place could be selected on the way out, and then all scouts would know it. The scouts would gather information, and take it back as often as possible, to the supporting squadron. The supporting-squadron leader would make all necessary arrangements for transmitting all reports to the commander who sent him out.

In various books on Cavalry work a tendency may be noticed to confuse terms such as 'contact squadron,' 'reconnoitring squadron,' 'supporting squadron,' etc. The name should describe the principal duty the detached body is carrying out.

They might be classified as follows:—

Reconnoitring patrol, troop, squadron, etc.

Principal duty:

(1) To reconnoitre or search for any trace of the *enemy* inside a given area. (The most usual task for Cavalry.)

(2) To reconnoitre an *area* of country and report on its (supplies, roads, etc.).

(3) To reconnoitre some particular point or *place*, and report the presence or absence of the enemy there (railway junction, defensive position, etc.).

The relative importance of (1), (2), or (3) must be laid down very precisely by the commander who sends the Cavalry out. As a rule a particular body of Cavalry should be allotted only one of these tasks.

Observation post, troop, squadron, etc.

Principal duty:

To take up a stationary post, or line of posts, in concealment, and observe or watch for any signs of the enemy approaching.

In the absence of orders to the contrary, it should be understood that an observation post will remain concealed in its position, and not fight with every small body of the enemy that chances to pass.

They should usually be told when they may withdraw.

Contact patrol, troop, squadron, etc.

Principal duty:

To get contact with the enemy and keep contact, and to send back information frequently.

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A contact patrol or squadron may be likened to a leech, which accompanies its host as a matter of course. One sucks blood for his own benefit, but the other sucks information for the benefit of the Commander-in-Chief.

The officer commanding contact squadron must take every opportunity of sending back *to the commander who sent it on its mission* information of the movements of the force with which it has contact.

To preserve contact without sending back information at intervals would be a useless proceeding. It does not matter what the leader of the contact squadron knows. It does matter what his Commander-in-Chief knows.

Supporting patrol, troop, squadron, etc.

Principal duty:

To support some particular smaller bodies in front, who are either reconnoitring or observing.

To support observation posts will usually demand that the supporting squadron should avoid being discovered by the enemy.

To support *reconnoitring* patrols the supporting squadron may sometimes have to attack, and will continually be moving from point to point.

It will often be necessary for the leader of a supporting squadron to lay out a chain of concealed relay posts of despatch-riders. The necessity for this should be realised beforehand, so that the relay posts may be dropped on the way out.

To summarise:—

A Reconnoitring squadron reconnoitres.

An Observation squadron observes.

A Contact squadron keeps contact with the enemy.

A Supporting squadron supports.

The name 'Combat Patrol' is sanctioned by long usage. This term is used to designate the patrols which a concentrated body of Cavalry throws out, just prior to and during a Cavalry fight, to guard against surprise. But this name in no way describes the duties which such patrols have to perfom. The name 'Protective Patrol' would be much more descriptive, since the duty is solely of a protective nature.

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Of course it is quite possible that a certain squadron may start out as a reconnoitring squadron (say reconnoitring for the enemy's main body). Having found a large body of the enemy, it will as a rule maintain contact with that body of the enemy. This particular squadron would then no longer be a reconnoitring squadron, with the task of having to reconnoitre, but would automatically become a contact squadron, with the quite different duties to perform of keeping contact.

Again, a squadron may be sent out as a supporting squadron, to (say) three observation posts, which have to observe three river crossings till 6 P.M. the following day.

One of the observation posts reports to officer commanding supporting squadron that a brigade of Cavalry is crossing the river and moving south. Officer commanding supporting squadron decides to leave a troop to do supporting troop, and to go and maintain contact with the enemy's Cavalry brigade. This squadron (less one troop) becomes a contact squadron, and its duties thenceforth are entirely changed.

In a book recently published about Cavalry work, written by a Cavalry officer, the statement occurs that 'A contact squadron was despatched in the direction of the enemy, with orders to reconnoitre the ford over the river so-and-so, and to report any attempt of the enemy to cross there.'

Now this squadron leader would have three contradictory duties to perform:—

(1) As a 'contact squadron' he would naturally suppose he ought to keep contact with any considerable body of the enemy he might meet *en route* to the river crossing. This duty might take him to any point of the compass.

(2) Being ordered to reconnoitre the ford he ought to get there, collect the topographical information required, and take it back. If the whole squadron goes back with the information it is less likely to be delayed *en route* by any small party of the enemy.

(3) Having to report any attempt of the enemy to cross the river, he should remain at the river crossing as an observation squadron. A small observation post alone would always be liable to be driven off by a patrol of the enemy.

In ordinary circumstances (2) and (3) might possibly be undertaken by the same squadron. But in this instance the country was swarm-

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ing with the enemy's Cavalry, and the river crossing was about fifteen miles off.

In effect, therefore, this squadron leader is allotted the following impossible combination of tasks:—

(1) Go wherever the enemy may take you.

(2) Go to the ford and return at once with important information concerning that ford.

(3) Remain at the ford indefinitely, to watch it.

For the successful employment of Independent Cavalry the first essential is that the Commander-in-Chief should state precisely the exact item of information which is most necessary to him:—

(*a*) The location of a *specified body of the enemy*. (Stating whether contact should be *maintained* with this body of the enemy.)

(*b*) Definite news of one of our *own detachments*.

(*c*) To search a specified *area* of country, and to ascertain what *forces of the enemy* are within that area.

(*d*) To examine a specified locality to obtain *topographical* information.

(*e*) To examine a specified area of country to obtain information *re* water, *supplies*, etc.

(*f*) To take up a line of observation posts along a specified line of country. (Passes of a mountain range, etc.) Or the Commander-in-Chief may allot a definite strategical operation to a body of Independent Cavalry.

(*g*) A detailed plan of operations against a certain portion of the enemy's lines of communication.

(*h*) To get contact with a specified body of the enemy and delay its movements.

The Commander-in-Chief (in consultation with his Cavalry commander, if necessary) will then determine the strength of the body of Independent Cavalry, which he is willing to send away on this particular mission, and will draw up the necessary detailed instructions for this mission, which should include all information already available.

The selected Cavalry leader will then have a clear conception of the exact duty which he is to perform. To depart from the spirit or the letter of these clear instructions of the Commander-in-Chief will only be justified under unforeseen and exceptional circumstances.

The method of carrying out the mission should be left to the discretion of the Cavalry leader who is selected for this duty.

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AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN WAR

By Major W. A. Tilney, *17th (D.C.O.) Lancers*

The assertion is frequently made that correct observations cannot be made from balloons or very high altitudes, owing to the difficulty of reading the country and calculating the exact position of troops. Those who have had much experience in such work know that this is a fallacy, and it is only a question of good eyesight and much practical experience before observations can be made with almost absolute certainty. In Ladysmith the laagers discovered by the Intelligence Department, after much labour and considerable loss of life, had frequently been previously located and reported by the Balloon Section. The great defect in those days was that observations could not be made if there were even a moderate breeze, for in the lightest air the balloon was incessantly turning round like a cooking-spit, and except on an absolutely still day a telescope could not be used.

Another great difficulty which had to be overcome in the old-fashioned gas-bag was sea-sickness, which, when an ascent on service had to be made, overcame the best of sailors and the most experienced aeronaut.

The dirigible and aeroplane have completely changed all conditions, and with a strong stalker's glass in the hands of an expert no body of troops should be able to approach unseen within a distance of three miles. We read of Artillery practising on balloons at a two-mile range. What is the use of that? For the aeronaut would never have occasion to approach within such range in order to discover a battery or section of guns. During the action of Nicholson's Nek, the balloon reported the enemy's chief movements and the position of our troops on the hill. The Boer commandoes were clearly visible, and this at a distance of five or six miles. But the sceptic will say that was in Africa, which has an extraordinarily clear atmosphere! When our guns got into trouble at the action of Lombard's Kop, every detail was seen at an altitude of about 1,000 feet and five miles distant;

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and, although the enemy amused themselves almost daily shooting at the balloon, they only succeeded in hitting it twice, when it happened to be near the ground. A cruising dirigible at an altitude of 1,000 feet and three miles' range is invulnerable for Artillery, and from it even on a fine day in the British Isles the range of effective vision for a regiment, battery, or battalion is five miles. In India, Africa, and most parts of Europe the range of vision is greater also when troops are moving on dusty roads.

The dirigible must increase its altitude in an undulating or hilly country, and, except at night when camp fires show up for miles, its powers would be greatly curtailed in a mountainous country.

The reconnoitring powers of the dirigible and aeroplane in the hands of an expert will be fully realised ere long, and aeroplanes or portable dirigibles equipped with wireless telegraphy will accompany Cavalry brigades and divisions at manœuvres and on service.

At present their *rôle* must be reconnaissance, rapidity of communication, and in open country they can act as the watch-tower, from which the enemy's movements may be observed. As long as these birds-of-warning are aloft, surprise by large bodies of troops in broad daylight will be impossible. The true objective of the strategical reconnaissance being the early and accurate information regarding the enemy's main columns, it appears that this can be most effectively carried out by means of aerial-craft, and the nation that is most efficiently equipped with aeroplanes and dirigibles will, in favourable weather, be able to transmit every detail of the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief in an incredibly short space of time. In a pursuit they would be invaluable, as the enemy's line of retreat, state of morale and dispositions would be disclosed. But such useful work can only be performed by carefully selected experts. Every sportsman knows that spying a country when deer-stalking is not an easy matter, and a man who cannot use a stalker's glass is not worth training as an aerial observation officer, for from personal experience it has been proved over and over again that the telescope just makes the difference as to the identity of troops and reading country at long ranges. Observation experts must have many of the same qualifications as the first-class scout, and with such men in the air the only chance of effecting surprises will be by long night-marches or movements in wet, stormy, or hazy weather.

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'THE CAVALRY SCHOOL,' SAUGOR, CENTRAL PROVINCES, INDIA

THE newly-formed Cavalry School at Saugor, Central Provinces, has now been opened, and the first class for instruction commenced its course on September 12. It is composed of thirty-four British subaltern officers drawn from British and Indian Cavalry regiments, five British officers specially selected by the Commander-in-Chief, and twenty Native officers.

The officers' course lasts eight months—that is, until April 30, 1911. There are also seventeen British non-commissioned officers and twenty Native non-commissioned officers, for whom the course is seven months, ending on March 31, 1911. On the conclusion of the course British officers may take two months' holiday direct from the School, which will not be classed as leave, and may not be combined with any other form of leave.

Similarly, British non-commissioned officers and Native officers and non-commissioned officers may take two months' leave on rejoining their regiments.

Cavalry subalterns, detailed for the course, must have three years' service and a good knowledge of practical field sketching and map reading. It is intended also to allow two Royal Horse Artillery officers to attend the School for a course.

The guiding principle in detailing officers and non-commissioned officers of the British or Indian Army is that they should be likely to prove efficient instructors on return to their units.

British officers take two chargers and Native officers one trained charger with them to the School. The non-commissioned officers, British and Native, are provided with horses at the School out of the establishment of 185 horses allowed. This allowance of horses at the School is regulated by a corresponding reduction of the numbers maintained in the Remount Depôts.

The 185 horses are divided into sixty untrained remounts, sixty

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remounts in their second year of training, and sixty-five trained horses. As the education of the untrained and partly untrained horses is completed they will be drafted to British Cavalry regiments, or sold as officers' chargers, and will be replaced by untrained or partly trained horses from the Remount Depôts.

The officers of the staff of the School are appointed for four years, and are seconded while holding any of these appointments. There are, in addition, the four Captain-Students selected by the Commander-in-Chief, who act as Assistant-Instructors, and one Lieutenant, Royal Engineers, who teaches military engineering. The non-commissioned officer instructors are appointed for three years, extendable to four, and become supernumerary in their regiments. The other non-commissioned officers on the staff of the School are appointed for one year only. A medical officer is attached to the School, and a veterinary officer is detailed to visit it.

No wives or families are allowed to accompany officers or non-commissioned officers, British or Native, attending the course.

Like the School at Netheravon, this establishment in all matters connected with training and administration is under Army Headquarters—in this case Simla. The Commandant communicates direct with General Officers Commanding Divisions and Independent Brigades as to the numbers, ranks, and units, from which students will be detailed.

The syllabus of instruction is similar to the syllabus of the School at Netheravon.

The chief subject is equitation, by which is meant proficiency and the power of imparting instruction in riding, and in the breaking and training of horses for military purposes. The other subjects are skill-at-arms, horse management and veterinary subjects, strategy and tactics, including the study of the tactical and strategical employment of Cavalry in the field; rapid appreciation of situations and the writing (or issue of verbal) orders; practical exercises in the field in reconnaissance, despatch riding, inter-communication, and operations of Cavalry in co-operation with the other arms; military engineering as affecting Cavalry, and sanitation.

Students should thus be able during their course, in addition to gaining a certificate as having passed the course at the School, to obtain a knowledge of veterinary subjects, to pass in military engineer-

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ing in the same way as is done at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham, and also in sanitation, which is one of the subjects included in the promotion examinations.

This would have a great advantage in the eyes of commanding officers, who would only lose the services of their subaltern officers for this eight months' course, during which they could obtain certificates in three or four different subjects, in addition to being turned out efficient instructors.

Unfortunately, the School is suffering in the same way as Netheravon suffered, *i.e.* lack of support in the way of funds.

It seems a very great pity, when so much has been done to make the place what it is, at the small cost of £10,000, that the staff of instructors should be so inadequate. As compared with Netheravon, there are over twice as many students at Saugor, yet there are only three British Officer Instructors, a Commandant, and an Adjutant and Quartermaster, while the fact of the Veterinary Officer only visiting the School once a month for three days from a distance of nearly 200 miles not only prevents the students from getting proper instruction in veterinary subjects and so passing a veterinary course while at the School, but seems altogether wrong considering that, in addition to the 185 horses on the establishment, there are 100 chargers and 100 polo ponies without a Veterinary Officer within ten hours' journey by train. Moreover, the instruction could not be possibly carried out if it were not for the fact that the five officers specially selected by the Commander-in-Chief are used as instructors. These officers, however, get no extra pay, are only at the School for the course, and may be losing command of a squadron pay by being at the School. The Commandant, Brigadier-General R. Wapshare, is eminently suited for his position, having commanded his regiment, the 30th Lancers, and since then been on the Army Headquarter Staff at Simla.

It is satisfactory to note that the Indian Government has made the post of Commandant carry the rank of Brigadier-General, although he does not get as much pay as a Brigadier-General commanding a Brigade. This is not yet the case at the School at Netheravon.

The staff of the School consists of Major P. G. Reynolds, D.S.O., 3rd Dragoon Guards; Captain A. M. Kettlewell, Central India Horse; Captain G. N. Reynolds, 21st Lancers, who has been through a course at Netheravon, and at Saumur, France; and Captain R. W. W. Grimshaw, Poona Horse, the Adjutant and Quartermaster.

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The five student instructors are: Captain P. B. Sangster, 2nd Lancers; Captain R. A. Steel, p.s.c., 17th Lancers; Captain B. C. Fellows, 30th Lancers; Captain C. H. Howell, 18th Lancers; and Lieutenant O. E. U. Ingham, Royal Engineers.

The senior non-commissioned officer instructor, Sergeant-Major C. G. B. Vaughan, comes from the School at Netheravon.

There are four other British non-commissioned officer instructors, a Native officer instructor, and six Native non-commissioned officer instructors. Among the non-commissioned officer instructors, British and Native, are included the Fencing Staff. It is a question whether signalling might not be added to the course later on, combined with the study of the service of inter-communication, so as to allow of every ordinary certificate, except musketry, being obtained during the eight months' course for officers. The musketry too might be done at Pachmerhi, Central Provinces, now the Central School of Musketry in India, either just before or immediately after the course by the British officers.

Saugor, 2,000 feet above sea-level, is a convenient place for the Cavalry School, and although it is not actually on a main line, it is the most central station in India. It is only fifty miles by rail from Bina on the Bombay-Punjab mail line, and 120 miles by rail from Katni on the Bombay-Jubbulpore-Calcutta route.

The work of establishing the Cavalry School at Saugor was started early this year, and the amount of work done to bring it to its present condition reflects great credit on the supervision of the Commandant and his staff. The buildings are converted Artillery and Infantry barracks, and are for the most part lighted by means of petrol air-gas. The officers' mess is a most comfortable and cool building, with ante-room, dining-room, billiard-room, and library. The accommodation provided for the instructors and students is very good. All the quarters are very well furnished. The bungalows are all solidly built buildings, with stables close by. The Commandant's house affords the proper accommodation for the Commandant of so important an establishment. The stabling for the horses belonging to the School is permanent and good, and there is a good Veterinary Hospital.

Lecture rooms and a fencing hall have been provided, as well as a large covered riding-school, already in use, the same size as the one at Netheravon, 228 by 71 feet. It cost about £3,000. The

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floor of it is sand and sawdust mixed, on a foundation of faggots, made of kurbi, that is the stalk of the Indian millet. The whole of the sand used was made by breaking up red rock by hand, no sand being obtainable. In addition to the riding school there are four very good open manèges, a jumping lane, and a jumping course, two miles long, consisting of twenty obstacles.

There are no less than five polo grounds in use or in course of construction, a racket-court near the mess, several tennis-courts and golf links, also tracks for skill-at-arms, while a chase course is being made.

The School may be said to have started exceedingly well, and the keenness of the staff is reflected in the work of the students.

The following British officers are attending this first course:—

Rank and Name	Regiment
Second-Lieut. E. W. H. Sprot	1st Dragoon Guards.
Lieut. S. J. Sassoon	6th Inniskilling Dragoons.
Lieut. J. F. Neilson	10th Hussars.
Lieut. J. H. Hind	13th Hussars.
Lieut. D. C. Boles	17th Lancers.
Lieut. H. Gillies	1st Lancers (Skinner's Horse).
Lieut. D. S. Danison	2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse).
Lieut. A. M. Daniels	3rd Skinner's Horse.
Lieut. R. E. Harenc	4th Cavalry.
Lieut. A. B. Porter	6th Cavalry.
Lieut. C. F. Trench	7th Hariana Lancers.
Lieut. D. O. W. Lamb	10th Lancers (Hodson's Horse).
Lieut. St. J. V. Baker	11th Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
Lieut. W. R. P. Henry	12th Cavalry.
Lieut. F. H. Moody	13th Lancers (Watson's Horse).
Lieut. D. G. Bromilow	14th Jat Lancers.
Lieut. E. S. Vicary	16th Cavalry.
Lieut. F. C. C. Yeats Brown	17th Cavalry.
Lieut. F. Gwatkin	18th K.G.O. Lancers.
Lieut. G. B. Howell	19th Lancers (Fane's Horse).
Lieut. C. A. C. Mackenzie	20th Deccan Horse.
Lieut. W. Lowry-Corry	23rd Cavalry (F.F.).
Lieut. J. M. W. O'Rorke	25th Cavalry (F.F.).
Lieut. C. K. Greenway	26th Light Cavalry.
Lieut. V. L. F. P. Jackson	27th Light Cavalry.
Lieut. R. B. Macan	28th Light Cavalry.
Lieut. M. H. Jackson	29th Lancers (Deccan Horse).
Lieut. W. Kenworthy	33rd Light Cavalry.
Lieut. J. N. Simonds	35th Scinde Horse.
Lieut. M. E. Parnell	36th Jacob's Horse.
Lieut. G. Henderson	38th C.I.H.
Lieut. W. A. K. Frazer	39th C.I.H.
Lieut. J. F. W. Ogilvie	Guides' Cavalry.
Lieut. F. M. Carpendale	42nd Deoli Regiment.

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FREDERICK THE GREAT.

1712-1786.

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THE CAVALRY OF FREDERICK THE GREAT: ITS TRAINING, LEADING AND EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

By LIEUT.-COLONEL W. H. GREENLY, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *12th* (*P.W.R.*) *Lancers*
(*General Staff Officer, Staff College*)

(Lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution)

THE ARMY BEFORE THE ACCESSION OF FREDERICK THE GREAT

IN order to form a clear idea of the work accomplished by Frederick the Great in raising the Prussian Cavalry to that pitch of perfection to which it attained under his instructions, it is necessary to consider the condition of the army as he found it in 1740 on his accession to the throne of Prussia.

The creator of that army, with which Frederick was afterwards able to more than hold his own against the whole of Europe, was his father, Frederick William the First, generally known as the Drill-Sergeant of Europe.

In all matters connected with the army his right-hand man was Prince Leopold of Dessau, well known to readers of Carlyle as The Old Dessauer. He, like his chief, was a veteran of the wars of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, and in these had greatly distinguished himself.

That these men understood their business, in so far at least as the training of the Infantry was concerned, was amply demonstrated soon afterwards by the Prussian victories in the first Silesian war.

Traces of two of their most important reforms are visible in the German army of to-day

In the first place, the corps of officers was put on a sound footing and established in that high position in the State which they still most worthily occupy. Secondly, the introduction of the Canton system in 1733 laid the first foundation of the principle of universal service on a territorial basis.

'All dwellers in the land'—so ran the edict—'are born to arms,

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and every man belongs to that regiment in whose district his home lies.'

Exemptions, however, were numerous; the numbers required for the army were small in proportion to the population; the period of service was unlimited, and of those actually serving one-third were allowed to be foreigners, and were recruited abroad.

Both enlisting and maintaining the soldiers was the private concern of the company and squadron commanders.

Except for reviews the squadron commander was only supposed to keep with the colours three-quarters of the establishment, and in actual practice he also allowed a third of the remainder to be on special furlough.

Only those present with the colours received any pay, and the balance thus saved was supposed to be used for recruiting purposes. Accordingly, when he could obtain recruits cheap, the squadron commander made a profitable business out of the squadron, and the command was naturally a much-desired post.

Horse-breeding in Prussia at this time was at a low ebb, and the bulk of the horses for the army were brought from abroad.

As regards the organisation and methods of fighting of the army as a whole, time does not admit of more than a brief reference.

The proportion of Cavalry to Infantry was, roughly, one to three, and of Artillery one light gun, usually a 3-pounder, to 1,000 of the other arms; in addition there were a few heavier guns and howitzers.

A battle generally began by the Artillery advancing and engaging in a duel, while the Infantry, with the Cavalry guarding their flanks, halted out of range awaiting the result. When the Infantry lines had arrived within 500 or 600 yards of each other, the opposing horsemen advanced to the Cavalry fight. During this they often drifted away from the battlefield, and not infrequently remained absent for the rest of the day.

After a battle the victorious army usually re-formed on the ground it had won, and rarely pursued. The Cavalry never followed up the beaten enemy, and touch was quickly lost.

To turn now in more detail to the Cavalry. It was organised into Cuirassiers, Dragoons and Hussars. The Cuirassiers rode large, heavy horses, nearly all blacks, while the Hussars were mounted on animals which averaged rather under fifteen hands. All were armed with a sword, two pistols, and a carbine, Dragoons having in addition a

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bayonet. They rode in panelled saddles of the German pattern, and bit and bridoon bridles, the bit being first introduced shortly before Frederick the Great's accession. The dress of the period is too well known to need description. The only armour still retained was the breast-piece of Cuirassiers.

Regiments of Cuirassiers and Dragoons had five or ten squadrons, Hussars three or six. The squadron was the real unit for all purposes; it consisted of six officers, twelve non-commissioned officers, and about 130 troopers. It was divided into four troops, and formed up in three ranks, the largest men and horses in the front rank. Line was the formation for attack, which was carried out at the trot.

Speaking generally, the drill of the Cavalry corresponded closely with that of the Infantry; much of it was extremely complicated, and without the slightest value in the field. All Cavalrymen, especially the Dragoons, were trained to fight on foot; but the methods employed were practically the same as those of the Infantry. Mounted drill was only carried out once or twice a week, and drill on foot once a week.

The Cavalry regulations, in spite of their defects, contained a good deal of sound instruction for the training and employment of Cavalry. The practice, however, fell far short of the theory, and during thirteen years of peace matters in this respect had been growing steadily worse. The endeavour to economise by saving horseflesh had had the inevitable result that the men had been more and more exercised on foot, less and less on horseback. The constantly recurring fallacy that the rifle is the Cavalryman's chief weapon was also widely accepted. The fact is, that, good soldiers as they were in many respects, neither Frederick William nor Prince Leopold, both Infantrymen, had any conception of the true functions of Cavalry or of the principles which should govern its training.

Significant of the whole state of affairs is the order prescribing the trot as the pace of the charge. Even under Frederick William's father, the attack had been practised at the gallop, while in England, nearly a hundred years before, Cavaliers and Roundheads had ridden at each other at the full speed of their horses. But with all these faults the Cavalry, though wretched horsemen, were, in common with the rest of the army, imbued with the most perfect discipline—a fact which goes far to explain the wonderful rapidity with which they improved when once they came under the direction of a true Cavalry soldier.

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From the Accession of Frederick the Great to the End of the Second Silesian War

Frederick the Great came to the throne in May, 1740.

The Cavalry at that time consisted of:

Twelve regiments of Cuirassiers, sixty squadrons.

Six regiments of Dragoons, forty-five squadrons.

Two corps of Hussars, nine squadrons.

i.e., in all twenty regiments in 114 squadrons.

The King thus described the Cuirassiers: 'They consisted, like the Infantry, of very big men, and rode enormous horses. They were giants on elephants and could neither manœuvre nor fight. There was never a parade at which some of them did not fall off. They were not masters of their horses, and were far more drilled on foot than on horseback. The officers had no idea of mounted duties at all, least of all of their duties in war, and had no knowledge of the use of ground. As regards what is required of Cavalry in battle, they were absolutely without instruction.'

Then again: 'My father left me a bad Cavalry: hardly an officer who knew his duty. The men were afraid of their horses, and hardly ever mounted them; they only knew how to drill on foot.'

Six months after his accession war broke out, and the poor opinion he had formed of the Cavalry received only too clear a confirmation.

The Austrian Hussars at once showed themselves superior to the slow and clumsy Prussian Cavalry. In the first two months they had surprised a regiment of Dragoons, captured their standard, and nearly made a prisoner of the King himself. They had also slipped through the Prussian outposts into Silesia, and were already carrying on there a harassing guerilla warfare.

The first serious action of the war was the battle of Mollwitz, fought on April 10, 1741. Here the Prussian Cavalry certainly proved themselves brave enough, but in other respects they hopelessly failed. They were too slow to take advantage of an excellent opportunity of charging the Austrian Cavalry in flank, and as they were beginning to be got on the move to do so they were themselves charged by other Austrian Cavalry and completely routed. The King put himself at the head of some squadrons in reserve and endeavoured to save the situation, but the whole Prussian Cavalry was quickly swept from the field.

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The King himself found safety among the Infantry, whose steadiness gave him the victory.

Nothing can show more clearly the results of the training of Frederick's predecessor. On the one hand, the Infantry 'a splendid instrument of war'; on the other hand, the Cavalry 'neglected and completely ignorant of its duty.'

Frederick's comments were: 'The Cavalry are so bad that it isn't worth the devil's while to take them away. They can drill with the precision of Grenadiers, but are equally slow; in front of the enemy they are useless, and invariably arrive too late.'

Improvement, however, was already beginning, and by the end of July we find the King in his camp at Strehlen showing off sixty-two squadrons to the French Ambassador. The latter, who had seen their wretched condition at the time of Mollwitz, now reports to the French King: 'This Cavalry is the most surprising thing in its kind that can be imagined'; and this only three months after the battle.

In the following March, 1742, the King issued some important instructions: 'Instructions for the Cavalry in Battle' and 'Instructions for the Colonels and other Officers of Hussar Regiments.' These instructions breathe the true Cavalry spirit in every line, and are full of sound Cavalry teaching. Among the points emphasised are the importance of the squadron as the tactical unit, and the necessity of the squadron leader being ever ready to act on his own initiative. The Prussian Cavalry was always to be the first to charge, and never wait to be attacked. The gallop was laid down as the pace of the charge. 'When the Cavalry advance they are to do so at the trot until within about a hundred paces of the enemy; then, still well closed, the horses are to be driven in at the gallop, and the enemy ridden down.'

Squadron commanders are made responsible that not a man uses carbine or pistol in the mounted attack; the enemy is to be ridden at sword in hand.

The instructions for the Hussars, too, are most comprehensive. The officers are told that their first care must be to have their troops as well drilled as the Dragoons, and that their usual form of attack is to be at close files with sword in hand. In attacking Hussars, not more than one troop in each squadron is to skirmish in loose order, firing from their horses; the remainder are to keep closed, and seek for opportunities to attack with the sword.

The principles laid down for outposts, patrolling, and attacks on

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convoys are much the same as those of to-day. Officers are cautioned that when sent out reconnoitring, 'it is a poor kind of bravery on this service to get engaged with the enemy; they should rather act by cunning and stealth.'

Meanwhile the war continued. The next considerable battle, that of Chotusitz, May, 1742, showed that the sound teaching and indefatigable energy of the King was already bearing fruit.

The Cavalry, though finally defeated, achieved some success, and on the whole the day was by no means discreditable to them.

That they took their fair share in the fighting is proved by their losses—1,280 men and 2,500 horses out of a total of less than 10,000 Cavalry.

The King attributed their defeat chiefly to two causes: too great intervals between the squadrons and the want of a third line. These defects he immediately set about remedying.

Less than a month after Chotusitz the Treaty of Breslau brought the King the peace he so much needed for continuing his reforms.

He now made time, among the countless other duties which claimed his attention, to devote much of his energy to personally instructing his Cavalry. He showed in this work an expert knowledge of his subject and a true appreciation of those qualities, moral even more than physical, which alone can convert a collection of men and horses into Cavalry.

From this time forward progress was rapid and continuous.

In the second Silesian war, but two years after its disaster at Mollwitz, the Cavalry had reached a high state of efficiency. Hohenfriedberg, Soor, Hennersdorf, and Kesseldorf are all names glorious in the annals of Prussian Cavalry.

In this war it was the Austrian horsemen who felt and showed their inferiority to the Prussians; their excuse at Hohenfriedberg proved unmistakably which way the balance was inclined: 'We could not charge the Prussians' right wing,' they said, 'partly because of the morasses that lay between us, and partly because they rushed across and charged us.'

We are reminded of Cromwell's Cavalry charging across the ditch at Marston Moor, and can recognise the same initiative and dash, the same confidence of the leaders in the riding of the men.

Then followed ten years more of peace—1745–1756—and at the end of those ten years, that is, in the early part of the Seven Years' War, the Prussian Cavalry first reached its zenith.

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Frederick's Principles of Training

We must now turn again to the King, and examine the methods by which he transformed the Cavalry of Mollwitz into that of Rossbach, Leuthen, and Zorndorf.

During these years of peace Frederick had worked unceasingly at his own military development. The opinions he had formed in his war experience he now put practically to the test, and communicated to the army in the form of instructions. His first care was the training of the leaders; he knew that the education of these to the same principles of thought and action was the only means by which to guarantee the co-operation of all parts of his army when in the presence of the enemy.

'The campaigns which I have fought,' he wrote, 'have given me the opportunity to reflect upon those principles of the great art by which different Empires and States have triumphed or been overthrown. I have thought it right to communicate these ideas to those who stand next me in command, so that on half a word from me they shall understand my intentions, and when I am not present be able to act upon my principles.'

The King strove continually to direct the military education of his officers towards what was useful for *war*. Under Frederick William they had learnt to drill; Frederick the Great taught them tactics.

He regarded manœuvres as the chief means of educating the leaders, especially in teaching them the use of ground, and he insisted far more upon their recognising the object of every movement than upon the repeated practice of the mere forms.

Prussia was still a small State, and surrounded on all sides by greedy enemies; her only chance, both in strategy and tactics, was to compensate for want of numbers by skill, mobility, and a vigorous offensive. Towards this offensive, therefore, Frederick's training was continually directed. In speaking of generalship he writes: 'It must become the common custom for Prussian generals to act in a way which in any other country would be considered rash; they must always be ready to undertake everything which it is possible for flesh and blood to carry out.'

The spirit of boldness and energy which he infused into the Army as a whole was, from the very nature of Cavalry, of particular importance to that branch of his Service. To return to detail.

In the first place, the greatest possible care was devoted to the individual training of man and horse. Just as the efficiency of all larger

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units depends upon the thoroughness of the training of the squadron, so the squadron can only be brought to perfection by the most careful individual instruction of each man and horse in the ranks. 'The Cavalry must be instructed man by man and horse by horse,' was Frederick's order. 'The officer must see that the men ride continually, so that each man can turn and twist his horse and be completely its master.' He also said that 'the day was wasted on which the rider had not exercised his horse.'

Time does not admit of going into the details of the individual training, but those who care to do so will have their trouble well repaid. The point that stands out most clearly is that Frederick never mistook the means for the end; he aimed at producing a good 'campaign horse'—one that would go collected and in the rider's hand over the roughest ground and could be trusted to jump with safety all ordinary obstacles to be met with in the field. In the same way every rider was to have his horse completely under control and to have such complete confidence in his mount that he could devote his whole attention to keeping his direction and his proper position in the ranks.

As regards mounted movements in formed bodies, a totally new atmosphere was introduced; the keynote was mobility and the aim in future was to be the highest speed combined with precision and absolute cohesion.

The manœuvring power of Frederick's Cavalry, certainly in large masses, has never been surpassed, and yet modern conditions make this power of rapid manœuvre of even greater importance than it was in his day. A large body of Cavalry can only manœuvre as well as its worst squadron, and though there are many squadrons in our Cavalry which are admirably trained, yet it is open to doubt whether we have as yet attained to that uniformity of excellence which can alone permit of the precise and rapid manœuvre of really large bodies.

Constant exercise in the 'rally' was another point on which great stress was laid. It was carried out daily, not only after an attack, and was practised over all sorts of ground. 'The men are not to look for their original places in the ranks, not even for their proper troops, in order that the squadron may be rallied the quicker. The order does not matter only that the men are there.'

'I do not want a *melée*,' he says, 'the Cavalry must charge knee to knee.'

He aimed at decisive results, and these are only to be obtained by the

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knee-to-knee charge, with the fixed determination to ride the enemy down or to force him to seek safety in flight.

The King at this time personally supervised the training and was his own inspector of Cavalry.

From time to time he summoned the higher leaders from the farthest parts of Prussia to Potsdam or Pomerania that they might see his methods with their own eyes. On these occasions he would sometimes take command of a squadron himself in order to make perfectly certain that they understood what he wanted. He thus secured that uniformity of system and training which alone made it possible to manœuvre forty or fifty squadrons hastily collected from widely separated garrisons.

At his inspections he was most particular that the Cavalry should move over every sort of country; he would often take up a position wherever he happened to be and make large bodies of Cavalry charge towards him, criticising severely if the ranks became disordered by the rough ground.

He set up as his ideal that 'the Cuirassiers and Dragoons should be as adroit as the Hussars,' that 'the Hussars should be able to charge with as much cohesion as the heavy Cavalry.' This ideal he fully attained, and without damaging the special qualifications of each branch.

As efficiency increased so the King's demands on the Cavalry became greater. In 1750 he lays down that in approaching an enemy 1,200 yards away, the first 600 are to be covered at the trot, the last 600 at a good gallop. Four years later he demands 4,000 yards at the trot, 1,800 at the gallop, and the last 300 to 400 at full speed.

While constantly reminding leaders of the importance of individual training as the necessary foundation of the whole, the King was careful to afford them opportunities of handling large masses, and in his camps of exercise he often assembled as many as sixty to seventy squadrons.

Such, then, were the methods of training of this great Cavalry soldier, but in addition to his untiring zeal for efficiency he possessed a delightful human personality which called forth the complete devotion of all with whom he came in contact.

One story may here be told to show the love and confidence with which the army regarded him, and the personal relationship which existed between them.

Late in the evening on the eve of the battle of Leuthen, the King rode into the bivouac of the Life Guard Cuirassiers. The men were

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standing round the fires and bade him a cheery 'Good evening' as he rode up. Some old veteran asks: 'What is thy news, then, so late?'

'Good news, my lads; to-morrow you will beat the Austrians roundly.' 'That we will, by God,' they answered. 'But just think of their position and how they have entrenched,' said Frederick. 'And if they had the devil in front and all round them we will knock them out, only thou lead us on.'

'Well, I will see what I can do; now lay you down, and sound sleep to you.' 'Good-night, Fritz,' answer all, and the King rides on in the dark to the next regiment.

The Cavalry in War

Having considered the principles on which it was trained in peace, it is now time to examine the Cavalry at work in war.

Armies at this time moved very slowly, and remained closely concentrated both at the halt and on the march; for this reason no great necessity was felt for strategical reconnaissance as now understood.

The imperative need for this arose later on. From the time of Napoleon onwards all campaigns have shown the vital importance of such reconnaissance in order to ensure 'strategical liberty' for the commander of an army. The liberty can only be secured by the right use of Cavalry—the strategical instrument of the Commander-in-Chief.

Modern conditions make strategical liberty more important than ever; the enormous masses of troops employed and the wide fronts on which armies operate make it increasingly difficult to alter dispositions once made, or to assign to an operation a new objective. In other words, the strategic direction of armies has grown in importance, and, as an inevitable consequence, the value of good Cavalry has increased accordingly.

Yet there is no reason why Frederick the Great should not have made more use of his Cavalry as a strategical instrument. Cromwell had set the example nearly 100 years before, and the method in which he employed his Cavalry before the battle of Preston must have been known to Frederick, who was a great student of history.

The instance is worth recording:—In 1648 a Scottish army under Hamilton crossed the English border and advanced southward along the western coast. Cromwell, who was with the English army about York, nearly 100 miles away, at once pushed forward to the Pennines

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a force of Cavalry under Leslie. This Cavalry not only kept Cromwell constantly informed of the position of the Scotch but also effectually prevented the latter from gaining any information. The result was the complete surprise and almost total annihilation of the Scottish army at Preston.

Frederick certainly laid the greatest stress on reconnaissance, but it does not appear to have been carried out to any great distance. For instance, in the advance on Lobositz the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, when at Fishbach, had Hussar patrols on the Elbe about ten miles to the front. On a certain occasion in the Rossbach campaign Marshal Keith sent out fifteen squadrons on reconnaissance; they made a fairly wide movement and covered about thirty miles in all without meeting the enemy, but they did not touch any point more than ten miles from where they started.

In the same campaign the King himself cannot have had patrols very far to the front, as he received the first news of the position of the allied army when he was only four miles away from them.

On the other hand, the tactical reconnaissance, when the enemy had once been located, was very thorough. This reconnaissance was usually entrusted to Hussars; but 'Hussar service' was taught as part of the duty of all Cavalry. The commander of the force often accompanied the reconnoitring squadrons.

On the day of the battle of Lobositz, at half-past five in the morning, the King rode out to the outposts to reconnoitre. There was a thick mist, and the Austrian Cavalry was found covering the front of their army. To clear up the situation the King ordered forward a force of sixteen squadrons. This reconnaissance led to a Cavalry fight and the opening of the battle.

On the day before the battle of Gross Jaegersdorf the hostile camps lay about five miles apart. Early that morning forty Prussian squadrons were sent forward to reconnoitre, the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal von Lehwald, accompanying the reconnaissance. The Russian position was covered in front and flank by light Cavalry, and the Prussian attack on these caused the Russians to occupy their battle positions. The reconnaissance successfully located the flanks of the position, and the squadrons then returned to camp.

Again, before Leuthen fifty squadrons were sent on in front of the advanced guard to reconnoitre the Austrian position; they were met by five Austrian regiments, and a Cavalry fight ensued. The Austrian

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Cavalry, heavily outnumbered, were driven from the field. The King, who had followed the victorious Hussars, was then able, with a small escort, to personally reconnoitre the position from the Schönberg.

These examples are sufficient to show that the same principles operated in the days of Frederick the Great which still hold good to-day. Information of any value had to be fought for then as it has to be fought for now; great Cavalry fights took place in the endeavour to gain information, and heavy prices had to be paid before it was obtained.

Our 'Cavalry Training' clearly lays down that the ultimate objective of our Independent Cavalry is to discover the enemy's *main columns*. The first obstacle will usually be the enemy's Independent Cavalry, but when that has been defeated there will still remain a second obstacle —the Protective Cavalry, which will have to be pierced or thrown aside before the information can be obtained.

These Cavalry fights were not, in the days of Frederick any more than at present, the object in themselves; they were and are the means, and the *only* means, by which the end of obtaining information can be gained.

Great importance, too, was attached to reconnaissance of ground. Officers were often sent ahead to reconnoitre routes to be used, and all Cavalry when manœuvring sent forward scouts, frequently officers, to examine the ground in front and report upon its practicability. We see frequent evidence of this careful reconnoitring. At Zorndorf Seidlitz found the boggy valley of the Zaber between him and the Russian right flank, against which he was operating. He sent officers and pioneers to reconnoitre it and to improve passages across it, marking the crossings with wisps of straw. This reconnaissance made possible his subsequent crossing to charge the Russian flank.

When waiting in positions of readiness, too, the Cavalry were always careful to reconnoitre the ground in the vicinity so as to be able to deploy rapidly and operate at once in any direction required. Had their example in this respect been followed by the French in 1870, many disasters would have been avoided and some great successes might have been gained.

As regards the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field itself, the King's usual plan was to draw them up in three lines on one or both flanks of the Infantry.

The accompanying plan shows an 'order of battle' issued by Frederick in 1748.

The first line was generally the strongest, and in it the intervals were small. The second line was about 300 yards behind the first, squadrons

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at wide intervals, and some of them often outflanking the first by about 150 yards. The third line, or reserve, stood about 200 yards in the rear of the second, the squadrons at wide intervals.

The principle of their employment was as follows :—

The first two lines were the attacking lines ; the first was meant to ride down the enemy, and was therefore the strongest, and formed of Cuirassiers ; that is, the heaviest men and horses. The second line was in close support of the first, its primary duty being to fill up the gaps and to attack any bodies of the enemy who might break through. It did not, however, merely follow the first line, but often manœuvred round its flanks and brought off a flank attack on the enemy's supporting lines, as, for example, at Rossbach. Dragoons were usually employed



ORDER OF BATTLE (ISSUED 1748).

in this line, as they were held to be rather more mobile and capable of quicker manœuvre than the Cuirassiers.

The third line was often used as a general reserve for the whole army ; it was nearly always formed of Hussars, the most mobile of the three sorts of Cavalry. It was employed where most needed at any particular time to re-establish the fight or to protect the rear and flanks of the lines in front.

It was forbidden by regulations to completely use up all three lines until the battle was decided, and at least four squadrons were to be kept back in reserve. ' Only when the enemy's Infantry have been finally driven from the battlefield are these four squadrons to be thrown into the pursuit of it.'

The above was the usual distribution and employment, but the King

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did not tie down the Cavalry leaders to any particular form, and was quite content to leave them a free hand to adopt whatever formation they found most suitable.

No tactical unit higher than the regiment existed, and the grouping of squadrons was settled on each occasion by the order of battle.

As regards intervals between squadrons in line, the practice seems to have varied at different times. In one place we read of twelve paces between squadrons, in another of lines of many squadrons charging with no intervals at all.

In studying past campaigns, nothing stands out more clearly than the all-important influence exercised on Cavalry by the quality and character of the leadership. With Cavalry everything depends upon the initiative of the leader, his personality is the decisive factor; the battle of Kolin is an excellent example. On the one hand, the want of grasp of the situation, the lack of energy and dash of the sixty-eight-year-old Penavaire resulted in total failure. On the other hand, the brilliant leading and personal magnetism of Seidlitz, then thirty-six, inspired his squadrons with the most devoted bravery in their attempt to avert disaster.

The Prussian Cavalry at Kolin lost about 25 per cent. in men and 30 per cent. in horses. At this time, however, the Cavalry considered themselves a means of deciding battles equally important as the Infantry, and they were equally prepared to suffer losses.

The unfortunate expression of 'death ride' for every Cavalry attack entailing casualties, had not then been invented, and the higher leaders were not prevented from using their Cavalry in battle by the thought that it was so valuable that it must avoid all losses. On the contrary, Frederick was of the same opinion as that later expressed by General von Schmidt: 'This arm is far *too* costly to have any check placed upon its employment.' He believed in his Cavalry, and was careful to teach them to believe in themselves. He educated them up to a readiness to act and to a determination to conquer absolutely regardless of consequences.

This sound principle is apt to be forgotten, and not only the Prussian army but our own as well has suffered from its neglect.

Writing of the Prussian Cavalry in the war of 1866, Moltke says: 'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps, not so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence. But all its initiative had been destroyed at manœuvres, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore learnt to shirk bold independent action.'

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Self-confidence, morale, is the very life-blood of Cavalry, and morale is a delicate plant which must be carefully fostered. Every officer would do well to ponder upon these words of Moltke's, and when acting as umpire to pause before giving his decision that 'the charge was hopeless and the whole of the Cavalry must be put out of action.'

The principal features of Frederick's mounted attacks were these:

1. The simultaneous action of the whole force available, with one common object; no niggardly pecking with isolated detachments in succession, but a bold launching of a great mass against one objective.
2. The combination of front and flank attack; the chief blow in flank if possible.
3. Surprise.

As the best means of effecting surprise it was the constant endeavour to carry out the deployment for attack under cover, and when this was possible the attack was nearly always successful. Examples of this are seen in Ziethen's attack at Prague, Driesen's at Leuthen, and Seidlitz's two attacks at Rossbach.

The effect of Cavalry has always been more moral than bloody; their successes counted by the tactical results produced, not by the actual losses inflicted. In producing this moral effect, surprise is one of the most potent factors, and all modern campaigns furnish incidents which show that 'surprise is still the deadliest of foes.'

The above principles are eternal; it is their application only which varies. Let us now see how the Prussian leaders applied them.

At the battle of Prague the Austrians had a mass of over one hundred squadrons on their right wing. They were drawn up in four lines, one behind the other, and with a few squadrons of Hussars in échelon to the right front:



The Prussians attacked this mass in front with twenty squadrons in one line. The Austrian first line awaited the attack at the halt, received it when quite near with fire from horseback, and then advanced a very

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short distance to meet it. The result was the overthrow of the Austrian first line ; but the Prussians came to a standstill against the second line, were charged in flank by the Hussars, and had to withdraw.

The attack was soon renewed, this time with twenty squadrons in the first line, twenty squadrons supporting in second line, and a simultaneous flank attack on the Austrian right by two regiments of Hussars. A desperate hand-to-hand fight amidst dense clouds of dust ensued, and finally the Prussians, greatly outnumbered, again withdrew.

The Austrians then sounded the ' rally,' and began to re-order their lines, without, however, taking any measure whatever for security against surprise.

Meanwhile Ziethen had arrived with forty-five fresh squadrons, and deployed them *under cover* opposite the right flank of the Austrians, who at the moment of attack were still in four lines. Ziethen's formation was two lines—twenty-seven squadrons in the first line and eighteen in the second.

The Austrians were completely surprised. A shout arose in the ranks that they were surrounded, and nearly the whole mass, seized with panic, broke and fled.

The Prussians then committed the mistake against which the King had so constantly warned them, and instead of rallying rushed wildly in pursuit.

A proper study of history would have saved the leaders from so fatal an error ; they would have seen how often in the battles of Cromwell and Rupert the difference between rallying and failing to rally had meant the difference between victory and defeat. By thus getting out of hand the Cavalry failed to be of any further use to their army for the rest of the day. They had made a night march the night before, had been saddled up for twelve hours, and had made three mounted attacks. This thoughtless and unnecessary pursuit put on the finishing touch, and completed the exhaustion of the horses.

At Leuthen the Prussian Cavalry was divided into three principal masses, each of which brought off successful attacks against the Austrian Cavalry. The following were the formations used :

Of the fifty squadrons with the advanced guard under Prince Eugene, thirty attacked in first line, five delivered a simultaneous flank attack, and fifteen followed up in support in second line.

Ziethen drew up his fifty-three squadrons with twenty-three in the first line, twenty in second line, and ten in third line.

Driesen's attack is explained in the plan attached, which shows the

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situation at about five o'clock in the evening. At this hour, as it was beginning to grow dusk, seventy squadrons of Austrian Cavalry, under Lucchese, formed in three lines, one behind the other, advanced to attack the left wing of the Prussian Infantry.



LEUTHEN: DRIESEN'S ATTACK.

Driesen was then in a position of readiness behind the Sophienberg, with forty squadrons.

While his squadrons were resting, Driesen himself had remained constantly on the look-out and had carefully watched the whole course of the action. The ground all round his position had doubtless been

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thoroughly reconnoitred, and security patrols posted in every direction from which attack was possible. When he saw the Austrian advance Driesen wheeled to the left by squadrons, advanced, still under cover of the hills, sufficiently far to outflank the enemy, then wheeled into line to the right and attacked. His formation was twenty-five squadrons in the first line and fifteen squadrons in the second line, while he detached ten squadrons of Hussars round his left to attack the enemy in rear.

At the same moment Prince Eugene, who had also been carefully watching the fight, detached thirty squadrons from the reserve to meet the Austrians in front. This brilliant combination, a concentric attack of eighty squadrons, from widely different directions, and acting by surprise, was completely successful.

The Austrian Cavalry were routed, and dispersed in wildest confusion. Again the leaders were to blame for the surprise, not a single patrol had been detached from this mass of several thousand horsemen. Their formation, too, of four lines, each directly behind the other, was faulty; it allows of no manœuvring of lines in rear, and leading lines if overthrown are driven back on the top of those following, often throwing them into confusion.

The battle of Lobositz is interesting as showing a mistake in the Prussian leading.

Old Field-Marshal Gesseler, who was in command of the whole Cavalry, carried away by his eagerness, took part in the charge of the reconnoitring squadrons.

After defeating the Cavalry opposed to them, these squadrons came under Infantry and Artillery fire, and were finally driven back in considerable confusion. The remainder of the Prussian Cavalry, about sixty squadrons, then charged; Gesseler, who ought to have been commanding them, was engaged in endeavouring to rally individual squadrons defeated in the first attack.

This attack was entirely contrary to the intentions of the King, who was exceedingly angry when he saw what had happened: it ended in the defeat of the whole Prussian Cavalry, a result entirely due to the want of appreciation of his duties on the part of the Cavalry commander.

It is the business of the supreme Cavalry commander to direct the operations of his *main body*, it is his duty to decide the attack formation, the direction of the charge, and the moment for deployment. When once the squadrons have been launched to the attack he can only further influence the fight by the use of whatever force he has retained under his

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own hand with which to meet eventualities. The rest must depend upon the skill and initiative of subordinate commanders.

Perhaps the most remarkable of all the achievements of the Cavalry in the Seven Years' War was that under Seidlitz, at the battle of Zorndorf. As a concise and excellent account of this battle is given by Colonel Maude in his 'Cavalry: its Past and Future,' it will only be necessary to refer to it very briefly,

On this occasion Seidlitz charged and rallied three times with the same squadrons, a feat which later, for no sufficient reason, came to be looked upon as impossible.

In his first attack, made with thirty-three squadrons, he surprised the Russian right by crossing ground which they considered impassable, but which, as previously mentioned, he had carefully reconnoitred and prepared for crossing.

His first line consisted of three regiments of Cuirassiers, that is, fifteen squadrons; each regiment had but one crossing place, and that so narrow as to compel them to form in columns of half-troops. Crossing in this formation, each regiment formed line to the front at the gallop and attacked. Eighteen squadrons of Hussars followed in support, and completed the success of the first line.

In his third attack Seidlitz was in command of sixty-one squadrons. Owing to the habit of the Russian Infantry of throwing themselves on the ground to let the Cavalry pass, and then rising to pour a fire into their backs, he determined to form in three lines, each directly covering the other, and at 250 yards distance. In first line, which he led himself, he had eighteen squadrons of Cuirassiers, fifteen squadrons of Dragoons followed in second, and twenty-eight of Hussars in third. There was no panic, and the Russians received the charge with stubborn determination and steadiness. They were only finally defeated after a long and desperate hand-to-hand fight, their losses in the whole battle being about the heaviest ever recorded in history.

The Battle of Rossbach

The Battle of Rossbach, fought on November 5, 1757, furnishes a striking picture, both of the supreme military genius of Frederick the Great, and also of the fighting methods of his army as a whole. No battle shows more clearly the different elements which formed its strength, and in no other do we see those elements working together in

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better combination. First we are struck by Frederick's boldness, both in strategy and tactics, his comprehensive grasp of the situation as a whole, and the lightning rapidity of his decision. Hardly less admirable are the skill and certainty with which he handled the three arms on the battlefield.

Considered as a Cavalry study, it is impossible to watch better squadrons at work under a better leader.

Before describing the battle it seems desirable to say a few words on the subject of the Cavalry leaders.

The names of Ziethen and Seidlitz are known to almost everybody who has heard of Frederick the Great. Certainly they stand out above the others, and Seidlitz was probably the greatest Cavalry soldier that ever lived. But there are many more names scarcely less famous in Prussian history, and known to-day to every Cavalryman in the German Army. Yet most of these men were by no means geniuses, some of them quite the reverse. When Frederick heard of the brilliant attack of Driesen at Leuthen, which we have just described, he exclaimed in surprise : ' What, Driesen, that fool ? ' and no one knew his men better than Frederick the Great. The fact is that a good system of training produces good leaders. Given such a system, and the opportunity for practice, men of quite ordinary ability can, if they will, fit themselves for the leadership of even large bodies of Cavalry.

Seidlitz, at seventeen, had joined as a cornet a regiment of Cuirassiers, and at twenty took part with them in the First Silesian War. His first experience of the real business was in command of a troop of thirty dismounted Cuirassiers defending a village on outpost duty. Attacked by superior numbers of the enemy's Hussars, after some hours' defence with the rifle, Seidlitz found himself short of ammunition and determined to cut his way out on horseback. In this attempt his horse was shot under him and he fell into the enemy's hands. The King, who soon afterwards heard of his conduct, arranged for his exchange, and presently promoted him to a captaincy of Hussars. In 1752 he was made lieut.-colonel of a regiment of Dragoons, and in 1757 colonel of Cuirassiers. He had thus had experience of all three branches of the Cavalry. The Seidlitz Cuirassiers were described by a contemporary as a ' Pattern for the Cavalry of the whole world ; indeed, it is impossible to bring Cavalry to a higher pitch of perfection than Seidlitz has brought this regiment.'

A story is told of how at this time an anxious mother of a young

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Cuirassier came to remonstrate with the colonel about the dangers to which she thought her son was exposed. 'I assure you, madame, there is no danger,' said Seidlitz, 'cats and cornets never break their necks.'

Two days after the battle of Kolin, in which he had greatly distinguished himself, Seidlitz was made a major-general. When congratulated by old Ziethen on his promotion he said: 'It was high time, Excellency, if they want to get anything more out of me; I am already thirty-six.' A few months later, on the morning of Rossbach, the King put him in command of all the Cavalry present, passing him over the heads of two generals senior to him. 'Gentlemen,' said Seidlitz, on this occasion, 'I have got to obey the King, and you have got to obey me.'

At the time of the battle the position of Prussia appeared almost desperate. The North German Allies had been driven back into Hanover by the French, a second French army was on the Rhine, the army of the Emperor on the march from the Maine to the Elbe, the Swedes were threatening an advance on Berlin, the Russians on East Prussia. All attempts to bring the Austrians to a decisive battle in Northern Silesia had failed.

As the only chance of success, the King determined to attack the now united French and Imperial armies.

On November 4 he found the Allies in a strong position north-west of Rossbach, with an army of ninety battalions and eighty-four squadrons, in all 64,000 men; Frederick had twenty-seven battalions and forty-five squadrons, a total of 22,000.

Even Frederick thought the enemy too strong to attack in the position they had taken up, and he withdrew his army that night behind the little Leiha stream, between Bedra and Rossbach, hoping that the morning would bring him the chance of the battle which he needed. By two o'clock next day the King was on horseback, reconnoitring with Seidlitz and his Hussars. The Allies, too, were early astir, and by eight o'clock were on the march towards the south, Seidlitz at once sending information to the King.

Knowing that the Allies were short of food, the King at first thought they were retreating, and made preparations to overwhelm their covering detachments on the Schortau Hill and the Galgen Berg. When, however, on reaching Zeuchfeld their main columns changed direction to the east, he at once determined to attack them. Orders were issued for the army to march off from its left and to move eastwards behind the Janus Ridge.

The Allies, whose intention was to cut Frederick off from the Saal,

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took his movement to be an attempt to escape by Merseburg. They therefore hastened their march, and the Cavalry pushed on some 2,000 yards in front of the rest of the army.

The Prussians, leaving seven squadrons of Hussars and one battalion near Schortau, moved off eastwards behind the Janus Ridge, the Cavalry under Seidlitz trotting on in front.

Only a few minutes before moving off Seidlitz was put in command of the whole Cavalry. His first act was to assemble his officers and explain his plan, which was to move under cover of the Janus Ridge, and, using the Janus Hill as pivot, to attack the heads of the enemy's columns. He moved off in a double column of squadrons, taking rather



BATTLE OF ROSSBACH, SEIDLITZ' FIRST ATTACK.

more than wheeling distance in order to give a broader front when he wheeled into line, as he knew the enemy greatly outnumbered him.

His right was covered by the Székeley Hussars on the Janus Ridge; making good use of their carbines, they secured his pivot of manœuvre and effectually prevented the enemy's patrols from watching his movements. He himself, with his staff, and perhaps some of his leaders, rode along the ridge keeping the enemy in view.

Seidlitz seems to have preferred columns of squadrons to the heavier and denser formations, such as mass or double column of troops, and doubtless found that it had many advantages. Being more elastic there was an avoidance of checking, lengthening of the column and bumping whenever obstacles had to be crossed; the increased distance between

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ranks gave the horses room to jump, there was less trouble from dust, leaders could see better and horses got more air.

After passing the Janus Hill Seidlitz changed direction half right, and then, still under cover, wheeled into line to the right and halted. He formed up in two lines, fifteen squadrons of Dragoons in the first line, eighteen squadrons of Cuirassiers in the second line, covering a front of 1,300 to 1,400 yards. The Székeley Hussars, having finished their task of protection, had rejoined the main body, and were now in the third line a few hundred yards on his left rear.

By the time the Cavalry had reached the Polzen Hill, Frederick had got eighteen heavy guns on the Janus Hill, and now opened a sudden and effective fire on the hostile Cavalry, throwing them into considerable confusion. Seidlitz was watching for the opportunity, and when the enemy's Cavalry were within about 1,000 yards he gave the signal to attack. The enemy were completely surprised; their deployment was hampered by the road cutting—a serious obstacle—ten to twelve feet deep, and practically forming a defile 700 yards broad immediately in front of them, and the fall of the ground was also in favour of the Prussians. In addition the Artillery on the Janus Hill were able to continue effective fire up to the moment of actual collision.

Amidst the praises heaped upon the Prussians, the prompt action of the French battery, which was engaging the guns on Janus Hill, is apt to be overlooked. Directly the Prussian Cavalry appeared over the ridge the battery commander turned his fire upon the charging squadrons, and was able so effectually to influence the result that the first collision proved indecisive. Seidlitz's first line was met by two Austrian regiments, and the result was one which is most unusual in Cavalry charges. Both sides rode home, but no part of either was able to break through the other—a proof of equal daring and determination and equal cohesion in the ranks.

Seidlitz, who personally led his second line, now launched it to the attack, and the Székeley Hussars simultaneously attacked the enemy's right flank. The whole thus brought off a converging attack, as shown in Plan I. of the battle, which resulted in the enemy's squadrons being overthrown and put to flight. Meanwhile twenty-four more French squadrons had arrived, and now attacked the Prussians on both flanks. While only a few Prussian squadrons had pursued the defeated Austrians, the remainder had rallied, and were in consequence quite ready to meet the new attack. They now charged again, overthrowing the French

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Cavalry and capturing the French battery. The whole allied Cavalry then turned and fled.

Seidlitz, who had been wounded in the fight, at once called off his squadrons from the pursuit, quickly rallied them behind the hollow road, and then moved to a position of readiness near Tagewerben. Here, completely hidden by the ground, he again formed up in two lines and took the opportunity to rest his horses, ready at a moment's notice to intervene in the main battle or to launch his squadrons in pursuit. He himself remained on the look-out watching the course of the action.

Meanwhile the Prussian Infantry, having completed their deployment behind the Janus Hill, advanced to the attack. The Allies were completely surprised, and the fire of seven battalions in conjunction with the Artillery sufficed to throw them into considerable confusion.

On seeing the enemy thus disordered, Seidlitz again sounded the charge, and, riding over their few remaining squadrons on his way, crashed into the flank of the hostile Infantry. Panic at once became general, and the whole Allied army broke into flight. The Prussian Artillery continued to fire on the retiring masses as long as light lasted, and the Infantry pursued as far as Obschütz. The Cavalry, who had done a very hard day's work, were called off when darkness fell.

The King's dispositions for the night should be noticed: While the Infantry bivouacked on the high ground between Obschütz and Markwerben, the Cavalry were withdrawn behind them and put into billets in Reichswerben, Tagewerben, and Storkau. While the casualties of the Allies amounted to 650 officers, 9,500 men, and seventy-two guns, the Prussian losses were only thirty officers and 518 men killed and wounded, four generals, including Seidlitz, being among the latter.

The Infantry fight had only lasted fifteen minutes; two Prussian battalions had expended from twelve to fifteen rounds each, five others a few less, while the remainder had not fired a shot.

Next day the army moved forward in pursuit, and by the evening of the 8th the Cavalry reported that the whole country this side of the river Gera, fifty miles from the battlefield, had been swept clean of the enemy.

The chief credit for this amazing victory belongs, of course, to the King. His was the big decision, his alone the responsibility. His conduct of the battle shows the highest possible skill in the use of all three arms combined. He knew where to retain personal control, where and to what extent to give his leaders a free hand. The discipline of

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the troops, too, and the skill of the leaders, Cavalry as well as Infantry, were the results of his ceaseless efforts. Nothing can show more clearly the effect of his training than the mere possibility of manœuvring as a single body a mass of nearly forty squadrons handed over to a new leader on the battle-field itself.

Seidlitz and his Cavalry require no further praise; their performance remains as a model of perfection to all times. It must, however, always be remembered that under another Commander-in-Chief they



BATTLE OF ROSSBACH, SEIDLITZ' SECOND ATTACK.

would probably have found themselves covering with dismounted fire the Prussian retreat to the Saal. In Seidlitz's handling of the Cavalry his self-restraint was quite as important a factor as his magnificent dash. The charges were well timed and well carried out; squadrons well closed, mutual support of all three lines, combination of front and flank attack, and above all *surprise*.

The whole battle shows the most admirable co-operation of the Cavalry with the rest of the army, and the perfect control which the leaders exercised over their troops.

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Concluding Remarks

During the first and second Silesian wars the main strength of Frederick's army had lain in the Infantry, and it was only in the Seven Years' War that the Cavalry were able to perform their fair share in deciding the issue on the battle-field. This fact shows that their early failure and subsequent success was not a question of the firearms of their enemy, but depended entirely upon their state of efficiency and the skill or want of skill in the tactical leading of the officers.

A charge against unbroken Infantry, fresh and ready to receive it, no more promised success in those days than it does to-day.

We need not wait for the days of magazine rifles and Q.F. guns to find instances of such failures. There are several in the battles we have been considering.

In one important particular, indeed, the odds against the Cavalry were greater then than they are at present. In the time of Frederick Infantry in line three deep could fire thirteen shots a minute per yard of front, and the projectile was an 8-bore bullet, which brought a horse down in a single stride. The small-bore rifle of to-day has very small stopping power in comparison, and I have myself seen a spring buck shot through the heart with a Mauser bullet travel over half a mile before it stopped and fell dead. It will take many such bullets to stop a line of charging Cavalry determined to reach the firers, cost what it may.

But war does not consist of isolated duels between the different arms. It is by the close and effective co-operation of all three arms that battles are won, and the value of Cavalry on the battle-field depends upon the skill with which its leaders can take advantage of situations created by the other arms.

In the future as in the past, leaders will sometimes make mistakes, precautions will be neglected, troops will become exhausted and demoralised. That 'the long-fire fights of the present are more destructive of the moral and physical energy of the Infantry than the close-quarter conflicts of the past' is amply demonstrated by the events of the recent war in Manchuria.

The Austrian, Captain Spaits, in a recent book, gives his personal experiences of the Russian retreat from Mukden. He describes the terrible condition of the crowds of fleeing soldiers, many of them weaponless, and all vestiges of discipline vanished. When these masses of fugitives, horse and foot mixed together in hopeless confusion, hungry

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and frozen, reached the Puho River, a block occurred owing to difficulties in crossing. About three o'clock in the morning part of an ammunition column, fleeing from the Japanese, broke at full gallop into this mass of shivering humanity, upon which the wildest shooting began in all directions, and the most complete panic set in.

'At such moments,' to quote Captain Hoenig, 'it is quite a matter of indifference whether these remnants carry a repeating rifle, a flint musket, or a pitchfork, for the men's nerves are overstrained and their weapon counts for nothing.'

All campaigns, especially the latest, furnish examples of such demoralisation, and prove the utter fallacy of statistics based on rifle range experience.

To again quote Hoenig: 'If battle-fields were simply rifle ranges, then the effect so generally attributed to firearms to-day would certainly be due to them. Battle-fields, however, are not rifle ranges, but a confused mass of heights and valleys, of fields and ravines, of woods and villages, which give to each arm a field for its action, provided, of course, that the arm is capable of manœuvring in such country.'

The moral of this seems to be, first, that the Cavalry leader must be a tactician, and must study the other arms, in order to be able to recognise the opportunities which will inevitably occur; and secondly, that he must know and have confidence in the capabilities of his own arm and develop to the utmost its tactical knowledge, its speed and manœuvring power. By this means only will the Cavalry be able to act by surprise, and thus make the most of the possibilities which the future certainly has in store for them—possibilities even greater than those which the Great King and his leaders knew how to turn to such glorious account.

Note.—Principal authorities made use of:—

'Der Siebenjährige Krieg, 1756–1763,' by the German General Staff.

'Geschichte der Branderburg-Preussichen Reiterei,' by General Von P. Narbonne.

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CAVALRY UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE AND THE ATTACK OF ARTILLERY BY CAVALRY (MOUNTED)

By R. H. A.

I.—Cavalry under Artillery Fire.

The first of these two subjects, which is involved in the consideration of the second, is perhaps best discussed with reference to the various circumstances under which Cavalry might find thmselves exposed to the fire of Artillery. It is assumed that the guns are already in action, and the nature of a modern battle makes it probable that the ranges to many prominent features of the terrain will be known. It is probable that conclusions will be most easily reached by considering the difficulties and limitations of Artillery fire. The conditions of a mounted combat between two bodies of Cavalry, supported by Horse Artillery, make it unlikely that the former will have time or opportunity to alter their formations merely in order to minimise losses from shrapnel fire. Their objective is the enemy's Cavalry, and any deployment must be relative to this object. Therefore, although it is in the highest degree desirable to avoid exposing a Cavalry mass to the enemy's Horse Artillery, the risk of coming under his fire must often be taken—and taken in any formation that the tactical situation of the enemy's Cavalry may demand. A Cavalry fight of this kind may, therefore, be dismissed as irrelevant to the subject under consideration.

In a general action it will often happen that Cavalry are exposed to gun fire, whether they are attacking the guns or not. The circumstances vary with the length and direction of the exposed movement and with the range at which the danger zone begins and ends. It may be necessary in open country to make a long advance, flank movement, or retirement under gun fire, or, on the other hand, the country may be close, and it may be necessary to cross only a short space intervening between one covered position and the next. The

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range at which a movement directly to a flank is carried out may be long or short; and in an advance or retirement of some length the range varies in direct proportion to the size of the angle between the direction of movement and the position of the battery.

It is unnecessary to state that the intensity of fire at short ranges is greater than at longer ones, though the fascination exercised on the minds of all officers by commanding positions may lead to guns being so placed that their fire is useless at ranges under 1000 yards. It must be remembered that with the very flat trajectory of modern guns the 'defiladed space,' which is best explained by the accompanying diagram (see Diagram 'A'), is very long indeed for a mounted man, even up to a range of 2,500 yards. The range at B may be 2,500 yards, at A only 2,200, which gives a considerable margin of error to layers and battery commanders.

Generally speaking, at any rate at medium and long ranges, line is easier to obtain than range when guns are laying direct. Distribution for line is automatic on the part of layers in a well-trained battery.

DIAGRAM A.



Distribution for depth involves a difference of range for each gun or section, and it is impossible for the battery commander himself to do this effectively. He is forced to hand the ranging over to the section commanders, and the difficulty of distinguishing their shell and of observing when standing in the battery, makes their task a very hard one.

Reverting to the question of the distribution of fire for line, a continuous target presents less difficulties than a broken one, especially if it be split up into a number of segments greater than the number of guns under whose fire it comes. Under such circumstances it will often happen that two guns fire on the same portion of the target. Finally, the fear of being 'off the target' tends to make the fire of a battery converge towards its centre.

From the foregoing arguments the following inferences may be drawn as to the means by which the greatest difficulties may be pre-

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sented to Artillery fire by Cavalry moving under it for a considerable distance in open country.

Cavalry should be divided into small bodies—at medium and short ranges not larger than troops. In moving across a fire-swept zone these bodies should present a broken front, each segment being, if possible, at a different range and on a different line of fire. If two segments must be in the same line of fire they should not be in the same defiladed space, so that one shell can be effective on both. Lastly, in view of the fact that fire tends to converge on the centre of a target, the formation should be least dense in the part which appears to the guns as its centre.

DIAGRAM B.



Three squadrons moving to a flank in squadron *échelons*. *a* (1) = 'A' squadron 1st troop, etc.

Difference of range from X to Y say 250 yards.

Diagram 'B' shows three squadrons moving to a flank and forward in such a way. Each squadron is in *échelon* or double *échelon* of troops at about double the ordinary wheeling distance. This formation is not in the book, but it is in no way complicated, and might be inserted. It could be formed from the centre or from a flank, or in the diamond

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shape familiar in divisional manœuvre. Irregularity of distance and interval are the principal objects. In the example under consideration the extent of front is two and a half times that of the battery, and the ranges of the different troops vary considerably. At long ranges, squadrons instead of troops might be formed, as in the diagram, either in line or line of troop columns.

For short distances, in close country, or on roads, the procedure is necessarily different. There is a good deal to be said for moving fast in small formed bodies and trusting to luck. A battery moving to a flank under fire usually does so by sections at close interval. Each section remaining covered, if possible, till its predecessor is nearly or quite across the danger zone. Under such conditions troops might be moved similarly in close formation; and it is conceivable that circumstances might arise which would necessitate moving a regiment or brigade in mass on the same principle. It would be rash to do so over a long distance or in the open or at short ranges, inasmuch as so much damage may be caused by one shell among troops in close order. Movements of this kind must be irregular and not continuous. In every case rapidity is indispensable.

II.—The Attack of Artillery by Mounted Cavalry.

In considering the question of a mounted attack on guns in action, it is probably best to look first, as before, from the gunner's point of view. It may be assumed that in open country, where there is only a normal amount of dead ground, Cavalry will hardly be able to make a direct frontal attack on a quick firing battery capable of developing its full fire power. It might be desirable to make a feint in front in order to occupy the attention of the guns. But such a movement, unless carried out at medium or long ranges, is likely to incur considerable loss, without serving its purpose.

Diagram C.



'Danger angles'

AB=central line of fire at right angles to AF.
CAF, EAF } are danger angles.
Consequently only F gun can fire without being run up.

On the other hand, the flanks and rear of a battery are very vulnerable, and the teams are open to attack, even though they have an escort.

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Without entering into too many technicalities, it may be pointed out that when the line of fire of a gun (see diagram 'C') makes an angle of 45° or less with a line joining its muzzle to that of the next gun, a 'danger angle' is created, within which it is unsafe to fire. Therefore, it is impossible for guns to be fired more than 45° right or left of the central line of fire without running up or back.

Moreover, the long trail of the modern gun after one or two rounds becomes deeply buried, and is difficult to move in soft ground, so that much shifting of the trail delays the rate of fire very much.

The principles laid down in the first half of this Paper should be followed where applicable. It should be remembered also in this connection that at shorter ranges the difficulties of obtaining line, or, more correctly, of covering the whole front of a target, are very much enhanced.

A quick-firing gun can only be traversed 8° from right to left without shifting the trail, a proceeding which entails an almost prohibitive delay at short ranges. At 1,000 yards range this angle of 8° subtends a front of only 160 yards, a space that can be covered at a gallop in little more than twenty seconds, during which time the gun could only fire two or three times. A reference to diagram 'D' will show that the closer the range the shorter this lateral space becomes. This reference may be considered too technical for the scope of the article, but it serves to emphasise the desirability for an attack to change its direction as often as is compatible with the object in view.

From the above considerations it may be inferred that a battery must be attacked on one or both flanks, and from the rear also, if the ground admits of it; and that the Cavalry should combine flank movement with their advance, rather than persist in one line of attack. If possible the teams should be attacked, and from such a direction as to place them between the attacking horsemen and the guns, whose fire will thus be masked. The supports should come up in successive waves. If the leading lines have got into the battery, the fire will be checked or cease altogether, which will simplify the attack of the supporting bodies and make open formations necessary. Surprise and pace are, of course, essential.

DIAGRAM D.



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As regards formation, the knee-to-knee line employed in shock action against Cavalry is not necessary or even desirable. Open files or section groups at irregular intervals offer a smaller target, and have greater freedom of movement. The latter of these two alternatives is perhaps preferable. It facilitates the passage of obstacles and the maintenance of direction; and men riding close together undoubtedly give each other moral support. It is at least no more vulnerable to close-range fire than a continuous line, even at open files; inasmuch as the risk of one shell accounting for a whole group is counterbalanced by the amount of space where there is no one to hit. Moreover, it may tempt the layers to waste time in laying for direction.

But it is allowable to doubt whether the resolution of any men or horses would permit of an attack passing through the inferno of bursting shell which can be created at close ranges by a quick-firing battery, whose fire power is unimpaired. For this reason the necessity for the attack to outflank the extreme width of the zone of fire is of paramount importance.

Given that the flanks of a battery are uncovered, and that the escort, if it exists, can be contained, there seems no reason why the majority of the attacking horsemen should not reach the battery, provided that the inherent disadvantages which make a purely defensive attitude so difficult for guns are borne in mind.

The ensuing fight, a *mêlée* in which only one side is armed, should offer great opportunities for lancers!

It is recommended by competent authority that under these circumstances the gunners should use their rifles, which should be lying near them for the purpose. But, apart from considerations of morale, it does not appear that such a course could be adopted with any success if the guns were served up to the last possible minute, which is surely the *raison d'être* of Artillery.

At the same time the Cavalry must not forget that the dispersion or capture of the wagon line and led horses are of far greater moment than human pig-sticking round the guns. The immobilisation of a battery is infinitely more important, and more easily and quickly accomplished, than the death of individual gunners or the temporary disablement of individual guns.

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KILPATRICK'S RAID

RAID OF THE UNION CAVALRY AROUND THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN ATLANTA, AUGUST 1864[1]

By W. L. Curry, *Captain First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry*

(*From the 'Journal of the U.S.A. Cavalry Association.'*)

In military parlance Cavalry is called the 'eyes of the army,' and the life of a Cavalry man in time of war is one of constant activity, hard and dangerous service. During the winter season, when the main army is snugly ensconced in winter quarters, Cavalry is the most active and has the hardest service to perform, as it is kept constantly patrolling and scouting. All these movements of the Cavalry arm of the service require vigilance, secrecy, energy, promptness and dash; and whether the command is composed of a Platoon or Division, the Commander must not halt or hesitate in an emergency, but must act immediately and supply by strategy what he lacks in numbers.

During the last two years of the War of the Rebellion, Cavalry officers were composed largely of young men who were, at the beginning of the war, privates or non-commissioned officers. The older officers could but with rare exceptions endure the hard duty of picket guard, routs, raids and scouts of fifty and sixty miles a day, which were of usual occurrence. Many of the most dangerous expeditions were under command of officers of the line, penetrating the lines of the enemy with a company or squadron, capturing outposts and couriers with dispatches that were of vital importance. Scores of instances of bravery and heroism in the rank and file could be related that would do honour to a Kilpatrick or a Custer, and instances of individual adventure and heroic deeds in the Cavalry service could be multiplied by the hundred.

As an instance of the importance of a Cavalry expedition ordered

[1] A paper read before the Ohio Commandery, M. O. L. L. U. S. February 4, 1907.

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by General Sherman on the Atlanta campaign, and how little the loss of life was considered, the order to General Kenner Garrard, bearing date of July 20, 1864, read in part as follows: 'I do wish to inspire all Cavalry with my conviction that caution and prudence should be but a small element in their character.' 'It is a matter of vital importance and must be attempted with great vigour.' 'The importance of it will justify the loss of a quarter of your command.' Garrard's Division numbered four thousand men, and the order meant that one thousand men should be sacrificed in this one raid rather than it should fail.

A Cavalry raid is defined in military sense 'to be an incursion or irruption of mounted troops into the theatre of war occupied by or under the control of the enemy.'

One of the main duties of Cavalry in time of war is to make raids in the rear of the enemy's army. These raids, when successful, always add to the efficiency and raise the morale of the Cavalry arm of the service and give forces engaged confidence for any expedition, however hazardous it might seem.

In fact, the Cavalryman is always in his element when on reconnaissance or raid teeming with dash and adventure. Cavalry raids have been in vogue more or less from the earliest times of which we have any history of the Cavalry service, yet in no prior war was it practised to the extent that it was during the War of the Rebellion.

There is no kind of service that so develops the skill of the officer and the endurance and intelligence of the soldier as the Cavalry raid. From the time he cuts loose from the main army until the object of the raid is accomplished the commander must depend on his own resources, as he has nothing to draw from, and his command is being constantly weakened by contact with the enemy. His men are being killed and wounded; his horses are exhausted or killed by hard marching or by the bullets of the enemy; his ammunition is being rapidly consumed, his rations eaten up, and there is a continuous destruction of his forces.

The object of the raid is to destroy the enemy's communication by burning bridges, filling up tunnels and railroad cuts with rocks and timber, cutting telegraph wires, burning ties, heating and destroying rails, burning and destroying army supplies, capturing railroad and bridge guards, and creating general consternation and havoc in rear

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of the enemy's lines. Raiding expeditions must carry all their ammunition from the start, as they have no resources from which to draw should their ammunition become exhausted. Therefore they usually avoid all large bodies of the enemy, excepting those in their immediate front, who are endeavouring to repel the expedition from striking some point on a railroad or depot of supplies.

They capture all prisoners that come in their line of march, but the prisoners are usually paroled, as the command moves so rapidly—often marching fifty and sixty miles a day—that prisoners cannot be guarded if they are mounted, and if on foot could not march the distance required; besides, all the good mounts captured are needed for the dismounted troopers of the command, as many horses become exhausted, while others are killed or wounded by the enemy.

When prisoners are captured on such raids they are taken to the Commanding Officers and questioned very persistently as to their commands, strength, name of Commanding Officer, and any other information that may be of interest or benefit to the Commander.

No rule can be adopted for the time and place of raids, but the Commander must be governed by the developments of the campaign. If he sees an opportunity that he may think desirable to draw the enemy's Cavalry away from the front, before making an attack in force, if he has the Cavalry to spare from his own army, a raid may be made in the enemy's rear; or if he fears the enemy will receive reinforcements, he may attempt to cut his communications. All these matters must be governed by circumstances, and the Commander considers carefully all the surroundings, and whether or not the sacrifice will justify sending out the expedition.

One of the most daring and successful raids made by the Cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland during the Civil War was the raid made by two Divisions of Cavalry, commanded by General Judson Kilpatrick, in August 1864, and as an officer of the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry I participated with my regiment in that expedition.

General Sherman's magnificent army moved out from Chattanooga May 5, 1864, and the Confederate Army, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, had been driven back steadily through the mountain passes and across the rivers of Northern Georgia during that great battle summer of 1864—the 'one hundred days under fire from Chattanooga to Atlanta.' The battle of bloody Kenesaw Mountain had

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been fought, the Chattahoochee River had been crossed, and by the middle of August the Union Army was closing in around the 'Gate City.'

During the month of July two Cavalry expeditions had been sent out, one under General Stoneman from the left flank and the other under General Ed. McCook from the right flank. Neither of these expeditions had been as successful as General Sherman had hoped for, as McCook's Division had been repulsed by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and Stoneman, with about one thousand of his command, had been captured. Sherman, therefore, decided to make another effort to break the enemy's communication before beginning his grand flank movement to the right. General Kilpatrick—who had been severely wounded early in the campaign at the battle of Resaca, had just returned to the front, chafing to be again in the saddle for a raid full of dash and danger—was selected to command the two Divisions of Cavalry detailed for this hazardous undertaking.

The expedition was composed of five Brigades of Cavalry and two Batteries of Artillery. The Third Cavalry Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, was, on August 17, encamped on the Chattahoochee River at Sandtown, on the right and rear of the army. The three Brigades were present: Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Klein commanding the First Brigade, composed of the Third Indiana (Major Alfred Gaddis) and the Fifth Iowa (Major J. Morris Young). Lieutenant-Colonel Fielder A. Jones commanded the Second Brigade, composed of the Eighth Indiana (Major Thomas Herring commanding), Second Kentucky (Major Owen Starr commanding), and Tenth Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas W. Sanderson commanding). Colonel Eli H. Murray commanded the Third Brigade, composed of the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry (Colonel Smith D. Atkins commanding), the Third Kentucky (Lieutenant-Colonel Robert H. King commanding), Fifth Kentucky (Colonel Oliver L. Baldwin commanding), the Tenth Wisconsin Battery (Captain Yates V. Beebe commanding).

The First and Second Brigades and a Battery of Artillery of General Kenner Garrard's Division were ordered to report to General Kilpatrick at Sandtown, to engage in the movement against the Macon Railroad. The First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Robert H. G. Minty, consisted of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry (commanded by Major Frank W. Mix), Seventh Pennsylvania (Major William H. Jennings), Fourth

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United States (Captain James B. McIntyre). The Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Eli Long, consisted of the First Ohio (Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston), Third Ohio (Colonel Charles B. Seidel), Fourth Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver P. Robie), and the Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery (Lieutenant George Robinson commanding).

The whole command, numbering about 4,800 men, was composed of veterans of long service, well drilled, splendidly officered, and was ready and anxious for any expedition which had promise of adventure and fighting.

The Brigades of Minty and Long were on the extreme left of the Union Army at Buckhead, and marched all night on August 17 in the rear



of the army and joined the Third Division at Sandtown, on the right of the Union Army, on the morning of August 18 at sunrise, and General Kilpatrick assumed command and turned over the command of his Division to Colonel Eli H. Murray, who in turn turned over the command of his Brigade to Colonel Robert L. King.

We lay in bivouac all day, and on the same evening at sundown we were in the saddle, and the order from General Kilpatrick was read, stating that we 'had been selected as the last hope of the Commanding General to break the enemy's communication, and we must go forth with the determination to do or die.'

General Sherman, in a communication to General Thomas, bearing date of August 17, said: 'I beg you will convey the following orders

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to govern Kilpatrick in his movement on the Macon road. It is not a raid, but a deliberate attack for the purpose of so disabling that road that the enemy will be unable to supply his army at Atlanta. He will have his own Division of Cavalry and two Brigades from General Garrard's Division. With these he will move to-morrow night, aiming to cross the West Point road between Red Oak and Fairburn. If he has time he should remove a small section of the road without using fire, simply to lessen the chances of an Infantry Force being sent to intercept his return. He should move then in force to the nearest point on the Macon road, about Jonesborough, and should destroy as much of that road as he possibly can do, working steadily until forced to take to his arms and horses for battle.

'He should avoid battle with Infantry or Artillery, but may safely fight any Cavalry he encounters, and all the Army should so engage the attention of the enemy that he cannot detach Infantry as against General Kilpatrick. Instruct the General to advise at the earliest possible moment of his success.

'I wish to notify General Garrard to have one of his Brigades ready to make a demonstration, without risking battle, on our left, and have this effective part of two Brigades, under Long, if possible, ready to move this night by moonlight by Pace's Ferry and Sandtown bridges, to operate with Kilpatrick on our right.'

Strong demonstrations were made along the front of the Union Army as soon as the command drew out from Sandtown, by Infantry and Artillery, making feints by the display of troops as if to assault on both the 19th and 20th. General Garrard with his remaining Cavalry force made a demonstration to the left toward Stone Mountain, and drew a force of Hood's Army in that direction. General Jefferson C. Davis, with his Division of the Fourteenth Corps, moved out from the right and drove the enemy across the West Point Railroad and destroyed a portion of the track.

In spite of all these aggressive movements of Sherman's Army, Hood detached a Division of his Army to attack Kilpatrick's Cavalry, which was seen from the signal station, as shown by the following dispatch:

Howard's Headquarters, August 20, 1864, 5 P.M.

General Schofield: The following just received from signal officer: 'A train of fifteen freight cars just left Atlanta, loaded with troops inside and outside; tops of cars were crowded.'

O. O. HOWARD, *Major-General.*

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This force proved to be Clebourne's Division, which fought Kilpatrick at Lovejoy.

Every officer and soldier in the command realised that the proposed expedition was very perilous, and the chances were that many of us would be either killed or wounded, or, what seemed worse, land in prison. After the order was read, the command was given for 'the pack train to fall out, and all troopers whose horses were lame or exhausted should go to the rear.' In a few minutes, and just as the sun was dropping behind the mountain, the command was given, 'Right forward, fours right!' and we were off on what proved to be one of the hardest Cavalry raids during our four years' service. Soon after dusk we struck the enemy's pickets, which proved to be the advance of Ross' and Ferguson's Brigades of Cavalry, and a brisk skirmish was kept up all night, and during a greater part of the time we were dismounted, as the enemy would throw up barricades at every good position at bridges or along the edge of a wood, and they gave us so much trouble that instead of reaching the West Point Railroad at midnight, as we intended, we did not strike it until just at daybreak of the 19th. King's Brigade of the Third Division had the advance during the night, but before daylight, and before we struck the West Point Railroad near Fairburn, King's Brigade swung to the left, and Jones' Brigade of the Third Division had the advance when we reached the railroad. When the railroad was reached Long's Brigade dismounted and commenced tearing up and destroying the railroad track near and south-west of Fairburn.

Cavalry, when they become accustomed to this kind of work, would tear up a track very rapidly. When the order is given to dismount, number one, two, and three dismount, and number four always holds horses, remains mounted, and leads the other three horses. Number three hands his reins to number four; number two ties his reins to the bit of number three, and number one to rein of number two. The men then form along one side of the track in close order, and at command grasp the rails and ties and turn the track over, and sometimes a half-mile of tracks is turned before a joint is broken. The men move along rapidly, and many rods of the track will be standing up on edge. If there is time, the rails are then torn loose from the ties by picks and axes, carried for that purpose; the ties are piled up and the rails on top of them, and then the ties are fired; thus the rails are heated in

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the middle and bent out of shape by being twisted around trees or telegraph poles, are left there to cool, and no doubt some of them are there yet to mark the trail of the Cavalry raiders. The Brigade destroyed about a mile of track, when we were attacked by the Cavalry and Artillery of the enemy in both the rear and left flank. The Brigade was ordered to mount, and galloped forward to join the First Brigade, under Minty, which had crossed the track and had the advance.

Long's Brigade formed a line of battle facing toward the left, and as we began to advance a Battery galloped into position on a little knoll to the right of our line. Just at this moment General Kilpatrick, who had been giving orders to the commander of the Battery, came dashing along in front of our line, mounted on an Arabian horse, looking the ideal Cavalryman. He directed Colonel Long to move his Brigade forward at a gallop, and we dashed across a field in front, over ditches and fences, and into the woods, routing the enemy and taking a number of prisoners.

Still farther to the left the First Brigade, under Minty, had a sharp fight with Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, and a Battery of Artillery, which had been carefully masked, and the fighting was terrific for a short time. The Eleventh Wisconsin Battery was brought into action, shelled the woods to the left, and very soon the enemy retreated in confusion towards Atlanta, and were driven back a mile or two from the left of our column.

During all of this time General Kilpatrick's headquarters' band, mounted on white horses near the railroad track, where the work of destruction was being prosecuted vigorously, was enlivening the scene with patriotic airs, which was rather an unusual innovation during a fight.

As the real objective point was the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, as soon as the left of the column was cleared of the enemy harassing the flank that part of the command which had been participating in the fight joined the main column and moved forward towards Jonesborough, Long's Brigade having the advance, while Minty's Brigade was in close support in column, and the Third Division was protecting the rear and flanks.

We struck the enemy in a short time and attacked them at once, pushing them back slowly but steadily. The country was thickly wooded, and a very bad place for Cavalry to operate. The enemy

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would throw up barricades at every favourable position, such as woods, streams, or ravines, firing on the advance from ambuscades. The progress of the column was much retarded, and the enemy made every effort to keep our column back from the railroad until reinforcements could be moved down from Atlanta. About noon the advance halted and dismounted in a thick piece of woods to let the horses rest, and to eat a hard-tack, raw-pork sandwich. The men were all sitting or lying down, when all at once the enemy fired a volley and charged the advance guard, driving them back on the reserves before we could mount.

Colonel Long ordered the Brigade forward, dismounted and on the double-quick, and the bang of the carbines was soon ringing out, and the Confederate horsemen were suddenly checked and sent scurrying back through woods and fields. The Brigade then advanced, dismounted, with a strong skirmish line in front and flankers to protect the column, as the enemy's Cavalry kept a continuous fire from the woods to the right and left. The Confederate force was pushed back steadily until we reached Flint River, and on the east side of this stream they had thrown up works, dug rifle pits, and had a strong position.

As soon as our advance appeared a Confederate Battery opened up and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was put in position, and after a lively Artillery duel their Battery was silenced. The First and Second Brigades of the Second Division dismounted, advanced some distance in the woods on the west side of the stream, where we halted, and both of our Batteries, with eight guns, were put in position on a hill in our rear, and at a signal they opened up by volleys for several rounds, and as soon as the Batteries ceased firing the two Brigades rushed forward with a yell, and the Confederate line left their works and rifle pits and fell back rapidly towards Jonesborough.

When the bridge was reached the planks had been torn up, and there was nothing left but the stringers, on which the 1st and 3rd Ohio and 4th Michigan crossed. As we crossed Kilpatrick himself came up, and was ordering the men to jump into the stream after the planks to repair the bridge. The dismounted men moved forward, and reached Jonesborough about sundown. The bridge across the stream was soon repaired, and the Artillery, mounted men, and led horses were closed up by the time we reached the town.

We had some skirmishing in the outskirts of the town, and to the

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south on the opposite side of the town a strong force of Confederate Cavalry was drawn up in line of battle in plain view, and the officers could be seen dashing to and fro forming the lines. Our lines were straightened up, and, moving forward, the rear guard of the enemy dismounted, opened fire on our skirmishers from houses and buildings, and a brisk fire was kept up from a brick church. A section of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery came dashing down the street up to the skirmish line, unlimbered, and sent a few shells into the church, making the bricks and mortar fly, and the church was evacuated in short order.

The sound of the guns and scream of the shells was sweet music to the ears of the skirmishers, and they moved forward with a shout, and the bang! bang! of their sharp-ringing carbines swelled the chorus as the mayor and a few citizens appeared in the main street with a white flag to surrender the town and claim protection for the citizens.

The line advanced rapidly through the town, the enemy fell back along the railroad, and we soon had undisputed possession. The shells from the Artillery had fired the cotton bales, used as barricades around the railroad building, and soon both cotton and buildings were blazing, and the water tank at the station had been shivered by a shell. Our men took possession of the telegraph office, and it was reported that an old operator in our command caught a dispatch stating that reinforcements were on the way from Atlanta, which was very important news to Kilpatrick. Jonesborough is about twenty-five miles south from Atlanta, and a considerable amount of clothing and commissary stores were found, with whisky and other necessary munitions of war. All of these supplies that we did not need for immediate use were burned and destroyed.

As Hood's whole Army was now between us and Sherman's Army, it was not particularly desirable for less than five thousand Cavalrymen to remain in this position very long, and the destruction of the railroad, which ran through the main street of the town, was commenced at once. Tearing up the track and destroying the rails and ties was done principally by the Third Division, as they had not been engaged in the fight when we entered the town. The Second Brigade formed a line of battle south of the town and across the railroad; the First Brigade was formed facing Atlanta, and skirmishing was kept up all night. It was a wild night and a most graphic scene. The sky was lighted up

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with burning timbers, buildings, and cotton bales; the continuous bang of carbines, the galloping of Staff Officers and Orderlies up and down the streets carrying orders or dispatches, the terrified citizens peering out of their windows, the constant marching of troops changing position, Kilpatrick's headquarters' band discoursing national airs, with the shouts of men—all made up a weird scene never to be forgotten by the troopers who were on that raid.

By midnight about two miles of the road had been effectually destroyed, and in attempting to move farther south along the road a strong force of Infantry was found posted behind barricades, with timber cut in front. This position could not have been taken without a hard fight and heavy loss, and Kilpatrick then determined to withdraw from Jonesborough, make a detour to the east, and strike the road again farther south. The movement was commenced about two o'clock on the morning of the 20th by Murray's Division and Minty's Brigade of the Second Division marching on the McDonough road to the east, and the Second Brigade, under Colonel Long, remaining in the barricades to hold the Infantry in check. The Second Brigade withdrew just as the first streaks of dawn began to appear in the east, and they were followed up closely by the enemy, both Cavalry and Infantry, the 1st Ohio holding the rear. After we had marched about five miles the advance regiments halted to feed their horses, and the enemy made an impetuous attack on the rear guard, and one Battalion was dismounted, throwing up barricades hurriedly of logs and rails, and prepared to give the enemy a warm reception.

The enemy attacked the barricades, and as their line was much longer, the battalion was outflanked on both sides, and the balls were soon whizzing from the flanks, and, as the Johnnies would say, they took us 'end ways.' Although heavily outnumbered, this Battalion of the 1st Ohio held its position until reinforcements were ordered by Colonel Long, and the enemy were soon driven back in confusion towards Jonesborough. General Kilpatrick, in speaking of the fight, complimented Colonel Long for the manner in which he manœuvred his command. As General Phil Kearney once said to a Brigade Commander who reported to him during one of the great battles in Virginia, and asked as to the position his Brigade should take, 'Fighting Phil' replied, 'Just go in anywhere; there is lovely fighting all along the line.' This seemed to be about the situation at this time.

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As soon as the enemy was repulsed, Long's Brigade was ordered to the front on a gallop of three or four miles toward Lovejoy Station, where we found that Minty's Brigade, on striking the railroad, had been attacked by a heavy force of Cavalry and Reynolds' Division of Infantry. The Infantry line was concealed in a railroad cut, and the 7th Pennsylvania and the 4th U.S. Cavalry dismounted, drove the enemy's line in, and were within twenty or thirty rods of the railroad, when the Infantry line rose up, delivered a very destructive volley, and, rushing from the cut, drove the line of Minty's brigade back in considerable confusion. Just at this moment Long's Brigade arrived on the field with the Chicago Board of Trade Battery. The Brigade was dismounted, formed a line of battle, and by this time some of the dismounted men of Minty's Brigade came rushing back through our line, and it was not safe to fire, as it would endanger the lives of some of our own men. Although the balls from the enemy's Infantry were whizzing on all sides, the officers of Long's Brigade made every effort to keep their men from firing until the Confederate line was almost upon us, but when our troops did open up the Confederate line was repulsed and driven back with heavy slaughter. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery was up on the front line, and did excellent execution, and the enemy's Infantry fell back into the railroad cut. During this fight the lines were so close together that the officers of the First and Second Brigades used their revolvers with good execution.

Our ammunition was exhausted, and a detail was sent back to the ammunition train and got a supply in boxes, and the boxes were broken open with stones, and the cartridges were distributed in a few moments, much to the delight of the troopers.

The Second Division held this line for an hour, and during this time Staff Officers were busily engaged in forming the led horses in columns of fours facing the rear. One of the guns of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was disabled in a cornfield just to the left of the 1st Ohio, and it was hauled to the rear by some of the troopers of the Second Division. When the Second Division had driven the enemy's line back, and the firing had about ceased, Colonel Long and Minty were ordered to withdraw their Brigades and fall back to the led horses, a few hundred yards in the rear.

Now we began to realise that we were surrounded, and the chances began to look desperate, as our ammunition had already been pretty

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well exhausted, and we must cut our way through the lines. The distance between the two lines of the enemy could not have been more than three-fourths of a mile. When the Second Division was fighting along the railroad and near the station, King's Brigade was in support of the rear and right and had some hot work. Jones' Brigade was protecting the rear, and was hard pressed by the Divisions of Ross, Ferguson, and Martin, and kept up a continuous fight for two hours all along the lines. The rattling volleys from the front and rear echoed back and forth alternately, mingled with the shouts and cheers from both the Union and Confederate lines.

At this critical time the situation was as follows: In our rear were two Brigades of Clebourne's Division of Infantry, the Cavalry Brigades of Ross and Ferguson, and about a thousand State troops which had been sent from below Lovejoy Station, and on the right were the remaining Brigades of Clebourne's Division. Martin's and Jackson's Brigades of Cavalry were on the left, while Reynolds' Division of Infantry, with a Brigade of Infantry and a six-gun Battery sent up from Macon, were along the railroad at Lovejoy Station, with twelve pieces of Artillery sent down from Atlanta. A total of five Brigades of Infantry, eighteen pieces of Artillery, six Brigades of Cavalry, in all a force of more than ten thousand of all arms surrounding our two Divisions of Cavalry, numbering less than five thousand.

Kilpatrick, finding that he was completely surrounded, ordered his Division and Brigade Commanders to cut their way out. His Cavalry had been up to this time fighting almost entirely as Infantry, but they soon were going to be given the privilege of drawing their sabres from their rusty scabbards for a Cavalry charge, and the opportunity was hailed with delight. Saddle girths were tightened, revolvers examined, sabre belts and spurs adjusted, and all equipments were made taut for the shock and *mêlée* of the charge. When all was in readiness and the order was given to mount, many a brave trooper sprang into his saddle for the last time and rode to his death in that wild charge, cheering his comrades on to the front as he fell.

Kilpatrick, a Cavalry General, remembering the mistakes which had been made on a former expedition for the same purpose, instead of scattering his troops, massed them. The Brigades of Minty and Long were formed on the right of the road, and one regiment of Minty's Brigade formed in the road. The Third Division, under Colonel

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Murray, formed on the left of the road, all facing toward McDonough, while the Artillery, ambulances filled with wounded, and ammunition wagons were formed in the road with orders to follow up the charging columns as closely as possible. The troops were formed in columns of fours or platoons with the proper intervals, as it was thought best to strike the enemy's line and pierce it in several places rather than charge in line, as it was a long distance to charge, and in some places the ground was cut up by ditches and washouts, with two or three fences between our forces and the enemy's lines.

During the time the troops were forming the surgeons and ambulance corps were busy gathering up the wounded and caring for them as best they could. The enemy had formed two or three lines with Infantry behind barricades of fence rails and logs, as it seems they had anticipated a charge, and they were not disappointed in their expectations. When our troops were forming, two Batteries opened up on our lines from the front, and the Infantry was closing up from our now rear from the railroad. When all was ready every eye was turned intently toward the line of barricades in front, whence shells were now coming thick and fast, and through this line and over these barricades we must cut our way out, or surrender, and, perhaps, starve in Andersonville.

'Draw sabre!' and forty-five hundred sabres ring out as they are drawn from their scabbards, the reins are tightened, the horses are excited, with nostrils extended as if they 'sniffed the battle afar off.'

It was a glorious sight, with horses stamping and champing the bits as if eager for the fray, standards and guidons flung to the breeze, with the dashing here and there of Staff Officers carrying orders, the serious face of the Commander, the stern, quick commands of the officers as the Squadrons are forming. Many of the boys who witnessed and participated in that charge, but whose hair is now silvered with grey, can feel the flush of youth again mount their cheeks and the blood course more rapidly through their veins as they go back in memory to the day they charged with Kilpatrick, August 20, 1864.

The command 'Forward!' is given, the bugles ring out 'Trot! Gallop! Charge!' in quick succession, and the columns swept forward under the spur with a yell, scaling fences, jumping ditches, in that wild and reckless charge; the shells from the Batteries were sweeping the lines, while troopers and horses were falling on every side.

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The First Brigade struck their line at and just to the right of the road, and Long's Brigade struck farther to the right, and Captain W. H. Scott, of the 1st Ohio, fell mortally wounded in front of one of the guns of a Confederate Battery. When our columns struck the barricades the enemy retreated in great confusion, but a lieutenant, commanding a section of Artillery, who gave his name as Young, was mortally wounded just in front of where Captain Scott fell, as he was attempting to fire one of his pieces after all of his men had deserted their posts. Both Brigades urged their horses over the barricades, cutting right and left. Many of the prisoners had sabre cuts on their hands, arms, and heads, and it is estimated that from six to eight hundred prisoners were sabred. Infantry, Cavalry, led horses, and Artillery were fleeing in confusion, and at one time we had at least one thousand prisoners, but they nearly all escaped in our rapid march that dark night following.

After this long charge over broken ground, ditches, fences, and woods, the Regiments and Brigades were considerably broken up, as many horses had been shot, troopers wounded or killed, and some horses falling in a ditch that we crossed were with great difficulty extricated, so that many of the men were dismounted.

Before Long's Brigade could get into position, as Colonel Long had been ordered to cover the retreat, Minty's Brigade and the Third Division having moved out on the McDonough road, Long's Brigade was furiously attacked by Pat Clebourne's Division of Infantry and a Battery of Artillery, and this fight lasted about an hour, with a part of the Brigade dismounted. In this assault Colonel Long was severely wounded, but rode his horse to the rear, supported on either side by two mounted orderlies from his escort.

The 1st Ohio was forming on some high ground just as Colonel Long rode to the rear, pale and bleeding. As he passed by the regiment he smiled and bowed, and was given a rousing cheer by the boys. The 3rd Ohio was still fighting, dismounted, and the Brigade was falling back by alternate Regiments, and just at this time the Chicago Board of Trade Battery came galloping back, dashed through a gate, and into the dooryard of a plantation house on the opposite side of the road from where the 1st Ohio was forming. On the long porch in front of this house there were twelve or fifteen women and children wringing their hands; while some were crying, others were praying.

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The Battery opened up at once, and the enemy's Battery in our rear soon got range and sent the shells thick and fast, and at least one of them struck the roof of the house, thus adding to the terror of the women and children. While our Battery was firing one of the guns burst, injuring two of the gunners. There was not a grim veteran of our command whose heart was so hardened by the every-day scenes of carnage that it did not go out in sympathy for those mothers with their children, and who would not have freely risked his own life to have saved them; but no aid could be rendered those helpless ones, as no soldier could be spared from his post of duty.

The enemy was crowding the rear guard, and making a desperate effort, by shot and shell, to create a panic and stampede in the Brigade. Never were the words of General Sherman more truthfully demonstrated that 'War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it' than by this incident. Lieutenant Bennett, who commanded the section of the Battery in this fight, informed the writer the next day that all of the women and children escaped injury, which he considered almost a miracle under the circumstances, as the shells tore up the ground on all sides of the house.

Soon after Colonel Long was wounded his Brigade fell back in column through the lines of Minty's Brigade immediately in the rear, and Minty's men covered the column during the afternoon and had some sharp skirmishes with Clebourne's Division, following up with Infantry and Artillery.

The whole command moved rapidly toward McDonough. Both men and horses were tired out and exhausted, and after the excitement of two days and nights of almost continuous fighting there was a complete collapse when the fighting ceased, and the men had lost so much sleep that they seemed perfectly indifferent to all surroundings. The command marched all night in a drenching rain, but it was utterly impossible to march in any kind of order or to keep out an advance guard, as men and officers would go to sleep. In some instances the horses would halt along the road in fence corners, and the riders would either unconsciously dismount or fall asleep until dragged out by the rear guard and compelled to mount and move on with the column. Many of them lost their hats, and no doubt others were taken prisoners by the enemy, and the column moved on silently, horses exhausted, half of the men and officers asleep, and the night as dark as pitch.

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About two or three o'clock in the morning of the 21st the column halted.

We were ordered to unsaddle, as we had not unsaddled since leaving Sandtown on the evening of the 18th, and as soon as the saddles were removed the men tumbled down among the trees on the wet ground at their horses' heads, and were soon sound asleep. We halted there until six o'clock, about three hours, then saddled. Moving on about half a mile, we found ourselves on the bank of a stream called Cotton Indian Creek, at high flood, the banks full to overflowing, and no bridge. We had to swim our horses across this stream, and, as the banks were steep, there was a deep cut on either side of the stream, leading to the ford, and it was not possible to get up the bank only at one point, so that the process of crossing the stream was tedious. Picket ropes were stretched across the stream, and General Kilpatrick and his Division and Brigade commanders were on the bank superintending the crossing. Men, horses, and mules were floundering around in the stream, and it was no doubt the first attempt of some of the horses to swim, and in some instances the men would get frightened, pull on the reins, and as a result many of the riders were unhorsed, and were saved only by the ropes. A number of soldiers were drowned. Forty or fifty horses and a number of mules were lost, and the dismounted gun, hauled in an ammunition wagon, was abandoned. But the ambulances, carrying nearly one hundred wounded, were all safely got over. Having crossed this stream, we were not again troubled by the enemy; they did not follow us up, as they were in no better condition for fighting than our own forces. Guns and ammunition were soaked with water, and every man in the command was wet above the waist after fording the creek.

The command marched on all day, and about dark reached Lathonia, on the Augusta Railroad, and went into bivouac for the night, rejoicing to have the opportunity for a much-needed rest, as we had now been out three days and nights, had only unsaddled once, and had not more than two hours' sleep, excepting what we had snatched in the saddle. The next day the command marched through Lattimer and Decatur, and reached our old camp at Buck Head about sundown of the 22nd, having marched completely around Hood's Army in five days.

General Kilpatrick, in his report to General Sherman after the raid,

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stated that the defeat of the Confederates in the charge 'was the most complete rout that the rebel Cavalry had sustained during the war.'

In summing up results he stated that 'four miles of railroad track was completely destroyed, and ten miles badly damaged. Two locomotives with one train of cars were totally destroyed, and another train partially destroyed. A wagon train and many ambulances were captured, and a large amount of army supplies burned at Jonesborough. One four-gun Battery, three battle flags, with a large number of horses and mules, were captured, and one hundred prisoners of the eight hundred to one thousand taken at Lovejoy were brought into our lines, the balance having escaped in the darkness during the rapid march in a pouring rain on the night of August 20.'

General Long, in a letter written to the writer a few years ago, stated that, in the fight with Clebourne's Infantry, after the charge, and when Long was severely wounded, he 'manœuvred his Brigade by bugle commands or signals as he had never seen done before or since in a battle.'

The losses in killed, wounded, and missing in the two Divisions was 326, of which 216 were in the Brigades of Minty and Long, Second Division, and 110 of the Third Division. Among the officers killed were Captain W. H. Scott, of the 1st Ohio Cavalry, Inspector-General on the Staff of Colonel Long; Captain James G. Taylor, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry; Lieutenant C. C. Hermans, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The Confederate losses were heavy, but could not be ascertained definitely, but they were, no doubt, as heavy as our own.

A dispatch sent from Atlanta to the *Memphis Appeal*, and published a few days after the fight, gives the Confederate side, and is herewith published:

'The newspapers have lately been full of accounts of how Martin's Division of Cavalry was run over by the Yankees at Lovejoy on the 20th ultimo. The writer was on the field on that occasion, and, in justice to the much-abused Cavalry, states the facts in the matter.

'Martin's Division, supporting the Battery, was formed on the McDonough road. Ross' and Ferguson's commands on foot were in front and on each side of the Battery, behind rail breastworks. A Brigade of Clebourne's Infantry was on the left of the road in three lines, the last one in a piece of woods. About one hundred yards in rear of the position of the Battery, on the right of the road (east side),

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the State troops were formed in line. When the Yankees charged they came in a solid column, ten or twelve lines deep, running their horses and yelling like devils. They didn't stop to fight or to attempt to keep any kind of order or formation, but each fellow for himself rushed on, swinging his sabre over his head.

'They rode over Ross' and Ferguson's men in the centre, and over and through Clebourne's lines, one after another, on the left. Clebourne's first line, they say, tried to use their bayonets, but the Yankees cut them to pieces. After the Yankees had cut through all the other forces and captured the Battery, Martin, seeing the field was lost, retreated in good order to the east and joined Clebourne's main body, and aided in the final defeat of the enemy on the McDonough road that evening, and pursued them to and through McDonough that night, recapturing nearly five hundred of our men whom they took in the charge. The effort to arouse the people against Martin and his brave Division is more disgraceful and demoralising than the Yankees' charge itself, and should be frowned upon by all who wish well to our cause.'

The distance marked by Kilpatrick's command was about one hundred and twenty miles, and the route can be traced on the accompanying map (page 56).

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LIEUT. SWANSTONE

(The Poona Horse).

1818.

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THE POONA HORSE

By Captain R. W. Grimshaw (*Poona Horse*)

BATTLE HONOURS

Corygaum.	Meeanee.	Bushire.
Ghuznee.	Hyderabad.	Koosh-ab.
Afghanistan.	Persia.	Kandahar.
Kandahar, 1842.	Reshire.	Afghanistan, 1879-1880.

The Thirty-fourth Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse, generally known as the Poona Horse, dates its existence from July 15, 1817, when, in accordance with the treaty of Poona, it was decided by the Government of Bombay to raise a body of Auxiliary Horse on the Silladar System under the command of British officers.

The Poona Horse is, therefore, one of the oldest of the Silladar mounted units of the present Regular Army of India.

This Corps was not raised by the individual efforts of any one man, as was the case with so many units which trace their origin to these early years. It was recruited by several, both British and native, and included men of all castes and creeds, those of the Deccan predominating. For example, five hundred sabres were raised for it by the famous Colonel James Skinner in Hindustan.

Its original strength was at first five thousand sabres organised into divisions called thousands, each thousand being commanded by a British officer. This organisation underwent many modifications during succeeding years, and at one period there were actually two separately organised regiments of Poona Horse, which in their turn gave way to the present-day four squadron one.

The first officer appointed to command it on completion of its formation was Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, afterwards Major-General, and the cantonment of Sirur, forty-six miles north-east of Poona, was assigned to it as its headquarters.

The war services of the regiment are extensive, being second on the list of Indian Cavalry units as far as its battle honours are

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concerned, and the entire corps, or large detachments of it, have taken part in most of the campaigns which have been waged in India during the past century.

In addition, the regimental collection of medals won by the native ranks bears lasting testimony to the world-wide war services rendered to the Empire by individuals of the Corps. From the lofty Bamain Pass of Afghanistan to the southernmost limits of the Deccan, from Africa to China, have been seen the uniform and arms of the regiment. The Poona Horse first saw service in 1818 on New Year's Day, when 250 sabres, under the command of Lieutenant Swanstone, were present at the heroic defence of Corygaum, against 28,000 horse, foot, and guns of the then all-powerful Peishwa.

A monument over sixty feet in height, erected by the orders of the Government of India close by the village of Corygaum, testifies to the part the regiment took in that gallant defence, when over half its detachment was annihilated, and which, in the words of the Marquis of Hastings, was one of the most heroic and brilliant achievements ever recorded in the annals of the Army. A silver model of the obelisk, three and a half feet high, presented by one of the officers, is one of the much-cherished pieces of mess plate.

During the years 1818 to 1820 the Corps was employed on numerous petty frays throughout the Mahratta country, among which may be cited the capture of the forts of Basota (1,200 sabres present), Ryghur, and Prucheetgarh (500 sabres).

Twelve hundred sabres were present at the Cavalry action of Ashtee, which resulted in the defeat of the Peishwa and the capture of the Rajah of Satara. Five hundred sabres were also present at the capture of Mallegaum and Asigarh, while a detachment under Captain Swanstone captured the famous rebel Trimbuckjee Danglia. This latter exploit was highly eulogised by the Government of India in a letter, dated Fort William, August 17, 1818.

During the years 1820 to 1838 the Poona Horse was frequently employed in many small affairs, several of which were marked by stirring deeds on the part of individuals and small detachments, the recounting of which is prohibited by a want of space, their general character being very similar to the small frays which nowadays are met with on the north-west frontier. During this epoch of the regimental history many officers, afterwards distinguished, served with it, among

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whom was the famous Outram, who for some time commanded one of the divisions.

In 1836 the regiment ceased to be under the administration of the Government of Bombay, and was placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

In 1839 it embarked at Bombay for service in Afghanistan with the army of the Indus, and was present at the assault and capture of Ghuznee and the occupation of Cabul. Twenty-five sabres under Captain Outram took part in the pursuit of Dost Mohamed Khan as far as the Bamian Pass.

On the break-up of the army a detachment of 250 sabres remained behind with General England at Kandahar, and was present at two attacks on the Hykuzoie Pass, as well as under General Nott during the latter's numerous minor operations round Kandahar, the services of the detachment being brought to special notice.

The regiment served throughout the Scindh War, being present at the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.

During the years 1843 to 1855 it frequently supplied small detachments for quelling local disturbances in the Kokan and Deccan.

In 1856 it embarked at Bombay for Persia, and was present at the battles of Reshire, Bushire, and Khushab, at which latter action, in conjunction with the then 3rd Queen's Own Light Dragoons, it took part in the Cavalry charge which decided the day.

In this charge the Poona Horse struck the 1st Khuskai Regiment of Fars, almost annihilating it, and capturing its standard bearing a silver hand. For this conspicuous act the regiment was permitted to carry a standard bearing the silver hand (G.O.C. No 1, dated May 18, 1859), and the emblem was adopted as the regimental crest. The hand is believed to be of great antiquity, and bears the Persian inscription, 'Yad ullah fauk idehim' (the hand of God is above all things). An interesting relic of this deed remains preserved in the form of a silver snuff box, on the lid of which is the decoration (order of merit) granted to Dafadar Ghulam Hussain, who actually wrested the standard from its bearer.

During the troublesome times of 1857 several detachments were employed in stamping out the smouldering embers of the mutiny, the most important being 200 sabres in the pursuit of Tantia Topee.

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In 1875 two squadrons had the honour of acting as escort to his late Majesty King Edward VII., when he visited Bombay as Prince of Wales.

In 1879 detachments were extensively employed in stamping out dacoity in the Deccan.

In 1880 the Corps again saw service in Afghanistan, several of the Indian ranks gaining the Order of Merit.

In 1890 it proceeded to Bombay as escort to His Royal Highness Prince Albert Victor, and in September of the same year had the distinction of his being created Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment.

In 1900 the Regiment left Sirur, which had been its headquarters since 1817, and was conveyed by rail to Neemuch to relieve the then 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry which had been ordered on field service to China.

In 1902 the Regiment proceeded to Delhi to take part in the Great Durbar, and the regimental polo team succeeded in winning the cup presented by His Excellency Lord Curzon for competition among all regiments of the Indian Army.

The Poona Horse had always identified itself with polo, and was one of the earliest units to adopt the game as a regular pastime, the first of such games being played in September 1874 on their parade maidan at Sirur, and numerous trophies testify to their many triumphs on the field of polo.

The present caste constitution of the regiment is two squadrons of Rahtore Rajputs recruited from Jodhpore, one of Punjabi Mussulmans, chiefly Jenjuas, Awans, and Manas; and one of Khaimkhanis from Jaipur territory.

The Rahtore squadrons owe their existence to that fine old soldier and sportsman the Maharajah of Idah, better known as Sir Pertab Sing, and a very large percentage of the men are drawn out of the same clan from which spring the ruling princes of Marwar, of which latter Jodhpore is the capital.

The Colonel-in-Chief is Major-General George Hogg, C.B.

The regimental colours are dark green with a French grey horizontal band.

The colour of the uniform is dark blue, with French-grey facings; throat plume also French grey.

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CAPTAIN LEWIS EDWARD NOLAN
(*15th Hussars*)

By C. R. B. Barrett

Very few details of the earlier life of Captain Lewis Edward Nolan have hitherto appeared in print, and the additional facts contained in this brief article may therefore prove of interest.

Lewis Edward Nolan was the second son of Brevet Major Babington Nolan, and was born in the year 1820. Major Babington Nolan had served both in the 61st and 70th Regiments. As a captain he was on half-pay (4th West India Regiment), and when promoted to a brevet majority retired on half-pay 6th Foot.

The mother of Lewis Nolan and his two brothers had previously been married to a man of the name of Macfarlane, but whether he was or was not a military officer does not appear. She had, however, a son by this marriage, William Dick Macfarlane, who had served in the 42nd and 92nd, retiring from the latter regiment with the rank of captain. The eldest young Nolan, Archibald Buchanan, was born in 1816, the youngest, Edmond De Courcy, very late in 1820 or very early in 1821. All the brothers were destined by their father for a military career.

Major Nolan, when as a captain he went on half-pay, obtained the appointment of Vice-Consul at Milan, which was then in the Austrian Dominions. From his official position he was in touch with the best society there. He was popular, and among other notable persons was a *persona grata* to one of the Austrian Archdukes. Through the influence of the latter all three brothers entered the Austrian Service, being for the purpose of their military career placed at one or other of the Austrian military colleges. It was, however, the fixed intention of Major Nolan to provide if possible for at least one of his boys in the British Service, and the name of his eldest son was duly entered for a commission when an opportunity should arise, and

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perhaps also when the needful expense could be incurred. Archibald Nolan, however, remained in the Austrian Army, and his name was withdrawn in favour of the youngest, Edmond De Courcy. This took place in 1837, when the boy was about sevénteen, and was at the time a cadet in the Austrian Service and on leave in London. He was duly presented to Major-General Lord Fitz-Roy Somerset, K.C.B., at the Levée held on May 23 in that year.

Edmond Nolan had studied for three years at a military college near Vienna, passing thence to a cadetship in the 5th Regiment of Hungarian Hussars (late King of England's), of which Field-Marshal Count Radetzky, the Commander-in-Chief in Italy, was Colonel. The military attainments of the eldest are not recorded, but those of the youngest were little if at all inferior to those of the subject of this Paper, his brother Lewis Edward.

Edmond, in the event, followed the example of Archibald, and determined to remain in the Austrian Service. Accordingly, on January 31, 1839, his name was removed from the list of those desiring commissions, and the name of his elder brother, Lewis Edward, was substituted, the date of the application of Edmond being retained for him—*i.e.* 1837.

Of his son Lewis Edward, Major Nolan writes as follows to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, while thanking him for his kindness and patronage:—

'He is the same for whom your Lordship interested himself with General Klam, and is at this moment Lieutenant in the 10th Regiment of Imperial Hussars, and here (Edinburgh) on leave.'

Lewis Edward Nolan appears to have been fully determined to resign his Austrian commission if he could by any means obtain the

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commission in the British Service for which he longed. He had passed through a military college near Vienna, where his instructor was Colonel Haas, the instructor of the Imperial Austrian Cavalry. From his college Lewis Nolan was removed to a regiment, one year earlier than was usual, in consequence of the rapid advance he had made in his professional studies, and this transfer was made at the instance of the then Colonel Prince Liechtenstein. His service as a cadet was very brief, and his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant speedily came.

By 1839 he was the senior Lieutenant in his regiment.

Now what were the special qualifications of this gifted young officer. Beyond the ordinary and regulation professional studies as a Cavalry officer he added 'Engineering and Pioneering.' He could write, read, and speak like a native, German, Hungarian, French, and Italian, in addition to his native tongue. He had the reputation of being a splendid horseman, and what is more a skilled horse-master and swordsman.

Added to these he appears to have possessed the social accomplishment of being a more than ordinarily clever musician. While in the Austrian Service young Nolan was on leave in London during the summer of 1838—the Coronation year of Queen Victoria. At the Coronation Levée he was presented by Prince Paul Anton d'Esterhazy, who was then serving his second term as Austrian Ambassador to the Court of St. James. With the Prince, too, he was present at the Coronation Review, held in Hyde Park—a review at which it will be remembered that Marshal Soult and his horse parted company, it is said, owing to the tremendous cheers with which the veteran of the Napoleonic wars was received by the crowd. Soult's stirrup was broken, another pair was hurriedly fetched from the shop of Laurie the saddler. It happened that Laurie had in his possession a pair of stirrups which had belonged to Napoleon, and had been used by him on more than one campaign. These he sent to Marshal Soult, who, it is stated, was highly pleased by what was certainly a delicate attention.

Before leaving London Lewis Nolan called in due form on Lord FitzRoy Somerset at the Horse Guards.

Negotiations for the purchase of an ensigncy now proceeded, and the 30th, the 36th, and the 37th were one after the other selected as

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there were vacancies. In the case of the first-named regiment the purchase money, £450, was actually lodged, but the matter was not concluded. Eventually, on March 11, 1839, Messrs. Cox & Greenwood carried the business through, and Lewis Nolan was gazetted to the 4th (King's Own Royal Lancaster) Regiment of Foot. At, however, the urgent request of his father, who memorialised Lord FitzRoy Somerset on the matter, Lewis Nolan was transferred to the 15th (King's) Hussars on April 23, 1839, paying the difference. The 15th Hussars were then under orders for India, and Major Nolan particularly desired that his son should be in a regiment serving in India, and if possible on the Madras establishment, where, as he writes, 'Major-General Sir R. Dick was desirous to have him had he been in the British Service.'

Here, then, we find Lewis Edward Nolan, who had already made his mark in the Austrian Service and had attained to the rank of Senior Lieutenant, prepared to sacrifice all this for the sake of a commission in the British Army, and practically to re-begin his military life. Assuredly there was no lack of keenness for his country's service here. True he had a goodly experience to start with, which should have been by no means a negligible factor.

The 15th Hussars arrived in India in 1840, and for thirteen years Nolan served in that country. He obtained his Lieutenancy on June 19, 1841, and his troop on March 8, 1850. While in India he acted as A.D.C. to Lieutenant-General Sir G. F. Berkeley, the Commander-in-Chief in Madras, and subsequently as extra A.D.C. to Sir Henry Pottinger, the Governor of that Presidency, who had both discerned his exceptional talents as a Cavalry officer.

Nolan's was not, however, a case of the studious officer who sacrifices military duties and military sports to the accumulation of information more or less useful. As a trainer of horses in the regiment he was renowned, but of this later. As a military horseman we know that he excelled, and as a rider on the Madras turf his successes were many and great.

Still, he also found time to acquire several of the native dialects,

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which, added to his previous European linguistic attainments, furnished a striking example of intellectual power, nay, even of brilliancy. When their term of foreign service was concluded the 15th Hussars were ordered home. Having obtained leave, Nolan preceded the regiment to Europe, where, by permission, he travelled in Russia, and visited most of the places of arms in the southern portion of that kingdom as well as others in the north. Whether he studied the language is not known, but having in view the nature of the man it seems not improbable.

In 1851 his book entitled 'Cavalry: Its History and Tactics' was published. This book attracted the attention of the authorities at the Horse Guards, and the reputation of the writer increased. A second edition came out in 1854, and a third (posthumous) in 1860. Nolan was also the author of another professional book, published in 1852, of which a second edition also appeared after his death, and contained certain revisions which he did not live to see in print. This book was an adaptation of Monsieur Baucher's 'Méthode' (of Training Horses), and which Captain Nolan applied to English Cavalry horses.

On the outbreak of the Crimean War Captain Nolan was sent ahead of the Army to the East to purchase for the Government horses suitable for Cavalry purposes. On this duty he was most successful, the drafts of Syrian horses bought by him proving specially useful. Nolan received commendation from Lord Raglan, who was completely satisfied with his work.

On ceasing to purchase horses Nolan was appointed A.D.C. to Sir Richard Airey (afterwards Lord Airey), the Quartermaster-General of the Army. Of the events connected with the Balaclava Charge there is no need to write, they being too well known. It is, however, worth noting that the downhill gallop of Nolan when taking the historic written message to Lord Lucan in the lower ground excited the admiration of those who witnessed it. It has been stated that on his last ride Nolan was mounted on a troop horse of the 13th Light Dragoons, but this is a tradition as yet not substantiated. His bridle and plume ornament and his cloak, those used by him at Balaclava, are in the museum of the Royal United Service Institution. These relics have been deposited here by Lord Raglan, who inherited them from his grandfather the Field-Marshal. The two first named are here sketched, and it is to be remarked that one of the bridle bosses

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is non-regulation. Evidently one had been lost during the campaign, and Nolan had had the nearest substitute obtainable put on to replace it. The grave of Lewis Edward Nolan is apparently unknown, at any rate there is no monument to his memory on the field of battle; and his name does not appear in the 'Report on the Crimean Cemeteries of December 1872.' The facts stated in the above pages are absolutely ascertained, and throw some new light on the personality and the family of this gifted officer, whose untimely death was assuredly a deplorable loss to the regiment in which he was beloved, to the service which he adorned, and to the country to which he gave of his best. Yet it was of Nolan that the following lines were written, and by a Cavalry officer. 'There is, or rather was, an officer named Captain Nolan, who writes books, and was a great man in his own estimation.' The writer of this could not have really known Nolan. The opinions of 'C. W.,' late 15th Hussars, as appearing in the *Times* of November 16th, 1854, give a far clearer estimate of what Nolan was as regards his views on discipline and passive obedience to superiors.



Brief notice must now be made of the books written by Nolan. Clearly, he was a man who was born half a century before his time; but that fact in no way detracts from the value even to-day of the principles which he endeavoured to enforce more than half a century ago. And it is to be remarked that his merits were recognised by the authorities both at home, on active service, and on regimental duty.

His strictures on the military seat of 1852 were just, and the military seat which he advocated is that of to-day. His system of horse training was not merely visionary. From Lieutenant-General John Aitchison a letter is extant bearing the strongest possible testimony to the success of Nolan's methods applied by him to the horses of the 15th Hussars; and, moreover, recording that Lieutenant Lee, Nolan's successor, following the same system, obtained equally good result. To the same effect writes Major-General Lovell B. Lovell, 11th Hussars, and formerly of the 15th, and similarly does Lieutenant-

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Colonel G. W. Key, 15th Hussars. The latter states that Nolan's method of horse training 'perfectly succeeded with horses of various descriptions and breeds—Arab, Cape, Persian, Australian, and the country-bred horse of India—this last the least tractable of any,' and adds that all of these were previously unbroken.

Captain Nolan had the faculty of expressing himself with brevity and clearness. He objected to huge men on horseback, pace being power, and instanced the Indian irregular Cavalry in support of his argument. Objecting to the cuirass, and rightly, on the score of weight, he proposed, however, flexible steel gauntlets which, while leaving the inside of the hand bare, protected the hand and forearm. His views on heavy and light Cavalry were these:—

Heavy Cavalry required the heaviest and largest horses, but the men should be light and should be lightly equipped. Heavy men, as he puts it, bring heavy horses to the level of smaller and weaker horses. A good hunter should ever be above the weight of his rider—war is harder than hunting. This brings him to the declaration, and a true one, that a hunting and not a military seat is required for a Cavalry soldier.

His remarks on 'school riding' are just. A school rider, he avers, depends upon guiding and managing his horse for his seat, but a real horseman depends on his seat for controlling his horse. Speed and endurance are to be specially prized, but neither can be expected from overweighted horses; hence, in the long run light horsemen will prevail as they always have prevailed over heavy Cavalry. Four qualities render Cavalry formidable, and these are individual prowess, skill in single combat, good horsemanship, and sharp swords. This applies, of course, to shock tactics. On the question of swords and their sharpness Nolan deprecates steel scabbards, and probably his view is the true one, as no sword edge ever survived contact with a steel scabbard. In his views on overalls without straps, black leather gaiters shaped like Wellington boots and with a covered bar of steel running down the side, ankle boots, spurs detachable when not mounted and to be hung on the saddle, Nolan was perhaps less sound, but he adduces what he considers to be sufficient reasons in support of those views.

M. Baucher's *Méthode* was tried in the French Army, but was finally dropped. The inventor was, however, pensioned by Napo-

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leon III. It is curious to find that both Nolan, his father, and his mother wrote his name at one time Louis and at other times Lewis, and both names are to be found in the Army Lists. The obituary notice of Nolan states that both his brothers had already fallen on the field of battle. Probably their deaths took place during the Austrian campaigns of 1848 and 1849, when that wonderful old soldier Field-Marshal Radetzky achieved a European reputation as a soldier after he had reached the great age of eighty. The portrait of Nolan here given is derived from an oil painting of him which was executed in India. The signature beneath is a facsimile from one of his letters.

THE 'CAVALRY JOURNAL' COMMITTEE

A MEETING was held at the R.U.S.I. on December 9, 1910. Present: General Sir John French (in the Chair), Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, Colonel F. D. Wing, and Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham. Letters of regret were read from Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, Major-General Hon. J. Byng, and Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Yardley. The Managing Editor submitted his report of the working of the JOURNAL for the past year, and the financial statement (previously circulated to O. C. Cavalry Regiments), which were considered satisfactory and approved. General Byng, having been appointed to a Divisional Command, resigned the post of Honorary Editor, which was received with regret, and a vote of thanks accorded to him. The Chairman kindly undertook to arrange for the future editing of the JOURNAL. Captain R. W. W. Grimshaw, 34th P.A.V.O. Poona Horse and Adjutant of the Cavalry School, Saugor, was appointed Sub-Editor in India. It was left to the Inspector of Cavalry to arrange for a Sub-Editor for the Yeomanry *vice* Colonel R. B. Colvin, C.B., who is shortly vacating his command. Mr. Gilbert Wood was re-appointed advertising agent for the next three years. A vote of thanks was accorded to the Managing Editor for his services during the past year.

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SOME RUSSIAN VIEWS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY

By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B.

In a recent number of the *Russki Invalid* the views of three Russian officers find expression in regard to the future employment of Cavalry. This discussion is opened by Colonel Nowizki, who takes a pessimistic view of the future *rôle* of the mounted arm, while his opinions are stoutly combated by Colonels Krasnov and Fedotov.

Nowizki starts by declaring that the relations of the *arme blanche* and of the firearm have wholly altered within the last forty years, and that the change is particularly apparent in the tactical employment of Cavalry. Even in 1870 Cavalry had already lost much of its power of enforcing a decision in the tactical encounter, and since that date there is no instance on record of the successful employment of large Cavalry bodies, despite the fact that the old-fashioned views of those engaged usually led to a striving after success by ancient methods. The many failures of the Cavalry were at the time recognised, it is true, but very nearly always ascribed to accident or bad luck. The very moderate measure of success attained by the German Cavalry in 1870 was due to faulty armament; the sorry performances of the Russian horsemen in 1877 to indifferent leading; while the inefficiency of the Russian Cavalry in the last campaign is attributable to the total failure of the Regular regiments. It has been everywhere recognised that the other arms suffered from similar defects, but without surrender of their tactical importance. It would seem that in modern war there is a certain potent 'something,' which to an increasing extent shuts out the Cavalry from contributing to the tactical result. But even to-day the mobility of Cavalry enables this arm to exercise a disturbing influence upon an enemy by its mere appearance upon his flanks or rear, and it may therefore best be employed strategically; but on the other hand, it is particularly vulnerable against fire, it fails in sustained endurance, while the battle formations of to-day but rarely offer opportunities for attack, for the reason that owing to the range of modern

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firearms it must be kept at a distance from the actual front. The days when Cavalry could exercise a decisive influence on the battle are gone for ever; henceforth it can be no more than an auxiliary arm to be used for close reconnaissance, security, and communication.

The Cavalry must, therefore, devote its energies altogether to the strategic *rôle*; it has always enjoyed a certain measure of strategic importance, but the tactical uses of the arm have generally received hitherto the most attention because they were simpler and because they led to shock-action results. The strategical importance of Cavalry is to be found in the front of the opposing forces or on the enemy's communications. In the front its operations will lead to encounters on a large scale culminating in struggles for positions, and here the arm will fail; it can only be employed in the earlier stages, thereafter drawing off to a flank. From thenceforward the independent Cavalry can only be employed against the enemy's communications. These have become infinitely more vulnerable by reason of the vast trains which modern armies drag behind them, but operations should only be directed against the communications when these can be cut more or less permanently. A thrust at the enemy's lines of communication without a simultaneous blow at his front may effect a certain degree of injury, but will usually fail to put him in a really difficult strategical position. During any critical operations troops are particularly sensitive to any attacks or even threats against their communications. Here, then, is the only useful field for the employment of Cavalry in the future, and even here it may well happen that the actual fruits of such a raid may be culled, not by the Cavalry on the flanks or rear, but by the main army in the front. The importance of Cavalry has certainly diminished, but it must be said that it still preserves its individuality, and that Mounted Infantry, wheelmen, and other substitutes can never take its place.

In opposing the views of Nowizki, Krasnov lays great stress upon moral. He admits the increased power of modern firearms, but says that those by whom they are employed are exposed to many influences far stronger than those overcome by their predecessors. He attributes the very meagre results obtained by Cavalry in the late war to the *theories* of modern fire-power. These are responsible for the fact that whenever during manœuvres Cavalry has been opposed to the other arms, the cry has always been, 'That cannot be done in the face of Artillery and Infantry fire.' This has been repeated by all grades,

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and has finally filtered through and been believed in by the rank-and-file, until, thus hypnotised, the Cavalry was employed in the Far East. Krasnov then points to the splendid opportunities neglected by the Cavalries of either belligerent during the war, and especially during the battle of Mukden. 'There,' he declares, 'was *the* chance for Cavalry, at the moment when a terrible sandstorm darkened the air, when even villages were only faintly discernible, when the guns had ceased firing, musketry only sputtered here and there, and when no man could see a hundred paces to his front. At such a moment the lines of the Japanese might well have been ridden over by thousands of our horsemen, who, covered by the sandstorm, might without interference have destroyed the guns, the supply parks, and the reserves. But this hypnotising influence, which has denied to Cavalry any place on the battlefield, was responsible for distributing our masses of Cossacks all over the country. Consequently, there was no Cavalry to hand, while even had any been available, our manœuvre-teachings would have held them back from resolute and decisive action.'

It is in war, never in manœuvres, that the maddest Cavalry attacks are conceivable, if they are only unexpected and carried out with determination. And in war again the effect produced by bodies of charging horsemen is infinitely greater than during peace operations, when everybody knows that no harm can possibly happen to anyone. But Cavalrymen must thoroughly understand that no result can be secured without loss, and that they will have well effected their purpose if the enemy is really and truly overthrown. Krasnov then discusses the strategical employment of Cavalry, and urges that raids on communications should be carried even further than suggested by Nowizki. A mere interruption of the enemy's communications is not enough—the whole country in his rear should be laid waste. For this purpose the Cossacks of the First Levy should be made a separate organisation to the Army Cavalry, and from the twenty-four regiments of Cossacks available for service in Europe six Cavalry divisions should be formed. These, again, should be organised in three Cavalry Corps, under specially selected leaders, and should be permanently garrisoned on the left bank of the Vistula for the purpose of providing on the outbreak of war an impenetrable screen veiling the forward movement of the Russian armies. With a numerous Horse Artillery, machine guns, a good ammunition supply, and plenty of explosives, these Cossack divisions should be ready at any moment

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to operate in the manner above indicated. Krasnov hints that such an organisation is about to be carried out.

Fedotov also combats the opinions of Nowizki from the tactical and psychological point of view. He holds that the importance attached to the fire-power of modern small arms is an exaggerated one derived from rifle-range results. If the Infantry has been able to adopt new formations for movement under fire, Cavalry can do the like, while broken ground, twilight and darkness can all be favourably used by Cavalry. The moral of troops is to-day subjected to a strain far greater than of old; they are more liable to panic, and will, therefore, offer better opportunities to Cavalry in the future than this arm has enjoyed in the past. Fedotov points out that by denying Cavalry any place on the battlefield Nowizki has deprived it of its most important *rôle*—that of pursuit. On more than one occasion during the last campaign must the Japanese have regretted that it was impossible with only their victorious but exhausted Infantry to gather up the spoils or to turn a defeat into a rout. Since the war the Japanese have largely increased their Cavalry. Further, he points out that in considering the strategic employment of Cavalry Nowizki has again made no mention of pursuit.

In the war of 1877 the Cavalry was throughout employed only tactically and in this respect no worse than were the other arms; it was no fault of the Cavalry that nothing strategic was ever demanded of it. Since those days the Russian Cavalry has improved in all respects—in spirit, in organisation, and in training—but it was never called upon in the late war. 'We despised our enemy and gathered together an army composed of materials of different kinds, and by the time we had recognised our mistakes the initiative had passed from our hands to those of the opponent. . . . We confined ourselves to the lowest form of passive defence. If instead of the *make-shift* Cavalry employed in Manchuria only half our *Russian* Cavalry divisions had been sent thither, the campaign might well have assumed a wholly different complexion.' It is not difficult to imagine what might have resulted during the fighting on the Sha-ho, could seven or eight Cavalry divisions have been hurled against Oyama's communications. 'It is these modern armies, huge, unwieldy, and containing unwarlike, nervous elements liable to panic, which offer many favourable opportunities to a Cavalry possessing a leader who knows how to get the best out of it.'

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THE LONDON AND WESTMINSTER LIGHT HORSE VOLUNTEERS

By Captain B. E. Sargeaunt

The first troop of this Corps, composed mainly of city bankers and merchants, was raised in the year 1779, when the people of England were full of anxiety owing to the threatened invasion by the combined fleets of France and Spain. Everywhere in the country meetings were held, and all sorts of schemes were initiated for assisting the national defence of the islands. Money was subscribed in large sums, and, though in some instances it was devoted to increasing regular regiments, it was mainly employed in raising local companies of volunteers. From these local infantry companies, in some respects, the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers differed. They not only had the privilege of selecting their own officers, but the officers held their commissions direct from the Crown without any nomination on the part of the Lord Lieutenant.

During the Gordon Riots in 1780, the London and Westminster Light Horse was on duty and acquitted itself with distinction. This was shown by the fact that it was allowed to exist long after the volunteer companies throughout the country had been disbanded. In 1780, on the conclusion of the riots, the standards, which had been presented to the Corps by command of the King, were lodged in the Tower, and between 1783 and 1794 the Corps practically ceased to exist, though the members of it, one and all, kept themselves in readiness should their services have been required again at any moment.

In 1794 the Corps was revived on a basis of six troops of fifty sabres each, and the standards were taken back from the Tower with the usual military ceremony. At this time an order was framed by which the regiment could be called upon to serve anywhere within a

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ten-mile radius of the metropolis. The Lieutenant Colonel Commandant was Charles Herries, who had under him one major, six captains, six lieutenants, and six cornets. Captain Alexander Sinclair Gordon (represented in the accompanying illustration, which is taken from a rare engraving after Devis) was appointed adjutant on January 26, 1796.

As a mark of appreciation for the many valuable services rendered during these troublous times, two six-pounder field-guns were presented by his Majesty King George III., and formed part of the equipment of the regiment. It is interesting to note that these guns now adorn the entrance to the headquarters of the Queen's Westminster Rifles (16th Batt. The London Regiment), Buckingham Gate, London, S.W., and have appended the following inscription:—

'These field-guns were presented by King George III. to the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers about 1790.'

On the disbandment, in 1829, they were preserved by Colonel Charles Bosanquet, and presented by his grandson, C. P. B. Bosanquet, Esq., to the Queen's Westminster Volunteers, 1902.

One of the rules of the regiment was 'it is expected that every Gentleman will make a point of honour of being at the Post assigned to him a quarter of an hour before the time fixed, and never one moment after it.' Each volunteer signed an engagement to obey his officers, and the first thing to which every man was required to give attention was *riding*, for 'none will have cause to regret the time bestowed to learn as much of the menage as is necessary for a Dragoon, because it unquestionably improves the seat both for hunting and common riding.' No gentleman was considered fit to join the ranks until he had acquired an easy, graceful, and firm seat.

The expense of serving in this Corps was heavy. The cost of being a volunteer for the first year amounted to £147, and for the second to £78.

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CAPTAIN ALEXANDER SINCLAIR GORDON
(Adjutant),
London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers
(1796).

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15th (THE KING'S) HUSSARS.

1826

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Problem No. X.

Open to Non-Commissioned Officers of the Mounted Branches of the Regular, Territorial and Colonial Forces at home and abroad.

All Solutions should be as short as possible, and be attached to this page with the name, rank and address of the sender, and forwarded to

THE EDITOR,
'Cavalry Journal,'
Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.,

not later than May 13, 1911.

A Prize of a 'Cavalry' Watch will be awarded to the N.C.O. whose solutions are considered to be the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

From

Name .....

Rank ..... *Regiment* .....

Address .....

.....

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R.F $\frac{1}{126,720}$

PROBLEM No. 10.



EXPLANATORY NOTES.

1. Entrenchments at Village 'C' deserted, but recently occupied.
2. At Village 'D.' A few horsemen seen on hill to North. Fresh ashes of fires seen and traces of freshly vacated bivouac, about 300 by 400 yards in size, but scattered in appearance.
3. Patrols report a number of hostile horsemen occupying hills four miles West of Village 'D.'

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PROBLEM No. 10

(FOR N.C.O.s)

THE year is 1877; the season is summer, and very hot; the scene is Kazanlyk (south of the Balkan Mountains).

Russia and Turkey are at war. The Russian advanced guard, under General Gourko, has crossed the Balkans at the Hainkoi Pass. Part of Gourko's force is at the village of Hainkoi, and part has reached Kazanlyk.

You are a serjeant in a squadron forming part of the force at Kazanlyk. It is evening of a day in July; your squadron is ordered to reconnoitre west for a distance of about twenty miles.

The Squadron Commander sees all the officers and non-commissioned officers, and explains that the squadron is to proceed to village 'A,' starting at midnight, as a contact squadron, with orders to reconnoitre through the hills to the village 'D,' and clear up the situation.

On arrival at village 'A,' the Squadron Commander details No. 1 Troop, of which you are the Troop Serjeant, strength—one officer and twenty rank-and-file, to move out at daybreak (4 A.M.) and clear up the situation between village 'A' and village 'D'; all information to be sent to O.C. Squadron at village 'A' without delay.

The Squadron Commander in giving these orders explains to the Troop Officers and Troop Serjeants that his reason for detaching a troop instead of one or more patrols is that the country is very hilly and intersected. The passage of the foot-hills of the mountains can only be effected by the one road. Also, that the defiles may be held by parties of snipers, and that, therefore, a fight may have to be put up to gain information.

When near village 'B' the Troop Leader is shot by snipers—about four in number—who retire along the track to the south-west.

The Command now devolves on you. State:—

(1) How do you propose to conduct the reconnaissance?

(2) From what points would you send reports back?

(3) What means would you employ?

Give briefly any explanation you consider desirable in regard to the action you propose to take.

N.B.—The armament of both sides is that of the English Army to-day.

The sketch on the opposite page represents the country to be traversed, and the information given thereon is all that is available as to the enemy or his movements.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie.—During the manœuvre-period the majority of foreign military journals bring out two issues in one, and for this reason the August-September number of this *Revue* is a double one. The opening article—' Les Coups de Canon du Général de Rheinbaben '—is a criticism of the circumstances under which the battle of August 16, 1870, was commenced by the fire of the batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded by Rheinbaben. The author, Colonel Cordonnier, finds that these batteries acted rightly. The commander of the Second Army had been misled; he was marching on the Meuse when the French were about Metz, while the commander of the Tenth Corps was in doubt as to the correctness of the information furnished by Rheinbaben's Cavalry. Colonel von Caprivi, however, had grasped the situation and recognised that, while the Red Prince was in possession of the information, he was still too uncertain of its correctness to be turned from his march on the Meuse. To open fire upon the French army was the only means of publishing abroad and impressing upon all that the information *was* correct, and—*la parole revenait donc au canon.* The two papers which follow are of interest mainly to French Cavalry officers; they discuss, the one the *service intérieure*, the other, the existing Cavalry manual and the amendments proposed. The article on ' The Origin of the Chasseurs ' is continued, and is brought down to the close of the eighteenth century. British officers will find much of interest and value in the ' Exercices pratiques de Cadres,' of which the concluding instalment is here given. The last paper in this number is by a medical officer, who discusses the structural and physical conditions of the rider, and how these can be bettered in order that he may be able to get the most out of his horse by being himself so fitted by health and build as to exert his full powers under all circumstances.

Some thirty-five pages of the October number are occupied with the first portion of a review of Bernhardi's ' Reiterdienst,' which does not appear to have been as yet translated into French, and in which the ideas of the German general are compared with the views obtaining in the higher ranks of the Cavalry of the Republic. The writer—P. S.—points out that the Cavalry of France is placed at a double disadvantage—by reason of its numerical inferiority and by reason, too, of the difficulty of turning out a complete Cavalryman in the short period of service now disposable. He further suggests that to bring itself up to date this arm can rely neither upon tradition nor upon war experience, nor even upon the lessons of modern war

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which *se sont déroulées* under conditions quite different from what would occur in a great European war. Cavalry must, therefore, base the principle of its employment upon pure theory or upon peace experiences, which naturally are lacking in *l'effet matériel des armes et l'impression morale*. Colonel d'Urbale writes on the expected revision of the 'Cavalry Training Manual.' This officer is not now serving with the Cavalry, but, from the publicity here accorded to his views, it must be taken that they are considered to carry weight. He holds that with the present short service any attempt to preserve what he calls *l'homme-orchestre* must be abandoned, that it is hopeless to expect to bring all men up to the same standard, and that men must be induced to specialise; tradesmen, such as tailors, saddle-makers, smiths, &c., should only be drilled dismounted; that it is now impossible to make of a two-year soldier both a good farrier and a first-rate horse-soldier. He considers that the sword exercise might be greatly simplified; it is wholly based on the idea of a swordsman standing on his feet, and has no reference to the realities of the mounted combat. In the rifle exercises the men should be familiarised with aiming and sight-setting at extreme ranges, at which the writer considers Cavalrymen dismounted will usually be engaged. He objects strongly to the position prescribed for the charge in the regulations of 1904—the arm and sword outstretched and the men's heads bent along the horses' necks; he would have the whole of the French Cavalry armed with the lance. Colonel d'Urbale's remarks are to be continued. The account of the 'Origin of the Chasseurs' is carried down in this number to the days of the Revolution, and we are reminded that the 13th Chasseurs, formed in 1792, were commanded at one time by the celebrated Chevalier de Saint-George, as part of the American Legion, and later by Pérignan, who became one of Napoleon's marshals. Professor Barrier, the director of the Government Veterinary School at Alfort, has a paper on the 'Conformation et Choix du Cheval de Cavalerie.' He seems to be of opinion that in France the breeding of horses for Cavalry is not conducted on proper lines, that the French sires are not of the same class as ours, or so capable of breeding a stock suitable for Cavalry; and, further, that the prices given by the French remount agents are not high enough to get the best of the young horses—they only pay for animals actually of a light *draught* class. He also complains that when buying horses for the Cavalry the agents go rather by the stud history of the sires and dams than by the conformation, paces, temper, &c., of the young horse himself. Professor Barrier closes by urging the remount agents not to buy the inferior animals they at present accept merely to make up their numbers, and so by their inaction force the Government to raise the purchase price.

The *Revue* for November begins with a paper entitled 'Après les Louanges,' in which an anonymous writer criticises the manœuvres held this last autumn in Picardy. In regard to the Cavalry he complains of the confusion noticeable in manœuvre, the opening out, the belated deployments prior to the charge, and to the method of the charge itself—a number of isolated and unsupported attacks delivered by small bodies and at too slow a pace. He states that the *service de sûreté* was neglected; that some of the leaders of Cavalry bodies seemed to be under the impression that their one and only mission was to bring off a Cavalry fight; and that the mounted arm was accompanied in the field by too many impedimenta. The review of 'Reiter-

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dienst ' is continued, as are also the remarks on a revised manual, by Colonel d'Urbale. This officer is of opinion that the dismounted fight will, as a rule, partake more of the nature of a *démonstration* than of a combat to be fought out, and that one of the chief advantages of the employment of machine-guns with Cavalry will be the increased fire effect obtained without dismounting so many troopers. He also, like the anonymous critic quoted above, finds fault with the manœuvring power of the French Cavalry: ' Notre Cavalerie,' he says, ' n'est plus manœuvrière; elle ne sait plus évoluer; elle est lourde à manier.' This officer is now Chief of the Staff of the 13th Army Corps. The number closes with some tactical schemes set for subalterns at the Cavalry School.

Spectateur Militaire.—There is nothing of strictly Cavalry interest in the last quarter's numbers of this fortnightly, but in an article on the British Army now running there is, in the issue dated November 15, an appreciation of the English soldier which is not without a general interest: ' The English soldier is wholly recruited from the poorer classes. Men who are either out of work or who are too lazy to seek for it find in barracks a refuge from their wretchedness. The general intellectual level of the Army is not very high, but on the other hand there is no difficulty in training the men, thanks chiefly to the great liking all Englishmen have for sport (*sic*). They are well disciplined and respectful towards their officers, who appear to look upon them as grown-up children, unable to think for themselves. But since there has been everywhere a tendency to develop the initiative of the individual the officers now pay increased attention to the mental faculties of their men and have dropped the hauteur of their rank. A great blot on the British Army, but one which is gradually disappearing, is drunkenness. At one time this vice was equally rampant in the ranks as among the officers; all took a pride in being able to drink to excess, and even as late as 1880 it was by no means unusual to hear of terrible deaths from the effects of alcohol. To-day there is far more sobriety in the Army, thanks to a strict discipline and to wise regulations on the subject. The characteristics of the British soldier are altogether different from those of the Frenchman; he has less dash, but greater steadfastness. He does not possess the extraordinary *élan* of which we read on every page of French history; but with the Englishman there are no ups and downs—he remains ever the same. The spirit of the English soldier is less quick and less impulsive, but his imperturbability makes him more dependable. Less affected by externals, by the recollection of what has passed or by the hopes and fears of the future, his mind is altogether fixed upon what is happening at the moment. He makes up for his low standard of intelligence due to his inferiority of extraction by his implicit obedience. Being incapable of understanding the reason for what is taking place, and particularly for any movement either for or against his side, he is not oppressed by possible dangers. Consequently he moves forward to certain death without troubling himself whether it is at hand or far off; and for this reason the moral of the British Army is but little affected by ill-fortune.

' In short, the characteristics of the English soldier are an easy forgetfulness of the bad times which are past, indifference to those still to be faced, and a want of foresight, which he shares with soldiers of all nations.'

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Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—The October number of the Austrian Cavalry Journal begins with a number of reminiscences, recalled by different well-known writers, of the more brilliant episodes of the work of the German Cavalry in the Franco-German War. Captain Niemann, of the General Staff of the Seventh Corps, follows with his prize essay on 'The Organisation of the Strategic Reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division,' and he works out his conclusions on the basis of a normal Cavalry division operating in a hostile country, but relieved from the cares of supply. Starting with the assumption that the army Cavalry must acquaint itself as rapidly as possible with the situation of the enemy, he finds that in the first three days the total distance covered, and the distance between the distant patrols and the main body of the Cavalry division, will have already become so great that despatch-riders will hardly succeed in bringing back information; and that further, in case of contact with the enemy, the ordinary exertions will be doubled. The author utters a warning against using the newly introduced technical methods of transmitting information in order to increase the distances covered; rather should we use them as means for quickening communication and for economising reserves of strength, so that, where technical means fail, we shall still be in a position to transmit information as heretofore by mounted men. Captain Niemann seems to suggest that no advantage is gained by pushing out to the front unnecessarily; the army direction only requires time for freedom of operation, and should give daily directions as to within what limits the Cavalry should reconnoitre. The author then describes at some length and with the help of diagrams how this strategic reconnaissance should be carried out—when the enemy is distant, when he is close at hand, when he is in strength, and when the Cavalry division is covering a flank. Captain von Möller writes on the operations of the Austrian Cavalry in the south of France after Waterloo; and Count Lamberg has a short paper on 'The Needs of Cavalry'; briefly epitomised, these are—better remounts, picked men, a light sabre—*mit dem,* as the enthusiastic writer expresses it, *es ein Vergnügen ist herumzuhauen,* a rifle and bayonet. 'An Austrian Staff Officer' writes a paper in vehement condemnation of the bayonet as an extra weapon for Cavalry; but then he is opposed to dismounted action by Cavalry altogether, and considers that, although the improvement in modern firearms imposes increased difficulties of action on this arm, these must be overcome by a higher cultivation of the Cavalry virtues.

In the November number Major von Ruffer, whose writings are well known, describes the work of the Cavalry in last year's Manœuvres from a regimental officer's point of view. On September 1 last a Memorial was unveiled at Floing, to the north of Sedan, to the memory of the French horsemen who, under Margueritte and Galliffet, fell in the historic charges on that day forty years ago, and opportunity is here taken to give a brief account of all that took place. Captain Niemann, of the General Staff, writes on 'Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance during the Fight by the Divisional Cavalry'; he admits that this can be but indifferently practised during peace, with the result that during manœuvres patrols take all kinds of liberties with their opponents, and yet bring back information which, though often bulky, is frequently of no practical value. He pleads for a proper system based on field-service principles; the formed bodies should make for and hold advanced

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positions whence they can send forward patrols, and from which they will be in regular rearward communication with the commander. Based on these positions, the patrols can work forward and ensure the rapid and effective transmission of information. They will thus be always in touch with their leaders, patrols will not be duplicated, fighting power and horseflesh will be economised. Rittmeister Viktorin, who commands an Austrian Cavalry machine-gun detachment, writes on the 'Relative Advantages of Draught or Pack Equipment for Machine-guns.' He has served with both systems and with detachments armed with Maxim and Schwarzlose guns; he confesses that at first he was all in favour of the draught equipment, but has since altogether changed his opinion, chiefly by reason of the lessons of the late war and because of the pack system (Schaller) in use, of which, however, he gives no details. He insists upon his detachment being trained as Cavalrymen, and claims that his guns can follow him over any country. His record for coming into action from line is 23.66 seconds from the command 'Halt! Action Front'! to the opening of fire, with guns properly laid for the range and on the target indicated. Limbering-up takes no longer. The weights must be well distributed with the Schwarzlose gun and Schaller pack-saddle, for he says he had no galls on a 'raid' in which he recently took part, covering 73½ miles in 28 hours, and that the pack-horses, on the whole, were rather fresher at the end than were the riding-horses of the detachment.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—In this periodical for the quarter, as in others not specially catering for the mounted arm, there is a singular dearth of papers of outside Cavalry interest. In the issue for November 10 there is an article by Major-General Zobel dealing with the work of Remount Depôts and the raising of remounts. Germany possesses altogether twenty-five remount depôts—viz. in Prussia eighteen, in Bavaria four, in Saxony two, and in Würtemberg one, with a total establishment of about 13,600 remounts—a number which on mobilisation and at certain periods of the year may be nearly doubled. The general arrangement of the depôts is everywhere much the same, from fifteen to twenty remounts being kept together in an airy, well-lighted enclosure, where they are fed. General Zobel details the amount of their forage ration, but adds that no green food is given to the remounts ready for issue to the troops. Connected with these enclosures are roomy paddocks, where the remounts are daily let out to run loose; but in order to break them in to proper paces, give them a certain degree of preparation, and also to discipline them, each depôt possesses also an exercising run, usually in the form of an oval about 500 metres in extent, and every enclosure and paddock has its own separate entrance thereto. As a rule, about one hundred remounts from different enclosures are run into this exercising ground at one time, and are then taken round by members of the depôt staff, some riding in front to set the pace and others following in rear. Every remount is thus driven round in company for an hour or two daily, and it is wonderful how quickly the young horses take up the different paces set (walk, trot, or gallop) and how temperate they become. This system has now been in use for some fifteen years, and the greatest importance is attached to the improvement it effects in the frame, sinews, and lungs of the remounts. General Zobel considers the plea which has been put forward that young horses would do better were they permitted to run

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loose in droves on moorland. He admits that theoretically such a system has much to recommend it, but in reality it is impracticable. Suitable moorlands cannot be found everywhere, and in any case they would have to be in connection with a depôt of some kind, so as to facilitate the easy and rapid collection and distribution of remounts on mobilisation. It would, however, be very difficult to find anywhere suitable moorland capable of supporting droves amounting perhaps to 800 or 900 young horses; and further, moorland deteriorates unless it is made to support cattle as well as horses, and it is not every remount officer who knows how to do the best for both. It is impossible, too, to give moor-bred remounts the same educational attention as the young horses receive in the depôts. General Zobel also claims that the depôt remounts are not only singularly free from disease but that when passed to the ranks they last longer than the horses of any army—ten years—and that even when cast they are fit for work in the train. Casualties among remounts in depôts amount to about five per cent. of the strength during the year. Although the year's remounts are not taken to manœuvres by the Cavalry, they would be all available in case of war; they *are* taken to manœuvres by the Artillery, who do not notice any ill results.

The Editor of the CAVALRY JOURNAL has been favoured with the receipt of the first number of a new paper which is to be entirely devoted to literature of all kinds connected with the horse. The paper is entitled *Das Pferd,* and is published at Bâle, in Switzerland. The editor is the 'Kantons und Universitäts Stallmeister' Oscar Fritz, who has travelled in England, France, Austria, and Germany, and knows all that is worth knowing about the horses of these countries and about the men who breed and ride them. He intends in his paper to appeal to all who love horses, whether they have all or nothing to learn about them. The initial number, which appeared on December 1, seems full of promise; there is an article on the mounted sports of ancient days; a translation of one of Whyte Melville's papers from 'Riding Recollections' on the training of the young Irish hunter; articles on riding, bitting, the gradual evolution of the Cavalry seat with the disappearance of the armoured knight; and, among others, short papers on driving and on the comparative conformation of horse and man. *Das Pferd* is fully illustrated, and is published on the 15th and last day of each month at 30*c.*, or 30*pfg.*

The CAVALRY JOURNAL wishes every success to this, the only paper which has hitherto appeared devoted entirely to the horse.

'Cavalry Tactics as illustrated by the War of the Rebellion.' Part I. (U.S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). Price $1.50 (6*s.*).

A most useful work of reference. The author has taken the principles of Cavalry Tactics and Armaments in turn and illustrated them by references to accounts of operations in the War of the North and South from 1863 to the end. The extracts which are given of the works referred to are too brief to be of value by themselves, and the student must have a considerable library of these war books at his disposal to get real value from the work.

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'Compulsory Service.' By Sir Ian Hamilton. With a Preface by Mr. Haldane. (John Murray.) Price 2*s.* 6*d.*

At Mr. Haldane's request Sir Ian Hamilton, late Adjutant-General to the Forces, wrote a memorandum on Compulsory Service which Mr. Haldane has thought it right to publish.

The strategic situation is perfectly clear to Sir Ian Hamilton, who sets forth the essentials as follows :—

(*a*) The maintenance of British supremacy at sea.
(*b*) The maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.
(*c*) What he calls a 'long range' force for action anywhere on the confines of the Empire.
(*d*) A 'short range' Expeditionary Force of half a million men for action on the Continent of Europe.

'Whatever you do,' he concludes, 'remember, I beg of you, that the best defence to a country is an army formed, trained, inspired by the idea of the attack. If I have succeeded in bringing prominently to your notice the dangers of mere defence, then indeed I shall feel I have not written in vain. Once we fall into that pitfall, once we begin to develop (and pay for) "a tremendous potentiality for defence," by just so much must we paralyse our own attack, sacrifice our initiative, and imperil all that we stand for in the world.'

In a hundred charmingly written pages he attempts to persuade himself and the Secretary of State for War that the half-million men whom he proposes to put up against the most perfectly organised and best trained army in Europe can be got by a system of Voluntary Service, and among them he includes our present Territorial Force, whose value he thus appraises on a previous page : 'After being embodied for six months they might reasonably expect to defeat a first-line hostile Regular force, *if they outnumbered that force considerably.*'

In his preface Mr. Haldane gives the principles worked out by the Committee of Imperial Defence, *i.e.* :—

(*a*) Supremacy at sea.
(*b*) Garrisons to guard the land frontiers of the Empire.
(*c*) An Expeditionary Force of Regular soldiers.
(*d*) A citizen army for passive defence of the British Isles against an invading force of 70,000 men.

'Interest in the question of compulsory military service in these islands is very general,' writes Mr. Haldane, 'and it is important that materials for forming a judgment on the subject should be before the public.'

Sir Ian Hamilton has put them plainly enough, though the reader possibly may not interpret them as the writer of the preface appears to desire that he should.

'Our Regular Army in 1913.' By the Duke of Bedford, K.G. (John Murray.) Price 1*d.*

A reprint from the *Morning Post* of the Duke's arguments against the alleged reduction of our Imperial fighting strength by the present Government.

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'Cavalry Taught by Experience: A Forecast of Cavalry under Modern Conditions.' By Notrofe. (Hugh Rees.) Price 2*s.* 6*d.*

The operations of an independent Cavalry brigade with a battery and a field troop R.E. are here worked out in detail on the principle of 'The Defence of Duffer's Drift,' with three separate and progressive solutions to the problem set.

The teaching is clear, well put, and in accordance with the existing training manuals.

'The Sovereignty of the States.' By Walter Neale. (Neale Publishing Company of New York.)

An oration 'delivered to the survivors of the Eighth Virginia Regiment while they were gathered about the graves of their fallen comrades on the battle-ground of Manassas, July 21, 1910,' the motive of which it is difficult for an Englishman to appreciate, interesting though it cannot fail to be as setting forth the story of the evolution of the American nation.

'Dressage en Liberté du Cheval d'obstacle.' With seventy illustrations. By Count Louis d'Havrincourt. (*Sport Universel Illustré,* 13 Rue de Londres, Paris.) Price 6*f.*

Himself one of the first riders in France, winner of countless prizes in the show-ring with his jumpers, among others the championship at the Dublin Horse Show in '97 with his French-bred horse 'Bistouri,' the Count gives in these pages a detailed account of the methods which won for him his success.

This is quite the most exhaustive, most interesting, and best illustrated work on the schooling of jumpers and hunters that has yet appeared, and we strongly commend it to our readers; it should find a place in every Cavalry officer's library.

'Signalling Messages.' By a Signalling Officer. (Gale and Polden.) Price 3*s.*

A book which will save endless trouble to instructors in 'making up' messages.

'Notes on the Training, Equipment, and Organisation of Cavalry for War.' By Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Edwards, D.S.O., P.S.C., Indian Army. (William Clowes and Sons.) Price 6*s.*

The author has read widely and has brought both careful thought and practical experience to bear upon the problems with which he deals.

His notes are exhaustive, and treat of—

(*a*) The duties Cavalry will have to perform in war.

(*b*) The training, equipment, and organisation necessary to enable them to fulfil their various *rôles.*

There are very good chapters on Reconnaissance, Protection, Shock Action, and Dismounted Action; and there are some excellent illustrations of the author's method of carrying the rifle.

Altogether the notes are thoroughly sound and in accordance with the teaching of our manuals, and Cavalry officers will find them most valuable.

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NOTES

THE INDIAN ARMY

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to confer the honour of becoming Colonel-in-Chief upon the 6th King Edward's Own Cavalry.

Imperial Cypher and Crown.

His Majesty the King has approved of the undermentioned changes in the designation of the following Regiments, the new title being here given in each case :

18th.—King George's Own Lancers.
26th.—King George's Own Light Cavalry.
38th and 39th.—King George's Own Central India Horse.

'QUEEN MARY'S OWN'

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of the '18th (Victoria Mary Princess of Wales's Own) Hussars' being in future designated 'The 18th (Queen Mary's Own) Hussars.'

THE KING'S LETTER PARTY

The War Office has recently ordered the King's Letter Party to be withdrawn from the London District; and the detachment of the 7th Hussars, which last performed the duty, has rejoined the regiment at Hounslow.

'BOARDED-OUT HORSES'

The Army Council have announced the conditions under which 'boarded-out' horses may be used by allottees for Territorial Force trainings. An allottee who is a member of the Territorial Force may himself use the horse for his own camp training (including manœuvres), but such horses are not to be otherwise employed in connection with Territorial Force trainings. The payment laid down in paragraph 779, Territorial Force Regulations, may be made in respect of horses so used. No compensation will be payable in the event of loss, but, as the risks covered will be borne by the public, these need not be insured against by the allottee. It is to be understood that the use of these horses by the Territorial Force does not in any way affect the right of the military authorities to use them for a month each year if so desired.

Royal Cypher and Crown

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HORSES FOR PURPOSES OF WAR

By Captain Hereward Wake, D.S.O., General Staff

(Lecture delivered to 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, February 10, 1910)

I.—Prefatory Remarks

The subject of my Paper is 'Horses for Purposes of War.' The methods to be employed in training and riding the troop-horse are subjects which are interesting enough, but which the lecturer, being an Infantry officer, will be very careful to avoid in the presence of officers of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. It is therefore proposed to deal with the horse question from the broad point of view of organisation for war—a point of view that may appear less interesting to the lover of horses, but which to the Army, and therefore to all officers, is a question of the highest importance and, it may be added, owing to our peculiar conditions, one of considerable difficulty.

Organisation may appear a dry subject, and many people shudder at the mention of it. But, as a matter of fact, it is a subject which seems to require a very great deal of the practical knowledge and experience of a soldier. The organisation of a squadron, for example, is based on the principles of the tactical employment of mounted troops; the subdivision into troops and sections, the allotment of officers, N.C.O.s, scouts, signallers, farriers, trumpeters, horses and transport, is all arranged in accordance with war experience and tests in the field.

Organisation is a subject in which war is continually before one, and peace takes a second place.

Peace and War.—In peace time, as you are probably aware, the Army's requirements in horses are very small, and should be easily supplied. Our peace establishment in horses at home is about 22,000, and the Remount Department purchase about 2,500 horses a year.

But armies exist for war only, and an army must justify its existence in peace by so organising and training its component parts, and by so arranging for the provision of all it requires, that when war comes the troops are ready in every respect to take the field and encounter the foe; and we must also be able to maintain the Army in the field at war strength as long as the war lasts. We shall see how far the British Army is prepared for war in these respects.

The Sort of War we Prepare for.—The first thing to decide is for what sort of war we ought to be prepared. That, of course, is a question of policy which is decided for us. We maintain at home two distinct armies—the Expeditionary Force for action overseas, with its various reserves and adjuncts; and the Territorial Force for home defence. The most serious kind of war will undoubtedly compel us to place both these forces simultaneously on a war footing; and that is the kind of war for which we prepare, and which will now be discussed.

It may be argued that such a contingency as the simultaneous mobilisation of all our armed forces is very improbable. That is a matter of opinion, perhaps, but no one can deny that we *might* have to do it, and nothing less than preparation for a general mobilisation will suffice; it must also be noted that a partial mobilisation will be covered by these preparations.

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Taking, then, a really serious war as the test of our arrangements, let us consider:

1. The number of horses we require on mobilisation and immediately subsequent to mobilisation.

2. Our resources in horses.

3. Our arrangements for providing and issuing horses to the troops and our system for dealing with the supply of remounts, and the care of sick horses in the field.

II.—Horses required on Mobilisation

Tables A and B.—In Tables A and B will be found the detailed number of horses maintained in peace, and required in war, by the Cavalry Division and a division of the Expeditionary Force. These figures are from the latest War Establishments, except that for a Cavalry regiment 86 additional horses are shown, of which 50 are to be boarded out, which numbers have received recent approval.

Table C.—In Table C will be seen a short statement of the horses required for the Expeditionary Force. Column 1 is the peace establishment, column 2 the war establishment, and column 3 the difference between peace and war *plus* 10 per cent. for those horses in peace which are unfit or under five years of age.[1] It will be observed that for the Expeditionary Force about 50,000 horses must be added to bring the Army to a war footing—the Expeditionary Force being, as you know, composed of the Cavalry Division, six divisions, Army troops, and a certain quota of L. of C. troops.

Table D.—Table D gives the horses required for the Territorial Force of fourteen mounted brigades and fourteen divisions. This force has no horses of its own in peace, except a certain number of officers' horses and Yeomanry horses, in some cases a number so small as to be almost a negligible quantity. Originally the Yeomanry rank and file brought their own horses, but now the great majority hire their horses for training, and many horses go the rounds of three or four camps in the season. A few units keep a certain number of horses to train their recruits to ride; but it would be unsafe to rely on any horses of the Territorial Force being available on mobilisation. We must therefore conclude that 86,000 odd horses will be required for the Territorial Force.

Total Numbers Required.—If you will now kindly refer to Table F, you will see that on mobilisation we require about 150,000 horses, of which no less than 136,500 will have to be begged, borrowed, or bought at very short notice.

Of this 136,500, 56,000 are riding horses, 74,000 are draught horses, and 5,000 or 6,000 are pack animals—horses, ponies, or mules.

Wastage.—But this is not all. Provision must also be made to maintain the army in the field, and the troops at home also, at war strength—that is, to make good the wastage of war. You will doubtless remember the very large wastage in horseflesh that took place in South Africa, and if that is the only example one could go by, one would be forced to a somewhat gloomy conclusion as to our abilities to maintain our armies in the field with the resources at our disposal.

[1] The normal percentage of riding horses unfit for service in possession of regiments at home—say 30 per cent.

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TABLE *A*—HORSES OF A CAVALRY REGIMENT, BRIGADE AND DIVISION

	1 Peace establishment at home	2 War establishment	3 Required to complete, adding 10 % of peace estabmt. for unfit and under age
A Cavalry Regiment—			
Headquarters.	5	32	27
Machine Gun Section	33	33	3
3 Squadrons	563	525	19
Total	601*	590	49
Details left at base	—	48	48
A Cavalry Brigade—			
Headquarters.	5	35	30
3 Cavalry Regiments	1,803	1,770	148
Total	1,808	1,805	178
Details left at base	—	144	144
The Cavalry Division—			
Headquarters.	nil	70	70
4 Cavalry Brigades	7,232	7,220	711
H.Q. Div. Artillery	nil	18	18
2 Horse Artillery Brigades . . .	552	1,584	1,087
H.Q. Cav. Div. Engineers . . .	nil	11	11
4 Field Troops	208	324	137
1 Wireless Tel. Company . . .	56	114	64
1 Cav. Div. T. & S. Column . .	153	424	286
4 Cav. Field Ambulances . . .	nil	300	300
Total	8,201	10,065	2,684
Total details left at base . . .	—	576	576
Grand Total	8,201	10,641	3,260

* Including 36 extra to be provided in this year's estimates and 50 trained horses boarded out.

Of the 10,641 horses of the Division, 7,689 are riding, 2,833 draught, and 119 pack horses.

A Cavalry regiment, leaving 10 per cent. of its peace establishment of horses at home, takes the field with its full war establishment of trained riding horses. Only a few of the horses left at base have to complete their training there. (See note to preceding page.)

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TABLE *B*—HORSES OF A DIVISION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

	1 Peace establishment of 1st Division	2 War establishment	3 Required to complete, adding 10 % of peace establishment for unfit
Headquarters	9	69	61
3 Infantry Brigades	126	933	820
Artillery—			
H.Q. Div. Artillery	4	24	20
3 Field Artillery Brigades	822	2,877	2,138
1 F.A. Howitzer Brigade	274	504	257
1 Heavy Battery and Amm. Col.	33	177	147
1 Div. Amm. Column	nil	1,048	1,048
Engineers—			
H.Q. Div. Engineers	nil	10	10
2 Field Companies	44	146	110
1 Div. Tel. Company	21	41	22
2 M.I. Companies	nil	348	348
1 Div. T. & S. Column	136	363	242
1 Div. T. & S. Park	34	452	422
3 Field Ambulances	nil	294	294
Total	1,503	7,286	5,936
Details left at base	—	32	32
Grand Total	—	7,318	5,968*

* Riding 1,154
Draught 4,573
Pack 241
5,968

The peace establishments of the 6 Divisions are not identical; about 6,000 horses per Division will be required to bring them to a war footing.

South Africa.—In a paper on the losses in horses in South Africa, the following passage occurs: 'In the first four months of 1902 the mounted troops were completely remounted 2½ times, the artillery 1¾ times.' Over half a million horses and mules perished in that war, and this was primarily due to want of organisation.

But South Africa is more a warning of what to avoid than a fair example of what may be expected in the future: first, because the conditions were exceptional, and, secondly, because I hope and believe we have profited by experience. Besides, we are not likely to send a large army to the southern hemisphere 5,000 miles oversea again, nor perhaps to fight under conditions demanding so great a proportion of mounted troops.

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The South African war, however, has done great service in drawing attention to a subject of much importance and previously neglected.

TABLE *C*—HORSES OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

	1 Peace establishment	2 War establishment	3 Required to complete, adding 10 % for unfit
General Headquarters	nil	94	94
2 Army Headquarters†	nil	76	76
The Cavalry Division	8,201	10,065	2,684
6 Divisions	9,018*	43,716	36,000
Army Troops	2,158	6,820	4,878
L. of C., including H.Q.	nil	5,412	5,412
Details left at base	nil	1,088	1,088
	19,377*	67,271	50,000*‡

* Approximately. † If required.

‡ Riding 13,000
Draught 36,000
Pack 1,000
50,000

TABLE *D*—HORSES OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

War Establishment

14 Mounted Brigades	25,020
14 Divisions	57,606
Army Troops	3,129
6 Heavy Batteries (Coast Defence)	402
Total	86,157*

* Riding 43,567
Draught 38,366
Pack 4,224
86,157

The Territorial Force has practically no horses in peace time, those required for training being hired.

Data for Estimating Wastage.—We cannot say for certain, of course, what the wastage in horses is likely to be; but if we know where we are likely to fight and what sort of war we are preparing for, we ought to be able to make a very good guess by comparing the wastage in horses in previous wars.

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The first point, it is almost unnecessary to say, is that you cannot apply one general rule to every class of horse in the field. In the Cavalry there is the riding horse, the transport horse; the gun-horse in the Artillery and the horse that grows comparatively fat in the second line transport of Infantry are liable to different losses; while the horse on L. of C. may work hard, but with ordinary luck never hears a rifle fired in anger.

For our present purposes it will perhaps be sufficient if we consider only what the wastage of horses is likely to be during the first six months after war begins.

T. F.—The Territorial Force being primarily for home defence, we may perhaps safely assume that it will remain during this period at home, and is not likely to be engaged on a large scale in active operations. It is therefore suggested that 10 per cent. of casualties among their horses for these first six months is an ample provision. This allows them 8,600 horses, *vide* Table E.

E. F.—The horses of the Expeditionary Force are divided, as may be seen, into five categories for the purposes of calculating wastage.

The figures are mere guesswork, as they must be, but will perhaps be accepted as a reasonable statement of our probable maximum requirements, including the casualties that may occur during a short sea voyage.

The following percentages have been allowed for wastage in six months :—

40 per cent. for riding horses of mounted troops.
35 ,, for other horses of the Cavalry Division and mounted brigades.
30 ,, for field artillery horses, except Divisional Ammunition Columns.
25 ,, for remaining horses of field units.
15 ,, for L. of C. horses.

A total of nearly 20,000 horses.

TABLE *E*—ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE MAXIMUM REQUIREMENTS AT THE END OF SIX MONTHS

	War strength	Wastage per cent.	Required
Territorial Force	86,339	10	8,634
Expeditionary Force—			
Riding horses of Mounted Troops	11,421	40	4,568
Other horses of Cav. Div. and Mtd. Brigades	3,720	35	1,302
Field Artillery, except Div. Amm. Columns	20,892	30	6,267
Remaining horses of Field Units	25,826	25	6,457
L. of C. horses	5,412	15	810
	153,610	—	28,038
Or between 3 and 4,000 per month.			

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TABLE *F*—RECAPITULATION

	Peace establishment	Less 10 % unfit	War strength on mobilisation ‡, Table C	Required on mobilisation approximately	Required by end of 6 months, see Table F approximately
Expeditionary Force	19,377	17,439	67,271	50,000	28,000
Territorial Force .	—	—	86,339	86,500	8,630
Total .	—	—	153,610	136,500	36,630

About 20,000 are registered at 5*s.* per head per annum.

A few thousand horses of officers and Yeomanry are privately owned.

Regular troops not allotted to the Expeditionary Force (*e.g.* Household troops, Training Brigades R.F.A., Depôts, Coast Defence troops, &c.) possess about 3,000 in peace time. These numbers need not be increased on mobilisation.

The Special Reserve and Militia in Ireland require a certain number of horses—perhaps 500.

III.—RESOURCES IN HORSES

It having been thus ascertained how many horses we are likely to require, or rather *ought to have ready*, for the first six months of a national war, let us now consider what supplies of horses are in the country from which to draw in time of need.

Decline in the Supply.—The decline of horse-breeding in this country has lately received a good deal of attention, and it need hardly be said that motors have a great deal to do with it. Motors, in fact, no longer require the assistance of horses, as they did at first, to get them to their destination.

Now, it cannot be denied that the motor car, cab, and 'bus have deprived the Army of a large number of a very useful class of horse, and that in this matter the end is not by any means in sight. But it appears probable that the few thousand horses we require for the Army in war are there to be had, if we like to take them.

The breeding of horses is not, strictly speaking, a question which at present concerns the military authorities.

The lecturer had not intended to be drawn into a discussion on the subject of horse-breeding for Army purposes, but the recent articles in the Press, and the opinions publicly expressed by members of the Royal Agricultural Society, the Hunters' Improvement Society, and a new body called the 'Earmarking Association,' cannot be passed over.

It seems that these well-meaning gentlemen are labouring under a delusion. They do not see the difference between peace methods and the necessities of war.

Their proposals almost amount to a suggestion that the Army ought to breed and keep in peace time all the horses it may require in war, or else pay heavy premiums for the privilege of registering. They cannot realise that

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the Army is not directly interested in horse-breeding, as long as the number of horses fit for military purposes existing in the country is ample for their largest requirements.

It is true that horse-breeding is not in a good way, and a soldier would hesitate to say one word that would prevent steps being taken by the Government to prevent our supply diminishing or deteriorating. But if we know that there *are* enough horses, and that all we want is the power to take them compulsorily when we want them, just as every other country does, it makes one smile to read that the scheme of registering horses is unpopular, that this or that firm or private owner is not going to sell his horses when war comes, or that the Jobmasters' Association object to the Territorial Army because it teaches men to ride, and so takes away their means of livelihood.

Such proposals as the above lead one to believe that these associations are trying to help the military authorities without having consulted them; and it will be noticed that at most of the meetings recently held representatives of the Remount Department have been conspicuous by their absence.

This seems evident from the following facts:—

1. The number of horses we require on mobilisation is inaccurately stated and generally grossly exaggerated.

2. The number of horses in the country fit for Army purposes is far larger than is admitted.

3. Their proposals as a rule involve an expenditure which puts them out of court at once, and is also unnecessary.

Abroad.—In France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Japan every horse is registered, and every horse can be taken on mobilisation. All these countries have increased and improved their supply of horses by maintaining Government studs and owning mares which are kept by farmers and others.

It is merely suggested for consideration that the Government would do well to own a number of properly qualified stallions and mares, the latter to be in the hands of farmers, the Army keeping first call on their progeny at a certain price.

Any measures to curtail the export of horses require careful consideration, as if you take away our foreign trade you will inevitably diminish the supply which is created by the demand.

Mechanical Transport.—As to the future, if one considers that the motor-driven vehicle is only more used because it is more efficient, and if we remember that the roads in civilised countries are bound to improve and to keep pace with the machine that uses them, one may venture a prophecy.

For road transport the horse may eventually become a thing of the past, and the only horses an army will want will be riding horses, and draught horses for guns and ammunition wagons.

But we must not anticipate the future—the present must be catered for.

As has been said, we require 136,000 additional horses on the outbreak of war, and as there will be no time to draw on foreign markets which may be available, we must rely entirely on the home supply for this number.

Numbers in the Country.—It is computed that there are eight million horses in the whole British Empire, of which over three millions are to be found in the British Isles.

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France.—Now France has about the same number as ourselves, three millions, though probably not so many that fulfil military requirements, and, according to a lecture delivered at the R.U.S.I. a few years ago, France expects to obtain most of the horses she may require to place her army on a war footing from her own home supply. And the number she requires is between 500,000 and 600,000. There should therefore be no difficulty in collecting our 136,000 horses in Great Britain and Ireland.

Why, probably there are three or four times that number in the country suitable for military purposes.

Horse Census.—But hitherto there has been no horse census in the country, and we have consequently had to work rather in the dark.

Devonshire Test.—The first experiment in registering horses so far as is known that has been made, was conducted last year, in the county of Devonshire, by the County Association. The particulars are obtained from a paper read by Lord Fortescue, the President of the Association, at a meeting of the National Defence Association.

The services of 500 gentlemen were obtained to classify the horses in the various categories, light and heavy draught, riding and pack, and the whole thing cost £170, which worked out at 1*d.* a horse.

It was found that there were in Devonshire 44,000 horses over 14 hands, not including those used for breeding and those still unbroken. Of these 34,500, or 78 per cent., are fit for military purposes, more than half being heavy draught horses. This number, curiously enough, is equal to the total of agricultural horses in the county as registered in the returns of the Board of Agriculture. These returns show 1,200,000 horses, and if this rule can be applied everywhere, we may take it that there are that number in Great Britain and Ireland suitable for military purposes.

Rough Estimate of Numbers of Suitable Horses.—The military horse, among other things, should be not less than 5 years of age and not more than 12. In the German Army horses are not put in the ranks in war until they are 7 years old. Taking the average life of a horse at 15, this would give us about 50 per cent. between 5 and 12, or a million and a half. Then, if we cut out stallions and breeding mares, small ponies and horses with less than four legs or other deficiencies, we may take half the remainder. That gives us, at the very least, 750,000, and of these we may say probably 200,000 will be up to the riding standard.

Supply Sufficient.—It is thus apparent that if only we can get them when we want them, there are still any quantity of horses for our requirements at the outbreak of war.

For replacing casualties, there will be a large surplus, much larger than we are likely to need. If we fight for a year, we may take it we are not fighting in England, and so we shall have complete command of the sea and foreign markets will be open to us, and the Home Defence troops will not require all their horses. And it need not be pointed out that horses that were 5 years old at the beginning will be 6 at the end of the year, and that means another 100,000 at least added to the supply.

We have, in fact, all the horses we require, and, except perhaps in riding horses, a splendid reserve of many times that number in addition. As regards

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riding horses, if anyone doubts these conclusions the lecturer would invite him to come to Crick on a Pytchley Wednesday and see for himself.

Purchase of Horses for South Africa.—And yet we find that during the South African war, out of 311,000 horses that were brought over the sea, only 77,000, or about a quarter, were purchased in the British Isles, and incidentally under 40,000 from our Colonies. The remainder, nearly 200,000, were purchased in foreign countries.

No doubt the comparative cheapness in some foreign markets was an attraction. A Russian or Argentine cob would be had for £5 to £8.

But these foreign animals were not all cheap, and, besides, we have to reckon not so much on the price of the animal in his own country, as on the cost of placing him fit and well in the theatre of operations, a cost largely increased by a long journey over sea and land.

The Horse Market.—The real reason was that sufficient horses at home were not in the market, and as the existing supply of horses depends on the demand for them in peace time, and no one is going to breed horses on a large scale on the chance of a war, the numbers required for war never *will* be on the market, at a reasonable price.

Now in small wars, or in wars like South Africa, when there is no urgent cause to disturb the people at home and injure their industries by arbitrary measures, we must take what we can find in the market or go abroad.

Market not to be Depended on.—But in a serious national war, such as we are considering to-day, half measures would be folly. We cannot waste time by asking who's got a horse to sell, and then haggling over the price. In about a week every screw in the country would be worth its weight in gold, and the best horses would never be seen at all, unless we offered a ruinous and ever-increasing price. No hopes can be held out to the owners of horses with three legs that such exceptional opportunities will occur to dispose of them.

This brings us to the third part of our subject.

IV.—Arrangements for Obtaining Horses on Mobilisation

S. 115 *A. A.*—Section 115 of the Army Act, revised last year, contains these words :—

'His Majesty by order, distinctly stating that a case of emergency exists, and signified by a Secretary of State, . . . may authorise any general or field officer to . . . issue a requisition . . . requiring justices of the peace to . . . issue their warrants for the provision . . . of carriages . . . and horses of every description. . . .

'The Army Council shall cause due payment to be made for carriages and animals, . . . and any difference respecting the amount of payment . . . shall be determined by a County Court Judge. . . .'

The Right to Requisition.—This means practically that on emergency, which I suppose means a general mobilisation, the military authorities can seize all the horses they require, and pay for them afterwards. It is possible that the realities of war are sufficiently strange to the English people to cause a considerable commotion when we do exercise these powers. But that is not our affair.

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Form **A.** *Boroughs.*

NOTE.—The partic be used in any way for purposes of taxation.

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Police Division _____ Date _____ 191 .

ADDRESS IN FULL	Mechanically propelled Vehicles suitable for transport								
	Maker's Number (not to be confused with the registration number)	Tractors	Lorries or Motor Wagons				Trucks, Wagons or Trailers fitted to be drawn by Tractors or Lorries	Motor Buses, including Char-a-bancs	
		Registered under Heavy Motor Car Order and not exceeding 6 tons tare weight	Steam	Petrol			2 to 5 tons carrying capacity		
			Carrying 4 to 6 tons	Carrying 10 to 20 cwt.	Carrying 1 to 4 tons	Carrying 4 tons and over		Carrying 10 to 20 passengers	Carrying 20 passengers and over
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)

Form **B.**—For use of Occupiers.

You are requested to furni ot be used in any way for purposes of taxation.

olice officer will call for it.

ADDRESS IN FULL	Mechanically propelled Vehicles suitable for transport								
	Maker's Number (not to be confused with the registration number)	Tractors	Lorries or Motor Wagons				Trucks, Wagons or Trailers fitted to be drawn by Tractors or Lorries	Motor Buses, including Char-a-bancs	
		Registered under Heavy Motor Car Order and not exceeding 6 tons tare weight	Steam	Petrol			2 to 5 tons carrying capacity		
			Carrying 4 to 6 tons	Carrying 10 to 20 cwt.	Carrying 1 to 4 tons	Carrying 4 tons and over		Carrying 10 to 20 passengers	Carrying 20 passengers and over
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)

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This power we shall have, and it is our business to see that arrangements are made to make quick and sure use of it when it is given.

The War Office Scheme.—These arrangements have been under consideration for some time at the War Office, and the Assistant Director of Remounts has brought out a scheme which has already been sent round to those concerned and of which I will try and give you the outline.

It is no use being able to take the horses we want unless we know where they are, so the first thing to be done is to register all the horses in the country. Some of you may be aware that about 20,000 horses are registered at the War Office at 5*s.* a head, which gives the right to purchase them when required in time of war. This scheme is very suitable for small wars and was put in force in 1900, but for a general mobilisation it is out of place. Why pay 5*s.* a head when we can get them without ?

The registration in the present scheme includes no payment in peace to the owner. The scheme was published in the War Office Letter which is now before you and is briefly as follows :—

Police Census.—The police authorities have undertaken to take a complete census of all horses by counties every December. The first census, it is believed, was completed last month, though the returns are not available.[1]

The police send round Form B (which you have before you) to every man in the district who keeps a horse or vehicle. This form is filled up, under police supervision, and returned.

The police then fill up Form A from Form B and forward it to the County Association, which informs the War Office of the total numbers in the county.

The County Association.—Acting on this information, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, under instructions from the War Office, gives each County Association as exact a statement as possible of the maximum numbers they will have to find :

(*a*) On mobilisation.

(*b*) Subsequent to mobilisation as drafts.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief also names the places where horses will have to be collected, which are called ' Collecting Centres.'

The County Association then has to set up the machinery for collection. The horses will have to be carefully classified according to their suitability for various kinds of work, and it will probably be necessary to divide them into several classes. This is also to be the work of the Association. It will then have to divide the county into areas, appoint collectors, and divide the total *quota* of horses to be provided among the areas, according to the supply available. The collector should know where every horse and vehicle in his area is located, and how he is going to get it to the ' Collecting Centre,' if required.

These arrangements will be kept up to date. The police census is to be revised every year, and the officers appointed by the County Association are to be kept informed of changes and keep their lists abreast of those changes.

Machinery for Taking over Horses.—So much for registration. The next step is for the military authorities to provide some machinery for taking over the horses they require on mobilisation.

[1] This lecture was delivered in February 1910.

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This machinery has not been finally decided upon, but in brief will be as follows :—

The horses are taken over under the directions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, who would probably find it convenient to send officers for the purpose from the nearest Regular or Territorial Army Service Corps unit, which distributes horses to other units. It must be noted here that on mobilisation the functions of the Remount Depôts cease.

By this scheme it should be quite feasible for all the horses required to be actually handed over to their units within a week after the order to mobilise is issued.

In this sketch of the scheme I have tried to avoid details, for the reason that it is only just started and much remains to be arranged, much to be corrected no doubt, and many objections and criticisms have to be met. But it may be hoped that in its final form it will meet our requirements, and at present it depends on the good will and assistance of all who have been asked to help to make it a success.

Hiring.—The only suggestion which may be offered is that it would be better not to buy outright the horses of the Territorial Force, but to reserve the right of returning them if not required at the end of six months, paying hire for them if so returned. By this plan we should be able to select the horses worth keeping at our leisure, and should avoid the risk of getting a large number of 'screws.' We might also mobilise and have no war at all, in which case the horses could simply be returned.

V.—Provision of Remounts and Veterinary Systems

Remounts and Sick Horses in the Field.—The subject of the provision of remounts to the troops in the theatre of operations, and dealing with sick horses in the field, would provide material for a lecture by itself.

The diagram marked G is an endeavour to cut this part of my Paper short and to give ' form at a glance.' A very few words will suffice to explain it.

Remounts.—The remount arrives at the port of disembarkation, called 'The Base.'

Here he is taken to the Base Remount Depôt, where he is kept to recover from the effects of the voyage and to receive a certain amount of training, for which *personnel* is provided. At the beginning of the war those horses which are left at the Base by their units also go to the Base Remount Depôt.

The remount next proceeds by train to one of the Advanced Remount Depôts, which is situated at the Advanced Base, probably, but not necessarily, *rail-head,* whence he is sent up to the troops as required.

Sick Horses.—The whole question of dealing with sick horses in the field is now under consideration, and little can be said at present. The first thing to recognise in this matter is that the Cavalry officer is not a veterinary officer, and it is not desirable to train him as such or to add to his duties those connected with the care of sick horses, except that he must, of course, know how to treat slight ailments and accidents. For the same reason the veterinary equipment carried by Cavalry regiments should be of the lightest description. Apart from wounds and casualties due to extraordinary exertions, it is calcu-

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lated that 10 to 12 per cent. of horses will always be incapable of work with units in the field.

A Cavalry regiment that is encumbered with sick horses is not in a state of efficiency for service in the field, neither are there officers or men to spare to look after them. Sick horses, as a matter of principle, should be got rid of as quickly as possible.

There are three ways of getting rid of them :

(1) Destroying them.

(2) Leaving them behind.

(3) Handing them over to another unit.

The first two alternatives being somewhat wasteful and expensive, the question is, Who is there to take charge of the temporarily disabled horses left in the track of mounted troops wherever they go, and in the track of other troops also ?

The answer is, the Veterinary Sections, of which there are six.

DIAGRAM G

Showing organisation for dealing with remounts and sick horses for the Expeditionary Force in the field.

Organisation for training remounts at home during war :—

Cavalry Depôts.
Reserve Cavalry Regiments.
Reserve Brigades R.F.A.
Transport Depôts A.S.C.



There is no time to set up field veterinary hospitals with the mounted troops. All they can do is to get their sick horses back to the nearest Veterinary Section as quick as they can, and if they cannot be sent back, they can either be left in villages or towns, making the civil authorities responsible for the care of them, or they must be destroyed if unlikely to recover or if there is any chance of their falling into the hands of the enemy.

It has been suggested that what is required is a small mobile field veterinary hospital to take sick horses back from the fighting troops to the Veterinary Sections. They could also on the return journey bring up remounts; in fact, this would almost be their more important duty, so they might be called

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'Remount and Veterinary Mobile Sections.' If they were each capable of handling, say, 250 horses, one for each Cavalry Brigade would bring up 1,000 horses at a time to the Cavalry Division, and take back 1,000 sick horses. In the same proportion for the rest of the E. F. we should have about fourteen of these Sections always working between the fighting troops and the Veterinary Sections, and no doubt a great saving in horses would be the result, but the above remarks are only offered as a suggestion.

It will be observed from the diagram that the weak spot at present seems to consist in the want of a connecting-link between the unit and the Advanced Base.

Director of Remounts.—The officers who are responsible for the working of the system of remounts in the field and dealing with sick horses are the directors of Remounts and Veterinary Sections respectively. They receive their orders either from the Inspector-General of Communications or direct from the Quartermaster-General at General Headquarters. Their offices are situated as a rule on the lines of communication, and they have deputy directors at General Headquarters.

Territorial Force.—There is no organisation at present for dealing with the sick horses of the Territorial Force, but it is proposed to organise a certain number of Veterinary Sections, of which some of the *personnel* would be enlisted only on mobilisation.

VI.—Conclusion

In conclusion, the lecturer would again refer to the importance of organisation, which is really the secret of the whole business. For want of proper organisation we earned the contempt of European officers by our conduct of business connected with horses in South Africa. 'British officers,' said a Frenchman, 'talk more and know less about horses than the soldiers of any other nation.' We certainly proved ourselves in horse matters *as a nation* to be pretty hopeless. We bought the wrong horses, we sent them into the field totally unfit—they often died in the train on the way to the front—and we enlisted thousands of men who had never seen a horse in their lives, and sent them against the Boers as mounted troops.

But it is suggested that it was not that we were ignorant of horses, we were ignorant of war, and we had not studied one of the first requirements of war, which is to organise and re-organise, and not leave our arrangements to be improvised at the last moment.

WAR MEDALS

A number of King's and Queen's South Africa war medals and clasps for non-commissioned officers and men who served with various mounted Colonial corps are still awaiting claimants. Applications for these decorations should be addressed to the Deputy Director of Ordnance Stores (Medal Branch), Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, accompanied by discharge certificate and full particulars of service.

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R.H.A.

It is announced in Army Orders that in future non-commissioned officers and men, other than drivers, of the Royal Horse Artillery will be equipped with swords and sword-belts. These will only be worn on full-dress occasions, and will not be carried at training or manœuvres, nor on any other occasion when in service dress.



INCIDENT IN AN ARGENTINE RIDING SCHOOL

When visiting the barracks of a Cavalry regiment in the Argentine Republic recently I was shown a recruits' ride, where they were taught to ride over a series of jumps without reins or stirrups. In order to show they were not losing their heads with the strain of riding, they had to keep shouting aloud the theoretical training which they had imbibed that morning.

One recruit was galloping round shouting 'The Republic has as its President the distinguished Senor Don Porro.'

Just then his horse struck a fence hard and rolled over, but the gallant recruit, as he turned a 'cartwheel' in the air, went on to shout, 'And the name of the Adjutant-General of the Army is Aguirra.'

And as he sat, finally landed, bruised and dizzy, he was still heard crying, 'And the colonel of this regiment is Marco di Paolo.'

R. S. S. B.-P.

THE MAHDI'S LAMP

An interesting relic of the Battle of Omdurman has recently been placed in the Crypt of the Royal United Service Museum, Whitehall—the actual lamp, made of red and white glass, found by the British troops hanging over the tomb of the Mahdi, after the demolition of the mausoleum. Since then it has been preserved in the Mess of the 21st Lancers, and was deposited by the officers of the regiment prior to their departure abroad.

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A TROOP AT WINTER TRAINING (EQUITATION)

The following system of training and inspecting a troop at 'Individual Instruction,' *vide* 'Cavalry Training, 1907,' section 2 (1), is put forward as a suggestion. It has the merit of having been tried and found a success.

All equitation work is to be done in the open; no menages or riding schools should be used when the weather permits.

All the men in the squadron should go through this winter training, horses being borrowed from other squadrons to mount them if necessary; such horses to be those which are known to require extra individual training.

Instruction to be given entirely by sections, classes to be never larger than eight men and an instructor; extra men over eight of sections to be formed into a fifth or sixth section, under an instructor.

Troop-sergeants, staff-sergeant-majors, and staff-quartermaster-sergeants should instruct a ride if necessary, the whole to be supervised by the troop officer.

Rides to move about in line at about a horse's length interval, never in single file; the regulation pace to be always maintained.

Aids to be known by all, and to be illustrated mounted when being repeated.

The following programme to be carried out:—

1. Independent riding on the equitation ground and round the station, especially of horses that are bad at leaving the ranks; extension motions and body-bending exercises; fitting of saddlery.

2. Pacing of individuals and rides in line; mounting and dismounting of restive horses by themselves in the open or on roads.

3. Sections riding through one another to train horses for mounted combat.

4. Troops to be taken about in columns of sections extended and at two or three horses' lengths intervals, and the rear sections to come to the front and the front sections to go to the rear, the whole being on the move, by means of the ladies' chain; quitting stirrups and taking them up on the move.

5. Mounted combat for every man and horse, sword *v.* sword, and sword *v.* lance, either on the pool system by sections or on the knock-out principle by troops, the winners being knocked out and the losers thus getting the most fighting. Singlesticks should not be used provided proper masks are available to make the use of the sword practice gymnasia safe.

6. Pointing at dummies on the ground on a large figure-of-eight course.

7. Individual riding on a small figure-of-eight course; chasing a dummy on a horse.

8. Bending track between posts.

9. Snatching a handkerchief from a sword in the ground.

10. Heads and posts, if possible, with spring dummies, or with heads so fixed that they will spring back into position after being struck, thus saving fatigue men.

11. Tent-pegging with lances and swords at pegs or spring dummies, care being taken that horses are kept straight after passing the peg or dummy; section tent-pegging.

12. Lemon-cutting, using four lemons, if possible, instead of only two and a peg.

13. Mounted football; making horses lie down; rounders.

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14. Jumping small lengths of fences without wings on saddles and bare-back.

15. Jumping a long fence without wings by half sections from opposite sides, bridle hand to bridle hand.

16. Jumping a course consisting of a hurdle, timber jump, bank, ditch with no fence, water jump with no fence, and V-shaped ditch.

17. Following a leader in single file by sections over rough ground, round trees, over the jumping course the wrong way on, drawing swords, returning them, dismounting and leading down a steep incline, riding down slopes, &c.

18. Jumping with led horses and by sections.

Notes on the above

a. All instructors, including troop officers, should be able to do anything required of the men on their own horses or on any that give any difficulty to any of the men.

b. Fatigue men should either belong to squadrons not going through the course or be men who are within a few months of their time for discharge to the Army Reserve.

c. The training must be progressive and a careful programme be made out, so that troops or rides are not kept waiting, and know always where to go.

d. Men should always rise in their stirrups.

The other subjects for this individual instruction are mentioned in 'Cavalry Training,' as already stated.

Judging distance can be carried out during equitation, and the linking of horses and teaching horses to stand by themselves can be practised at the same time; or, if on sandy ground, horses can be off-saddled and be given the chance of a sand bath.

Scouting and distant patrolling will come towards the end of the month, when the horses are fit for the work.

Troop officers and all instructors should give lectures on horse management, thrift, care of arms, use of aids, and fitting and care of saddlery, but not necessarily in the barrack-room.

Instructors should be allowed to choose the subject they prefer to lecture on.

Musketry should be carried out as usual during the month, preceded by practice on the miniature range.

Inspection of the troop by the squadron commander. The commanding officer should be present at the inspection.

The squadron commander should arrange to see the scouting and long-distance patrolling of each troop; also to hear some of the lectures during the course.

Inspection at equitation.

The troop to be formed up in column of sections in single rank, at one horse's length distance; instructors on the right of sections; sections to be numbered from the right, exclusive of instructors.

The troop officer to give all executive words of command; instructors to repeat them where necessary.

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1. Without advancing from the centre of sections to one horse's length interval extend. Right and left pass—march.

2. Troop will advance. Walk—march.

3. No. 4 (or rear) section by ladies' chain to the front at a trot. Trot.

4. Similarly the other three sections.

5. No. 1 (or leading) section by ladies' chain to the rear.

6. Similarly the other three sections.

7. Trot (slowly).

8. Rear section halt, rein back a horse's length, forward at a canter on the right leg through the intervals to the front, and then trot.

9. Rear section cover leading section.

10. Third section halt, rein back one horse's length, forward at a canter on left leg to its place, and trot.

11. Walk. Halt.

12. Rein back—first and third sections at a canter to the right in file, second and fourth sections at a canter to the left in file. Forward.

13. First and fourth sections circle left, second and third sections circle right, by individuals.

14. The whole forward in original direction.

The troop is now in two columns of two sections each.

15. First and third sections left turn, second and fourth right turn. Sections pass one another bridle hand to bridle hand.

16. Trot.

17. First and third sections right incline, second and fourth sections left incline. Forward in column of sections.

18. Halt.

19. Named men will be sent out 100 yards to the front, flanks, or rear, and halt facing outwards.

20. Rear section on the haunches about.

21. Men of front and rear sections and flank men of other sections figure of eight three times, left leg leading.

22. Men out of the ranks rejoin at a walk.

23. The whole right pass—march. Halt.

24. The whole on the forehand, about.

25. The whole on the haunches, right turn.

26. Right shoulder in. Right pass shoulder out.

27. Left ditto.

28. Halt.

The squadron commander will then see *all* instructors and different men from each section at the various exercises enumerated in the programme, selecting the men himself.

He will also see each man go down the jumping course, and each section doing follow the leader, led by the troop officer himself or the staff-sergeant-major. He will then let the troop officer show him anything he likes which his troop can do.

It is a good thing to have a competition among the troops at section jumping, section tent-pegging, &c., or marks can be given for all the various competitions throughout each troop to encourage competition.

F. R. L.

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Field-Marshal Horatio Herbert, Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, has been appointed to the Honorary Colonelcy of the 1st County of London (Middlesex, Duke of Cambridge's Hussars) Yeomanry.

SNOW-SHOES FOR HORSES

(Translated from "The Officers' Club Magazine"—Japan)
Contributed by the General Staff

It is said that the remark: 'For more than three months in the winter snow falls in the locality round Heku-riku' is no exaggeration, and that the small snowfall of recent years is exceptional.

Since the temperature of the air is generally not much below freezing point, the fallen snow is not fully frozen, being similar in this respect to that which falls in the country north of Sendai when winter is turning into spring.

Thus when the depth of snow is below six inches, and the bare ground is showing in places, the snow 'balls' on the underneath of the horses' shoes, and even though frost-shoes be used the spikes have no effect, the horses slip about at every step, and frequent cases occur of men and horses coming down together. On account of this not only do the horses grow timid and lose their free action, but great fatigue is caused to the joints and tendons, and great hindrance is caused to the instruction in riding and to the care and training of the horses.

The chief reason for the comparatively large number of cases of relaxed leg joints, especially of those of the forelegs, in my regiment, was the impossibility of carrying out training on account of such conditions during more than three months of the winter.

Thinking that if such 'balling' of snow under the shoes could be prevented, not only would both men and horses feel safe, but also great advantages would result as regards training and the care of horses, after my appointment in January 1908 I specially appointed a committee of examination, and tests were commenced.

Although the season was already late, and there was only time for one change of shoes, it is fortunately possible to consider that the object of the tests was obtained. (See Appendix I., Results of Tests.) Commencing with the first series of tests, two kinds of horseshoes were fitted—(*a*) with the under inner edge bevelled off; (*b*) similar to (*a*) but with a leather sole added, and each squadron commander and the veterinary surgeons were ordered to examine the results.

But unfortunately the period of extreme cold was already almost over, and owing to the small amount of snow this year sufficient time was not left for carrying out these tests.

A special request was therefore made to the G.O.C. Division, and on his consent being obtained a week's test march was made in the Etchu district, where snow lies very deep. Just at that time there were several good days of snow, and not only were the objects of the tests fully attained, but we were also enabled to inspect the results still further on return to barracks. (See Appendix II., Report of Results.)

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From the reports of the squadron commanders and veterinary surgeons the following conclusions were reached :—

1. The use of the leather sole (to the hoof) with the *bevelled shoe* * was successful in preventing the snow from 'balling' and did not affect the hoof in any way ; this shoe would therefore be suitable for districts where the snow does not freeze, as, for instance, in the vicinity of Kanazawa, but it requires about twice the expenditure and work involved by the other pattern.

2. Although the use of the bevelled shoe without leather usually reduced the balling of the snow as compared with the ordinary horseshoe, yet when the snow was rather dry, slightly frozen, and mixed with mud, the results were exactly the same as with the ordinary shoe. However, the expenditure and labour in the case of this shoe is very little greater than with the ordinary horseshoe, and it could certainly be employed with advantage when the leather sole cannot be fitted owing to considerations of money or time.

3. With frost-shoes, even with a leather sole for the hoof, the balling of the snow was the same as with the ordinary shoes ; sometimes the balling even covered the spikes.

These frost-shoes are therefore not suitable to the vicinity of Kanazawa, but in the country north of Sendai the use of these shoes would in my opinion offer some advantage from the end of January until February or March, during which period the snow is inclined to melt and no slipping is to be feared ; the spikes can therefore be removed.

In addition to the experiments with various classes of snow-shoes for horses mentioned in the appendices, it was desired to try the effect of shoeing the horses with rubber, but no experiments were made as it was considered that the expense of such shoes would prevent their adoption for army use.

The turtle-back plates for attachment to frost-shoes (the invention of Mr. S. Miura of Ogawa-machi in Miyagi Province) were not experimented with, as they were not suited to this locality.

Report on the March Carried Out to Test the Snow-shoes for Horses. 13.2.09. Captain Hiraishi, Lieutenant Sakane, and Veterinary Surgeon Matsuzaki.

1. *Object.*—In addition to the different snow-shoes, this march was carried out to ascertain the extent to which Cavalry are affected in action and on the march by various depths of snow. In these tests, in addition to experiments with snow-shoes, horses shod with ordinary shoes and others shod with frost-shoes were employed in order to discover the relative value of these patterns as well.

2. *Organisation.*—Omitted.

3. *Conditions of roads, weather, and snow.*—Omitted.

4. *Results from each kind of shoe.*—See Appendix II.

5. *Shape of the hoof and its effect on the balling of the snow.*—In the case of a flat and wide hoof the balling was but slight under all circumstances, especially when a leather sole was used. In the case of a narrow hoof, on

* *i.e.* the 'concave' shoe.

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the other hand, even when a leather sole was used, a certain amount of balling invariably occurred.

6. *Connection between march formation and the balling of the snow.*—Up to two inches depth of unfrozen snow, balling was but slight at the head of the column, but from the middle of the column towards the rear it gradually grew worse and worse in proportion to the length of the column. This was due to the fact that the hoofs of the horses in front turned the snow into a slushy mixture of mud and snow.

When the snow contained a certain amount of moisture and was more than a foot deep, the balling of snow in the hoofs of the leading horses was very much greater than in the case of the horses in rear. This was due to the fact that the trampled snow did not stick as easily as the new snow.

When the snow was dry and light and over one foot in depth, the leading horses had very hard work to open up a road, but the horses in rear had not such severe work and suffered less from the balling of the snow.

7. *Opinions formed from the results of the tests.*—(*a*) In a depth of more than one foot of snow, not only was it difficult to move at any pace faster than a trot, but the movement of the leading horses was very much more impeded than that of the horses in rear, and the leaders became greatly exhausted.

(*b*) In a depth of one metre (3ft. 3in.) of snow, advance at the walk was just possible, but any movements off the road were almost out of the question.

(*c*) When moving along a road under snow the horses have a trick of following in the tracks of men or horses, therefore formation in file is best.

(*d*) It is important to change the position of horses occasionally from rear to front of the column, so as to equalise the fatigue.

(*e*) Picketing horses in the open in snow gives them very little rest, however well covered their bodies may be; when snow is falling the horses should be put under a roof of some sort.

1. *Specification for the shoe.*—

(*a*) Bevelled shoe. Made of steel. Width 19½ m.m. (0.77in.), which is narrower than the usual shoe. A width of 5½ m.m. (0.22in.) from the inner edge of the under surface of the shoe is bevelled off to slope upwards towards the inner edge of the upper surface of the shoe.

(*b*) Leather-soled shoe. A thickness of 5 m.m. (0.2in.) of the American ox-hide leather is inserted between the bevelled shoe and the hoof. In this purpose the shoe is made rather broader. When fitting this pattern the leather is treated with wood-tar as a preventive against thrush.



LEATHER SOLE APPLIED TO HORSESHOE

2. *Weight of* 1 *shoe.*—

(*a*) Bevelled shoe. Average 66 momme (0.53 lb.).
(*b*) Leather sole. Dry 22 momme (0.18 lb.).
„ „ Wet 25 momme (0.2 lb.).

3. *Time required for manufacture.*—

(*a*) Bevelled shoe. About 40 minutes * for making the bevelled faces, ½in

* This is much longer than our shoeing smiths would take.

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addition to time for making shoes. In all about 2 hours for shoeing one horse.



BEVELLED HORSESHOE

(*b*) Leather-soled shoe. In addition to manufacture of shoe and bevel, about 30 minutes are required for the leather sole, and about 15 minutes for shoeing one horse.

4. *Extra expense.*—

(*a*) Bevelled shoe. For 1 set of steel shoes, 49 sen (1s.). For 1 set of 'Switz' (?) iron shoes, 33 sen (8¼*d*.).

(*b*) Leather-soled shoes. One set of leather soles, 66 sen (1s. 4½*d*.).

5. *Duration of wear.*—

(*a*) Bevelled shoes. As for ordinary shoes.

(*b*) Leather-soled shoes. The leather sole only lasts 1 month.

Appendix I.

Table of results of tests made with snow-shoes for horses

1. *Specifications for shoes.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. As detailed before.

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. The straw sole is made of plaited straw in a concave shape, and is fitted to the under surface of the hoof. This sole is treated with wood-tar as a preventive against thrush.

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. The upper surface of the inner edge of an ordinary shoe is bevelled off, the breadth being made slightly greater, and the cement is filled in hot. The composition of this cement is as follows :—

Ammoniacum	60 momme (0.48 lb.).
Guttapercha	40 momme (0.32 lb.).
Ether (alcohol)	40 grammes.

(*d*) Narrow shoe. Made of steel and half the width of the normal shoe.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. As detailed before (but made from the ordinary shoe and not of steel).

2. *Weight of shoe.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. Dry leather sole, 15 momme (0.12 lb.); wet leather sole, 17 momme (0.14 lb.). [These weights are slightly different from those already given.—Translator.]

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. Dry straw shoe, 5 momme (0.04 lb.); wet straw shoe, 13 momme (0.1 lb.).

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. Cement filling, 25 momme (0.2 lb.).

(*d*) Narrow shoe. Shoe, 85 momme (0.68 lb.).

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. Shoe, 66 momme (0.52 lb.).

3. *Time required for manufacture.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. Cutting out of 1 leather sole, 10 minutes; treating with tar, about 10 minutes.

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. Manufacture of 1 straw sole, about 30 minutes. Alteration of shoe (ordinary shoe), about 30 minutes. Fixing and unfixing of straw sole, about 20 minutes.

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(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. About 1 hour for filling one horse's shoes, and cooling.

(*d*) Narrow shoe. About 1½ hour for cooling of steel and shoeing one horse.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. About 40 minutes for bevelling one set.

4. *Extra expense.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. One piece (60 momme or 0.48 lb.) of ox-hide leather, 65 sen (1*s.* 4*d.*).

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. Material for one shoe, 25 momme (0.20 lb.) straw and 4 feet of twine, cost 2 sen (½*d.*). Instrument for shaping the shoe (?) 35 sen (9*d.*).

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. Cement filling, materials for, cost 1 yen 47 sen (3*s.*). Ether (alcohol) cost 5 sen (1¼*d.*).

(*d*) Narrow shoe. 22 sen (5½*d.*). extra to cost of ordinary shoe.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. Instrument for bevelling, cost 1 yen 50 sen (3*s.* 1*d.*).

5. *Effect of the shoe upon the frog.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. No effect after one month, although oiling of the under surface of the hoof was impossible.

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. No effect noticed.

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. No effect noticed, but pressure on the under surface of the hoof should be avoided.

(*d*) Narrow shoe. The pressure exerted from the ground on to the under surface of the hoof appeared to be very great.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. No effect noticed.

6. *Result of the test.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. In operations of under two hours' duration, the balling of the snow was slight, and even if it did ball under the hoofs it fell off after a few paces.

When the exercises were prolonged, for instance at the end of the third hour, although the snow still fell off as soon as it balled it quickly balled once more under the horse's hoofs, and therefore the condition of affairs was much the same as if it was permanently balled on the under surface of the hoof.

(*b*) Straw-soled shoe. In the various daily exercises a small amount of balling was unavoidable at the walk, but at the trot and at faster paces the snow hardly balled at all.

After about two hours, however, the straw soles became liable to come out. After they had come out the degree of balling of the snow became much worse than with the ordinary shoe.

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. In the daily exercises a certain amount of balling was noticed at the walk, but at the trot and at faster paces the snow scarcely balled at all. But owing to want of strength in the filling, several cases occurred in which it was damaged or knocked out by stones which appeared as the snow began to melt. It was therefore impossible to test the true value of these shoes.

(*d*) Narrow shoe. Degree of balling only slightly less than with the ordinary shoe.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. Compared to the ordinary shoe the snow balled less frequently and detached itself more quickly.

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7. *Conclusions.*—

(*a*) Leather-soled shoe. It possesses the advantage of being fully effective against the snow for two hours, is simple in construction, and does not require subsequent attention; it is therefore suitable for use on special occasions in a district where suitable farriers cannot be obtained. But as the leather sole costs 65 sen (1*s.* 4*d.*) and becomes useless after a time it is not suitable for general army use.

(*b*) Straw-soled shoes. These have already been used, and although there is the trouble of making the shoe, anyone can make the straw sole; moreover the fitting of the sole is easy. They are therefore suitable for use in special cases where rapid movement is necessary. But since the degree of balling after the straw sole has begun to come out is far worse than with the ordinary shoe, they do not appear to be suited for general use by troops who wish to move rapidly.

(*c*) Cement-filled shoe. Fully effective against the snow, but the sudden working out of the filling is apt to render them useless. Should further experiments lead to the discovery of some method of preventing the filling from working out, these shoes should prove advantageous.

(*d*) Narrow shoe. Advantages and disadvantages about balanced.

(*e*) Bevelled shoe. About 40 minutes are required for the special alterations, but after that they give no trouble, and since they are to a certain extent effective against the snow, their use may be of distinct advantage.

If made of steel and fitted with a leather sole they might give thorough satisfaction. Next year they should be tested again in combination with other methods.

Notes

1. The duration of these tests was one month, namely, from February 10 to March 10.

2. The weather during this month was as follows:

Days when snow fell . . .	8
Days when rain fell . . .	4
Cloudy days	8
Fine days	10

3. The greatest depth of snow was one foot.

4. If balled with snow, frost-shoes were useless; and even if the snow did not ball, the degree to which the ground was frozen was seldom sufficient to necessitate their use; therefore tests with regard to frost-shoes were not carried out.

Appendix II.

Results from each kind of shoe

1. *Connection between length of march and balling (and detaching) of snow.*—

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. At the beginning of a march along a road under snow the degree of balling is not great, but after 10 kilometres (6¼ miles) the snow balls quickly and constantly. This is owing to the fact that the chilling of the horses' feet and shoes is severe and facilitates the balling of the snow.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. The distance marched does not appear to have any

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connection with the degree of balling. This is probably due to the small grip afforded to the snow.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. The distance marched has no connection with the balling.

(*d*) Frost-shoes. Once the snow balls it does not come off, or if a portion does detach itself part of the lump is left behind, and facilitates the subsequent growth of a ball. The snow will never completely detach itself.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoes. No connection with the length of march. The degree of balling is great, but the snow comes away more quickly than it does in the case of the frost-shoe without a leather sole. Probably the balling is affected more by the condition of the snow than the length of march.

2. *The connection between the condition of the snow, the pace, balling and unballing, and slipping.*—

(i.) At a temperature of about 5 degrees below freezing-point the snow dry, light, and from one to three inches in depth, and the surface of the ground revealed at every step.

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. At the walk the balling is very rapid, and the unballing (detachment of balled snow) is difficult. At the trot the conditions are rather better.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. At the walk the snow balls after two or three paces, and the ball drops off after the fifth and sixth pace. At the trot the balling takes longer and the subsequent detachment is quicker than at the walk.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. Almost free from balling. Even if the snow did adhere it usually fell off after two steps, and left no particle of the ball behind.

(*d*) Frost-shoes. At the walk the snow was always balling and only detached itself with difficulty. But at the trot balling was to a certain extent diminished.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoes. Compared to (*d*) the balling was small, and the snow generally detached itself after eight to twenty paces. At the trot balling was to a certain extent diminished.

(ii.) Dry snow lying on the ground to a depth of one foot or more.

All kinds of shoe. At all paces the interior of the shoe was filled with a ball of snow which refused to detach itself, but did not protrude beyond the bottom of the shoe.

(iii.) Wet snow two to three inches deep.

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. At the walk the balling was very bad, and the unballing very slow. The snow usually detached itself after ten to sixteen steps, but a certain amount was left behind which facilitated subsequent balling. At the trot the balling was comparatively little, and the snow usually detached itself after four or five paces.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. At the walk balling took place after two to three steps, and the snow detached itself in the case of the fore legs after seven to eight steps, and in the case of hind legs after four to five steps. As the snow increased increased in depth the balling became less, and the unballing quicker. At the trot the unballing was markedly quicker.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. At the walk the ball detached itself after two to three steps. In a greater depth of snow the balling was almost nil, and at the trot and at faster paces disappeared altogether.

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(*d*) Frost-shoes. At the walk the balling was much greater than in the case of the ordinary shoe, and unballing scarcely ever occurred. This was probably due to the snow being held in position by the spikes. Sometimes the lower portion of the ball detached itself, but the portion remaining caused the snow to adhere again at once.

On a beaten road the balling was very slight, but once the snow had balled it did not detach itself.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoe. At the walk the balling was frequent, but the snow detached itself after ten to fifteen steps. At the trot the snow balled after four or five steps and unballed after seven or eight steps, no snow being left adhering to the hoof.

3. *Connection between the condition of the road and the balling of the snow.*—

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. When the surface of the road has once melted and then frozen again there is no balling, but on the other hand there is a great deal of slipping. When only the top surface is frozen, the balling is especially bad.

When climbing a slope on which one to three inches of snow is lying the snow does not ball easily; but once it has adhered it does not easily detach itself. When descending such slopes, however, the balling is great, but the subsequent unballing is rapid.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. Almost as for (*a*), but the amount of slipping is relatively slight.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. Compared to the bevelled shoe, there is an almost entire absence of balling, even when ascending slopes. Degree of slipping as for (*b*).

(*d*) Frost-shoes. When snow is left adhering to the hoof, the balling is rapid, even when the surface of the snow is frozen, and the detachment of such balls is slow. Practically no slipping.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoe. As for (*d*), but the balled snow detaches itself more quickly.

4. *Loose nails and loose spikes.*—

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. Loose nails extremely rare.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. Compared to (*a*), the loose nails are slightly more frequent in occurrence; this is caused by the slight outward turn of the nail on account of the narrowness of the iron at the mouth of the nail hole.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. Loose nails very frequent.* This is due to the softening of the leather due to its absorption of moisture and the consequent increase in the space between the hoof and the shoe.

(*d*) Frost-shoes. Loose nails occur with a frequency second only to the leather sole bevelled shoe. This is due to the difficulty of shoeing as compared with the ordinary shoe. The fact that the spikes do not work loose frequently is due to the constant balling of snow.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoe. Compared to the ordinary frost-shoe, loose spikes rather than loose nails are frequent.

This is due to the successive balling and unballing of snow, causing the tread to differ constantly.

* This always occurs with leather soles wherever used owing to the soft material between hoof and shoe, and our farriers recognise it and leave their clenches stronger in shoeing in this manner.

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5. *Connection between injury to legs or hoofs and the balling of snow.*—

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. Many cases of swelling of the joints. No damage to hoofs noticed.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. Except with the leather-soled bevelled shoe the leg troubles were least with this pattern. Hoof damage not observed.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. Very few cases of leg trouble. No damage noticed to wall or frog of hoof, in fact this pattern of shoe appeared to be advantageous in warding off the pressure of the ground from the under surface of the hoof.

(*d*) Frost-shoes. Swelling of joints caused more frequently than in the case of any other shoe; in particular, sprains (twists) of joints were caused. No damage to hoofs.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoes. Damage caused to legs next in frequency to that caused by ordinary shoe. Damage to hoofs, same as in the case of bevelled and leather-soled bevelled shoes.

6. *Degree of fatigue of horses.*—

The classes are arranged in order of fatigue caused:

(i.) Frost-shoe. Greatest fatigue.

(ii.) Ordinary shoe.

(iii.) Leather-soled frost-shoe.

(iv.) Bevelled shoe.

(v.) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. Least fatigue.

7. *Conclusions with regard to effectiveness of shoes.*—

(*a*) Ordinary shoe. Effect, of course, nil.

(*b*) Bevelled shoe. Effective when the snow is soft, but when the snow is frozen to a certain extent and mixed with mud its effect becomes very small.

(*c*) Leather-soled bevelled shoe. The most effective under all conditions.

(*b*) Frost-shoe. Effectiveness, nil.

(*e*) Leather-soled frost-shoe. Effective to a certain extent when the surface of the snow is frozen.

Persian shoes as used in Syria are the best for travelling over snow.

FOREIGN

Austria.—Experiments have for some little time past been in progress so to lighten the equipment of the Cavalry soldier and the weight of the saddlery, &c., carried by the horse, as to permit of each man having on his person more than the eighty rounds of the present field allowance, which is considered insufficient to enable the Cavalryman to sustain a fire-fight of any duration.

The Chief of the General Staff has recently issued instructions that the officers attached to the War School are annually to be exercised in a 'Cavalry Raid,' the objects of which are to enable them to determine or to form some opinion of the limits of endurance of men and horses, the paces to be maintained, rules for feeding, watering, &c. One such exercise was carried out during last June, the total distance covered being about 222 miles.

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France.—A pattern of Cavalry sword, lately issued for trial, has not met with approval: it lay badly in the hand, since, in order to bring the blade in prolongation of the arm, the wrist had to be kept awkwardly bent; the hand was unprotected; the scabbard and hilt were too conspicuous; and the scabbard was of weak construction. A second pattern has now been issued having something of a pistol grip, which facilitates the secure delivery of the point. There is a seat on the handle for each finger, so that the sword can be gripped more firmly. The hilt is almost of basket pattern, enclosing the whole hand. Scabbard, hilt, and grip are dulled. The scabbard is stronger made, and therefore rather heavier, and with some of those issued is constructed so as to be attached to the off-side of the saddle.

Germany.—A new lance is about to be taken into use. It is similar in all respects to that at present carried, except that at about ten centimetres from the point a 'stop' is fixed to prevent the lance from penetrating too deeply, whereby the lancer is sometimes unhorsed or disarmed. A new 'Riding Instructions for Cavalry' is now in the press for early issue in place of that which has been in use since the year 1882.

Italy.—The *Gazette* of August 13 gives some details of the reorganisation of the Cavalry in conformity with the law passed in the preceding month: these are to be:—

An Inspector-General of Cavalry.
Three Divisional Commanders.
Eight Brigade Commanders.
Twenty-nine Regiments.

In the Italian Army the officers are, for the most part, mounted on English- or Irish-bred horses; the rank and file upon home-bred animals, which are said to be quiet, enduring, and capable of fending for themselves on a campaign. They are not, however, up to much weight, and have little pace, but are surefooted, and some are quite excellent jumpers, able to get across or over any country. The best horses come from Tuscany and from about Rome; the Northern horses are poor and unsuitable for Artillery. The horses bred about Pisa show signs of English blood, while those from Sicily and Sardinia show traces of the Barb. The attempt to breed big horses by crossing country-bred mares with English stallions has proved something of a failure. Italy does not produce enough horses for army purposes, and many remounts come from abroad.

Roumania.—Further details are now to hand in regard to Cavalry reorganisation in this army. There will be in all twenty regiments, each of five squadrons, of which one will be depôt. The service squadrons will each have a strength of 120 men and 110 horses, the depôt squadrons numbering 45 men and 35 horses. The twenty regiments are divided into ten Rossiori and ten Calarassi; of the former these are grouped in five brigades, each of two regiments, to form two independent Cavalry divisions; the Calarassi are similarly brigaded, but form the Corps Cavalry of the five Army Corps.

Russia.—It has been decided that searchlights are to be supplied to all arms on field service. Each Cavalry division is to have one apparatus of 75 cm. diameter, possessing a mobility equal to that of a field-gun. A special corps is being organised to work these searchlights.

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SPORTING NOTES

POLO

Alterations in Rules

At a recent meeting of the Hurlingham Club Polo Committee alterations were made in three Rules, which will now read as below. These Rules come into force on January 1, 1911.

Addition to Rule 12 : ' When a foul is allowed by the umpire the time shall be deducted from the period till the game starts again. The ball is dead till the umpire says " Play." '

Addition to Rule 26 : ' If a player in attempting to strike the ball across the forelegs of an opponent's pony crooks the latter's stick, this constitutes a foul unless he succeeds in striking the ball.'

New Rule 40 : ' In the event of a game being stopped by darkness, weather, or for any cause which prevents a finish the same day it shall be resumed on the first convenient and agreed opportunity in the usual manner.

The King's Coronation Cup

The Ranelagh Club has added a new tournament to its list, to be known as the King's Coronation Cup Tournament, the King having approved of that title. It is a £250 Challenge Cup given by the Committee of the Ranelagh Club, with four souvenir cups to the winners, and it will be played for on July 15, 1911. Any preliminary ties will take place earlier in the week, while the tournament will be played annually, and is restricted to the winners of the Inter-Regimental Tournament, the Hurlingham Champion Cup, and the Ranelagh Open Cup, and approved teams representing India and the Colonies and Dominions of the Empire. So far as can be estimated at present, the tournament will follow the Inter-Regimental, the Open Cup, and the Champion Cup. It has been pointed out that the Ranelagh Cup and the Champion Cup are sometimes won by different teams, and it would be entertaining to see them come together in a match for the King's Coronation Cup. It will be recalled that last season the Old Cantabs carried off the premier cups of Hurlingham and Ranelagh, but the way was smoothed by the obstacles which prevented the Old Etonians from meeting them. The prospect of teams like the Cantabs and the Etonians meeting for the King's Coronation Cup makes one await the new tournament with much interest. Then, again, it may serve to bring together the winners of the Champion Cup and the Inter-Regimental Tournament. Ordinarily, it would be odds upon the civilian champions beating the best regimental team in England, but there is no certainty that this will be the case in 1911, owing to the arrival home of the 9th Lancers. Always a good polo Regiment, as was

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evidenced by their victories in the Inter-Regimental in 1889 and 1900, as well as by many triumphs in India, the 9th are probably stronger now than ever, as they have such players as Capt. L. W. de V. Sadlier-Jackson, Capt. Cavendish, Mr. F. O. Grenfell, Mr. A. N. Edwards, and the Earl of Rocksavage to choose from.

Abroad

The final of the Poona Junior Tournament between the 33rd Cavalry and the Royal Engineers resulted in a win for the Cavalry by four goals to two. Teams—33rd Cavalry : Lieut. G. Edward-Collins, Lieut. W. Kenworthy, Capt. F. G. Gillies, Lieut. P. K. Wise. Royal Engineers : Lieut. M. Rawlence, Major A. G. Bremmer, Capt. S. Boyd, Capt. A. D. S. Arbuthnot.

The Poona Open Tournament resulted in a win for the Inniskilling Dragoons, who, in the final, beat General Alderson's team by six goals to one. The Inniskillings played a splendid, combined game, and at the conclusion General Sir Partab Singh, a doyen of polo, and the donor of the Challenge Cup, presented it to the winners. The teams were—Inniskillings : Capt. Terrot, Mr. Colmore, Capt. Ritson, Mr. Burnham (back). General Alderson's team : General Alderson, C.B., Mr. Miles (Royal Dragoons), Mr. Wise (33rd Cavalry), Major Martin, A.V.D. (back).

The Mhow Tournament final witnessed a grand game between Bhopal and the Central India teams. Time was called with the score two goals each. Play was resumed with widened goals, and after a few minutes Bhopal scored the winning goal and gained a well deserved but unexpected victory.

Eight teams entered for the India Ram Tournament at Umballa. In the final between the King's Dragoon Guards and the 8th Cavalry, the former won by five goals to one. Teams—King's Dragoon Guards : Mr. Fleming, Capt. Spurrier, Mr. Gladstone, Major Wickham. 8th Cavalry : Sowar Jai Muli, Capt. Blood, Capt. Lane, Capt. Craster.

Mrs. Pirie, wife of Brigadier General Pirie, presented the Cup to the winners.

For the final of the Meerut Tournament the 17th Lancers defeated the 18th K.G.O. Lancers by twelve goals to one. The 18th were most unlucky. Lieut. Bray broke his arm in the semi-finals, and in the final both Capt. Mills and Risaldar Naibay had bad falls. At the conclusion Mrs. Peyton, wife of Brigadier General Peyton, D.S.O., presented the Cup.

Seven teams competed for the Bhopal Tournament. A close struggle with a fast and exciting game was witnessed for the final between the 2nd Lancers and the 22nd Punjabis, the former winning by three goals to two. This is the second time the 2nd Lancers have carried off the trophy.

For the Indore Tournament final the Central India team beat the Inniskilling Dragoons by six goals to three.

The All-India Polo Tournament in connection with the Provincial Exhibition at Allahabad has been won by the 10th Hussars, who defeated the Scouts, a scratch team, in the final round by seven goals to three.

The 10th Hussars had previously beaten the 17th Lancers by four goals to three in the best game of the tournament, after extra time had been played. Altogether ten teams competed, including Jodhpore and Central India States.

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RACING

Despite the severe frost the Aldershot November Races were successfully carried through, and good fields contested the various events.

On the first day the Bagshot Selling Steeplechase was won by Mr. G. Phipps Hornby's Valentine Vox (owner riding), starting at ten to one. Only two completed the course.

The Autumn Handicap Hurdle Race, for which sixteen started, was won by Mr. A. Fitzgerald's Tilston, on which his owner rode a capital race.

The Camp Steeplechase was taken by Mr. D. McCalmont's Johnstown Lad (M. Dowdall).

The Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase was won by Capt. C. Noel-Newton's Flaxfield (owner), Capt. T. Godman being second on his horse Kenilworth.

On the second day Col. Garratt's Cynique (R. Morgan) won the Long Valley Selling Handicap Steeplechase. Mr. E. P. Brassey's Man o' Man walked over for the Open Military Steeplechase, and Mr. T. H. Sebag-Montefiore won the Open Hunters' Hurdle Race on his horse Splash.

The National Hunt Committee have recently issued a new rule prohibiting Hunters Hurdle Races. This is a good rule, as these races neither benefit hunters nor sport.

FOOTBALL.

ASSOCIATION

The Cavalry Cup

The first round resulted as follows :—

5th Lancers beat 5th Dragoon Guards, 8 goals to 2.
16th Lancers beat Royal Scots Greys, 3 goals to 2.
(This was a splendid match, in which extra time had to be played.)
19th Hussars beat 18th Hussars, 1 goal to 0.
2nd Dragoon Guards beat 2nd Life Guards, 2 goals to 1.
(Another fine match in which extra time had to be played.)
4th Dragoon Guards beat 7th Hussars, 2 goals to 1.
3rd Dragoon Guards beat 1st Life Guards, 5 goals to 0.
11th Hussars beat Royal Horse Guards, 10 goals to 0.

The draw for the second round is :—

20th Hussars *v.* 5th Lancers.
16th Lancers *v.* 4th Hussars.
4th Dragoon Guards *v.* 3rd Dragoon Guards.
9th Lancers *v.* 11th Hussars.
2nd Dragoon Guards *v.* 19th Hussars.

At a recent meeting of the Committee of the Territorial Football Association regulations were framed to govern the competition, and invitations have been issued inviting entries from the Territorial units throughout the country.

Capt. J. H. Lindsay (London Scottish) and Lieut. Sir J. H. P. C. Edwards (23rd Batt. The London Regiment) were appointed joint Hon. Secretaries.

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HORSE SHOWS

England won a number of victories at the New York Horse Show, notably in the international jumping contests. In these the British officers' team, pitted against the United States, Canada, France, and Holland, carried off the chief honours. Lieut. C. L. T. Walwyn (Royal Horse Artillery) took first prize, the second going to Lieut. G. F. Brooke (16th Lancers), and the third to Lieut. T. A. Thornton (7th Hussars). Our officers were welcomed in a most sporting way and received a great ovation. This great show was, as usual, a grand success.

In November the big Chicago Horse Show took place. In the international competitions our British officers were again to the fore, as in the principal class for army mounts Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., captured first prize with his beautiful mare Harmony, Lieut. G. F. Brooke being second with Alice. Great interest was taken in the event for officers (in uniform) over a board fence, 4 ft. 3 in. high; a stone wall, 4 ft.; and double post and rails, 4 ft. high and 30 ft. apart. The first and second prizes were won by Lieut. Brooke (16th Lancers), with his mares Harriett I. and Harriett II. Lieut. T. A. Thornton (7th Hussars) was conspicuous for the able manner in which he handled Mr. W. H. Moore's horses in the ring.

The Executive of the Richmond Royal Horse Show has just received official intimation that his Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to continue his patronage. The Richmond Horse Show Society has decided to allot a sum of £50 in connection with the scheme for the encouragement of the breeding of light horses—that is to say, horses of the hunter type, or bred on polo lines above 14.2 hands. The grant is to take the form of three silver cups, which will be offered for competition during next season, and in each instance will be awarded for the best brood mare. One value £20 will be offered at the Royal Agricultural Society's Show at Norwich next June; another of the same value at the Dublin Royal Horse Show; and a third, value £10, at the Peterborough Show. It is hoped that other influential shows will follow Richmond's spirited example. The Show is to be held on June 9 and 10 next.

SUBSCRIPTIONS.

Subscriptions for Volume VI., 1911, are now due, and should be forwarded to:—

The Managing Editor,
THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,
Royal United Service Institution,
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(See p. 208.)

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S EUROPEAN LIGHT CAVALRY.

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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL 1911

THE STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE BY CAVALRY

By Major J. W. Ferguson, *20th Hussars*

Information in regard to the enemy is the indispensable basis of all military plans, and the possession or lack of this knowledge may have the greatest influence, not only on the initial stages of operations, but on the ultimate result of a campaign.

If history has taught us that this has been the case in the past, so it is recognised by all students of the science of war, that, in the future, the necessity of accurate information to enable a Commander to make the best dispositions of his force will be still more marked.

When we consider how modern conditions have modified the conduct of war, and thereby affected the action of Cavalry in carrying out the duties which from the nature of its being it is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight that the sphere of usefulness of the mounted arm had been greatly curtailed, especially when opposed to the increased power of modern firearms.

The service of observation and reconnaissance has become more difficult, owing to the extent of the danger zone, and to the fact that the intensity of fire within that zone almost prohibits an advance to within such distance as will permit an accurate survey of the enemy's strength and dispositions; while, at the same time, the use of smokeless powder—which effectually conceals the position of the firing line—makes

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a more thorough search of the ground even more indispensable than formerly.

The large size of armies, which now cover enormous tracts of ground, will, unless the proportion of Cavalry to the other arms be increased, greatly extend the areas over which it has to work either for their reconnaissance or protection, and each tactical advantage secured will in the future—owing to the small fraction of the enemy's force which can be engaged and defeated at a time—exercise far less effect on an opponent.

Lastly, the possible participation of the inhabitants of an invaded country, especially in enclosed districts, will, as was seen in the latter part of the Franco-German War, severely handicap, if not altogether paralyse the work of patrols. Though these changed relations may limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and make the solution of its strategical task more difficult, it can nevertheless be shown that the importance of the arm has in no way diminished, and that in future wars it will have even a wider scope for its activity and greater opportunities of achieving distinction and success.

Since all European States are now striving every nerve to employ enormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities in order to gain an advantage while their enemy is still concentrating, it must be apparent that the first great decision of arms will be of overwhelming importance.

To Cavalry will be allotted the task of discovering the area of this concentration, and of preventing or delaying its completion by demonstrating on the flanks and in rear of the advancing columns, by effecting surprises, compelling changes of front, threatening communications, destroying railways, &c.

The far-reaching results of such action can be gauged when it is realised how difficult it is to alter dispositions, and, with growing masses, to divert an operation when once commenced, to give it a new direction, or assign it a new object; and in these days large forces are so dependent on railways, not only for their own transport but for supplies and ammunition, that a single broken viaduct—preventing the arrival of fresh units or necessary stores—may upset the Commander's whole design.

If this be the case before the first collision, how much greater would be the disorganisation resulting from similar operations after

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a defeat, especially against troops inferior in quality and *morale*, no matter how well they are armed.

Thus we see that, with the growing importance of the strategical element, the value of efficient reconnaissance, though rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to meet in the future, has, on the other hand, proportionately increased.

In the latest (1907) edition of the 'Training Manual,' reconnaissance by Cavalry is classified under the following heads:—

(*a*) Strategical.
(*b*) Tactical.
(*c*) Protective.

It is with the two first, (*a*) and (*b*), that we have now to deal; but before proceeding to discuss the employment of Cavalry in strategical and tactical reconnaissance, it may be well to quote from the same volume the definition of these duties, and the manner in which the Cavalry of an army is divided for their performance.

'*Strategical Reconnaissance* is required before the opposing armies are within striking distance of each other for the purpose of locating the hostile columns, ascertaining their strength and direction of march, and thus affording the Commander-in-Chief information on which to base his strategical plan of operations.'

'*Tactical Reconnaissance* of the enemy is required when two forces are within striking distance of each other, for the purpose of discovering the tactical dispositions of the opposing force, and thus furnish the Commander with information on which to base his tactical plan of operations.'

'The Cavalry with an army is divided according to the duties required of it:—

1. Independent or Strategical Cavalry.
2. Protective Cavalry.
3. Divisional Cavalry.'

Strategical reconnaissance is one of the most important duties of the Independent Cavalry, and at the commencement of a campaign as large a force as possible should be organised for this duty. Complete independence must be allowed it in fulfilling the great strategical missions which may be assigned to that arm for execution, and this Cavalry should be under the direct instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.

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Before the Independent Cavalry can gain the freedom necessary for reconnaissance, however, it must first seek out and defeat the enemy's Cavalry, and when that has been accomplished, and not till then, it will be able to break through and discover what is going on behind its protective screen.

It entirely depends on the extent to which it succeeds in disorganising and demoralising the enemy's Cavalry whether the Commander of the army 'marches blindfold through the fog of war, or whether it is the opposing General who is reduced to that disastrous plight.'

General von Bernhardi, in his work 'Cavalry in Future Wars,' expresses the opinion that the employment of Independent or Strategical Cavalry during the period of mobilisation and railway transport of the other arms, either in the enemy's zone of concentration or against his communications—except in special cases—is unsound, and that only that army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of its mounted forces.

He argues that, although considerable damage may be caused by Cavalry at once crossing the frontier and breaking up the railways, seizing horse and supply depôts, destroying magazines, preventing the provisioning of fortresses, &c., the probable results are not proportionate to the probable losses. He also considers that the attempt to break up communications by well mounted officers' patrols is even less likely to secure permanent results, and that the greater the number of such patrols employed the more irreplaceable will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best and most daring officers who are most liable to fall victims to their courage and audacity.

In short, he maintains that the premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilisation and concentration can only succeed in obtaining information which should be already known to the General Staff, and that the replacing the losses of Cavalry with material of equal quality is so difficult that only the most important reasons can justify such enterprises.

At the same time he recognises the necessity of keeping a sharp look-out, of working up to the enemy as close as may be possible without incurring serious loss—in order to check the accuracy of existing information—allowing the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against the opposing Infantry and armed population, and

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then putting in our own Cavalry for decisive action, when the opponent has already wasted his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages.

Whether von Bernhardi's views be correct or not, it will be admitted that it is only when the strategical concentration commences, after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes possible and important, and that the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stages of a war lies not only in screening the advance of its own troops, but in the far more important, and indeed indispensable, task of securing the widest possible sphere of intelligence.

When the enemy's forces have grouped themselves into clearly defined masses, between the separate portions of his army and their lines of advance will be spaces unoccupied by troops, and into these the Independent Cavalry must penetrate, exerting its full strength to discover the heads and flanks of his columns, their strength, and direction of march.

Before it can do this, it must, as already insisted, beat the opposing Cavalry out of the field and secure command of the ground between the two armies, thereby gaining that sense of actual and moral superiority so essential to bold and successful reconnaissance.

This, however, must not be taken to imply that our Cavalry should allow itself to be drawn away from the zone in which it is to operate, which would enable the enemy to select his point of attack; but the time and direction of advance should be chosen with a view to compelling him to move to meet us on our own ground, when every effort must be made to ensure numerical superiority at the critical moment, to be certain of victory.

The necessity of concentration is thus apparent. Tactical patrols would, of course, have been sent out to locate the hostile Cavalry and give warning of its approach, but the ultimate object, *i.e.* the discovery of the enemy's main columns, must not be lost sight of, and strategical officers' patrols pushed forward from the first to effect this object.

After defeating the mass of the enemy's mounted forces, the Independent Cavalry must lose no time in carrying out the missions assigned to it by the Commander-in-Chief, brushing aside the enemy's screen, and penetrating into the chief district of concentration of his armies.

Great freedom must be allowed its leader in executing these tasks,

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and in deciding 'where the chief weight of his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served without applying half-purposes to the primary object. Above all, he must be inspired by the determination to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never relinquish it to his opponent.'

When the enemy has once been felt, contact must never again be lost, unless orders to that effect be given.

The Cavalry Corps fastens on to the enemy and his different columns in such a way that the points keep up unbroken touch with his front, while officers' and other patrols hang on his flanks, where they have ample opportunities for observation. Superfluous patrols should now be drawn in, and only such parallel and flank roads observed as from the nature of the case are likely to be used by the enemy. All really important information will be transmitted direct to Headquarters, while the strategical patrols should be given all information which becomes available, and should know the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the approach of the opposing armies to within striking distance of each other, strategical reconnaissance—with the exception of the patrols who direct their attention to the enemy's rearward communications, and seek to determine the approach of his reserves—for the moment ceases, and the Independent Cavalry is drawn away towards the wings to clear the front for battle, and to prepare itself for the part it is to play during and after the actual engagement.

In the further course of a war, opportunities for strategical reconnaissance occur again and again; for example, to determine the line of retreat of the enemy's army after defeat, as in the case of the German Cavalry after Gravelotte, when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's army was marching to the North East or not. Occasionally, too, it may be necessary for the Independent Cavalry to break through the line of Infantry outposts, in order to discover the whereabouts and movements of the enemy's principal masses; while the threatening of his communications, and securing our own from hostile flying columns, offers a wide field for active reconnaissance.

It is impossible—as stated in 'Cavalry Training 1907'—to lay down any hard-and-fast rules as to how far the Independent Cavalry engaged in strategical reconnaissance should be pushed out ahead of

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the advancing columns of an army, and all that can be said is, that the wider the front and the greater the depth of the army the further must the Cavalry be advanced.

If, as has already been stated, the Independent Cavalry employs tactical patrols during the strategical reconnaissance to locate the hostile Cavalry and give notice of its movements to ensure timely concentration, so, when the main opposing armies are within striking distance of each other, the Independent Cavalry may be called on to assist the Protective Cavalry in clearing up the tactical situation, especially if the mass of the enemy's Cavalry is still in being, and the concentration of sufficient force to defeat it becomes necessary.

The Strategical Cavalry, however, may have to work round the adversary's flank, and therefore each field army must have a force of Protective Cavalry attached to it to cover its front and secure it tactical freedom of action.

While strategical reconnaissance demands concentration, tactical reconnaissance, on the other hand, requires a wide extension of front, and consequently sub-division of force; but as the Commander of every body of Cavalry must always be prepared to fight, tactical reconnoitring patrols should invariably have supporting squadrons, to prevent the scouts being held up by small parties of the enemy, to attack and drive back the troops which he will have pushed forward to cover his movements or break through our screen, and to act as collecting stations for information. Reports in this case are made to the corps commander, but the leader must also be in constant communication with the Commanders of the advanced guards of the columns in his rear and keep them posted in what is going on in front.

The work of the Infantry is greatly lightened when the Protective Cavalry performs its duty efficiently, and in 1870-1 the Germans were able to march and rest in security knowing that their Cavalry could give warning of the enemy's advance, and allow them ample time to concentrate for battle. During the entire war the German Infantry was not once alarmed by the French, and its marches were made as easily as in autumn manœuvres.

The Cavalry entrusted with the duty of tactical reconnaissance may sometimes find it necessary to act as an advanced guard, to fight a delaying action, to seize and hold an advantageous position, and cover the deployment of the army.

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An instance of this is to be found in the American Civil War. 'In 1863 Rosecranz moved against the Confederate Army, which occupied the line from Wartrace through Shelbyville, along Duck River. His plan was to menace Brigg's left, and then turn his right by way of Hoover's Gap and Manchester. Thomas's Corps, which constituted the centre, moved out on the Manchester road, covered by Wilder's mounted brigade. A Confederate Corps under Hardee was in cantonments about three miles beyond Hoover's Gap, and it was the intention of that Commander, as soon as he should hear of an advance of the United States Forces, to push forward and hold the Gap at its northern entrance, where the ground was favourable for defence but unsuited to camping. Striking the Confederate outposts on the near side of the Gap, Wilder pressed them so vigorously as to drive them through at a run. He then took up a position at the southern outlet of the Gap, where he had the same defensive advantages that the enemy would have had at the northern end. Attacked here by greatly superior numbers he held his ground until the arrival of reinforcements enabled him to definitely repulse the enemy. Thus with a loss of less than 100 men was secured a position which General Thomas expected to gain only at the cost of many lives.'

Operations like the above also show that in reconnaissance situations will often arise which demand the employment of fire action by Cavalry.

The work of reconnoitring patrols of the Protective Cavalry includes not only driving back hostile patrols and denying them information as to the dispositions and movements of the force behind, but also topographical reconnaissance, which will enable the Commander of the field army to turn the features of the ground to account in his plan of action, and prevent his engaging the enemy on ground unfavourable to himself. This latter is specially important, and the information furnished must be thoroughly reliable and precise, for it has to serve as a basis of the Commander's plan of battle.

It is advisable that patrols detailed for this duty should be accompanied by Artillery and Staff Officers.

As the opposing forces get into close touch, and even during the progress of the fight, combat patrols, offensive and defensive, should be employed to carry out tactical reconnaissance on the flanks of the army, and protect it from surprise.

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After a battle there follows either pursuit or retreat—operations in which tactical reconnaissance cannot for one moment be omitted. Then, by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal conditions again. The two armies are separated by a certain area in depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before, both strategical and tactical reconnaissance is required.

Into the elementary principles of reconnaissance it is not proposed to enter; suffice it to say, in the words of the drill book, that, whether reconnoitring patrols are used for strategical or tactical purposes, they act according to the same principles and methods; but, as we have endeavoured to show, the duties assigned to each are quite distinct and must never be confused.

Until quite recently it was generally considered, and even at the present time there are those who contend, that the whole triumph of the art of Cavalry reconnaissance consists in solving the strategical and tactical problems simultaneously.

A passage from Von Bernhardi's 'Cavalry in Future Wars' clearly sets forth this view, and conclusively demonstrates its fallacy. He says of the authorities who are of this opinion:—

'They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the interests both of securing and screening, on a certain breadth of front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary degree of extension to cover the front of the army. They would leave reconnaissance to be carried on by rapidly advancing patrols, which evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus obtaining their object in spite of the enemy.

'I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient results.

'Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched. Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1 to obtain reliable information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time? How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when we

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can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country between the two armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well as we?

'Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern war, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.

'If, from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing communications with one's own Headquarters, it becomes necessary to beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field, to clear up the situation sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy's chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes compulsory, if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving them off the ground, and depriving them of the power of breaking through our own screen.

'That a numerically and materially inferior Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about collision with that of the enemy, so that from the beginning it secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry. . . .'

'Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the proper form at the right time and place.'

When it is evident that strategical and tactical reconnaissance will be the primary task allotted to Cavalry in future wars against a civilised enemy, and that the struggle for superiority between the masses of horsemen is only a means to an end—that end being the possibilities opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre, screen,

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and break the enemy's communications—we must leave no stone unturned to ensure that our system of organisation and training is conducted on lines best calculated to enable our Cavalry to meet all demands which this change of conditions may impose on it.

Our numerical weakness, when compared with any of the other Great Powers, renders it essential that our Cavalry shall have superior energy and skill in the conduct of its operations, increased boldness in its undertakings, with a wise moderation in the choice of its objectives, to compensate for its lack of numbers. And the pivot on which all this turns is mobility.

Strategical mobility depends on the training of men and horses, and in the efficiency of the arrangements for their replacement during a campaign, while complete tactical and technical independence of the units under all circumstances cannot be secured unless the guns and wheeled transport (which includes the ammunition and supply trains, and field companies of the R.E. &c.) have sufficient mobility to keep pace with the mounted troops.

It is only by the fulfilment of these conditions, and by adapting itself to the requirements of modern war, that Cavalry can hope to take full advantage of the great opportunities of distinction and success that await it in time to come, and reap the abundant harvest which in future wars will assuredly lie ready to its hand in the fields of strategical and tactical reconnaissance.

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SOME THOUGHTS ON DISMOUNTED ACTION

By Striguil

'The belief should be fostered amongst the men that they can defeat any opponent if they use their rifles coolly and keep up a steady fire. A general impression appears to exist that dismounted Cavalry is powerless against infantry; this idea should be discountenanced at every opportunity.'—*Cavalry in War and Peace.* Bernhardi.

All Cavalry authorities agree, and the majority of practical soldiers are of the same opinion, that, according to circumstances, the Cavalry soldier may be called upon to fight with the *arme blanche* or with the rifle; the same authorities, therefore, rightly maintain that the Cavalryman must be efficient in either *rôle*, and that such efficiency is quite possible.

This means that not only must the leaders be thoroughly conversant with the tactics of both sword and rifle, and when it is expedient to use them separately or in combination, but the men themselves must have the greatest confidence in their ability to apply either arm to the fullest advantage.

The question it is proposed to consider is, 'Is the training given to the Cavalry soldier such as insures his efficient training in both *rôles*, and is it such that he has thorough confidence in employing whichever weapon it may be most advantageous to use?'

Absolute confidence in whichever method of fighting be decided upon is essential to bring about a satisfactory issue.

Taking the training generally, and with the *arme blanche* in particular, it cannot be denied that the Cavalry soldier is, generally speaking, immeasurably better trained than he was a few years ago.

The officers have a more thorough knowledge of what may be expected of their arm on service, consequently the training in general shows better preparation for war than was formerly the case, better horsemanship is evident throughout, and for practical purposes the men are better horsemen and the training is less hide-bound.

Manœuvring collectively has also improved, and considering the difficulties caused by having partially trained horses in the ranks, the

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Cavalry, as regards actual movement in formed bodies, is probably as efficient as it is necessary to be.

Does this improvement in training extend to fire tactics?

Are the men and their leaders as much at home when it is a question of fire tactics as they are in that of shock?

Have they absolute confidence in themselves when it becomes a question of adopting fire action alone, or in combination with shock?

As regards individual marksmanship there is little to choose between the modern Cavalry and Infantry man, but here comparison ends.

In the Infantry the training is so thorough and systematic in the practice of fire tactics, use of ground, fire effect, judging distance, &c., that under these headings the Infantry soldier is a long way ahead of his Cavalry brother. Why should this be the case?

Is it that greater proficiency is not aimed at, or is it that the authorities are satisfied with the present standard and consider the Cavalry soldier has so many other matters to master that no more time can be given to this branch of his training?

As far as it goes the annual musketry course is probably as good as can be devised, though in England, owing to limited range accommodation, it is seldom possible to combine firing with mounted work, the true *rôle* of Cavalry—the training is therefore by no means complete.

Once the annual course of musketry is over, methodical training in fire tactics practically ceases.

Generally speaking, at inspections, the chief importance is rightly attached to individual horsemanship and drill, followed by manœuvres, little time being left for fire tactics. The unit may fire a few rounds of blank, as often as not on a piece of ground that does not lend itself to mounted action, but, as a rule, as long as the drill of mounting and dismounting is respectably carried out little more is expected; tactical proficiency, and even good fire discipline, may or may not exist.

It is after all but natural that a commander, whose one aim is to obtain as good an inspection as possible, concerns himself chiefly with the training in which he expects his unit to be tested.

Later on the manœuvres come.

This being the only opportunity that higher commanders have of handling large bodies, it cannot perhaps be expected that much thought should be given to promiscuous dismounted fighting.

Fire action by large bodies of Cavalry will probably but seldom take place; it therefore does not seem worth while to spend valuable

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time on this, while it is rightly considered that the period of Divisional Cavalry manœuvres is not the time to systematically train smaller units in fire tactics.

For one reason or another, therefore, systematic training in fire tactics plays no very prominent part either before or during manœuvres.

It is useless to conceal the fact that during recent years there has been a kind of feeling, though perhaps not entirely justified, among the regimental officers that on manœuvres fire tactics do not as a rule pay. This may be partly due to the fact that the side adopting them gets ridden over by an adversary whom no fire will even check, or possibly to the existence of an impression that Cavalry manœuvres is not the occasion to practise tactics other than shock.

Umpires do their best, but it often happens in isolated encounters that no umpire is available, and even if he is present it is no easy matter to stay the onslaught of an impetuous subaltern, who having had orders perhaps to push on as fast as he can, is not going to allow himself to be checked by a few blank shots, realising, as he does, that no harm will happen to him if he does go on, whereas, if he is more circumspect, he thinks he may not be doing all he can to help his side, and perhaps incur the wrath of some senior officer for his want of dash.

Occasionally, too, the interference of an umpire is not looked upon with favour, especially should he have to modify some pre-arranged move in consequence of his considering that, owing to the fire brought to bear by the enemy from some unexpected quarter, it would not be feasible on service.

It is one thing to check legitimate dash when exercised at the proper moment, but quite another to check foolhardiness, which, during training, is apt to give wrong impressions and thus lead to disaster on service.

The paucity of the allowance of blank ammunition is also against sound training. With the few rounds allowed, little can be done excepting to mark a position—rapid bursts of fire, or indeed any form of magazine fire, is practically impossible. Neither is any regular practice obtained in carrying or distributing extra ammunition.

No doubt, in the training manuals and in memoranda issued from time to time, stress is laid upon the importance of Cavalry being efficient in fire tactics, but it is not equally evident that these precepts are always acted up to.

The arm is essentially very conservative, and to inculcate a new

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spirit into its training needs something more than text-books and wholesome precepts. What is required is that there should be one school of thought and a definite standard of training for fire tactics.

Hythe has done untold good work for the musketry training of the British Army, but Hythe doesn't pretend to give the lead in fire tactics best suited to Cavalry, and what is taught there is not necessarily the soundest teaching for Cavalry.

It seems a question worth considering, whether it might not be possible either at Hythe, or perhaps better at the Cavalry School, to have special courses for instruction in fire tactics for Cavalry.

Horses would have to be provided.

An attempt has been made to briefly show that the training of Cavalry in fire action does not always receive the encouragement and support it needs, and that without some fostering care and sympathetic feeling the high standard of efficiency laid down as being absolutely essential will never be attained.

If, however, the question be seriously taken in hand there is no reason why as great an efficiency should not be reached in the tactics and training generally of fire action as has by common consent been reached by the Cavalry in its principal *rôle* of shock tactics.

After many years of comparative neglect, the importance of machine guns is only now commencing to be realised, and with this awakening the necessity of systematic training has become evident.

Is it too much to expect that there will be a similar awakening in the case of the training for fire action with the rifle?

No one will deny that, difficult as it is to obtain efficiency in shock tactics, the difficulties in the case of fire tactics are by no means less, with this difference, that perhaps the training for the latter requires greater thought, not only on the part of those responsible for the instruction, but also of those for whose benefit it is given—especially the junior regimental officers, N.C.O.s, and men in the ranks.

Against these opinions, it may be urged, the difficulty has always been, not to get men off their horses to use their rifles, but to induce them to remain on them to use their swords or lances.

To this objection the answer is:—

Better knowledge of fire tactics will also entail their disadvantages being more fully realised when the local circumstances are unsuitable for their adoption.

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MOTOR CYCLES WITH CAVALRY

By 'LANCER'

IT is an elementary truth that no information, however explicit and accurate, is of any use unless it is rapidly carried back to the Headquarters which sent out the reconnaissance.

Insufficient stress, however, is laid on the need for proper training in peace time of the means of getting information back.

The reason for this apparent neglect may be sought in the fact that the real difficulty of getting information through is produced by the action of hostile inhabitants or the enemy's troops, and that it is hard to improvise these difficulties in peace time in the midst of a busy population.

As civilisation advances more and more of the inhabited world become intersected with roads of good surface, and divided up into enclosures by wire or other obstacles.

Communication thus tends to be restricted to hard roads, and it is idle to pretend that horses are any longer a fast method of transit over such roads. Motor cycles on the other hand are about the quickest and handiest means of locomotion we possess as yet.

The Use of Motor Cycles.—Motor cycles cannot, and should not, be allowed to replace the horse in close contact with the enemy, for they are restricted to the roads, cannot stop or turn quickly, make too much noise and dust to escape observation, and would fall an easy prey to the enemy's advanced troops.

Behind bodies of mounted men they are quite invaluable for the services of communication and for transmission of information, and if armed with revolvers might work even in an enemy's country.

Provided with motor cycles a reconnoitring detachment might place its relay posts immensely further apart, or even dispense with them altogether, as the range of a motor cyclist, comparatively speaking, is unlimited.

Training.—It is illogical to suppose that the service of motor cycles can be improvised in a hurry in war. It is not enough for the men to be trained to read a map and commit it to memory, to deliver messages

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given verbally, or to find the officer to whom they are sent by shouting his name as they pass troops.

Our Regimental and Squadron Officers must be made well acquainted with their capabilities and accustomed to use them.

It is not an easy matter to link the hare and the tortoise. A motor cyclist is averse to going the pace of the horse, and the horseman has strong objections to being continually passed by the motorist. With a



reconnoitring squadron the simplest method would seem to be to appoint halting places close in rear of the squadron at which the cyclists would be at certain hours, and to which mounted men would take messages. The cyclists' *bonds successifs* would correspond with those of the squadron.

The motor cyclists themselves must be subject to discipline. On manœuvres last year two motor cyclists were allotted to a 'contact' squadron. One of them elected to go home, and the other could not be spared to leave the squadron for fear he might be needed for some serious emergency. No value whatever was therefore obtained from their employment with the squadron, and the lessons to be gained are these: an insufficient number of motor cyclists were attached to this squadron, and there was no discipline to compel the men to carry out the service they had undertaken.

The question may be asked whether such an organisation may not soon need to be replaced by aeroplanes. The answer is easy to find,

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namely, that when aeroplanes come into practical use the motor cyclist will be more necessary than ever to act in conjunction with the aeroplane, and carry the information gained by the aeronaut from the open space where he alighted quickly to the Headquarters of the Commander of the Force.

Organisation.—I would suggest that a motor cyclist unit become a recognised part of each Cavalry Brigade.

It would form a branch of the Special Reserve units (Section B), and undergo an annual course of training with the regular Cavalry.

For purposes of administration one unit might be affiliated to each of the four Field Troops R.E., which train in close connection with the Cavalry Brigades.

A unit or section would consist of :—

1 Officer,
3 N.C.O.s,
21 Rank and File,

and each N.C.O. would thus control a sub-section of seven machines.

A Brigade would have one section attached to it, *i.e.* one sub-section for each Regiment.

This section would be placed under the Brigade ' Signal ' Officer, and form an addition to the Signal Troop.

A three-horse-power machine might be taken as the standard of size.

The cycles would be the private property of the men, who should receive a special grant to pay for the expenses of petrol and upkeep.

The machines should be made free of taxation on production of a certificate that their owners had performed their annual training on them.

The conditions of enlistment, service, pay, and allowances would be the same as for Special Reservists of the other branches.

Annual Training.—The sections would be trained individually in the summer, would be used at any Brigade or Divisional Staff Rides, and would take part in Brigade and Divisional Training, and in Army Manœuvres.

In this way closer touch would be established between the Cavalry and such Special Reservists than is possible with the present organisation of the Army Motor Reservists.

Their training would take place concurrently with the Cavalry and their employment with that arm would be officially recognised.

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HAND TO HAND AT WATERLOO.

Corporal Shaw (Life Guards) attacking the French Cuirassiers.

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'REGI ADSUMUS COLONI'

By Colonel H. Fortescue

This device, borne by King Edward's Horse, the King's Oversea Dominions Regiment, very truly represents the ideal from which the existence of that corps has been evolved.

Towards the close of the late war in South Africa it occurred to certain prominent gentlemen from the Autonomous States and the Crown Colonies that it would be possible to raise a mounted corps from amongst such of their fellow countrymen as were residing in Great Britain at the time.

It was thought that the formation of such a regiment would be a fitting recognition of the great services rendered during the war to the British Empire by those portions of its people who dwelt in the lands beyond the seas; and that, so constituted, it would create a visible and an appropriate symbol of the unity of the British nations for the promotion and the defence of their mutual interests and liabilities.

It was also believed that service with a common purpose in such a corps would afford an opportunity to British subjects hailing from widely separated countries to meet under conditions enabling them to form friendships with one another, and to gain much mutual knowledge of the local conditions which, existing in their various communities, must inevitably influence their policies. The value of the proposal was realised by the military authorities of that day, and on November 29, 1901, the regiment was raised, under the designation of the King's Colonials, by Colonel Willoughby Wallace, C.M.G., an officer of Canadian birth.

On the same day His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales conferred upon it the distinction of becoming its Honorary Colonel, and the interest which was taken at that time in the corps by the Prince of Wales is graciously continued at the present moment by His Majesty, King George V. The King's Colonials were first raised as a unit of the (at the time) Imperial Yeomanry, and the Headquarters of all four squadrons were located in London.

The qualifications which are required from applicants desiring to

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join are, either that they should possess colonial birth or parentage, or that they should have resided in a self-governing dominion, or a colony of the Crown, for a period of not less than five years.

Notwithstanding, however, the interest which had been taken in the formation of the regiment, it was only in the year 1904 that it was able to achieve any very definite advance towards the position which its promoters had hoped to see it arrive at, and which it may now be fairly said to occupy.

In the year named, Colonel Wallace retired from the command, and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. A. Lawrence (previously an officer of the 17th Lancers) succeeded to the command. At this period the strength of the establishment of the King's Colonials was not entirely satisfactory, and it appeared as if the future success of the corps might be doubtful, in view of the seeming difficulty of inducing properly qualified and representative men to join in anything approaching the necessary numbers.

This doubt was reflected at home and in the Oversea States. In both some pessimists were to be found, who denied the possibility of maintaining a regiment in Great Britain which should serve under the conditions of the Imperial Yeomanry, and yet be recruited from exotic sources.

A drastic reorganisation was introduced, which was destined soon to produce successful results to a very marked degree. It was realised that men who come to the mother country from the Oversea States do not necessarily or by any natural law gravitate exclusively to the metropolis.

Permission was consequently sought to establish 'out detachments' in localities in which the class of men whom it was desired to attract might be expected to be found. After a considerable period of delay, the strong representations which had been made were successful, and the desired sanction was obtained from the military authorities. A detachment was at once formed at Liverpool for the convenience of men who resided in the more northern parts of the country. It speedily reached a strength of over eighty and, did the limitations of the establishment not forbid, there is practically no doubt but that this number could be doubled.

The creation of this detachment was directly followed by that of a second one at Oxford, and that again by a third at Cambridge. The two latter are entirely composed of undergraduates who have come from the various dominions and colonies, and together form one squadron, which is invariably filled to the limit of its permitted establishment.

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An interesting and satisfactory result which proceeded from the formation of this squadron was the connection with the King's Colonials, through the 'Rhodes Scholars' at Oxford, of the 'Cecil Rhodes Trust.' A number of the British 'Rhodes Scholars' enlisted in the regiment as soon as the opportunity was offered to them. And shortly afterwards the 'Rhodes Trustees' generously gave a considerable annual subsidy to the revenues of the corps, considering that the work which the King's Colonials were endeavouring to perform was entirely sympathetic and consonant with those principles for whose promotion 'The Trust' that they administered was founded. A necessary complement to the establishment of these detachments was the provision of suitable Headquarters and riding schools, where their instruction could be carried on. These were satisfactorily arranged for, the expense which they entailed being met from the private funds of the regiment, as public money was only available for the purpose of providing the Headquarters of the regiment itself. The improvement in the situation, which resulted from these measures, was immediate. Within little more than a twelvemonth the strength of the King's Colonials had doubled, and, although always subject to a considerable annual exodus of men who return to their own countries, the numbers have never since fallen below the establishment. Indeed, should it ever be thought advisable to do so, a further two squadrons could, in all probability, be speedily raised.

When the corps was originally founded, and in the earlier years of its existence, it may be said to have been practically composed of unformed material, for although several of the officers and men had seen war service with various contingents in South Africa, they had not had the opportunities given by a systematic training. Therefore, the improvement at this period in both the zeal and the soldierly qualities of the regiment was very marked, and it was suggested from several quarters, both well informed and interested in the movement, that a much closer connection with the oversea forces might be obtained and a possible avenue opened to considerable service to the Empire, by definitely connecting the King's Colonials with certain units of the forces of their own various countries.

The last Colonial Conference was then holding its meetings in London, and, with the sanction of the Honorary Colonel, various formal communications, leading towards the objects just mentioned, were held with several ministers and statesmen from the different dominions.

The receptions which were accorded to the general principles con-

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tained in these communications were in all cases sympathetic and encouraging. Among the proposals tentatively made was a suggestion that, if alliances were formed with regiments of the local forces of self-governing States, it might be possible to arrange the details of such a system of transference that members of allied regiments would be able to exchange from one to another without loss of service, should they at any time change their country of residence.

A further proposal was made that mutual facilities should be offered to each other by allied regiments, which would enable any members temporarily absent from their own States, nevertheless, to perform their obligations of service.

These suggestions, and others intended to strengthen the connection between allied regiments, are still under consideration, and there is reason to hope that they may soon materialise in useful form. One immediate and practical response was forthcoming at the time when they were first put forward. A regiment of the Canadian Militia, the 8th (Princess Louise's) New Brunswick Hussars, commanded by Colonel Wedderburn, at once applied to be allied with the King's Colonials. This application was forwarded by the Canadian Government, and graciously sanctioned by His Majesty, King Edward. It was speedily followed by a similar request from the Cape Border Light Horse, commanded by Colonel Price, C.M.G., and from two entire brigades of Australian Light Horse, under Colonel MacArthur Onslow and Colonel Vernon, respectively.

In every succeeding year Australia has added fresh units to the alliance, and is at this moment represented by no less than fifteen regiments of light horse.

All these allied regiments, by the permission of His Majesty, are placed in the British Army List with King Edward's Horse. The friendship and companionship, which commenced in this manner between bodies geographically so widely separated from each other, has tended to develop and to increase ever since, and without doubt another if unnoticed link has been added to the ties which hold us closely together.

The regimental records show two incidents of historical importance, which occurred during the year 1905, when the regiment represented the forces of the Oversea Dominions.

When H.R.H. the Prince of Wales unveiled in St. Paul's Cathedral the monument placed to the memory of those men from the Dependencies and Colonies who had given up their lives for the love of the Empire, His

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Royal Highness wore the uniform of the King's Colonials, and the regiment formed the Guard of Honour.

And in the same summer it was again called upon to furnish a Guard of Honour at the ceremonial opening in St. Paul's Cathedral of the Chapel of the Order of St. Michael and St. George by His late Majesty King Edward VII.

A symbol of the great British Empire which lies beyond the seas was, through its agency, placed before the eyes of the public on these two occasions and the corps was thus enabled to carry out one of the objects for which it was originally instituted.

Its future now seemed to be indeed fairly assured, and no further assistance necessary to enable the regiment to become a worthy and fitting representative of the forces of the Oversea Empire than could be given by the zeal and efforts of its own people.

But a little cloud arose which, at first imperceptible, in the end threatened the existence itself of the regiment in the form which had originally been intended.

Fortunately, the broad-minded course eventually taken averted this calamity.

In 1907 the Territorial Forces Act of Great Britain passed into law, and included the King's Colonials under its provisions together with the whole of the Imperial Yeomanry and Volunteer Force.

Based on the principle that definite and centralised localities should locally raise and locally administer their specified units from amongst the inhabitants of particular counties, towns or districts, the conditions thus contemplated by the Act were obviously incompatible in many ways with a body constituted as was the regiment in question; for, recruited in very diverse localities of the Kingdom, and consequently organised in widely separated detachments, their ranks filled with men whose local interests were in the distant portions of the Empire, citizens of Montreal, Melbourne, Toronto, Wellington, Cape Town, Pretoria or Natal, and not of London, Middlesex, Manchester, Gloucestershire or Yorkshire, the King's Colonials were as completely out of touch with the Metropolitan Association, to whose administration they were commended, as that Association itself was out of touch with them.

Not only were the national sentiments of the Colonials offended by a compulsory connection with one specified locality in Great Britain, but the County Association was not competent to administer or to recruit for quite one half of the regiment situated outside the area which was

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allotted to their care. The harmful effect of such a situation became manifest immediately, and for a short period it seemed, not only that numbers would again decline, but that all reason would disappear for seeking any special interest from the Dominions themselves.

The thanks of the regiment at this time were particularly due to the chairman of the London County Association, Lord Esher, for his sympathetic assistance at a critical moment.

After some delay a Conference was assembled at the War Office, and the creation of a special Administrative Committee was finally sanctioned in 1909.

It was entrusted with functions similar to those exercised by the various County Associations, and the following gentlemen were the first members nominated :

Lieut.-Colonel the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Bigge, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., &c. (chairman), Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G., High Commissioner for the Dominion of Canada ; Sir Somerset French, K.C.M.G., Agent General for the Cape of Good Hope ; Captain R. M. Collins, R.N., C.M.G., the representative of the Commonwealth of Australia ; Colonel the Honourable H. A. Lawrence (who had recently resigned the command of the regiment) ; the present Commanding Officer, Colonel Henry Fortescue, and the 2nd in Command, Lieut.-Colonel V. S. Sandeman.

Subsequently, at various periods, C. Wallington, Esq., C.M.G., Major General Sir Frederick Benson, K.C.B., Colonel Dalgetty, C.B., C.M.G. (late Commanding Officer of the Cape Border Rifles), and Major Hamilton were elected as additional members, the last-named officer having been one of the original founders.

The position of the King's Colonials was now formally recognised ; and many difficulties disappeared, which had at first appeared menacing when the regiment was included in the local Territorial Forces of Great Britain.

Whether or not it may be thought advisable to modify this position under any future Act, 'solvitur ambulando.' But at present the corps is able to go forward, and to look confidently for a successful and serviceable career with the Territorial Force, although not in every sense as the other units of that organisation. From the earliest moment when opportunity was given to them, the King's Colonials had done their utmost to act up to their responsibilities and their uniquely Imperial character.

In the month of May, 1909, they had been officially asked by the

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military authorities to undertake a special liability for foreign service, which would enable them to be sent to any part of the globe where the interests of the Empire demanded, in the event of such a national emergency that any portion of the Territorial Force should be embodied.

This request was immediately accepted, and the contract of liability signed by every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man of the corps. The distinction 'Imperial Service' was then added to its designation, and denotes that this corps, filled with men from the further States of the Empire, serving at the centre of the Empire, is in the proper and strict sense of the words an *Imperial* body. A similar regiment has certainly not previously existed, and its significance requires no amplification here.

The remainder of the short story of the regiment can be quickly written.

Increasing interest in it was being taken by the self-governing States, and in the autumn of 1909 it was visited on Salisbury Plain by many of the delegates of the Imperial Defence Conference, at that time in session, and privileged to entertain them in camp.

Amongst these visitors were Sir Frederick Borden, Sir Joseph Ward (whose son was then serving in the ranks) and Colonel Foxton. A more important event was still to occur in the history of the regiment, which was to be known for but a little while longer as the King's Colonials.

Through the much-lamented death of King Edward VII., His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Honorary Colonel of the King's Colonials, succeeded to the Throne of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Dominions Beyond the Seas, and on September 2, 1910, His Majesty King George V. was graciously pleased to honour the regiment by becoming colonel-in-chief. On July 12, 1910, His Majesty was pleased to order, that in future the name of the corps should be changed from the King's Colonials to King Edward's Horse, the King's Oversea Dominions Regiment. The honour of bearing the name of the late Sovereign was bestowed upon the regiment in order that it might for ever be a memorial of that Monarch who had done so much to unite the different countries of his Empire in the bonds of common devotion to his person.

Assuredly, no finer monument can be raised than one to which the men of the British Nations Beyond the Seas contribute their personal services. The most generous financial assistance was forthcoming to enable the regiment to fit itself properly for the task, and its means are adequate to give a sound and efficient training to its members of all ranks.

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King Edward's Horse should be able this year to continue their work under most favourable conditions. In their new Headquarters at the Duke of York's School at Chelsea they can look forward to offering a home to their fellow-countrymen who will represent their local forces at the Coronation of King George, and in so doing they will not only renew and extend their own friendships with them, but will be able to bring together the soldiers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and all the various Dependencies of the Crown upon a common ground.

The nations and States of the British Empire have been compared to a number of globes of quicksilver, each one complete, symmetrical and perfect in itself, but still capable of blending together into a united and perfect whole. To symbolise the galaxy of nations which together form our Empire is the object of the existence and the ambition of King Edward's Horse. To enable them to do so two things are requisite, their own efforts and the affectionate interest and the moral support of the States from which they come. There is no reason to doubt that both will be forthcoming in full measure. Great as the future will no doubt be of the British nations now growing into manhood, their strength and glory, should they separate, will be as nothing to the strength and glory they will reach united.

King Edward's Horse stands for an emblem of this Unity.

'Regi adsumus Coloni.'

'Imperial Service.'

The large badge in the illustration is the Regimental, the smaller ones being those of the various Colonies and borne by each separate Squadron.

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THE GENDARMERIE OF BELGIUM AND THEIR NEW EQUIPMENT

By A. E. Pearse

As in most Continental countries, the Gendarmerie Nationale of Belgium is a constabulary force, which exists in addition to the different Municipal Police, to help these to keep order whenever a large crowd collects, whether owing to processions, elections, strikes or riots; to patrol the country roads for the security of the public, and many other duties, which in this country fall to our different County Police.

The Gendarmerie forms part of the army and is under the authority of the War Office, but receives orders from the Minister of Justice concerning their police duties. The corps was first organised in 1830 after the Netherlands Maréchaussée* were disbanded in the Southern Provinces freed from the Dutch. Troublesome times were evidently expected at this period, the mounted Gendarmes being armed with a long sword, a carbine, a bayonet and two pistols.

Since then the Gendarmerie has increased in efficiency, and they must be one of the finest bodies of men of its kind in Europe, judging from the fact that last year no less than three different foreign deputations came to Belgium, especially to study this force. The first visit was from officers of the Austro-Hungarian Gendarmerie, who thoroughly inspected everything to the smallest detail connected with the corps, and came to the conclusion, which was publicly expressed, that 'the Belgian Gendarmerie was the best organised, recruited and commanded force of its kind in Central Europe.' A mission from Switzerland, and also some officers of the Republican Guard (which is a special section of the French Gendarmerie in Paris), visited Belgium for the same purpose, both deputations having nothing but admiration and praise for the organisation of the corps. Truly, after this, the Royal Irish Constabulary will have to look after their laurels.

If this elite corps of the Belgian Army has been so highly praised, it must be remembered that in the last few years everything has been done to make it as far as possible perfect and efficient. The best and

* *Maréchaussée* is the old French word used for Gendarmerie in the eighteenth century; this denomination is still used in Holland at the present time.

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most intelligent officers are posted to the corps, which is now only recruited from ex-army men, mostly non-commissioned officers, after they have passed a most severe examination concerning their physique, education and character. Promotion to N.C.O. is only awarded after passing a very stiff examination in both military and civil duties.

The present establishment of the Corps consists of 73 officers and about 3000 N.C.O.s and men, of whom about two-thirds are mounted; they, however, also take their share of dismounted duties. The Corps is divided into three divisions of three companies each, making a total

FULL DRESS.

of nine companies, one for each Province of the Kingdom. They are scattered all over the country, either in small detachments under an N.C.O. located in buildings called '*Gendarmeries*' which can be compared to our country police stations; or in barracks if the detachment is large and under an officer, as is the case in most of the important towns, especially in industrial districts. The depôt is at Tervueren, a few miles east of Brussels, where also is quartered the special mobile or flying squadron, ready to be sent on the shortest notice to any part of the Kingdom where their services might be required.

When all connection with Holland was severed in 1831, the authorities

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dropped the Dutch style and colour of uniform, and instead copied that of the French. The first uniform consisted of bearskin cap, dark blue tailed-coat with white aiguillettes and trifolium epaulettes, grey overalls or white buckskin breeches for full dress. The Foot Gendarmes had the same uniform with the exception that no aiguillettes were worn, the epaulettes having a fringe, and wore trousers instead of overalls.

The uniform has been modified several times, but in appearance it has kept its original stamp and is certainly one of the most handsome military dresses on the Continent; and with the carbine strapped in the old-fashioned style across the right thigh, gave the writer the impression of being some of Napoleon's troopers of heavy cavalry.

Like the Royal Scots Greys, and with them, they are the only two mounted corps that still wear the full bearskin cap, which in the Walloon part of Belgium has given rise to the nickname of '*Poyou bonnet*' for the Gendarmes. This head-dress has a brass grenade in front, partly hidden by the hair, like those on the busbies of our Fusilier officers. On the left side is a national cockade, to which is affixed a red hackle feather for full dress. A new pattern bearskin has just been issued, and although it has the same appearance, it is much lighter in weight than the old one; a short invisible visor is attached to prevent the hair from falling over the eyes, which, besides being more comfortable and necessary for the clear vision of the 'Eyes of the Law,' prevents those fidgety movements of brushing the hair aside with the hand, or a sharp shake of the head, for the same purpose, often to be seen of our Foot Guards, especially after the 'Stand at Ease' has been given. The inside cap and the chin-strap can be easily and quickly adjusted to fit the wearer's head, and it has three ventilator holes, one on each side, and one like a window wheel ventilator, in the ball of the grenade. For undress and ordinary duties a dark blue *képi* with white braid is worn, which has a rather large leather peak.

The old coatee has been replaced by a dark blue single-breasted tunic; the old epaulettes have given way to white cord shoulder-pieces, still, however, keeping a similar shape, with white aiguillettes from the left shoulder; both these are made of alternate white and blue cord for N.C.O.s. On the left forearm is a stripe of rank, no doubt for a similar reason as the Lance-Corporal's chevron in our Military Police.

The overalls are of dark grey cloth, but in full dress white knitted cotton pants are worn with high boots. A trial is being made with black leather puttee-gaiters and ordinary boots for service dress. The saddle cloth is dark blue with a wide white border and large grenades in the lower

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corners. The Foot Gendarmes have the same dress, except that they wear trousers instead of overalls. Officers have silver braid instead of white.

The force keeps its old reputation of being armed to the teeth; the present armament consisting of a revolver, carbine with its yataghan or bayonet, mounted men having, besides these, a cavalry sword hanging by a single strap from the black leather waist-belt when in full dress. The present firearm is an improved Mauser carbine to that carried by the regular Cavalry—it is perhaps a little shorter than the short L.-E.

SERVICE DRESS WITH NEW EQUIPMENT.

rifle; the yataghan in metal scabbard is very similar in shape and length to our latest pattern bayonet.

A most interesting experiment to readers of this Journal is a trial and a test made on a large scale of a new horse equipment for active service, a full set of which was exhibited in the Military Section of the Brussels Exhibition last year. The most striking feature of this equipment is that the sword is fixed rather low to the saddle on the off side, so that it can easily be drawn out, which has been proved by experience. The carbine is attached by a small strap from the waist-belt, the end being fixed round the stock by a stud, just below the upper swivel and under the sling, the butt resting in a small leather bucket hanging from the saddle on the near side. In this manner, although the carbine

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is always handy, whether the trooper is mounted or on foot, the weight of the firearm is fully supported by the horse. A portion of the connecting strap is made more or less rigid, either by sewing together two or three plies of leather, or by sewing it round like the handle of a travelling bag, to prevent the barrel knocking and rubbing the rider's back. The bayonet with its frog attached is carried in a leather sheath made for that purpose on the off-side wallet.

To dismount, all the trooper has to do is to lift the carbine a few inches and let it hang from the belt, leaving both his hands free to dismount; when on his feet, it is an easy matter to withdraw the bayonet and fix it to the waist-belt, the frog and strap combined being fixed round the belt with a stud. To mount, the trooper proceeds in the reverse order, having again the advantage of both hands free. When the cloak is worn the carbine emerges through the sword slit in the garment.

Experience has shown that the carbine keeps its place, whatever speed the horse might be put to or however restive he might be; even if the carbine was accidently jerked out, it would simply hang on, and could easily be replaced by a good rider. As regards falls, a special experiment has been made on the tan of a riding school by a rough rider, who acted the different falls that might happen to a rider; in each case the carbine followed the would-be unfortunate trooper, the bucket not being deep enough to keep the carbine in, except in an upright position.

The trial has been on some months; up to now it has given good results and will no doubt be adopted, not only by the Gendarmerie, but by the regular Cavalry as well.

The writer, not being a horseman, cannot and does not pass his opinion on the value of this new equipment, but from a student of military matters point of view, he does not think it an improvement on the long bucket carried by our Cavalry. On the other hand, for the Yeomanry who apparently have not as yet a definite or decided way of carrying their new short rifles a similar equipment might perhaps be copied with advantage, especially as they are not armed with the sword, and no doubt could still use the present pattern rifle-bucket of which there must be a large stock.

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A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE OPINIONS ON THE TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY RECENTLY PUT FORWARD IN THE ENGLISH PRESS, AND THE VIEWS OF CERTAIN OTHER WRITERS

By Colonel H. P. Gough

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The following extracts from various writers are interesting:

'1866 was also a bad year for Cavalry, though not so bad as is usually imagined . . . for the Austrians were usually obliged to attack under conditions which rendered success impossible . . . yet even then they frequently came within an ace of obtaining glorious results. . . . But the storm of opinion had fairly set in against them, and by 1870 it blew a perfect hurricane.

'On every field day, in every paper, the Cavalry were told that their sun had set for ever, and what wonder, under the circumstances, that they came to believe it.' (Colonel Maude.)

'The Englishman is a born rider, and sits his horse with an ease and confidence our men rarely can attain to. With such advantages it is extraordinary that the Cavalry is not better than it is. But here again the want of experience in handling large bodies of Cavalry, and the fatal fallacies which the breech-loader brought in its train, have all borne fruit. The narrow-minded ideas on Cavalry taught in the English military schools, and the strong prejudice against them existing in the minds of the Umpire Staff, who almost invariably order them out of action if they attack either Infantry or guns, have acted most prejudicially on all concerned. We ourselves knew what it was to suffer similarly before the glorious day of Vionville—Mars-la-Tour.' (Extract from lecture given by a German officer in Berlin shortly after his return from the large camp of exercise held at Delhi in 1885.)

General Langlois, the well-known French military writer, writing of the South African Campaign in his book, 'Two Recent Wars,' says:—

'His (the Boer) retreat was nothing less than a flight, and an active Cavalry would have ruined his chances of standing again on the defensive.

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But for reasons which we will not go into here, the British Cavalry never pursued.'

'Every kind of fancy ran riot in the conclusions drawn from the South African War. The change of armament would not only produce an evolution in the methods of handling troops, but even a revolution in the art of war' (*et seq.* p. 85).

'We are told that the power of firearms at the present time renders the *rôle* of Cavalry impossible in the fight—at least by shock action. It seems to me, on the contrary, that modern arms by their demoralising power of surprise place at the mercy of the Cavalry any troops who allow themselves by their own fault to be surprised by fire. For instance if the Boers at Colenso and Magersfontein had had, instead of mounted Infantry, several well-trained and well-led squadrons, with confidence in their horses, their swords, and the charge, would not the British battalions have fallen an easy prey to them when they were surprised in close formation by rifle fire at short range?' (*et seq.* pp. 96–97).

'It cannot be said that they (the Cavalry) were checked by rifle fire, for they made no attempt to do anything. It would appear that either Lord Roberts dared not expose his Cavalry, or had no confidence in them; and he was wrong, when he had a leader like General French under him.'

'Our Cavalry can, therefore, reassure themselves. While the battle is going on they will still find occasions for brilliant charges against troops which have been demoralised by a sudden and crushing fire. . . . More than ever will they be able to distinguish themselves in the decisive attack by a charge in mass.'

'The opinion of Lord Roberts, who, so to speak, never employed his Cavalry in South Africa, except in the ride to Kimberley, does not in any way modify my views. What we require is a vigorous, very mobile Cavalry, trained equally to fight on foot or to ride in a charge, and with as much confidence in their swords as in their carbines. But it must above all things be admirably mounted and be composed of good and bold riders. Given leaders of ability, we can let them go, for they will do great things.'

Now let us see what General Palat, an infantry officer, says in his book, 'Le Combat de Toutes Armes.' Discussing the battle of Bapaume, 1870, he says:—

'Here, as at other times (in 1870), the German Cavalry generals were far from possessing the boldness and the spirit of enterprise of their

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juniors, or even of their brothers-in-arms of the Infantry. . . . Nearly every one of them proved himself very much below his task, for reasons which would be too long to analyse here. Let us confine ourselves to saying—with Major Kunz—that the habit, previous to the war, of putting out of action at manœuvres all Cavalry risking a charge is the origin. Then, the criticisms wanting in a friendly tone, and finally, the tendency of Cavalry generals to remain quite passive during the combat. One can make this remark with profit in other countries besides Germany.'

Referring to the losses in this battle, in which the Cavalry suffered very little, he says :—

'This inequality shows sufficiently clearly that the Prussian Cavalry could have made a much greater use of its very great numerical superiority.'

In a critical study of Lord Methuen's tactics at the battle of the Modder, General Palat says :—

'Let us add, that he could have made his mounted troops intervene efficaciously and have held them ready to carry out a pursuit under the best conditions.'

In his study of the battle of Saint Privat, he quotes General von Kessel (another Infantry officer), who commanded the 1st Brigade of the German Guards, lying within 600 yards of the village of Saint Privat, when a feeble demonstration of attacking was made by two squadrons of the French Cavalry :—

'Infantry who have suffered heavy losses are never, in open ground, agreeably surprised when they see the hostile Cavalry approaching to attack; one never knows beforehand how these things are going to turn out. I looked on our situation as one of the gravest peril, and I could not believe that the charge, expected so long, would be so feebly carried out.'

And again Palat writes :—

'It was at this moment that the Marshal said to Du Barail: "It is necessary to charge." . . . But faith was wanting in the brilliant Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. He thought the charge "useless," "impracticable," because he had to cross 600 metres to reach the Infantry and 2000 metres to the Artillery. He did not take into account the state of exhaustion of Kessel's Brigade, nor the disorder that the brusque appearance of our Cavalry would have sufficed to throw it into. . . .

'But our Cavalry soldiers had no more faith in themselves than had Du Barail. Although the fire of the Prussians was comparatively harmless, they remained undecided, stopped, then turned about before reaching

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the enemy. Their total losses for the day were four officers and twenty-eight men!'

Similar opinions could be taken from the writings of General Bonnal (another Infantry officer) and many more, but we can see from the above quotations how, in Continental Armies, officers of the other arms regard the *rôle* of their Cavalry; how they believe in employing their Cavalry for shock-action; how determined they are to so employ them regardless of loss, and how merciless they are in their criticisms when Cavalry fail to make use of their opportunities.

General Langlois sums up his review of our Cavalry work in South Africa thus briefly:—

'This arm can do no more than is demanded of it, and nothing was demanded of it in South Africa.'

These views of men both well-read and well-experienced in war cannot be lightly set aside. They are quoted as showing not only what such men consider it possible for Cavalry to do, but also their opinion of the ill-effect of instilling into all ranks of an army during training a want of confidence in the power of its Cavalry to act with any effect on the battlefield.

Are the soldiers quoted above less competent judges than the writers in our Press? These soldiers, it may be noted, are not Cavalry men, 'blinded by the glamour of cold steel.' May it not be that these soldiers are right and our Press tacticians wrong? If so, may it not be that the latter—no doubt in the honest belief that they are doing good—are really doing infinite harm by instilling false ideas? It would be well that soldiers, at any rate, should weigh these considerations before they accept and teach the opinions now being urged in the Press.

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CAVALRY ACTION AGAINST INFANTRY

A STUDY OF REGULATIONS

By Von der Bock

Translated by the General Staff, and published by permission of the 'Militär Wochenblatt.'

A new German Cavalry Drill-book was issued in April 1909; a brief comparison of the regulations (with regard to Cavalry tactics against Infantry) contained herein with those of the Infantry Drill-book of 1906 will not be devoid of interest.

We find (in Part III.) under 'General Considerations' that, though mounted action is to be regarded as the essential characteristic of Cavalry, fire action on foot is also inculcated, especially in the case of Cavalry acting on the defensive against forces of all arms. Though Cavalry is considered to be capable 'under almost all conditions' of acting independently, a decisive charge during an action is 'only possible where large masses of Cavalry are engaged.'

With regard to the action of the Cavalry against Infantry (paras. 440-43) we find that (para. 440) 'in attacking Infantry the formation to be adopted depends not only upon the tactical situation and ground, but also upon the enemy's position and formation. . . . A deep formation is desirable where a lasting effect is aimed at, while the breadth of front must be such that no portion of the Infantry in question shall remain without being attacked. . . .'

'Against unbroken Infantry, complete success can only be hoped for if the Cavalry can approach unseen and deliver an unexpected charge' (para. 441).

'Cavalry may have to charge (in order to relieve pressure upon their own Infantry or Artillery) without being able to enjoy the advantage of this element of surprise. . . . The object of such an attack must be communicated to the troops on whose behalf it is undertaken,

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in order that they may make full use of the time gained, and that the sacrifice of the Cavalry may not be made to no purpose' (para 442).

'Against broken Infantry a charge will always be very effective' (para. 443).

Compared with the previous Cavalry Drill of 1895, the new regulations, though expressed in a more precise form, make but few changes. In fact, the latest regulations seem to lay even more emphasis than before upon the possibility of Cavalry action against Infantry, notwithstanding the increased power of modern small arms. This is specially the case in the matter of Cavalry attacking broken Infantry, where the latest Cavalry Drill-book goes much further than the Field Service Regulations of 1908. Whereas the latter (p. 587) lays down that such charges will *often* be successful, the latest Cavalry Drill-book (p. 443), quoted above, expressly states that such a charge will '*always* be very effective.' Whether this statement is not altogether too optimistic must be a matter of opinion. Even against broken Infantry the success of a Cavalry charge must depend upon many varying factors, and the expression used in the Field Service Regulations would seem to be the more appropriate of the two.

Comparing the statements contained in this latest Cavalry Drill with those in the Infantry Drill-book, we find that the latter (Part II., pp. 451-52) lays down that 'Infantry (if ready to open fire) has nothing to fear from even a very superior force of Cavalry. No special formation is required, effective fire alone is sufficient. Firing lines suffer little from a Cavalry charge. The hostile Cavalry will consider that they have scored a success if they compel Infantry to change their formation or delay their advance. Therefore, only those Infantry units directly threatened by Cavalry should take part in driving the Cavalry off.'

It can scarcely be maintained that these views of the Infantry point of view correspond with those expressed in the Cavalry Drill-book. Even making every allowance for the different points of view, one receives the impression that upon this question there is no close agreement between the two drill-books.

This lack of harmony between the two sets of regulations is especially marked in the matter of Cavalry charging unbroken Infantry. Whereas the Infantry are told that they have nothing to fear from Cavalry (even in great numerical superiority) if they are prepared for

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fire action, the Cavalry are impressed with the possibility of their achieving a real success (in breaking through the Infantry), if only they can get close up, unobserved, and deliver an unexpected charge. That the latter condition of success will often occur is, to say the least, very doubtful, in view of the absence of smoke on a modern battlefield, improved methods of communication, and the increased distance between Cavalry and other troops engaged, owing to the enhanced efficiency of modern firearms.

How little importance is attached to a Cavalry charge in the Infantry Drill-book (even when this element of surprise is supposed to favour the Cavalry) is to be seen from the order that only those Infantry units directly threatened will take any notice of a Cavalry charge, because the Cavalry will consider that they have gained their end if they succeed in making the Infantry change their formation or delay their advance.

There is obvious contradiction here between two drill-books, which may well lead to incorrect views and even bad tactics on the part of both the arms concerned. The need for uniformity in tactical instruction has before now been pointed out, and, judging from the present instance, not without cause.

IMPORTANT.

The staff of the JOURNAL is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers; every effort will, however, be made to trace the moves of regiments.

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INDEPENDENT CAVALRY: ITS RÔLE IN WAR

By Captain Cecil Battine, *late 15th Hussars*

It is generally understood that our four Cavalry brigades at home are to form a single division as Independent Cavalry in case of our intervening in a Continental War. Four thousand armed horsemen are not a very magnificent array for the decisive effort of the British Empire, but these 36 squadrons in skilful hands constitute a powerful auxiliary to any ally we may find it necessary to assist. The principal military efforts of England against foreign foes have been made in northern France or the Netherlands, and it is far from impossible that the campaign of Waterloo may have to be fought over again. It is even possible that our foes and allies may change sides in the next Waterloo campaign. In 1815 the British army included a very strong Cavalry division of about seven thousand horsemen.

When Napoleon crossed the frontier near Charleroi our Cavalry was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Mons, where Wellington expected the attack. The division reached the field of Quatre-Bras at nightfall on June 16 by a severe forced march, and made possible the manœuvre of retreat to Waterloo under the nose of the victors of Ligny. In the decisive encounter of June 18 the repeated charges of our Cavalry contributed powerfully to the British victory and probably caused the panic and stampede which finally ruined the French army. In this short and brilliant struggle the French Cavalry had laboured under many disadvantages: they were mounted on remounts of poor quality, and the best of their chiefs were not present. In his earlier and triumphant wars, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland and Wagram, Napoleon had surpassed all previous commanders in the effective use he had made of his Cavalry masses acting independently, but in harmony with, his Infantry columns. It is probable that Murat contributed not a little to these brilliant successes. In subsequent wars the Americans alone in 1861–65 have so far followed the Napoleonic scheme of employing Cavalry masses. In South Africa the Boers fought without Infantry and on our side the Cavalry were usually tied to the marching columns, though the intercepting

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of Cronje at Paardeberg by Sir John French's Cavalry was a brilliant exception.

In the Franco-German War of 1870 both sides took the field with a very ample proportion of well-mounted Cavalry but made astonishingly little use of it. This was partly owing to the superstitious terror inspired by the word 'breech-loader,' and partly to the amazing incapacity of most of the Cavalry commanders on both sides. At the present day the Germans profess to employ their Cavalry as their sole strategical advanced guard, while the French Cavalry, having very seriously deteriorated since the reduction of the term of service from three years to two, is not expected to move out in masses ahead of the Infantry columns at the beginning of the struggle, but to be held in hand as a reserve for manœuvre. The crisis of the last Franco-German war was certainly reached on August 15 and the following day, when the French army was attacked west of Metz and induced to relinquish its march to the Meuse. The afternoon of August 15 saw the French army painfully defiling through Metz and slowly gaining the heights on the left bank of the Moselle by a single road. The Germans were marching in army corps columns towards the Moselle while three army corps guarded their right flank and their left extended as far south as Nancy. Two divisions of Cavalry from each army preceded the troops and were in a situation to strike at one another that afternoon between Vionville and Mars-la-Tour on the Metz-Verdun Road. They actually exchanged artillery fire, and then withdrew without a collision in opposite directions. The night of the 15–16th August passed quietly. Both armies lay in blissful ignorance of the whereabouts of the adversary, nor did either make a serious attempt to lift the veil by patrolling. On the morning of the 16th the orders which reached the French Cavalry from Bazaine were of a nature to paralyse initiative and to conceal the real intentions of the Commander-in-Chief. Moltke, on the contrary, sent urgent directions to clear up the situation. Spurred at length to a show of activity the Commander of the 5th Prussian Cavalry division prepared to intercept the Metz-Verdun road and he was informed of the bivouacs of the enemy between Rezonville and Vionville. At the same time about 9.30 A.M. the heads of the 5th Infantry division was approaching to support the Cavalry. General von Rheinbaben was unable to resist the temptation to 'surprise' the French, who were in the act of watering their horses, and he opened upon them with two horse-artillery batteries. The fire stampeded a brigade of Dragoons, which subsequently rallied, but it effectually warned the French army of the intended attack. This artillery fire was certainly

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premature and injudicious. It is evidently unwise to begin a critical battle by forcing the pace when time to assemble adequate forces is needed by the aggressor.

The battle of Vionville—Mars-la-Tour, fought in the open undulating plateau south of these two villages on the Metz-Verdun road, is the most interesting in the history of modern war, and in it Cavalry played a leading if not a decisive part. Nothing but the criminal incompetence of Marshal Bazaine prevented the gallant army he commanded from winning a great victory. So long as military history is debated it will be a question whether the German attack was justified by the symptoms of irresolution already displayed at the French Headquarters or whether it was foolhardy in its audacity and lack of proper reconnaissance. The attack, however, succeeded strategically in spite of the tactical successes gained in the afternoon by the French, for on the morrow the army of the Rhine fell back on the line Gravelotte-Saint Privat, thus abandoning the *rôle* of field army for the fatal delusive advantages of the Metz forts. When the two Prussian divisions had exhausted their energies in two hours' severe fighting, there remained nothing but Cavalry to form their second line. This Cavalry repeatedly attacked and threatened to attack the masses of the enemy; it contributed in a high degree to immobilise his Infantry and to hypnotise his commanders. On the left flank of the attack the famous duel between thirty squadrons on either side took place about half-past four in the afternoon. The encounter was sanguinary and indecisive, but it resulted in bluffing the commander of the French IV. corps, Ladmirault, whose Infantry had just routed the Prussian 38th-brigade, and whose determined counterstroke at the outer flank of the exhausted German Infantry must have rolled up the line and completed an important victory for France. At the same hour strong and fresh masses of Infantry belonging to the III. and VI. corps stood behind the French centre in reserve. If these troops had been employed for a determined effort no German troops within reach of the battlefield could have withstood their advance. On either side, but particularly on the French, there were strong forces of Cavalry of which no use was made in the critical struggle, and the same half-hearted policy was persevered in two days later when the French army was attacked with its face towards France and its back to the fortress.

The history of this great battle recently published by the historical section of the French General Staff gives a thrilling and at the same time reliable account which all Cavalry officers should read when they get the chance. The accompanying reports from the French commanders,

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written within a few days of the battle, are of fascinating interest and throw a vivid light on the tactical methods of the day, the prevalent ideas, and the impression made upon the actors by the mighty drama of the war. Its principal lesson for us is the part played by the Independent Cavalry, the comparatively poor use made of opportunities and the tremendous consequences even of its somewhat perfunctory intervention. Mars-la-Tour gives us a peep at the colossal struggle which is possibly looming in front of us. If the fate of western Europe is once more submitted to the test of battle on the banks of the Meuse we must be prepared to take our part in a struggle for life which will involve desperate fighting. It may be essential once more to pit a mass of Cavalry against hostile Infantry in spite of the vaunted armament of the latter. The rout of the enemy's Cavalry may also be required to paralyse this strategic advanced guard, for the Germans are credited with the intention to use Cavalry for the purpose. It is at any rate certain that a strategic advanced guard which attacks with all its might has many more chances of success than the one which awaits the attack of the hostile forces deployed. Compare the fate of the isolated French corps on August 6, 1870, with the feat of the III. and X. Prussians on August 16, though the latter was at the mercy of the foe had its commander realised the situation or done his duty.

It is interesting to speculate on the tactics which would nowadays prove most useful in such an encounter as Mars-la-Tour if the event were repeated. Should Cavalry form long lines for a single shock as practised in the Indian camps of exercise from 1887 to 1897, or should they adopt the échelon tactics in favour in France since the war, and to some extent practised by us lately, and particularly in the Cavalry manœuvres of 1910? How should artillery and machine guns be most effectively employed? To what extent should Cavalry seek or avoid fighting on foot? Should Cavalry hug their horses in dismounted fighting or separate from them? In what units should Cavalry fight on foot, and to what degree should the arm be prepared to sacrifice itself on foot? Or should it only skirmish on foot and deal its decisive blow on horseback? Cannot a fraction of attacking Cavalry dismount and act as a pivot for the mounted échelons? What suggestions can be made towards effectively combining fire with shock action? Officers interested in the future of the Cavalry arm will do well to reflect on these problems and to enlighten their comrades on their conclusions. And such of our officers who can afford the pleasure of a motor trip in Belgium will find the roads through the Ardennes excellent and the scenery most picturesque.

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

GENERAL SIR JOHN FLOYD, BART.

1748-1818.

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From portraits in the Officers' Mess of the 9th Hodson's Horse.

MAN SINGH.

The first Resaldar-Major of the Regiment.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

BREVET-MAJOR
WILLIAM STEPHEN RACKER HODSON.

1821-1858

"I trust I have done my duty."

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HODSON OF HODSON'S HORSE

By Colonel R. H. Mackenzie

Brevet Major William Stephen Raikes Hodson, the skilful, daring, and successful light Cavalry leader, was the third son of the Rev. George Hodson, chaplain to the Bishop of Gloucester, afterwards Archdeacon of Stafford and Canon of Lichfield. Born at Maisemore Court, in a village near the Severn, about two miles north of Gloucester, on March 19, 1821, he was educated at Rugby, where he was renowned as an athlete, and subsequently graduated as B.A. at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1844. His first insight into military life was in the capacity of subaltern in the Royal Guernsey Militia in 1844–45; but even in that limited sphere of duty he evinced a zeal which prompted the Governor, General Sir William Napier, the historian of the Peninsula War, to write: 'I not only consider you fit to hold a commission in any service, but I think you will be an acquisition to any service'—an anticipation which was amply justified.

In 1845 Hodson was appointed to the Hon. East India Company's service, and joined the 2nd Bengal Grenadiers, a native regiment, forming part of the Governor-General's escort, and was fortunate enough to participate in the ensuing Sutlej campaign. His private letters show him to have been an officer unusually observant and keen for one of such very short service, and in no hurry to conceal his dissatisfaction with the general mis-management which is associated with the conduct of the operations. However, he was present at the battle of Moodkee, the first of the fights which taught us to respect the power of our Sikh foes, and was wounded in the leg at Ferozeshah. Then, exchanging into the 16th Grenadiers, he did good service at the decisive victory of Sobraon, in which he was grazed by a bullet and spiked two of the enemy's guns. He emerged from the campaign with his first war medal with two clasps. His attainments, which were evidently superior to those of the ordinary officer of his standing, did not escape notice, and he was introduced, as a

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promising young officer, to Sir Henry Lawrence, thus beginning a friendship which only ended with their lives. Exchanging into the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, now the 1st batt. Royal Munster Fusiliers, he was in 1846 appointed Adjutant and Second-in-Command of the Guides, that splendid corps which was afterwards to win renown in many a frontier campaign. It was a regiment after his heart, but one whose organisation, duties, and very title were a departure from custom which occasioned much concern to officers of the old school. The object of the corps was to provide trustworthy men, mounted and dismounted, to be trained in peace to be efficient in war, able to acquire accurate information regarding the roads, rivers, ferries, and passes on the frontier, having a good idea of the supplies &c. available locally, knowing how to act as guides, and fight. And it was in the service that this involved that Hodson gained much of that experience which afterwards made him an unrivalled partisan leader, for he seemed to possess a natural aptitude for reconnoitring and scouting. He was employed at the same time in surveys, and in road- and canal-making under the Chief Engineer. He served with the regiment in the Punjab Campaign of 1848–49, including the siege of Mooltan, and as an active member of Lord Gough's Staff at the battle of Goojerat. He distinguished himself by brilliant conduct and personal gallantry on several occasions, was favourably mentioned by Brigadier-General Wheeler and Lord Gough, and received the thanks of the Governor-General of India, and the medal with two clasps. His men thought a lot of him, for he was a fine active athletic man standing five feet eleven, and an exceptionally good swordsman. On one occasion he signalised himself by engaging and killing an Akali who had beaten off in succession four sowars of the 15th Irregular Cavalry. He was also a good walker, and could run a mile in five minutes.

When, in 1849, the Punjab was annexed, Hodson was transferred to the Civil department as Assistant Commissioner, and was stationed for some time at Umritza. Then, as at all times, he was a consistent reader, for, as he said, 'few sciences require more study than the art of war.' He studied at least three hours a day, and we find him writing home to the library of the Royal United Service Institution for Cæsar, Zenophon, and Arrian: Shakespeare he always carried with him. He was very intimate with Sir Henry Lawrence all this time. He accompanied him to Cashmere, and saw a good deal of Thibet. In 1852, in part recognition of his services in the Punjab, he was appointed to the command of the Corps of Guides, the then object of his ambition; at

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that time Sir Henry Lawrence speaks of them as 'the best Irregular corps in India.'

Hodson commanded the regiment in the Hazara Expedition in 1852–53, and showed great zeal and aptitude for his work. One engagement, which lasted from sunrise to sunset, gave him a fine opportunity of showing with what skill and coolness he could handle his Guides in mountain warfare under the most trying conditions. He held the civil and military control of the wild district of Yuzafzai on the northern frontier of the Peshawar Valley, and in his letters has left a vivid picture of the arduous life it entailed.

Up to this time his career had been one of uniform prosperity; but his rapid promotion had made some envious and created jealousy, while his scorn of pretence, his restless energy, and his undisguised criticism of those who neglected their duty, had made him enemies. And a storm burst upon him which at the time threatened to ruin him. There was some confusion in the regimental accounts, and charges of dishonesty, as well as of harsh treatment of natives and his own men, were brought against him. A Court of Inquiry was held which terminated its sittings in January 1855. The report was unfavourable, and he was removed from the command of the Guides. Against this decision he appealed, and a second inquiry was ordered under the presidency of Major Reynel Taylor, 'the Bayard of the Punjab,' which after a long and patient investigation reported on February 13, 1856. This report fully cleared him of the imputation cast upon him; Colonel Napier, afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala, writing: 'The result of Major Taylor's laborious and patient investigation has fully justified the confidence that I have throughout maintained in the honour and uprightness of his conduct.' But the second report, somehow, was not communicated to the Commander-in Chief. It was laid quietly aside in some office, and no more notice was taken of it. He was thus left for two years living under unjust

THE KING OF DELHI.

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imputations, and looked on with suspicion by those who were ignorant of the facts, while to add to his distress he lost his father and only child. He soon afterwards rejoined the 1st Bengal Fusiliers at Dagshai, thus practically commencing his career all over again, but discharging all the regimental duties and those of brigade-major with a zeal and energy that procured especial commendation from his commanding officer, and from the brigadier-general commanding the Sirhind district.

His chance came with the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny at Meerut, followed by the massacre at Delhi. General Anson, who knew his man, appointed him Assistant Quartermaster-General to the force he was preparing to lead to Delhi, placed the Intelligence Department in his hands, and authorised him to raise a new regiment of irregular horse. The latter was the body known throughout the Mutiny as 'Hodson's Horse,' of which it may be said that no single regiment did so much towards saving our Indian Empire. He was assisted in the raising of this fine regiment by Montgomery and one or two of the influential sudars; an active part being also taken by Man Singh, his first Resaldar Major, whose death only recently took place at Umritza, where he was President of the Sikh Golden Temple, and whose portrait as a devoted follower of Hodson will be interesting. Hodson was the life and soul of the force marching on Delhi. He seemed to be everywhere and to know everything, and nothing escaped his notice. As an Intelligence officer he was unequalled, and never beaten as a scout, while his contempt for anything like danger or even risk was unique. In June, 1857, he was before Delhi, and there met his old corps the Guides, who received him with an enthusiasm which more than stultified all the false reports of his unpopularity with the corps. The men cheered and shouted, crowding round him like frantic creatures. They seized his bridle, dress, hands, and feet, and literally threw themselves down before his horse with tears streaming down their faces. How glad they were when they came under his command again. Of the details of the siege of Delhi, and the important share that he and his Horse had in its capture, his letters give a very clear and interesting account. At times fifteen hours in the saddle, at others in the trenches, yet his intelligence so complete that it used to be said he knew what the rebels had for dinner. There was no one in the field force whose fame rang louder. Yet new and noteworthy services were to be added to his already bright record of heroic deeds.

Delhi was taken on September 20, 1857, and on the following day he obtained leave from General Wilson to pursue and seize the King of

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Delhi. He started with only fifty of his men for Hymayoun's tomb, where the King had gone after leaving the palace. The surrender followed, and Hodson brought the King back into Delhi, handing him over to the Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the thousands following, any one of whom could have shot him down in a moment. This, the leading of the King a captive into his own palace, was perhaps the heaviest blow the rebels had received. The next day, with a hundred picked men, he started again for Hymayoun's tomb, where the Shahzadas, princes of Delhi, had taken refuge. Hodson demanded their surrender; they came out, and were sent away towards the city under a guard. The tomb was crowded with six or seven thousand of the servants of the palace and scum of the city. Hodson demanded of these men the instant surrender of their arms. In spite of the small number of his force, they obeyed, and, after leaving the arms and animals with a guard, he went to look after the princes. A large native mob had collected, and were turning on the guard. It was no time for hesitation; the question was between the lives of himself and his soldiers, and those of the prisoners. And, after appealing to them and saying that these were the butchers who had murdered and brutally used the helpless women and children, he took a carbine from one of his men and shot the princes, one after another. 'God is great!' was the cry that broke from the multitude of lips, but quietly the crowd of awe-stricken Mussulmans melted away. The critical condition of things in India, and the absolute necessity at the moment for immediate action for the safety of his own life and those of his soldiers, gained for Hodson the approbation at the time of all engaged in suppressing the rebellion. Yet he did not escape detraction, and, as he himself said, it brought him more envy and ill-will than one would believe to have been possible.

Hodson's Horse were not suffered to lie idle after the fall of Delhi. They were soon afterwards sent towards Cawnpore in charge of a convoy of supplies for the Commander-in-Chief's army, and went through a great deal of hard fighting and service of all kinds. One of Hodson's most brilliant episodes was his riding from Mynpoorie to the Commander-in-Chief's camp at Meerun-ke-Serai to open communication between the two forces, when he travelled 72 miles on one horse through a country swarming with enemies. His brilliant services are too numerous to give in detail here, and he was very frequently mentioned in despatches. But his life's race was nearly run. On March 6, 1858, he was before Lucknow, when he seems to have had a presentiment of his approaching end, for he gave away several keepsakes. He felt very much the hard treatment

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he had received. He was weary, and, as he said to one of his friends, would be at rest. Not many hours afterwards he was summoned to his eternal rest. He accompanied Napier, as a volunteer, at the attack on the Begum's palace at Lucknow on March 11, when he was shot through the chest, the bullet entering between the false ribs in front, and coming out between two of the same ribs behind. He breathed his last peacefully on the following day, within a week of entering upon his thirty-eighth year, one of his last expressions being 'I trust I have done my duty.' His faithful orderly, Nihal Singh, wept long and bitterly over his master's body, and his troopers cried like children over the dead hero whom they would have followed to the death. He was buried the same evening in



THE EMANBARRA, LUCKNOW.

the garden of the Martiniere at the foot of a clump of bamboos; even Colin Campbell bursting into tears as the body was lowered into the grave of 'one of the finest officers in the British Army.' And so was laid to rest the bold and skilful leader of Hodson's Horse, the prince of scout officers, and one whose name shone with inspiring lustre among the brave men who fought and died in their country's service during the flood-tide of the Indian Mutiny. As a leader of Irregulars, a commander of Light Horse, and as an Intelligence officer Hodson has had few equals. A magnificent swordsman, and brave as a lion, it is said of him that he earned the Victoria Cross every day of his life. Yet with all his brilliant service, he was but a captain and brevet-major at his death, the latter having been promised for his services in the Punjab. Sir Robert Mont-

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gomery wrote: 'I can find no one like him. Many men are as brave, many possess as much talent, many are cool and accurate in judgment, but not one combines all these qualifications as he did.'

Hodson's claim to be remembered as a great soldier has never been questioned even by the boldest assailants of his moral rectitude, or of his fitness for civil rule. He has had many detractors, but none of them have in our opinion succeeded in substantiating their charges. They have given implicit credit to whatever his enemies said of him, while neglecting the testimony of such friends as Lord Napier of Magdala, who wrote at the time: 'I am now, as I always have been, fully convinced of his honour and integrity.' As in the Corps of Guides, so in his own fine regiment of Horse, he was the object, not only of respect, but of veneration. To this day, the few men who remember him, and the descendants of those who served under him, speak of him by the title given him by the old King of Delhi—Hodson Sahib Bahadur. His corps of Horse has since been split up into the 9th and 10th Cavalry, while the latter have been honoured with the title of the Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers; but the name which they never forget, and which they most delight to honour is that of Hodson's Horse. His portrait and sword belt find an honoured place in the officers' mess of the former, while the 10th equally treasure his field glasses. He was a born leader; a man to follow; and one with an extraordinary knowledge of and influence over natives. His men were ready to follow him, as their descendants are ready to follow their present officers, to death or glory:—

'I rode to Delhi with Hodson: there were three of my father's sons;
Two of them died at the foot of the Ridge, in the line of the Mori's guns.
I followed him on when the first two fell: he was cruel and cold, they said:
The men were sobbing around me the day that I saw him dead.
It's not soft words that a soldier wants; we knew what he was in the fight,
And we love the man that can lead us, ay, though his face be white.

* * * *

And when the time shall come, Sahibs, as come full well it may,
When all things are not fair and bright, as all things seem to-day,
When foes are rising round you fast, and friends are few and cold,
And half a yard of lusty steel is worth a prince's gold.
Remember Hodson trusted us, and trust the old blood too.
And as we followed him—to death—our sons will follow you.' *

* These words, by Sir Mortimer Durand, are supposed to represent the feelings of an old Sikh warrior, Attar Singh.

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THE WORK OF THE CAVALRY AT SOBRAON

(February 10, 1846.)

By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B.

At the battle of Sobraon Sir Joseph Thackwell was fortunate in having an exceptionally fine body of Cavalry under his command. It comprised fifteen regiments in four brigades, and was probably a stronger Cavalry Division than any British Cavalry soldier has commanded in action before or since—with the one exception of Lord Uxbridge at the battle of Waterloo. It was, moreover, a particularly war-seasoned force: the divisional commander was a man of ripe experience who had served with the 15th Hussars in the Corunna campaign, during the latter part of the war in the Peninsula, and at Waterloo, where he had lost an arm. He had commanded the Cavalry of the army of the Indus in the first Afghan War under Sir John Keane, and had again commanded the Cavalry Division in the short Gwalior campaign under Sir Hugh Gough. One of his brigadiers at least—Cureton—was a Cavalry leader of quite exceptional ability, and there was scarcely one of the fifteen regiments present which was not fully experienced in Indian warfare. Of the three British Cavalry regiments, the 3rd Light Dragoons had fought their way to Kabul in 1842 and had already within the last few weeks covered themselves with glory both at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, as had the 16th Lancers at Aliwal; while the 9th Lancers had had two squadrons engaged at Punniar only three years previously. Among the native Cavalry corps there was hardly a regiment—regular and irregular, and not even excluding the Governor-General's Bodyguard—which had not served in recent years either in Afghanistan or before Gwalior, or which had not already crossed swords with the horsemen of the Khalsa army in the two stern fights which immediately preceded the battle of Sobraon.

During the operations under Sir Harry Smith which culminated in

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the victory of Aliwal, Cureton's Cavalry Brigade—the 3rd—strengthened by the 1st and 5th Light Cavalry and the 8th Irregulars, had been detached from the main army, but between the 6th and 8th February the whole of Smith's force, considerably weakened in numbers, had rejoined the camp before Sobraon. Between the city of Ferozepore and the point where the River Sutlej, after the inflow of the Beas, turns sharply to the southward, there were four points where the stream could be crossed by ford or ferry; and it was opposite the large village of Sobraon that the Sikhs had established a bridge of boats, covered on the east bank by a strong entrenchment. Sir Hugh Gough determined to attack the entrenched position at daylight on February 10 and made the following dispositions; the main attack was to be made on the left by the Third Division under Sir Robert Dick, supported by the fire of thirteen heavy guns. This division was already stronger than either of the two others, since it contained three brigades while the others had but two each, and for the purposes of the attack it was further strengthened by the attachment to it of the 53rd Foot from General Grey's division. In rear was the 1st Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier Scott with the Cavalry Divisional Headquarters. The 2nd Division was in the centre, with a battery of heavy guns on either flank, deployed so as to be ready either to support Dick or attack the entrenchments in its own immediate front, while Sir Harry Smith's Division—the 2nd—was to attack on the right supported by the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry under Brigadier Campbell. The rest of the Cavalry was disposed wide on the flanks; the 3rd Brigade under Cureton was directed to move on a ford immediately below the junction of the Beas and Sutlej and, by feigned attempts to cross, to occupy the attention of the Sikh Cavalry on the further bank. The 4th Cavalry Brigade appears to have been broken up, and of its regiments some were kept in reserve on the left rear while others observed the ford immediately above Ferozepore.

The troops began to take up their positions at 4.30 A.M. on the 10th, and as soon as the river mists had lifted our guns opened fire, but it was 6.30 before the whole of our Artillery fire developed and 9 A.M. before the leading Brigades of the 3rd Division moved off to the attack. Our Artillery had been replied to by the fire of seventy guns within the entrenchment, but at the moment when we seemed about to establish our superiority the British gun-ammunition supply gave out, and the Infantry advance was consequently entered upon without due preparation and continued without the intended Artillery support.

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Both the leading Brigades of Dick's Division effected, with hard fighting, an entrance into the entrenchment, but were for a time able to get no further—'the Sikhs, even when at particular points their entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, strove to regain them by the fiercest conflict, sword in hand.' Both the other Divisions were now ordered to attack to take some of the pressure off the 3rd, but the assault made by either was checked and even repulsed—the earthworks opposite Gilbert being from eight to ten feet in height and only surmountable by the men climbing on each other's shoulders, while Smith's Division by its losses at Aliwal had been reduced to no more than the strength of a Brigade; some of the native corps in the 2nd Division had already began to fall back.

At this juncture part of Scott's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to support the 2nd Division, and Thackwell, taking two squadrons of the 3rd Light Dragoons, and followed by the 4th and 5th Light Cavalry, trotted along a nullah in front of and towards the left of the enemy's line of earthworks, till the head of the Cavalry column came upon a part which was still held by Sikh Infantry and which was flanked by a battery of three guns. The unexpected appearance of the Cavalry caused the enemy temporarily to fall back, and Thackwell, observing a breach across the ditch, left by the Sikhs to facilitate their ingress to and egress from the entrenchment, passed through the leading squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons, under Major Hale, in single file, and then, rapidly forming, led the Dragoons in a brilliant charge almost to the river bank. Of this movement the second Viscount Hardinge—then as Captain Hardinge serving on the Governor-General's staff—writes thus: 'At this crisis'—the temporary check all along our line—'the Cavalry were ordered up under Sir Joseph Thackwell, who rode with his squadrons in single file through an opening in the entrenchment. It seemed as if they were doomed to destruction. Many fell in the ranks when within the camp. But the 3rd Light Dragoons, showing the same invincible bravery as on the night of December 21, quickly reformed and charged the serried ranks of the Sikh Infantry.'

The right squadron of the 3rd was for a moment borne back by the pressure of the retreating Sikhs, who retired slowly, fighting desperately with their tulwars to the last, but by this time the 2nd squadron had passed the entrenchment and another charge was made. The 4th and 5th Light Cavalry now joined, as did the other two squadrons of the 3rd Light Dragoons, which under Brigadier Scott had entered the entrench-

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ment further to the right, and several charges took place until the interior of the works and the shallows of the river were filled with sabred Sikhs. Owing to these Cavalry attacks the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the pressure being thus relieved, were able to enter the lines with comparatively small loss. Sir Hugh Gough in his despatch gave full credit to the help given by the Cavalry in gaining the victory ; he wrote of the 3rd Dragoons ' whom no obstacle usually held formidable by horse appears to check,' and who ' galloped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field works,' and later of their ' attack on field works, usually supposed to be the particular province of Infantry and Artillery.'

It is worthy of note that although the 3rd had been under close fire all the morning, and although immediately prior to their entrance into the entrenchment the regiment had been exposed to a heavy Infantry fire within sixty yards of the Sikh right and under the flanking fire of a battery at 150 yards firing grape-shot, their casualties—four officers and twenty-two men wounded and five men killed—were fewer than those of any other regiment engaged, whether Cavalry or Infantry, with one solitary exception. The success of their attack, and the trifling loss with which it was effected, were no doubt due to the fact that their action was as unexpected as it was opportune—that the moment produced the men.

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CAVALRY MACHINE GUNS ON PACK ANIMALS OR CARRIAGES

By Captain H. Victorin, *3rd Austrian Dragoons*

(Translated from the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* by the General Staff.)

The question whether machine guns with Cavalry should be carried on pack horses or on wheels is still being discussed in Germany, though it was decided in Austria, as long ago as 1907, in favour of pack transport. The writer of the present article has commanded machine-gun sections with both descriptions of transport and has more than once contributed articles on the subject to this periodical.

The author of a book published in Germany entitled 'The Latest Machine Guns'* appears to be in favour of wheeled transport. So was the present writer, once. In 1907 he contributed an article to the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, pointing out the advantages of that description of machine-gun mounting, viz. its great mobility (with a team of four horses), its instantaneous readiness for action, and capability for carrying over 15,000 rounds of ammunition with the gun. But his views were entirely changed during the autumn of that same year.† The excellent results obtained from the *Schaller* pattern of saddle removed the objection, as to probable sore backs, raised against pack transport; while close study of the Russo-Japanese war proved that a machine gun must still be considered as a small arm, the principal work of which is at short ranges, within which it is difficult to handle any large carriage mounting with a team of horses.

It is worth while reproducing here a passage which occurs in an article by Colonel Köppel (cited by Captain Fleck), where he replies to the favourite argument of the partisans of carriage mounting, to the effect that if horse artillery possesses adequate mobility to act with Cavalry, the same applies to machine guns mounted on wheels.

* *Die Neuesten Maschinengewehre*, &c., by Captain A. Fleck, 4th German Army Corps.

† *Vide* the writer's article in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, April 1908.

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Colonel Köppel remarks:—

'Field guns possess a much wider range of action. They can come into action at much longer ranges, and have a much wider choice of position, besides being able to remain in the same place for a considerable time.

'Machine guns, on the other hand, must push on to closer ranges if a good result is to be attained, while the time within which their action can be utilised is strictly limited.

'They must move by the shortest lines, get into position quickly, deliver rapid fire for a few minutes only and then disappear again.

'Such requirements as these can only be met by a machine gun carried by mounted men.'

The writer of the present article, from his own experience of practical work with both descriptions of mounting, thoroughly endorses Colonel Köppel's views. The chief point is getting into position unseen, and thus being able to open fire unexpectedly at ranges between 1000-1500 paces.

It is a very different thing for an officer commanding machine guns to know that his men can follow him wherever he himself can go, compared with the feeling that he is followed by wheeled vehicles. The writer has repeatedly jumped with his section over fences 5¼ feet high, and then opened fire within twenty-six seconds.*

In a tight place, moreover, there is no necessity for bringing up all the horses of a machine-gun section. The four gun-horses, leaders, and four men for each gun, &c., would suffice; *i.e.* thirty horses in all, capable of being sub-divided into two parties of fifteen, which might well advance unnoticed, carrying the respectable number of 2000 rounds with them.

A mounted machine-gun section is almost independent of the question of ground. It can get over any obstacle which an individual rider can jump, negotiate steep gradients, pass through woods, use any footpath where a single horse can pass, and so on. As Colonel Köppel pointed out in an article on the Japanese machine guns published in the *Militär-Wochenblatt* (No. 5 of 1908), there are many paths among the smaller German mountains which would be impassable for any form of vehicle, though perfectly practicable for mounted men and pack transport.

* *Vide* previous articles in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, November 1908, December 1909.

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Captain Fleck refers to the Austrian regulations as to equalising and balancing loads (empty and full), as showing the 'seamy side' of pack transport. But in actual practice that is far from being so complicated as it may seem in print. It is done in a couple of seconds, without any trouble whatever. Moreover, if time presses, the *Schaller* pattern of saddle is so well arranged on the horses that 3 or 4 lb. more or less, on one side or the other, cannot possibly shift it all at once.

With regard to Captain Fleck's opinion that a machine gun carried on a pack horse must take longer coming into action than one mounted on wheels, I know from my own personal experience that my own (wheel-transport) machine-gun section in 1907 was able to open aimed fire from the carriage within twenty-six seconds of halting. But fire can also be opened with a pack-transport machine gun within the same limit of time and the target presented to the enemy is infinitely smaller than the upstanding carriage.

The four guns of my (pack-transport) machine-gun section were always ready to fire within twenty-six seconds of halting, even after the fastest gallop, and delivered well-aimed fire, as shown by the results of field-firing practices.

In order to encourage quick handling of the guns, prizes were offered for competition as follows: The machine-gun section would be drawn up in line. A gun leader was then ordered to gallop his gun to a given point, and there open fire upon a given target. The time elapsing between the word 'halt' and the first shot was noted by an officer, while another officer checked the sighting and aiming. Credit was given for smart and quick removal of the horses to the nearest cover. Then the next gun followed and so on. The gun team which took the least time and lost no marks for mistakes received a prize.

Thus a 'record' was made on each occasion, which had to be beaten in subsequent competitions.

In this way the time was reduced to 23½ seconds between the order '*Halt! unload*' (followed, for example, by the words: 'Cavalry 1200! Aim at the high poplar tree!' &c.) and opening fire. There was no difficulty in obtaining such results and the operation of loading up again was just as quick.

On getting into position the men leading led horses remained

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mounted, each holding two horses (ridden by men of the gun detachment) on their left side, in addition to the pack horses on their right.

The man leading the pack horses carrying the gun took the horses of Nos. 1 and 2, while the leader of the first ammunition pack horse held those of Nos. 3 and 4. No. 5, if not required, remained on horseback, but if necessary gave his horse over to the leader of the second ammunition pack horse. In special cases, when the gun horses alone were brought up, No. 5 (mounted) held the horses of Nos. 3 and 4.

As soon as the loads were removed the horses were galloped off to take cover.

Similarly, if the guns were not withdrawn by hand to where the horses stood, the latter would be brought up at a gallop to receive their loads.

With regard to what Captain Fleck says as to the danger of sore backs, &c., I can only say that during the Grand Manœuvres in West Hungary in 1908 my machine-gun section rode over 500 miles within five weeks without one single sore back.

We also took part in a 'Cavalry raid' (described in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, July-August 1909), in the course of which he rode over seventy-three miles in twenty-eight hours without any casualty among the men or horses. A few days later, on May 14, the section was present in full strength at the parade held to welcome their Majesties the German Emperor and Empress in Vienna.

The result of my own long experience is that, as a rule, the pack horses are fresher after a day's work than those ridden.

As to Captain Fleck's remark to the effect that constant handling of the pack loads must 'worry' the men, who must, at the same time, be very good horsemen, while the leaders of horses require special training, I can only say my men showed no sign of 'worry,' but were always most keen on their work. Undoubtedly, the men must be good riders; but if they are, two or three lessons are enough to teach them how to lead led horses.

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THE CAVALRY SWORD

By Major R. M. Poore, D.S.O., *7th (Q.O.) Hussars.*

Since the issue of the present pattern Cavalry sword, difficulties seem to have been experienced in its handling. A new departure has been made in the shape of the handle, and the difficulties referred to have probably arisen from a want of appreciation of the reasons why this shape has been adopted, and are also, no doubt, owing to the fact that regiments have not had practice sabres for a sufficient time to enable them to carry on proper instruction in swordsmanship.

In this article an endeavour is made to show the errors that arise from an improper method of holding the sword. It deals in the first instance with the sword as a practical weapon for war, and then explains how it should be carried for parade purposes.

The Sword for War Purposes.

Experience has shown that pointing is the most effective form of attack, and the present pattern is designed essentially for this purpose, the main object of instruction in swordsmanship being to teach the proper delivery of the point.

But for whatever purpose the sword is to be used, the first essential is that it should be held properly in the hand, and the present shape of handle has been adopted to enable this to be done with the greatest facility.

It is hardly necessary to say that a true cut must be made with the edge of the sword leading. It is also just as important that, in the formation of a parry, the edge should lead, so that the opposing weapon may be met by the edge of one's own. The handle of the sword is therefore designed so as best to ensure a parry (or cut) with the true edge, and to give the greatest facility for pointing straight. To take the best possible advantage of the special design of the weapon it is, however, necessary that the swordsman should at least hold it properly.

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In Fig. 1, the practice sabre is correctly held. It should be noted that the tip of the thumb is withdrawn slightly from the front of the shell and particularly that the central line of the thumb is directly over the central line of the back of the handle and consequently the back of the sword.



FIG. 1.



FIG. 2.

Fig. 2 illustrates a sabre held wrongly. It is easy to see where the fault lies, for when properly grasped the thumb should be in the same plane as the blade and handle. But it is unfortunate that soldiers, unless very carefully taught, will always hold the sword as in Fig. 2, although with a little care in their instruction the proper method becomes almost a second nature to them. Though these illustrations are for the practice sabre, the same hold good for the Cavalry service sword, the handle of which is so shaped as to make it fit the hand when the sword is held as in Figs. 1 and 4.

Fig. 3 may perhaps illustrate why Nature seems to induce a man to hold the sword in the wrong way. There is a natural groove across the hand, and if a stick is picked up and held tightly, it rests naturally in this groove (*vide* lines *a*) and the stick is then nearly at right angles to the forearm. But the swordsman is told he must place the thumb on the back of the handle, and then, in holding the sword in this way, the handle falls naturally into another groove, *i.e.* at the base of the thumb along the line of life (*vide* lines *b*). When the hand closes in this position the result is as in Fig. 2, and there is in this position a general want of control over the weapon, besides the impossibility of ensuring the correct position of the edge for pointing, cutting and parrying.

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To acquire the correct grip, it is necessary for the sword or sabre handle to run across the hand (Fig. 3) as shown by lines *c*. A side view of this correct position with the service sword is shown in Fig. 4. To the beginner this grip may at first feel awkward, but when acquired, it is a far firmer one than that shown by lines *b*. The necessary power over the muscles is soon acquired by practising this grip, which may be done on any ordinary stick that one may be carrying.



FIG. 3.

As before pointed out, contact with an enemy's weapon should be made with the edge of the sword and not with the flat, and 'Instruction in Swordsmanship' lays down that, while delivering a point, the edge of the sword should be to the right and *slightly* upwards. But a very common error is made by instructors in teaching men to turn the edge too much up. To do this the swordsman has to twist his arm round to a most uncomfortable and unnatural position, and the soldier, to avoid this, gets into the habit of turning the *sword* round in the hand, as in Fig. 2, so that he can get it into what he understands is the correct position (with the edge of the sword up) and thereby loses the proper grip of the weapon. Under these circumstances the sword must feel uncomfortable, as the handle was never designed for this.


FIG. 4.

In delivering a point, the sword and forearm should always be in one line,* the elbow may be bent if necessary, the wrist never. Usually, the whole arm will be extended to its full length, so that one line is formed from the sword's point to the shoulder. This is the most effective method and can be practised in thrusting at dummies, the body being bent

* It will be observed that in the service sword the blade is attached to the handle at an angle, and that in addition, the back of the handle is slightly curved. This is done to entirely obviate the difficulty, experienced by some, of holding the sword in the same line as the forearm without a strain on the muscles.

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slightly forward and well covered by the hilt, the eyes looking almost along the arm and sword direct at the object aimed at. The edge of the sword should be to the right and slightly up as it enters the dummy, and although, while galloping past, the arm has to swing round from the shoulder, the sword must be withdrawn in exactly the same corresponding position (see Fig. 5). To do this, the arm must be kept in line with the sword. The usual tendency is to drop the hand and so form an angle between sword and arm (see Fig. 6), with the result that the sword is twisted and a great strain is brought on the flat of the blade, and this is the way swords get broken or bent. It can be seen that if the sword is held in the proper manner with sword and arm in a straight line, the strain comes on the depth of the blade, where it is almost impossible to damage it.



FIG. 5.

In attacking a dummy on the ground, the edge of the sword should be to the right and *not* inclined slightly up. If two dummies are attacked, one the height of a Cavalry man and the other on the ground, the sword can be easily brought into the right position for the second if it is withdrawn in the proper position from the first (see Fig. 5), but if the hand is allowed to 'drop' (see Fig. 6), as described above, the tendency is to attack the second dummy with the edge of the sword downwards (instead of to the right), which is quite wrong—but one bad position begets another.



FIG. 6.

When thrusting at dummies, complaints are constantly heard of men hurting their hands, especially if some hard or resisting substance is met with. The chief causes of this are—the sword being wrongly held, or the grasp not being sufficiently firm at the moment of impact.

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If the sword is held as in Fig. 2, a firm grip is not possible, and then the hand crashes up against the hilt, either injuring the thumb against the inside of the shell, or the back of the hand against the edge of the hilt. The point of the thumb, as before indicated, should be kept slightly back from the inside of the shell (the more practice the swordsman has the further back will he be able to keep his thumb) and, still further, to obviate the chance of injury to the thumb from contact with the shell, the grip of the sword should be tightened as much as possible at the moment of impact. This will prevent the thumb from slipping forward and the resistance, which is taken on the forefinger, is reduced to a minimum by the tightening of the grip.

A 'resistance block' is placed on the handle of the service sword, near the hilt, to take the forefinger resistance, to assist the maintenance of the correct grip, and to enable the thumb to be kept still further back from the inside of the shell. When the sword is grasped correctly, as shown in Fig. 4, and gripped tightly at the moment of impact, there is no danger of injuring the thumb.

In a charge we must expect to come in contact with hard substances such as bones, bandoliers, &c., and it is therefore very necessary to be prepared for this.

If the wrist is bent backwards, the blade will not be in line with the forearm, the grip is again weakened and the back of the hand will receive a nasty blow from the edge of the hilt.



FIG. 7.

A point delivered with the sword and forearm in one line will penetrate a dummy with the greatest ease, but if this alignment is not strictly followed (which means that the wrist is bent at the moment the thrust is made), the sword will often not even enter a dummy lightly stuffed with straw, giving the impression that the dummy must contain some hard substance to cause this non-penetration, while it is simply bad swordsmanship which has occasioned the trouble.

'Jobbing' must on no account be allowed, as in such cases the point cannot be directed properly and the wrist is brought far too much into play. A damaged hand is often the result.

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The best form of defence is offence; an enemy should therefore be met with the point. The parry, however, should be taught and practised, not so much with the idea of using it when meeting an enemy, but because it conduces to better swordsmanship, and a man who is capable of parrying successfully cannot fail to be on friendly terms with his weapon.



Fig. 8.

Even so, the parry must be offensive in its nature, and the sword must be made to meet the opponent's weapon by carrying it well away from the body to the front, by a resolute forward movement, the sword being so held that contact is made with the edge, and as near the hilt as possible. To try to parry by allowing the hand to come nearer the body, that is by a backward instead of a forward movement, as is often the tendency, is quite ineffective.

The Sword on Parade.

In the illustrations for this, the sword has been drawn without the hilt in order to make the explanations plainer.



Fig. 9.

Fig. 7 represents the sword held at the 'carry,' dismounted. The top of the hilt rests on the top of the hand, the resistance piece is held by the forefinger and thumb, the second finger is under the resistance piece, and the third and fourth fingers laid lightly on the handle.

Fig. 8 shows the sword at the 'slope.' Here the top of the hilt rests on the top of the hand, and the resistance piece is grasped by the forefinger and thumb, but in this case the forefinger is under the resistance piece. The second and third fingers rest lightly on the handle, while the little finger is placed behind it. This latter is necessary when mounted, and therefore, for similarity, is also done dismounted, though in this case it is not a necessity. The wrist should be only very slightly bent, otherwise it soon becomes a strain.

Fig. 9 illustrates a sword at the 'carry,' mounted. The hilt should

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rest on the top of the hand, the first and second fingers grip the handle under the resistance piece, while the thumb along the latter, and the little finger behind the handle, steady it. Both the wrist and the pommel of the sword should rest on the leg. It will now be seen that there are three agents at work on the sword; the first and second fingers pull the sword towards the holder from the centre of the handle, and this pull is resisted from each end of the latter, viz., by the top of the hilt against the top of the hand and by the pommel against the leg. This method of holding the sword is a very secure and comfortable one.

The hand must be pressed well down the leg; as the sword should not be huddled up near the fork, nor jammed anywhere against the saddle.

It will be seen in the last three illustrations that the hilt in each instance rests on the top of the hand, and if, in either case, the hold feels strained, it must be that the sword is held incorrectly.

23rd April 1911.

St. George's Day.

'Our Patron Saint.'

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AEROPLANES WITH CAVALRY

By Lieut. R. A. Cammell, R.E. (*Air Battalion*)

The employment of aeroplanes in war will for the present be very largely limited to tactical reconnaissance. In this *rôle* they will, of course, in no way replace the Cavalry scout, whose capacity for resistance and screening they cannot imitate. Since their use will be, accordingly, supplementary to that of Cavalry it is important to examine how they will best co-operate, and what organisation will fit them for the work.

The Power and Limitations of the Aeroplane Scout.

Figuratively speaking, the function of the aeroplane scout will be to obtain information in 'plan,' while that of the Cavalryman will be to fill in the corresponding 'elevation.'

The view of the Airman is unrestricted but his military perspective is distorted. He can obtain a very accurate measurement of distances but very little idea of height.

Thus the aeroplane scout can be properly used to obtain the relative positions of the enemy's forces and his information can be relied on in questions of numbers (at any rate, of formed bodies), but he can obtain very little indication of their 'tactical strength' (less, in fact, than can be conveyed by plotting their positions on a contoured map). Again, it may be laid down that 'negative' information from the air can never be wholly reliable. The country needs to have been traversed by combatant troops to be certain that it is unoccupied. 'Positive' information, on the other hand, will be of greater accuracy than that of Cavalry, since it will be derived from direct vision, and not from fire effect.

Thus we can expand our former statement to the following general division of duties in reconnaissance.

The aeroplane will determine the enemy's distribution in plan, while the Cavalry will complete this information by obtaining his tactical elevation.

Starting from this basis we can draw the main outlines of aeroplane reconnaissance.

(1) It will be advanced reconnaissance.

(2) It will be directed chiefly to obtain the location of the enemy's main bodies and other questions of military interest beyond the reach of the Cavalry screen.

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(3) Its value as regards minor tactics can be but small, and it will, therefore, be of more importance to the Central Intelligence staff than to the local patrol leaders.

Organisation.

Paragraph (3) above will give the clue to the principles of organisation necessary.

Until it is found practicable to transmit information from an aeroplane in flight by means of wireless telegraphy it must be necessary for the machines to return to some definite point easily found, there either to land with the information gleaned, or to drop a message for the Cavalry to pick up. But it is through wireless telegraphy that the full value of the aeroplane will be developed, and we may assume that the war organization will be based on the distribution of wireless stations.

For work with Cavalry, accordingly, it will be on the Cavalry Brigade Headquarters, with its field wireless station, that the aeroplane will find its natural base.

We can imagine an aeroplane section detached to Brigade Headquarters from the central aeronautical park (with Army troops). It will consist of from four to six aeroplanes, with a fuel supply and repair outfit sufficiently mobile to travel with mounted troops.

Method of Use.

The aeroplanes will be despatched under direct orders of the Brigadier, with instructions as to the reconnaissance which they are to carry out.

It will probably be found best to allot patrolling areas and periods of observation based on the radius of action and fuel supply. By this means and by using relays a constant watch can be kept over a vast area. It would probably be a mistake to attach a machine to any definite reconnoitring patrol, since the chief use of aeroplanes will be found well in advance of the Cavalry.

Only urgent information will be transmitted by wireless telegraphy during flight, and the remainder must be reported when the machine returns to the base for fuel replenishment and fresh orders at the end of its period of observation.

At all times the observers should be kept fully posted with latest available information and endeavours be made to assign definite tasks to them rather than general injunctions to 'find out about the enemy.'

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Effect of Aeroplane Co-operation on Cavalry Tactics.

Since the aeroplane will, to some extent, relieve the Cavalry of their *rôle* of reconnaissance, it is possible that Cavalry movements will become more definitely tactical, as less extended formations can be adopted, and 'manœuvre' units can be directed, as a whole, against bodies of the enemy already located by aeroplane information. The ground scouts and patrols will, however, still be essential in order to supply such information as is unobtainable by the aeroplanes, for the condition of the terrain cannot be ascertained from the air and it will rarely be possible to say whether buildings, woods, &c., are occupied unless they are examined by patrols.

Since the Brigadier will still further rely on his wireless station, both for information and communication to headquarters, he will be tied more strictly to its vicinity and will not care to move it much.

Miscellaneous Considerations.

(1) *Messages.*—The aeroplane is an excellent dispatch carrier, but the more important *rôle* should not be sacrificed for this object. It may be found convenient to have specially fast and handy machines for this special purpose, but messages to advanced patrols could conveniently be dropped from aeroplanes going out for reconnaissance trips.

(2) *Distinguishing marks.*—The aerial observers will undoubtedly have difficulty in distinguishing between friend and foe when Cavalry is in contact. In the case of single men and small bodies this will not matter, as they will not greatly concern the observer. Larger bodies, however, might have to carry some distinguishing mark, such as a flag held horizontally.

(3) *Alighting at Headquarters.*—Machines alighting at Cavalry Headquarters, as also those waiting there for orders, may render its position very conspicuous, especially to the enemy's aerial scouts. It may therefore be necessary to choose a base for aeroplanes at some distance away, yet in telephonic communication with the Brigadier.

(4) *Height of Flight, &c.*—Reconnaissance will be carried out at an average height of one thousand to two thousand feet, which should render them immune from any but special gun-fire: Cavalry staff officers can be taken up as observers if desired, but previous training in aerial observation is essential if good results are to be obtained. As a help in estimating distances, observers can be supplied with glasses with graticules adjustable for height.

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THE MAMELUKES, OR SLAVE CAVALRY OF EGYPT

By C. R. B. Barrett

As a pendant to the interesting and instructive article upon this subject by 'Carabinier,' which appeared in the Cavalry Journal for October 1909, the following may be acceptable.

Since the article appeared, reproductions of two drawings by the eminent French battle painter, Horace Vernet, have come to hand.

Horace Vernet, whose full Christian names were Emile Jean Horace, was born in Paris on January 30, 1789.

The campaign of Napoleon in Egypt took place in 1798, and consequently Vernet was not among the 'savans,' artists, &c., that accompanied the French Army in its wanderings in Egypt, much to the disgust, by the way, of that army.

The 'savans' rode on donkeys, and excited the derision of the troops, the latter applying to the quadrupeds the term 'demi-savans'; and it is recorded that when these worthies, donkeys and all, were ordered to take refuge within the squares, the cry would go forth: 'Room for the savans and demi-savans.'

Of Mameluke pictures Vernet is credited with at least four, as besides the two reproduced here he exhibited a 'Massacre of the Mamelukes' in the Salon of 1819, and another picture entitled 'The Massacre of the Mamelukes by order of Mehemet Ali' was on show at his studio in 1822.

It is, however, probable that he had opportunities of seeing Mamelukes while on his journey to collect materials, local colour, &c., for his series of paintings which had for their subject the triumph of the French armies in Algeria, a heavy commission with which he was entrusted by the French Government. The 'Retreat of the Mamelukes' is evidently meant to represent the scene at the Battle of the Pyramids. The other has no particular date which can be assigned to it, and cannot be identified as representing any particular incident.

As an authority for the arms, dress, equipment, &c., of this splendid body of horsemen, these drawings are of extreme value, for it must be remembered that of all painters Vernet was most distinguished for his

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RETREAT OF MAMELUKES.

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HALT OF MAMELUKES.

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absolute accuracy in detail. His pictures show a dash, vigour and truth, which, coupled with his method of expressing the fiery life of conflict, animate his work and produce an effect at times almost amazing. As is well known, the condition of discontent in the French Army on this campaign amounted almost to mutiny, nay, a serious conspiracy among the officers was only nipped in the bud by the personal influence and intervention of Napoleon himself. His remark to the ringleader, whom he actually caught at a treasonable meeting, was this: 'I ought to have you shot in spite of your 5 feet 10 inches.' The traitor was somewhat larger than the 'Little Corporal.'

To give some little idea of the costliness of the arms and equipment of these wild horsemen, it may be stated that for days after the Battle of the Pyramids, as opportunity offered, the French soldiers were occupied in fishing out of the Nile the bodies of the slain Mamelukes, and that the worth of the trappings and arms as well as the money found secreted in clothing and saddle, often amounted to between four and five hundred louis d'or.

The spoils of the victors would have been greater if the flotilla which accompanied the French Army had kept pace with the land forces. This it did not do, and those in charge of the Mameluke wealth, which was enormous, set fire to it on board the sixty vessels on which it was stored.

At Cairo, for politic reasons, Napoleon gave out that he was only warring against the Mamelukes, and it is certain that he treated the women of that nation with great consideration.

The stores requisitioned by Napoleon from France, when he had settled down in Cairo, as he thought, and the heterogeneous collection of people for whom he sent, are too curious to be left unmentioned. They were as follows: Actors, dancers, toy dealers, one hundred women, the wives of all the men, twenty surgeons, thirty apothecaries, ten physicians, founders, distillers and dealers in liquor, fifty gardeners and their families, the seeds of all kinds of vegetables, twenty thousand quarts of brandy to accompany each party, thirty thousand ells of blue and scarlet cloth, and lastly, a supply of soap and oil. How highly Napoleon thought of his brave but luckless foes may be given in his own words: 'Could I have united the Mameluke Horse to the French Infantry I should have reckoned myself master of the world.'

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HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTS OF CAVALRY MASSES SINCE WATERLOO

By Cavalier

The era of comparative peace which prevailed in Europe after the fall of Napoleon saw gigantic strides in the development of machinery of every sort, and its application to the improvement of firearms. Rifling increased the range, and loading by the breech enormously increased the rate of fire. At the same time the urgent necessity for war preparation, which alone supplies enough driving force in peace to produce good Cavalry, had apparently vanished. All European armies rapidly deteriorated, and the much vaunted effects of fire action assumed gigantic proportions in the minds of the average officer who rose to general's rank in the Continental armies. The feats of our Cavalry at Aliwal and Gujerat, and the stern nature of the struggle in the Punjab, preserved the spirit of Cavalry energy and enterprise better in our army than elsewhere, but it was not until the struggle between Prussia and Austria in 1866 that masses of Cavalry once again encountered one another on a European battlefield. At Sadowa a very formidable force of Cavalry amounting to about twenty thousand horsemen was at the disposal of each side. The Austrians made no use of their fine Cavalry divisions to check and delay the march of the Prussian columns. They did not even patrol the neighbourhood to ascertain what these columns were doing. When the battle was disastrously lost, the Austrian Cavalry at length intervened to cover the retreat. On the Prussian side the Cavalry marched behind the Infantry, came into action at the end of the day, but did not attempt to shiver the protecting screen of opposing horsemen, though some partial collisions took place.

In the great war of 1870 both sides, too, were very well equipped in Cavalry, and the advantage in most respects lay with the French, but from the beginning of the contest ineptitude and supineness characterised the French commanders. Although the French armies were at once thrown on the defensive no attempt was made to interfere with the march of the German troops. Patrolling was shamefully neglected, and

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there existed no superior officer with the army of the Rhine who attempted to utilise the splendid body of nearly twenty thousand horsemen concentrated at Metz. At the beginning the German horse showed very little enterprise, but they gathered confidence as they proceeded. On August 16, when the fate of France was sealed by the interception of Bazaine's retreat, repeated encounters took place between the Cavalry on both sides which formed the second line of both armies, attacks directed with more or less success and skill against all arms by Cavalry forces which never exceeded a brigade in any one place. About five in the afternoon thirty squadrons on either side met in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle on the outer flank of both armies. Both forces of Cavalry charged in a succession of échelons, as the troops reached the scene of the conflict. The tactical result was a draw. Several hundred men and horses on each side were slain or injured. The loss in officers was very heavy, but the solid result was the retreat of the French after nightfall, thus abandoning the road from Metz to Verdun to their enemy. This retreat was not even then a necessity of the situation, but was dictated by the tragical incompetence of the French Commander-in-Chief. In this important Cavalry duel, which might have been decisive to the fate of either army, less than one-fourth of the available forces was employed on either side.

We have to look to another continent and the great Civil War from 1861–1865 to find the most important Cavalry fighting of that epoch. At Brandy Station and Fleetwood hill in 1863 there were severe fights between large divisions of Cavalry, who fought one another at the same time on horse and on foot, alternating fire with shock action. At the decisive battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863, on either flank of the two armies fierce Cavalry encounters took place, and the struggle on the Federal right resembled in its conditions the battle of Mars la Tour just quoted. In this fight not less than four thousand horsemen on each side were engaged. After a determined fire fight, charging was resorted to, and the advantage finally rested with the Federals for the first time in the war. There were other important Cavalry engagements in the Western theatre of war quoted by Captain Alonso Grey in his book on the Cavalry Tactics of the War, and supported by official records of either army. In Manchuria no important collision took place between the rival Cavalries. The Japanese were numerically very weak, and the Russians suffered from a disadvantage even more fatal. It is expressed thus by one of our officers who was present: 'Had the Russians availed themselves of one capable Cavalry leader not an armed Jap would have been able to escape from Manchuria.'

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INDIAN SILAHDAR CAVALRY

By CAPTAIN H. J. K. WALLIS, *20th Deccan Horse*

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LEST the reader commence his perusal with a mind puzzled by the title and with no anticipatory insight into the purport of this article, it should be explained that *silah* means in Persian a weapon or arm, while *dar* is the agentive termination, the whole meaning ' one with weapons or arms.'

To appreciate how the term comes by obscure metonymy to have its present application, we must consider the feudal idea that has prevailed in every community desirous of maintaining peace within its own limits, and depending for its homogeneity on armed individual effort. In those days everybody maintained—for his own safety he *had* to maintain—some form of weapon, and the wealthier of course had their horse or horses. At the call of necessity or ambition each man gathered round the standard of his particular *gens*, armed and equipped. Of course, if it were a case of the cause heroic, where the defence of country and of home and hearth was in itself the only guerdon, there was no case for the wages of military service; but it can be very readily adduced that from the defence of the land and the home within its marches to the aggressive attack upon him or anyone that dwelt without is an easy step. Those so ambitious would naturally call out the ready armed man, ' the silahdar,' and with promise of pay, of loot, and the replacement of accoutrements and horse lost in the emprise would induce men to fight beneath their standards.

The various States and Nations of what in England is known as the peninsula of Hindostan were in the beginning and, outside the limits of British India, are to this day, intensely feudal. Distances are great and often beyond achievement by human self-locomotion, so that every man with any claim to standing or substance owned a horse or pony. Hence we can see the explanation of the large proportion of horsemen or Cavalry which has distinguished the composition of armies in India from the days of Alexander and the Rajah Porus to the time when, under Clive and Wellesley, we fought the mounted hordes of Maratha and Pindari leaders. The distances in India, as I have remarked, are great, hence we may infer that a man who could bring his own horse or pony when he enlisted either as a volunteer or a mercenary was thrice acceptable.

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Thus the term *silahdar* came to embrace in its meaning more than an armed man, and by metonymy began to be exclusively used for the mounted soldier of feudalism.

Precisely similar in kind, if a little broader in degree, the Indian Silahdar Cavalry preserves in itself this last relic of feudal organisation. All over the country, service under the British *Raj* as a horse soldier is looked upon as an honour and passport to social distinction ; for no matter if the officers' badges of rank, which every *sowar* or trooper (like the French soldier and his baton of the Marshals of France) carries in his saddlebags, be never worn, still there is a moral or psychic something which allocates to the Indian trooper a pride of place which ranks him immeasurably superior to his erstwhile compeers.

Drawn mainly from the sons of the soil, the backbone of the Indian peoples, the *zamindar*, or landowner and farmer class, the recruit, very 'jungli' or raw, proposes for enlistment. He must nowadays not bring his own weapons and horse—the march of stern and pitiless science in war cannot allow any but the most modern weapons and the best horses—but must bring with him the cash equivalent of his mount and share of baggage pony, which amount is then paid into the funds of the regiment. He is then allotted a horse and half a share in a baggage pony or mule, and is debited the value of the saddlery, uniform, and necessary kit, which he is usually glad to take over from the man whose vacancy on becoming non-effective he is filling. The share in the economy and organisation of the regiment, which he has thus purchased and which is commonly termed the *assami*, the trooper will have to maintain by monthly subscriptions from his pay and horse allowance, which subscriptions serve as a guarantee against the death of his horse and of deficiencies in and inevitable deterioration of kit. All that Government does for him is to supply bandolier, rifle, ammunition, and the cost of the feed of his horse and half-share of a transport animal ; and the tremendous business of maintaining, equipping, and mounting regiments of four squadrons of six hundred and twenty-five sabres or lances, as the case may be, then devolves upon the man and his British and native officers.

There is another source of recruiting, and that is from among the sons of the men and native officers of the regiment who are allowed within a certain percentage to have their families in the lines. Many commanding officers prefer to enlist these 'line boys,' as they are called, for, having been brought up all their lives in the regiment, they are naturally imbued with regimental traditions, and are familiar of course with the methods of the discipline which they are sensible of as being inseparable from the

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control of the body militant. They know their drill, are accustomed to horses, and can of course all ride from their babyhood. Familiarity with the life of the trooper only seems to redouble their keenness for military service, and it is a fact that these youngsters will actually set themselves to acquiring some feature of the profession of arms, such as signalling, farriery, &c., and will stump round with the real recruits' drill by the hour, if by so doing they think they will be able to induce a commanding officer to enlist them.

That the system is a success is borne out by the fact that regiments on the silahdar system have been flourishing now for many decades, some indeed from Southern India for over a century, and a high authority has said that for its cost to Government it is the most efficient arm in the world.

It is true that of the thirty-eight regiments of Indian Cavalry there are three 'Regular' regiments as opposed in contradistinction to the thirty-five Irregular, *i.e.* silahdar regiments. These are organised and administered on usual lines, the entire cost of their maintenance being a charge against Government—a very heavy charge indeed, and as compared with regiments on the silahdar system probably as two to one. They have no transport, and in time of war would be dependent on the Commissariat authorities' efforts towards the conveyance of their effects, and so the maintenance of their efficiency, in a campaign.

Of the sound financial aspect of this military organisation there can be no question; and the system is really a method of insurance as applied to every need and want of the regiment and the trooper that is not fulfilled by Government. A silahdar regiment is thus entirely self-supporting, and must look to none and to nowhere but itself for the maintenance of its remounting, stabling, barracks, both of men and followers, for a great part of its conservancy and sanitation; troop servants, such as grooms, washermen, cooks, tailors, and saddlers, and also many other objects of expense relative to its efficiency, life, and well-being.

It may be queried that though the man subscribes for the maintenance of what he has got, how about the renewals of horse and pony flesh, uniform, &c., which are all of them things perishable? This is all met by the extent of the man's subscriptions being calculated from years of experience, to not only cover all that, but to go just a little way beyond; the moiety remaining forming the insurance effected by the regiment against the depreciation of its live and dead stock; and regiments that are run on sound financial lines have very large funds, partly built up by these means, and established by the whole-hearted efforts of the British

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and Native officers, whose nights and days are devoted to the augmentation and promotion of their regiments' financial prosperity, and partly by utilising every little opportunity that may offer for adding to the regimental funds, such as, for instance, the training and sale of horses, and the exploitation of the various regimental institutions (like the shoeing-forge, workshops, &c.) among civilians and other officers.

The soundest aspect of the whole system has not yet been touched upon, and that is, that when a man goes to pension, retires, or for any reason becomes non-effective, he receives from the incoming recruit the value of his paid-up share in the regiment, which he, as a recruit, had purchased at the beginning of his service, and now sells out as well as his kit and accoutrements, which are priced at their market value, and handed over to the new-comer. This return of the primary deposit is rendered possible by the above-mentioned moieties forming insurance premiums that are remaining from a man's regimental subscriptions, and are of course, nothing more, looked at from another point of view, than deductions on account of deferred pay.

The amount a man takes away with him as a result of the sale of his interest in the regiment, and of his uniform and accoutrements, varies with different regiments ; but it is regarded as sounder finance for a man to pay a long price on enlistment—which, in some regiments, he is allowed to do by a primary deposit and consecutive instalments—for in that case he has, at the end of his twenty-one or thirty-two years' service, laid by a greater provision to enable him to set up in civilian employment, or add to his land or property, by means of the respectable sum of Rs.500 to Rs.600 (£35–£40), than in the case of one from those regiments, the value of whose share or *assami* is only some Rs.250 to Rs.300 (£17–£20).

Of late years Government has initiated a scheme of practical philanthropy, and has given the prior claim on this to men of the Native Army. This is the husbanding of the waters of the great rivers, their diversion into canals, and the planting of colonies by inducements to settle there in the form of free grants of land along their banks, to deserving applicants ; just as, in years gone by, Rome rewarded her legionaries.

In this way military colonies are flourishing in many parts of Northern India ; and combined with the fostering of the fighting races, Government encourages horse and mule breeding by allotting extra land to men of the Cavalry regiments who are willing to maintain a brood mare, which can be served free of cost by Government horse and donkey stallions.

The traditions, the proud achievements, the merits of the Indian silahdar Cavalry, are, in themselves, a plea for encouragement and appro-

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bation; and the feudal devotion of the men to their British and Native officers, and of their officers to their men, and all that concerns them and their welfare, must constitute one of the surest and safest bulwarks that the Empire has founded for her defence and her protection; for these regiments, self-contained and self-supporting, are fit and ready to go anywhere and do anything.

THE EUROPEAN LIGHT CAVALRY OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S SERVICE

AT the crisis of the Mutiny in 1857 five regiments of European Light Cavalry were raised in England. They first appear in the East India Register for 1859 and were numbered 1–5. These regiments belonged to the Bengal Army. The list for 1861 informs us that the uniform of these regiments was 'blue, lace gold.' The list for 1862 styles them 'the late.'

The Depôt was at the Barracks, Warley, Essex, where all European recruits, whether horse, foot, artillery or engineers, destined for the H.E.I.C. Service were trained.

On November 1, 1858, the Crown assumed the Government of India, and the East India Company thenceforth ceased to govern. No attention was paid to the view that might be taken of the change in the ranks of the Company's army, consequently trouble arose with their late European soldiers. The British soldier yields to discipline, but is a soldier by his own free will; and the men objected to being handed over willy-nilly 'like bullocks,' without discharge or a fresh bounty. A request to volunteer for service under the Crown would probably have been almost unanimously responded to. Trouble seemed imminent. Wiser counsels, however, prevailed. Orders were published allowing the men the option of discharge, but no bounty to those who elected to remain, while those who took their discharge were not allowed the option of re-enlistment in India. Upwards of 10,000 seasoned soldiers elected to take their discharge, and were thus lost to the British Army, only 2800 re-enlisting, in England. The five Regiments of European Light Cavalry became three, now known as the 19th and 20th Hussars and the 21st Lancers. They were officered mainly by their old officers. The plate represents troopers in review order mounted, undress or walking-out kit, and a back view of the review order. The Hussar is a Staff Regimental Sergeant-Major of the Depôt, Warley. The helmets were brass, and were of distinctly French type.

C. R. B. B.

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CAVALRY SABRETACHES

By D. Hastings Irwin

When Cavalry sabretaches were abolished in 1902, there disappeared the most ornamental adjunct of uniform, although their use as letter, or dispatch cases, as originally intended, may have died out.

The Dress Regulations published from time to time, between 1822 (when they were first printed in their present form) and 1861, describe in a general way the sabretaches worn by the different classes of Cavalry, but no details of the different regimental designs are given. Latterly sealed patterns were lodged at the War Office, and manufacturers had to make sketches or notes from them when required; but no official record of the regimental designs exists. If it were not for those existing in collections and makers' pattern-books all record of them would be lost. It is to be regretted that when they were abolished the sealed patterns were destroyed.

Sabretaches were introduced in the reign of George III., about 1805, when a uniform design was worn by all the Cavalry regiments. Those worn by the Hussars had a scarlet cloth face, those of the Dragoon Guards, Heavy, and Light Dragoons having blue cloth faces. They were edged all round either with gold or silver lace to match that on the uniforms, and in the centre was the Royal cypher '*G.R.*' surmounted by a crown.

During the reign of George IV. the shape and design of the sabretache underwent a change. Those of the Dragoon Guards had velvet faces, the Dragoons having cloth, all of the colour of the regimental facings. The Light Dragoons' sabretaches had dark-blue cloth faces, and the Hussars retained the scarlet cloth faces as before. The general design of the face of the sabretache consisted of the monogram '*G.R.*', surmounted by a crown, and surrounded by a wreath of embroidered oak or laurel leaves, bordered with regimental lace.

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On the accession of William IV. great changes were made in the Cavalry uniforms, and the sabretache was altered in design. Light Cavalry regiments wore the double monogram '*W.R.*' in the centre, the Heavies having the single cypher, in all cases surmounted by a crown. In addition, most of the regiments who were entitled to do so wore the regimental honours, authorised after the Peninsula and Waterloo campaigns. The two exceptions to this rule seem to have been the 7th and 21st Hussars, although the former were entitled to display upon their appointments, '*Dettingen*,' '*Orthes*,' '*Peninsula*,' '*Waterloo*,' and later on '*Lucknow*.'

The Heavy Cavalry sabretache had a rounded bottom, instead of being shield-shaped, like that of the Light Cavalry and Hussars. The embroidered sabretaches of the Dragoon Guards, Heavy Dragoons, and Lancers were abolished in 1854, when the tunic superseded the jacket. From 1822 until 1846 the regulation size of the face of the sabretache for Heavy Dragoons was 15 in. deep by 9 in. wide at the top, by 13 in. wide at the bottom; for Light Dragoons, 14 in. by 8½ in. by 12 in.; for Lancers, 14½ in. by 8½ in. by 12 in.; and for Hussars, 15 in. by 9 in. by 13 in. After that time no dimensions are given in the Dress Regulations; but in those of 1900 it is stated that the Hussars' sabretaches are not to exceed 12 in. in depth, by 7¾ in. at the top, and 10½ in. at the bottom. It is evident that the dimensions as originally laid down were not strictly adhered to, as the sabretache worn by the 10th Hussars from 1820–30 was 13 in. deep, and 11¼ in. wide at the bottom, tapering to 7½ in. at the top. That worn by the 15th Hussars of the Waterloo period was 15½ in. deep, 10¼ in. wide at the top, and 13 in. below.

No sabretache was worn by the 17th Lancers in 1846, nor by any Dragoon Guard nor Dragoon regiment between 1845 and 1864. Subsequently black patent-leather sabretaches were gradually introduced for the Household Cavalry, Dragoon Guards, Dragoons, and Lancers, having a regimental design in gilded metal in the centre. They were worn until the sabretache was finally abolished, the last regiment to adopt it being the 1st (Royal) Dragoons. The 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons never took it into wear.

With the abolition of the officers' sabretache and shabraque the Hussar regiments were bereft of any chance of displaying their battle-honours 'on their appointments,' excepting those borne on the drum-cloths, and in a few regiments where they are still shown on the flaps of the officers' dress-pouches and shoulder-belt. The Lancers, in addition

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to those on the drum-cloth, also wear them on the front-plates of their lance-caps. The Dragoon and Dragoon-Guard regiments still bear their battle honours on their standards and guidons.

The sabretaches of the different regiments were as follows :—

Regiment.	Facing.	Lace.
1st Life Guards .	Black leather, 1812–1820	
2nd ,, ,, .	Blue cloth, 1820	Gold
	Black leather, 1880	
Horse Guards . .	,, ,, 1812–1820	
,, ,,	,, ,, 1880	
1st Dragoon Guards	Dark-blue velvet, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
2nd Dragoon Guards	,, velvet, 1820–1830	Silver
,, ,, ,,	,, ,, 1830–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	,, patent-leather, 1870–1892	
3rd Dragoon Guards	Yellow velvet, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
4th Dragoon Guards	Dark-blue velvet, 1820–1830	Silver
,, ,, ,,	,, ,, ,, 1830–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
5th Dragoon Guards	Green velvet, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
6th Dragoon Guards	Dark-blue velvet, 1819	Gold
,, ,, ,,	White velvet, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
7th Dragoon Guards	,, velvet, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, ,,	,, patent-leather, 1866–1902	
1st Dragoons . .	Dark-blue cloth, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, . .	Black patent-leather, 1872–1902	
2nd Dragoons . .	Dark-blue cloth, 1820–1854	Gold
,, ,, . .	Black patent-leather, 1860–1902	
3rd Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth, 1815–1860	Gold
	The middle sabretache in the illustration shows the pattern worn from 1830–1837. The lace and embroidery are gold, and the battle honours are embroidered on crimson velvet scrolls. The White Horse of Hanover is struck in silver.	
3rd Hussars . .	A scarlet cloth face, 1861–1902	Gold
	The third sabretache in the illustration shows the design. The lace is gold, with a scarlet silk line down the centre. The battle honours are embroidered on bright blue silk scrolls ; as is also the garter surrounding the silver horse, and the regimental motto on the scroll below it.	
4th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth, 1820–1837	Silver
,, ,, ,,	,, ,, ,, 1837–1861	Gold
4th Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth, 1861–1902	Gold
5th Lancers . .	Black patent-leather, 1860–1902	
	The original regiment was the 5th Regt. of Dragoons, disbanded in 1798, and revived as Lancers in 1858. Hence the regiment did not exist during the embroidered sabretache period.	

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Regiment.	Facing.	Lace
6th Dragoons . .	Yellow cloth, 1820–1830	Silver
„ „	„ „ 1830–1854	Gold
	This regiment never adopted the black patent-leather 'tache' of the 1866–1902 period.	
7th Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1812–1902	Gold
	From 1812–1820 the monogram '*G.R.*' was embroidered in the centre; but thence onward to the abolition of the sabretache they bore the regimental cypher '*Q.O.*' instead.	
8th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face, 1815–1820	Silver
8th Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1820–1830	Silver
„ „ . .	„ „ „ 1830–1902	Gold
9th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face, 1812–1846	Gold
9th Lancers . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1846–1854	Gold
	In the centre the double monogram '*A.R.*' was embroidered in gold, with a crown above, and crossed lances on either side.	
„ „	Black patent-leather, 1870–1902	
10th Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1810–1902	Gold
	The Prince of Wales' plumes and motto have always appeared on the crown, surmounting the Royal monogram.	
11th Light Dragoons	Blue cloth face, 1806–1830	Silver
„ „ „	„ „ „ 1830–1840	Gold
11th Hussars . .	Crimson cloth face, 1840–1902	Gold
	Figure 5 on the illustration shows the sabretache worn from 1860–1902. It is surrounded on three sides by gold lace of regimental design, with a gold cord across the top. In the centre is the double monogram '*V.R.*,' with a crown above. Below is a silver sphynx, the regimental crest, with 'Egypt' below. The name of the regiment, '*Prince Albert's Own Hussars*,' is embroidered in gold on a dark-blue velvet, gold-edged scroll between the crown and the monogram. In the centre of the monogram is the Prince Consort's crest, and below it on a crimson velvet scroll is his motto, '*Treu und Fest*,' embroidered in gold. Below the monogram are five blue velvet scrolls inscribed in gold letters '*Peninsula*,' '*Alma*,' '*Salamanca*,' '*Waterloo*,' and '*Balaklava*'; and below the sphynx a three-fold scroll inscribed '*Inkerman*,' '*Bhurtpore*,' and '*Sebastopol*.' Gold-embroidered laurel-leaves are thickly interspersed amongst the scrolls.	
12th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face, 1816–1820	Gold
12th Lancers . .	„ „ „ 1820–1846	Gold
„ „	Scarlet cloth face, 1846–1854	Gold
„ „	Black patent-leather, 1860–1902	
13th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face, 1820–1860	Gold
13th Hussars . .	Buff cloth face, 1861–1902	Gold

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Regiment.	Facing.		Lace.
14th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face,	1812–1820	Gold
„ „ „	„ „ „ „	1820–1830	Silver
„ „ „	„ „ „ „	1830–1860	Gold
14th Hussars	Scarlet cloth face,	1861–1902	Gold
15th Hussars	„ „ „	1806–1819	Silver
	„ „ „	1820–1826	Gold
	„ „ „	1826–1830	Silver
	„ „ „	1830–1902	Gold
16th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth face,	1814–1820	Silver
16th Lancers	„ „ „	1820–1830	Silver
„ „	„ „ „	1830–1854	Gold
„ „	Black patent leather, 1880–1902		

Figures 2 and 6 on the accompanying illustration show the dress-sabretache worn from 1837–1839 and 1848–1850 respectively. The first is surrounded by gold braid of regimental design 2¼ inches wide, and on the blue cloth face the Royal cypher '*V.R.*' is embroidered in gold thread, surmounted by a crown worked in gold, silver, and coloured thread, with a crimson velvet cap. Below the cypher is a threefold crimson velvet scroll edged with gold, on which are embroidered in gold thread the battle honours '*Peninsula*,' '*Waterloo*,' and '*Bhurtpore*,' the latter being in the lowest fold. Gold-embroidered laurel-leaves ornament the ends of the scroll, and below it are the lower rays of an embroidered star. The other is of a more elaborate design. In the centre of the dark-blue cloth face is the monogram '*V.R.*,' with crossed lances with scarlet and white pennons behind it, surmounted by a crown. Between the cypher and the crown are two dark-blue silk scrolls placed end to end, inscribed respectively in gold letters '*Peninsula*' and '*Waterloo*.' Gold-embroidered olive-branches extend across the bottom and more than half way up each side of the face, each bearing four dark-blue silk, gold-edged scrolls, charged with battle honours. Those on the right are '*Nive*,' '*Vittoria*,' '*Maharajpore*,' and '*Sobraon*'; and on the left '*Fuentes d'Onor*,' '*Salamanca*,' '*Afghanistan*,' and '*Ghuznee*.' Below the cypher are two similar scrolls, with the regimental number '*XVI*' between them. The upper one is inscribed '*Talavera*,' and the lower one '*Bhurtpore*.' The whole is surrounded by broad gold lace of regimental design.

17th Light Dragoons	Black patent leather, 1810–1817		
„ „ „	Dark-blue cloth face,	1817–1823	Silver
17th Lancers	„ „ „	1824–1830	Silver

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Regiment.	Facing.	Lace.
17th Lancers . .	White cloth face, 1830–1837	Gold
	According to the Dress Regulations of 1846, the regiment wore no sabretache at this period.	
„ „	Black patent leather, 1870–1902	
18th Light Dragoons	Dark-blue cloth faced, 1820–1821	Silver
18th Hussars . .	Bright-blue cloth faced, 1822	Silver
	The regiment was disbanded in this year, and was revived in 1858.	
„ „	Scarlet cloth face, 1858–1902	Gold
	Figure 7 on the illustration shows the sabretache last worn. The scarlet face is edged on three sides by gold lace of regimental design, and with a gold cord across the top. The embroidery is all gold, with coloured threads in the crown. Below the monogram is the regimental number, and on each side is a dark-blue velvet gold-edged scroll inscribed '*Peninsula*' and '*Waterloo*' respectively, with gold-embroidered laurel-branches behind.	

(*To be continued.*)

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

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SABRETACHES AND THEIR BADGES.

(Abolished 1901.)

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Spectateur Militaire.—The four numbers of this journal for the months of February and March contain, mixed up with more general matter, a good deal that is of interest for the mounted arm. There is a translation, running through all these numbers, and not yet concluded, of a paper issuing from the Italian General Staff on the employment of large bodies of troops in war. Herein will be found an expression of the modern views now generally accepted on the strategic employment of the advanced Cavalry, on the work of the Cavalry *affectée à une grande unité*, conduct of the Cavalry in case of encounter, and, indeed, of the employment of this arm under almost all circumstances, whether isolated or in combination with Infantry and Artillery. In a paper entitled 'Les Allemands dans le Gâtinais' will be found an account of the action of the German Cavalry prior to the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande; the distribution and work of the Cavalry is given in considerable detail, with reasons for the inactivity of the 1st Cavalry Division. This account is interesting because it describes such action as fell to comparatively small Cavalry bodies, and shows what measure of success was attainable in country not specially adapted for mounted men. Further, running through these numbers is an article called 'a year's tactical instruction des cadres dans un demi régiment de cavalerie': this is intended to serve first as a grounding in the general principles of the tactics of the three arms, thereafter showing by illustration the application of such principles. The idea seems to be to impress upon the commander of even the smallest mounted unit acting alone, that its action, whether of itself or in its results, is never a wholly isolated one—that the mission of the smallest detachment is only one of a number which collectively may have a great result, and that initiative is only accorded to the subordinate commander so far as concerns the means whereby he carries out his mission.

Incidentally, in this paper we are warned against a habit, by no means uncommon, of giving too much rein to fancy, or even to fairy tale, in the elaboration of schemes and ideas, general or special: a French general is quoted as remarking once in this connection: '*Faire un thème de manœuvre ce n'est pas écrire un roman, c'est préciser une situation.*'

The Journal of the Royal Artillery for February contains a lecture on 'The Events in Alsace'—4-6 August 1870, by Capt. A. F. Becke.

This excellent lecture, illustrated by nine maps, should prove very useful for officers reading this period for promotion examinations. (Sold by Dulau & Co., 37 Soho Square, London, W.)

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Revue de Cavalerie.—The editorship of this well-known journal has now been assumed by Colonel Fleury, recently in command of the 2nd Dragoons at Lyons. To the December number 'A. A.' contributes, under the title of 'la mise au point d'un régiment,' some instructional notes used in the two regiments which at various times were commanded by the writer. They deal first with the instruction of the young officers in order that they may be able in time to instruct their subordinates; then follows the instruction of the recruit with a view of making him fit to take his place in the ranks at the end of four months; the instruction of the older soldiers; the training of the remounts; and finally the instruction of the officers. The whole course is so designed as to *instruire vite sans cesser d'instruire bien.* The précis of Bernhardi's *Reiterdienst* is concluded in this number. Then follows an 'étude sur le combat à pieds' by Captain Audibert; the writer holds that a Cavalry which in these days confines its action entirely to shock thereby condemns itself either to *inaction prolongée* or *action prématurée*, and that more than the others has the mounted arm the need for a long-range weapon so that it may be able to act under all conditions. At the same time if instruction in dismounted duties tended in the smallest degree to reduce its *allant à cheval*, it were better to sacrifice the firearm altogether. Captain Audibert lays down the following rules for the action of Cavalry: to *attack* mounted whenever opportunity offers; to *fight* on foot whenever the allotted mission cannot be carried out mounted; he finds that for French Cavalry it will be especially necessary, in view of the numerical superiority of the German horsemen, to make use of ground and carbine. In this portion of his article, which is to be continued, the writer considers the action of Cavalry in *exploration et sûreté*, and then attempts to lay down certain principles to serve as the basis of a rule for dismounted work. A Cavalry body should not, he contends, ever dismount more than half its effectives; only small units, such as squadrons, and then only when acting on the defensive, should dismount all their men. The attack should be in line *plus ou moins échelonnée* with a reserve, and not too many rifles should be put in the firing line at first. The attack to be executed with great rapidity and the fire to be as heavy as possible. 'Seydlitz' is concluded in this number.

In the number for January of this year 'L. N. C.' has a short paper entitled 'Credo,' wherein he seems to urge that, lest the lessons of modern manœuvres should cease to possess any value for Cavalry, the moral effect which it produces on a campaign *must* for the future be taken into account in estimating the result of its action in peace. It is pointed out that in war the actual material effect of artillery is but small, and that none the less at manœuvres umpires give an almost undue prominence to its imaginary influence upon the action of the other arms; 'L. N. C.' holds that umpires should accord no less consideration to the effects produced by Cavalry upon Infantry—not as upon men who are only out for a few days of manœuvres, but as upon the wearied, hungry—possibly demoralised—Infantry in a protracted campaign. Captain Moreau contributes the first portion of an article called 'Sur le champ de bataille,' being a study of the combined action of the three arms under varying circumstances; it is illustrated by a number of examples from modern war. Captain Audibert concludes in this number his study of the action of dismounted Cavalry, wherein he has striven to lay down certain general rules, but he is of opinion

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that the subject is one in regard to which the principles of employment under all circumstances should be drawn up by competent authority.

The number for February opens with a paper by General de Torcy on 'The positions of France and Spain in Morocco at the outset of the current year'; it is a very clear and readable exposition of the events, military and political, which have created the present situation on the Mediterranean littoral between these two Powers and Morocco, and upon which nobody is better qualified to give an opinion than General de Torcy. There follows yet another suggestion for the reorganisation of the French Cavalry! The writer would do away altogether with the *brigades de corps*; effect a permanent organisation of the divisional Cavalry, giving a regiment of four squadrons of chasseurs to each division; and form the remaining Cavalry regiments into permanent Cavalry divisions. For the Cavalry division, he considers the best composition to be two regiments of cuirassiers, two of dragoons and two of hussars, but admits that there are not enough cuirassiers to go round. Two of the proposed divisions will contain but two regiments. He would also do away with the *régiments de réserve*, and use the men to replace casualties in the ranks and not as part of separate organised units. Lieutenant Rupied discusses the question of Cavalry machine gun detachments which have now been organised for the last four years; he expresses his general satisfaction with the material supplied, gun and equipment; the organisation seems to leave something wanting, since it appears that the detachment is only a detachment on service or during manœuvres, its *personnel* at other times being dispersed among and disciplined by various squadrons—the commander of the detachment has, therefore, responsibility without authority. In regard to the employment of machine guns with Cavalry, the writer seems to suggest that there is a tendency falsely to employ them as artillery, but that they give best results at comparatively short ranges, and should not be used for *tirs prolongés* but for *rafales courtes et violentes*. When used as batteries, the result of their combined action is not in proportion to the number of guns in action. Captain Moreau continues his study of the combined action of the three arms.

'Battle Honours of the British Army.' By C. B. Norman. (John Murray. Albemarle Street, London.)

Mr. C. B. Norman gives a short description of the various actions the names of which are borne on the colours and appointments of the regiments of the British Army. The part that each individual corps has played in every engagement is shown and a return appended of the losses suffered.

The author points out the many anomalies in the award of Battle Honours. There are regiments whose colours bear the names of battles in which they did not lose a single man; others that suffered heavy losses and fought bravely have received no recognition. At Schellenberg, for example, Marlborough's earliest victory, which is absent from our colours, the losses of the fifteen regiments engaged exceeded the total casualties of the whole army in the Afghan Campaign, 1879–1881, for which no less than seven battle honours were granted. The battles are arranged geographically with a chronological list for reference at the beginning of the book.

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Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—The December number of this journal is perhaps hardly as good as usual. It contains an article by Major-General Buxbaum on ' modern inspections,' wherein he lays down how in his opinion these should be carried out so as to offer all ranks a standard to which they should strive to attain. In ' audiatur et altera pars' Lieut.-General Count von Brühl discusses the armament of Cavalry and advocates the employment of lance and sword mounted with carbine and lance for dismounted work. He claims that of all steel weapons for the mounted man the lance is far and away the best so long as it remains at the rider's disposal. In the charge, however, many lances must be broken and left in the bodies of opposing man or horse, when the rider must have a sword to fall back upon. A Cavalry fight is not decided, says Count von Brühl, by the charge alone but also by the result of the ensuing mêlée. The writer deprecates the consideration of the weight of the mounted man's weapons when striving after any reduction in the deadweight carried by the Cavalry horse. For dismounted work the writer makes the unusual suggestion that the cavalryman should take not only his carbine but also his lance with him, using the latter for the decision of the dismounted fight as the Infantry soldier does his rifle and bayonet. He admits that the lance may be in the way when advancing on foot over broken ground, but considers that such disadvantages will be more than counterbalanced by the increased confidence conferred by the possession of an offensive weapon and by the extra rapidity with which the cavalryman will be able, when necessary, to regain his saddle. Curiously enough the writer does not discuss the question of using the less cumbersome sword for the weapon of offence of the dismounted Cavalry soldier. Major-General Baron von Fritsch contributes a reply to Major Immanuel's observations on the use of the Cavalry on the 18th August, 1870. Captain Sponer has an article on ' Horse Artillery ' wherein he endeavours to show that this arm is no longer an auxiliary but a sister arm to Cavalry, and that by the properly combined action of both the opportunities for the successful employment of Cavalry will be in the future very greatly increased.

In the January number Major-General Buxbaum—who appears to be the German Military Editor of this journal—offers something of the nature of a continuation and reply to his own paper in the previous number, and emphasises the different points to which the squadron commander should chiefly devote himself. There follows an account of the Cavalry action on the 30th May, 1904, south of Wafangu. Colonel Wenninger, whose writings are well known, has an article, based on a section of the latest German Cavalry regulations, wherein he discusses the several conditions under which Cavalry, either alone or in combination with the other arms, can delay or bring to a stand the onward march of an opposing column. He gives illustrations from the most recent manœuvres and from modern war of such action of Cavalry, and shows how the result is affected by the choice by the Cavalry of the point of attack. Major Diechtl is of opinion that none of the competitions and exercises of the ' heads and posts ' order fit the mounted man for the mêlée, that they only teach him to engage and oppose a single hostile swordsman, whereas in the mêlée he may have to be prepared to ' take on ' several—either at one time or one after another Major Diechtl suggests that better practice for the

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mêlée would be given were the mounted man introduced to a ring occupied by several dummies representing mounted and dismounted men, and made to engage each in rapid succession, thus affording good practice for hand, eye and horse-control and in the use of the steel weapon.

In the February number Col. Wenninger describes the method followed by the regiments of the brigade he commands for facilitating the rapid dismounting for and remounting from the fire fight. The point insisted upon is the fact that the near side of the dismounted man's horse is always clear, but the disadvantage—possibly a minor one—appears to be that the horse-holder *must* invariably dismount on the off-side. Further it is not clear how the lances are regained when more than the even numbers only dismount for the fire fight. When one man remains in charge of four horses—his own included—Col. Wenninger directs that the four lances are placed *in einem Bündel zur Hand*; it is not explained how these are carried and re-distributed should it become necessary, for instance, for the horses to be advanced towards the dismounted party. There follows an account of a stud farm, the property of a Count von Silva, whereon the young stock is especially taught to jump in what appears to be a jumping-lane on a very large scale and containing every variety of obstacle. Most of the remaining articles in the number are of purely local interest.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—There is rather a dearth of Cavalry matter in this quarter's numbers of the journal. The issue dated February 9 contains a long criticism, unfortunately anonymous, of the prize essay on 'the reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division,' from the pen of Captain Niemann, published in the October number of the *Austrian Cavalry Journal.* The critic objects to the writer's scheme, mainly apparently because it is a scheme, and would prefer to leave the conduct of the work of the Cavalry Division to be evolved on the spur of the moment by the man in command on the spot. The essayist's idea in propounding some sort of a scheme was to save the increased work demanded of men and horses; the critic's plan is simple, but not always, perhaps, practicable in the field—it is to increase the strength of the Cavalry division in proportion as more is demanded of the men and horses comprising it. In the number of February 11 a Cavalry general joins in the discussion, 'lance or sword'; he deprecates, as do the majority of the continental disputants, any consideration of the respective weight of the rival weapons—if the weight carried by man and horse is to be lessened, any reduction must come out of clothing or saddlery, and no weapon should be preferred to or give place to another solely because it is lighter. The writer contends that a lance-armed Cavalry has an advantage over a numerically superior Cavalry armed only with the sword. Under dates of February 11 and 14, there is a paper on 'Reconnaissance Before and During the Battle.' The writer reviews the opinions expressed by General von Bernhardi, Colonel Wenninger and others, and combats the views which some authorities have expressed, that the reconnaissance work of the Cavalry comes to an end when contact has been established, and must thenceforth be carried on by the Infantry alone; only by the proper combination of both arms, declares the writer, can all be accomplished which is required for safety and information.

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'Cavalry Reconnaissance.' By Colonel W. W. Norman, 22nd Cavalry (Indian Army). (Hugh Rees, Ltd., Pall Mall.)

This is a thoroughly sound and practical little book which should be of great assistance to all officers and non-commissioned officers. It is based on our existing Cavalry Regulations, which it amplifies where necessary. The arguments are backed up by historical references wherein are traced causes of failure and success.

The principle of advancing by 'bounds' is insisted on for all detachments.

Chapter VII.—'Advanced, Flank and Rear Guards, and Outposts'—is especially good and the essence of common sense.

'Das Armeepferd,' by General Felix von Damnitz. (Leipzig: G. J. Göschen; 1911.)

This little book, written by an officer who at one time held the appointment of Director of Remounts under the Prussian War Office, is divided into five parts: the evolution of the war horse; the use of the horse in armies; measures adopted by the State for the breeding of horses for military purposes, with especial reference to Germany; conditions of modern horse-breeding in Europe and other countries from the standpoint of military requirements; and finally the supply of remounts to the Army. Interesting is the necessarily condensed account of the horse-breeding establishments in Germany, while there is a tolerably full description of the evolution of the English thoroughbred. The author reckons the horse population of the world at from 75 to 80 million, of which half are to be found in Europe; he estimates the horse population of these islands at 3½ million. While remarking in enthusiastic terms on the quality of almost every kind of horse raised in this country, the General expresses his astonishment at the inferior quality—due primarily to the low prices paid—of our Cavalry remounts, and at the number of dismounted men always present in our Cavalry regiments. He does not appear to anticipate any real military benefits as likely to result from the measures about to be adopted for the improvement of our horse supply. As a comparison of German methods of military horse supply with those of other Powers, this little book is of no small interest, while the views expressed derive increased importance from the fact that they are those of one who may be considered as an expert upon what to us is still a very controversial matter.

'Horsemastership.' By Surg.-Capt. F. F. MacCabe, South Irish Horse. (London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox.)

A lecture delivered to the South Irish Horse which should be read by every one who has anything to do with horses. It is essentially practical and deals chiefly with the prevention of disease, and is written in language that can be understood by all. If the simple precautions here recommended were generally carried out our horses would suffer far less than at present from coughs, colds, roaring and kindred diseases. There are also some common-sense remarks about feeding, treatment of accidents, use of drugs and care of horses' feet. This booklet can be read in half an hour and contains a wonderful amount of useful information simply given by a practical man.

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'Military Sketching, Map Reading and Reconnaissance.' By Lieut.-Colonel Mockler Ferryman. 2nd edition revised, 5*s.* net. (Edward Stanford.)

This is the latest of many books on this subject, it is very simply written and easily understood. It is in entire accord with the official Manual of Map Reading and Military Sketching. It is intended to instruct those who are unable to procure personal instruction and is admirably fitted to the purpose. There are, in addition to the usual subjects treated of, some very good remarks and hints on training the memory and powers of observation.

'Mishtshenko's Raid.' German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War, Volume V. Translated by Karl von Donat. (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) 8*s.* 6*d.*

This volume, in continuing the account of the Russo-Japanese War, contains descriptions of Mishtshenko's raid against the Japanese communications and of the battle of San-de-pu.

Any addition to literature on a Cavalry question of such interest, and about which opinion is so divided, must be of especial interest to the Cavalry soldier, but this volume, setting forth as it does the German official opinion on the subject, is doubly welcome.

In criticising the raid, the German General Staff points out that Kuropatkin was wrong in making Yin-kou the main objective of the raid, for the Japanese Army at the front depended upon the railway line for the supply of food and ammunition and not upon Yin-kou, which at that time of the year was ice-bound.

In the execution of the raid the German Staff points out several errors which the Russians made: the preparations were not kept secret, time was wasted in attacking villages unnecessarily, a day was wasted in the preparation for the attack on Yin-kou: finally, the attack was conducted in a half-hearted manner when the greatest vigour and determination was essential.

It is also of opinion that in the American Civil War such successes as were achieved by this form of operation were to a certain extent due to the peculiarities of the country: its size, its resources and its widely scattered population. It admits that raids may possibly be carried out with profit in a European war, but is doubtful whether they will be often advisable.

'Notes containing the Admiralty View of the Risk of Invasion.' (John Murray, Albemarle Street, London.)

These are issued as an Appendix to the second edition of Sir Ian Hamilton's book on Compulsory Service.

It is pointed out that the interruption of our trade, not invasion, is what we most have to fear.

It goes minutely into the enemy's difficulties and anticipates that we shall be moderately successful in preventing his ships getting far enough to sea to do any damage, and concludes that an invasion, on even a moderate scale, is practically impossible.

There is, however, no statement of our difficulties: possible complications in the East and the Mediterranean, loss of initiative entailed by our form of Government, different objectives and so on.

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NOTES

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to confer upon the following regiments the honour of becoming Colonel-in-Chief :—

The 10th (Prince of Wales's Own) Hussars.

The Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry.

COMMENTS ON THE SUMMER TRAINING OF A CAVALRY MAXIM BRIGADE.

By Lieutenant M. CRAWSHAY (5th Dragoon Guards).

Generally.—The officer who is 'given' the Maxims of a Cavalry brigade is given with them very considerable responsibility, for there is no doubt that in the future the Maxim Battery will play an important part in the Cavalry contest.

Until this year the authorities had apparently not quite digested the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, as far as Maxims are concerned, but they are now keenly alive to their possibilities.

On manœuvres, umpires were desired to specially note the action and handling of the Maxims, and they (meaning the Maxims) have come through the ordeal unscathed, the general opinion being that when properly handled, coupled with a reasonable amount of luck, they would have done very considerable execution against the masses of charging Cavalry, and during many other phases of the Cavalry conflict.

The officer in charge of a Cavalry Maxim brigade labours under considerable difficulties in its training, because he has little precedent to be guided by, and, although he may have qualified at Hythe, he will not have received there much instruction as to the uses of the gun peculiar to Cavalry, most of the tests, lectures, &c., being worked out from the point of view of the Infantry, which uses its guns in quite a different fashion. Again, there is no text-book on the Maxim gun as regards training, drill, and tactics; information *re* Maxims being mislaid in odd paragraphs in the various manuals.

The 'Cavalry Training' of 1907 only refers directly to massed Maxims from a tactical point of view in two places. First, it says that the brigaded machine guns will usually accompany the Artillery in the approach march. Secondly, that during the Cavalry fight they will co-operate with the R.H.A. and that their presence with it will often admit of the Artillery dispensing with any other escort.

Now these two paragraphs do not give the brigade machine-gun commander very much information as to the lines on which he is to train his battery, and in any case the *rôle* designated is a debased one for the guns, as I will presently endeavour to show. For this reason I think that some of

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the deductions and conclusions I arrived at during this year's lengthy Cavalry manœuvres may be of use to anyone wishing to train a Maxim battery in the future.

Even if my deductions are not correct, it may at least give some food for thought to those who are interested in the erstwhile much discredited machine gun.

Usefulness of Machine Gun already recognised.—Cavalry commanders have now great hopes from machine guns, hoping that their co-operation and use will keep the cavalryman, as a cavalryman, on his horse, and thus strike a blow at the school which suggests M.I. tactics for the training of our Cavalry.

Therefore, to all true cavalrymen the machine gun is a weapon—though some go so far as to call it an arm—to be exploited, and the best it is capable of extracted from it.

Now it is granted that the machine gun at present is a valuable asset; but I consider that it might become a more valuable one if certain alterations in the gun and equipment are made, and the teams trained on a definite and uniform system on the general lines which will follow.

Groundwork to be learnt before Brigading.—When the Maxims of the Cavalry Brigade are formed up as a battery for the first time, their commander expects that the teams should be already thoroughly expert in the duties of an individual gun team—viz. acquainted with mechanism, and have a good idea of handling the gun in its peculiar tactical requirements, have passed the standard tests, and be good shots with their weapon. It is now his duty to turn these three separate fire units into a battery able to work in unison at the highest speed.

His first difficulty will be the three clumsy-looking four-horse carts containing guns that he will find drawn up before him (on mobilisation there would be six); but the Cavalry are as yet only allowed half their establishment for peace training, owing to the lack-of-horseflesh evil.

Initial Fault in Equipment as affecting Training.—These carts were used on Salisbury Plain this year to bring the guns into action and transport them all over the Plain. This, I consider, is the initial and biggest mistake in the training of the Maxim Brigades.

These carts are, in my opinion, only suitable for carrying the gun and ammunition on the roads, when the opposing forces are still some way apart, with a view of saving the pack horses for the actual combat. Directly the Cavalry forces begin to get into touch, the guns should be at once put on the pack until the combat is over, or the guns again return to the line of march on the road.

Objections to Use of Wagons.—The objections to the use of the carts are manifold:—

1. A Maxim Battery is unmistakable at a very considerable distance, and cannot even be mistaken for R.H.A., as the cart is only drawn by four horses. Thus surprise, one of the chief characteristics of the gun, is almost abolished.

2. The strain on the horses is very great when keeping up with Cavalry moving by successive bounds, as they now invariably do, and still greater when the battery has to dash out to the flank to obtain its fleeting opportunity.

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Frequently the guns had to gallop up hill, which the R.H.A. always avoid, as the breast harness then chokes the horses. The Artillery can choose their pace to suit their teams more easily than can the galloping Maxims in wagons, because it is usually not quite in such intimate touch with the Cavalry which it accompanies. Also the Maxim Battery has often to gallop out accompanying a small force, perhaps one squadron, which will move much faster than a brigade, sent on as an advance guard or on some special mission. It is impossible for carts to keep up with such Cavalry on rough ground, moving at its highest speed.

3. Unless some device is arranged to fasten the gun and tripod in the bottom of the wagon it may be jerked out when crossing a bank or other obstacle; this actually happened several times, and any arrangement to fasten down the gun takes time to unfasten when coming into action.

4. Carts take much longer to form line, which is necessary when coming into action with them, because if 'action' is given to the front, with these three wagons (or six on active service) in column, the rear guns must be carried up by hand, and would never open fire in time. With the pack equipment the guns are easily got at, column of detachments (column of troops) being formed just previous to 'halt action.'

5. Fast galloping over rough ground breaks up the carts, several teams this year having had to put R.H.A. gun-wheels on, which adds to the weight. Out of thirteen guns, only seven were in action on the last day of Cavalry manœuvres, the remainder having broken up their carts.

6. The use of carts is only possible on Salisbury Plain. Directly Cavalry get into the country surrounding the Plain they go through hunting-gates, through gaps, narrow rides in woods, and over small fences. The clumsy Maxim cart cannot follow, but a strong pack horse will follow a troop anywhere.

Objections to Use of Pack.—The objections laid against the use of packs are (1) that they take longer coming into action. This is true with *untrained* teams. It is much easier for an untrained team, and far less trouble, to pull the Maxim and tripod out of the back of a cart than to get it off a pack; but with careful training the gun which we are now armed with comes into action in thirty seconds from the pack and goes out in forty seconds, which is good enough.

2. The packs break up with heavy work and are always undergoing repairs. This is true. There is one particular bar on the pack of a Maxim which is ridiculously weak and inadequate. Although the pack saddle is continually being sent to the Ordnance for repairs, they refuse to put in a stouter bar because it would not be seal pattern. In the field a broken pack saddle means one gun less in the battery, as duplicate saddles are not carried. It is a pity the Ordnance Department and experimentalists do not take the advice of the combatant officers in these matters, who use these things practically in the field every day, and therefore should know most about them. I am convinced that a better and stronger pack could be made for the gun, which would not break down.

Objection 3 is that the pack horses are not strong enough to carry the heavy gun which we are armed with (weight, Mark iv., tripod 48 lb., gun 58 lb., and weight of pack saddle), and would soon break down. This

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is true in peace. On Salisbury Plain this year we had an approach march and a collision almost daily, and sometimes a repetition in case of a mistake; but in war there might be only *one* collision in the course of a campaign. Of course, for the purposes of training these frequent collisions are necessary. However, the pack team consists of one gun horse and two led pack horses for ammunition. These two ammunition horses have no weight comparatively to carry in peace, as ball ammunition is not carried, so the gun should be changed frequently between these horses.

4. Most machine-gun officers had never given any attention to their packs, considering that they were only meant for mountainous country. This was possibly their original use, and no doubt the carts were good enough for the old *rôle* of Maxims—viz. escort to guns and accompanying Artillery. But now that the Maxim has an entirely new *rôle* allotted to it, and has to work much faster, the Cavalry should be re-armed with a thoroughly up-to-date light gun with a strong pack equipment. The expenses would not be very great. In the Home Army it would mean twenty-four guns only to re-arm the Cavalry Division.

Armament for Cavalry, and suggested necessary Alterations.—The Maxim has been in use in our Army for a good many years without any very radical change in its construction, while other Powers, who were formerly behind us, have now a better weapon. The Germans have a much lighter gun, but it has a sledge mounting, which is unsuitable for Cavalry. Both mountings were tried together on the Plain this year, and the tripod came out on top.

The Americans are, I believe, adopting a much lighter gun. Denmark uses heavy automatic rifles for her dismounted Cavalry, and it is a question whether twelve men with six automatic rifles would not knock out twelve men with two Maxims (Maxim establishment) in Cavalry work, and the difficulty of packs and carts would be abolished. Maxims, as at present issued, are certainly rather clumsy, and if a breakdown occurs fifty per cent. of your fire has gone, while only one-sixth of the automatic rifle is lost. At the same time, most automatic rifles have so far been found rather unreliable.

Japanese Alterations.—We have a lesson of practical war before our eyes. The Japanese at the commencement of their war had a battery of six guns (Hotchkiss, made in Japan) to each Cavalry Brigade, mounted on *limbered carriages* with draught horses. Since the war, guns and tripods are carried on horses, with thirty-two ammunition horses, each carrying 2400 rounds.

Now, having disposed of the cart, and, I think, satisfactorily shown that our team should be mounted on packs when being handled tactically in the face of the enemy, I will continue my ideas as to the handling and training of this battery.

The first main catchwords at Hythe and elsewhere are, rightly, 'surprise' and 'opportunity,' and this, in the Cavalry action, means speed in moving the battery and getting in and out of action.

Necessity of Drill.—To obtain this the battery must drill. Without drill and a recognised and well-practised method of coming into action, the confusion amongst numbers and led horses will be great, guns will take longer time getting in and out of action, and will not be able to conceal themselves in the folds of the ground when making their approach by the adoption of suitable formations.

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Kind of Drill.—The drill must be the same as for a squadron, the detachments representing troops. The men are acquainted with this drill, and it works well. Any copy of Artillery drill or new inventions by Maxim officers will at once discover the battery as a battery to watchful patrol leaders of the enemy.

The Battery Commander must be well out in front and drill mostly by signal, because the guns, ammunition, &c., carried on the packs make a great noise.

The pack horses should be in the centre, with riding horses on flanks of the troop, as the gun is thus less likely to be detected. A Maxim battery must always try to look as much like an ordinary squadron as possible, conforming to the squadron's formations when marching behind it.

Directly the detachments move handily, coming into action with all possible speed should be practised, always working with a watch, and gradually reducing the time till a standard of thirty seconds into action from full gallop and forty seconds out is arrived at.

This will only be done by rather wearisome repetition, but is necessary if our principal ambition, a bold *rôle,* is to be played.

Main Object in Cavalry Collision.—While the battery is being trained in practical drill, and during halts, the Brigade Commander must lecture, and, first and foremost, he must drive into his hearers' heads his ambition for the battery, which is that when the supreme moment of the Cavalry collision takes place, according to the words of the German Drill Book, the most advantageous position for the battery will be well to the front and flank of the advancing Cavalry, since from there a continuous fire is possible up to the moment of the charge, and at the same time an outflanking movement of the enemy is prevented on that side.

Now to get to this favourable position and develop fire in time is the great difficulty, and success is governed by two factors, the primary one of hard galloping and quick action, and the second the position of the Maxim guns in the brigade during the approach march.




Maxims masked by hill.
In action too soon
Point of Cavalry collision wrongly anticipated
Maxims correctly anticipate collision
A perfect target at critical moment.

There are four possible positions :—

1. Behind the R.H.A. on the outer flank.
2. In the rear of the brigade.
3. Sandwiched in rear of the leading regiment of the brigade.
4. Immediately in front of the brigade behind the ammunition guard.

The third is, in my opinion, the better position, because the Maxims are from there easily extricated to gallop out to either flank as may be necessary, which is all important in saving valuable seconds.

Position in Brigade during Approach March.—If the Maxims follow

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behind the guns they can be easily detected by enemy's patrols, and if wanted in a hurry cannot be got at, particularly on the flank away from the guns.

If the Maxims follow in rear of the brigade they are so far behind when the opportunity for action occurs that their fire will usually be too late; also the brigade Maxim commander has great difficulty in keeping touch with his guns.

The objection to the third position (in rear of leading regiment) is that the Maxims will get in the way of the forming brigade. In practice this did not happen, the second regiment deploying to the left, the third to the right, leaving the guns free to gallop out to the right flank before the third regiment came up; and even when galloping to the left flank there was no difficulty in clearing the second regiment.

The fourth position is, as far as I am concerned, rather an unknown quantity, as it was not tried by any brigadier on manœuvres this year, though I believe the Maxims, and R.H.A. as well, have in India been handled in this manner, the advantage claimed being that, in the event of surprise, Maxims can come into action far quicker than the brigade can deploy, or than the battery can be purposely dropped to form a central pivot of manœuvre. The danger would be that the brigade might mask the fire of the Maxims. It would be interesting to see such a manœuvre attempted this year.

Minor Points when obtaining Enfilade Effect Forward and on Flank.—Besides these two primary points just discussed, there are other minor points which must receive attention if the battery is to develop its fire at the psychological moment:—

1. The position of the battery commander, which should be with the brigadier when the commanding officers are with him.

2. That he is in touch with his battery and his battery second-in-command.

3. That he will be able to be distinguished from the other members of the Staff when he gallops out to show directions for Maxim battery; taking off the cap, pointing with it, and blowing the Maxim call on the whistle is the method I use.

4. That he takes his battery sufficiently wide to the flank to clear the forming squadrons of his own force.

5. That, although cover is desirable for his battery, the first essential is a clear field of fire.

6. That he does not over-estimate the field of fire when selecting his place for action. When mounted he will have a far higher command than the man firing the Maxim gun, and it is very undesirable to have to move guns backwards or forwards to obtain command; the collision will probably in such cases have taken place before the battery could get off a round.

7. That although everyone knows that massed guns should, if possible, all open fire together to obtain concentrated fire, yet when it is a question of seconds *v.* Cavalry galloping, guns should come into action as quickly as possible independently, not wait till the last one is ready, as there may frequently be a lame duck, owing to a fallen horse, casualty, &c.

8. That if a bit of broken ground, or a wood, or some such obstacle is available, it is advisable to gallop for this.

9. That he gallops well ahead of his battery, and that his range-finders

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are with him, so that they are ranging before the battery comes into action, or else with mekometers they will be too late.

The mekometers are a very unsatisfactory instrument. I should suggest every Cavalry Maxim battery having a Marinden R.F. carried on the person of the range-finder, as the Marinden is easily damaged by jolting.

Other Rôles for Battery acting with Cavalry Brigade.—Of course, the battery may not always be able to act in the way described; circumstances of the fight or conformation of the ground may make it desirable to leave the Maxims with the R.H.A. as a pivot of manœuvre, or the guns may open fire from a point in rear and on the flank of their own Cavalry, or develop covering fire over their heads. All these *rôles* were carried out by the Maxim with considerable theoretical success during the late manœuvres.

The battery must further be instructed in acting in defensive action échelloned on a flank, indirect fire, night fire, in action with dismounted troops, in advance and rear-guard action, under Artillery fire, &c.; but the general principles in these cases are also applicable to Infantry, so I do not touch on them, as tactical handling of this nature is taught at Hythe.

As regards the action of the Maxim battery under Artillery fire, which may be anticipated after the collision, something may be said.

If good enfilade practice is made at this juncture at the opposing Artillery they will in self-defence turn their attention to the Maxims, which is, of course, just what is wanted, as it takes their attention from the Cavalry reserves. I purposely say 'enfilade,' because the present shield carried by the new Artillery gun makes it difficult to obtain material effect with frontal Maxim or rifle fire. But the Maxims must on no account be led into a duel with the R.H.A. directly the first shell comes their way; the gun numbers must either scatter to cover, leaving their guns, which will probably not be damaged, or else, if a covered line of retreat is possible, carry away the guns by hand to a position some little way off and open fire again when the opposing Artillery has sought another more important target.

Action v. Artillery after the Collision.—What the Maxim battery should avoid is a duel of any sort with Artillery, or trying to get out of action with their teams under Artillery fire, unless the circumstances urgently demand taking the risk of losing their led horses.

Of course, hard-and-fast rules, which must be rigidly conformed to, cannot be laid down, as one cannot legislate for exceptions; but methods which will generally be found suitable can be taught, and contingencies of war rehearsed in peace, to the great benefit of the battery.

Programme of Daily Work Illustrating Method of Training.—Perhaps my ideas on training have been up to now a little general. To particularise—to give some idea of what one actually does with this white elephant which is given one, this white elephant which eventually develops into a fascinating independent command:—

First Day.—1. Drill with carts.

2. Massed battery fire control with combined sights; lecture explaining use of same.

3. Sudden action, massed guns from carts, taking time with stop-watch.

4. Transference of guns from carts to packs; this will leave only the wheel horses in the wagons, the leaders carrying an ammunition pack.

5. Sudden action, massed guns from packs.

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6. Fire control, changing of objectives. Firing gun without tripod from man's shoulder, fire at train over parapet of bridge, two legs only being on bridge, third supported by gun number.

NOTE.—Range-finders to be exercised, and the two best selected as brigade range-finders.

2. Five or six different actions are, I think, sufficient for one day; they must be repeated to obtain speed without confusion.

Second Day.—1. Drill, with lectures in intervals, horses being allowed to graze.

2. Sudden action from packs and wagons working at slow gallop.

3. Action with brigaded guns, acting on wider front, up to 80 yards, which is the formation usually adopted by Infantry.

4. Practice of ground scouts.

5. Use of an observing party to a flank, using the signals.

6. Action to rear, teams drop guns and gallop on to cover. Wagons must draw up halted facing battery, so as not to have to turn round.

Third Day.—1. Sudden action on flank of Cavalry.

2. Covering fire to Cavalry attack from high ground.

3. Flanking fire and its principles explained, and repetition of previous exercises.

NOTE.—Avoid using the voice as far as possible, and signals must always be acknowledged by salute.

4. Changing position of guns by hand in action.

Fourth Day.—Sudden action wagons packs.

Flanking fire brigaded front.

Rearguard action.

Fifth Day.—Road fighting, action from pack and wagons.

Note.—In carrying gun over a gate or high obstacle, No. 3 should cross first and take it from the No. 1. Section sergeants should at once double up to the front to ascertain plan of battery commander, so that they can lead their gun direct when it comes up. Battery commander's only signal, halt action; but this must be passed back, as tail of column will otherwise think the halt is an ordinary one.

Adoption of gun and tripod to the various difficult platforms encountered by the roadside, such as bank or stone wall; the rear leg may have to be supported on a man's back or held in position.

Sixth Day.—Practice of mutual support, galloping to successive positions.

NOTE.—Care not to mask each other's fire when galloping forward, develop rapid fire when the gun to be supported is actually limbered up and under fire.

Practice of indirect fire, only likely to be used in an ambush scheme with Cavalry. Instruct led horse commanders in their duties, led horses to come up in an arranged order, so that each number can quickly find his own horse.

Seventh Day.—Methods of firing through a hedge or over bank.

Night firing.

Changing numbers.

Action with Artillery.

Action *v.* Artillery.

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Adaptation of gun to difficult platforms.

Surprise effect on Infantry flank.

Eighth Day.—Examination and competition for speed test between teams coming into action and out.

There are many more situations and tactical opportunities which can be worked out for the training of the battery, but to continue them would make my article too extensive; these instances, however, show the lines on which to start work.

The work should be progressive; interest must be kept up as much as possible and a spirit of competition between the rival teams fostered, though complete unanimity and uniformity in action must not be lost sight of.

Brigade Field Days.

Wednesday, July 27.—Guns massed and forward on a flank of brigade working with protective reconnoitring squadron formed a pivot of manœuvre and secured right flank *v.* flags.

Note.—In this case a defensive position was occupied; therefore it was essential to allow enemy to approach till a good target was offered, simultaneous opening of fire and fire discipline being essential to success.

Friday, July 29.—Guns sent to their respective units for road fighting.

Note.—The guns were in one case hurried up from the rear, and the position in front was not explained to their commander before they entered the firing line. Their line of advance was consequently ill chosen.

In road fighting the best value will be got from the battery by its temporary non-existence.

Saturday, July 30.—Operations of Cavalry brigade *v.* flag Cavalry. Maxims first protected the exposed flank of the brigade in the approach march, and when the actual shock took place succeeded in developing covering fire over the squadrons heads from some high ground.

Tuesday, August 2.—Road fighting guns to units, action *v.* Artillery, shooting down cross roads. Maxim dragged by hand to a concealed position on flank of Artillery gun to avoid shield (surprise action).

Wednesday, August 17.—Action of gun useless owing to foggy weather.

Thursday, August 18.—Obtained one minute's actual fire forward and on flank at 400 yards, as no troops were detached to oppose me, nor did the battery came under any fire; action should have been very successful.

Action *v.* flags acted in conjunction with one squadron dismounted, occupying wood on commanding ground on flank of brigade, guns concealed on forward edge of wood.

Brigade attack down valley, covering and enfilade fire obtained.

Friday, August 19.—Action of battery *v.* the brigade with the flags. First acted as pivot and protection of exposed flank of flags, from position echeloned in rear; then galloped forward to enfilade position on flank 400 yards. In both cases fire should have been very successful *v.* the masses of horsemen.

Half-Divisional Days.

Tuesday, August 23.—First collision. The brigade surprised in a hollow, having just completed a bound by the opposing Cavalry. In the confusion,

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and owing to the Maxim being in rear of the brigade, and therefore difficult to extricate, they were unable to occupy a small wood directly to their front, from which good enfilade fire could have been obtained.

The brigade Maxim officer was used as a galloper just before the critical moment, and on his return to headquarters was not in touch with his battery second-in-command.

On no account should the brigade Maxim officer leave the General when action is imminent. He further awaited a word of command according to orders, but later on instructions were issued to act without orders if considered necessary.

In a subsequent action the battery was sent forward and able to open fire with surprise effect at the opposing brigade, massed and dismounted awaiting information, range 500 yards. One minute's fire was obtained before squadrons masked fire, and owing to the battery being on high ground a half-minute's covering fire was further obtained over heads of brigade in valley.

Wednesday, August 24.—Very successful action in the best *rôle* forward and on flank, obtaining enfilade fire at 450 yards for two minutes, the battery being on high ground, with a wire fence between it and the enemy.

After the shock, fire was directed at the R.H.A., which was obliged to turn its fire on them, thereby diverting the guns from their proper objective.

Friday, August 26.—Battery left on high ground with R.H.A., forming pivot of manœuvre and rallying point. Good targets obtained, but the ranges rather long for the weapon.

Saturday, August 27.—Battery from commanding ground covered the crossing of brigade over a river. They assisted in clearing enemy from opposite bank and made good the position till the Artillery were brought up into action, which was not for twenty-five minutes.

After river crossing had been accomplished a collision took place. Battery encountered opposing machine guns and were forced to take them on, thus being prevented from getting enfilade fire at Cavalry brigade; it was the first time that the battery encountered opposition.

Divisional Training.

The battery was formed up with the other three batteries of the division, so the discussion of their handling is rather outside my sphere. The guns were all in wagons, the horses had to do a lot of very trying galloping uphill, which affected their condition for the rest of the manœuvres, and successful fire action was not often obtained. I do not think Maxims should be handled in a larger force than a brigade, certainly unless they have received instruction previously in divisional drill.

Tuesday, September 6.—Rear-guard action, guns with regiments. Action at 500 yards obtained at a battery of Artillery limbered up, which was put out of action for twenty minutes.

It will be seen from the foregoing diary that only once was the Maxim battery useless during a Cavalry collision, and this was an exceptional circumstance.

From the teaching and experience obtained, it may be anticipated that better results will be obtained next year.

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ARTILLERY FROM A CAVALRY POINT OF VIEW.

By CAPTAIN C. VAN DER BYL, *16th Lancers.*

Some time ago the writer was afforded an opportunity of watching Horse Artillery firing at their practice camp on Salisbury Plain.

Each battery fired 600 rounds of shrapnel during the course; and each day one or more practices were carried out, always with a sound tactical scheme in view, which, as a rule, necessitated about three changes of position for the guns. Whilst advancing from one fire-position to another, which on service would often have to be done under fire, batteries invariably adhered to their regulation intervals and distances between gun teams, offering a large and compact target to an enemy's fire.

If a more scattered formation had been adopted, when moving over an open country like the Plain, they would not have appeared nearly so vulnerable.

The waggons, halted or moving, always gave a larger target than the guns.

When indirect laying was employed, about a quarter of an hour usually elapsed before fire was opened. When coming into action direct against a target which appeared suddenly, it took from one and a half to two minutes after the trails were dropped before the first shot was fired.

During one minute and a half Cavalry galloping at the rate of twenty miles an hour would have time to advance 880 yards.

Therefore, if guns can be surprised within this distance, when limbered up and without an escort, it would be quite safe to charge them even with a very small body of Cavalry, as they would be practically defenceless.

The rifles which a battery carries are always behind with the waggons, so that when the guns are in action they are never at hand if required.

Surely our gunners should be armed with an automatic pistol of a suitable pattern, so as to have some means of defence in the event of a Cavalry charge getting home.

As it is always far easier for an individual standing at a distance on a flank of guns in action to note whether the range is correct than it is for the gunners themselves, who are more or less in prolongation of their own line of fire, I would suggest a simple system of signals by means of which people from neighbouring units might assist gunners by informing them when their ranging is faulty.

For instance, should a patrol leader happen to be in advance and on the flank of a battery in action and see that the guns have ranged 150 yards too far, so that the shells are passing over the enemy's heads, he might stand facing the target and, raising his hand holding a handkerchief or his cap at arm's-length above his head, make three downward waves *in the direction of the target,* each wave meaning 50 yards beyond. Again, should the next shots appear to fall 50 yards short, the signaller should turn his back to the target and, raising his hand as before, make one downward wave *in a direction away from the target,* to show that the range is 50 yards short. If after this the range is again altered and the shells appear to be bursting in the right place, he might raise his hand above his head as for halt, to signify that the range is correct. It has often occurred to me that some co-operation of this kind between gunners and our arm might be adopted with advantage.

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GENERAL SIR JOHN FLOYD, BART.,

1748-1818.

By Captain Sir Henry Floyd, Bart., R.N.

Born February 22, 1748, son of Captain John Floyd, of the 1st, or King's, Dragoon Guards, for whose gallantry in the Seven Years' War he was at twelve years of age granted a commission without purchase in February 1760 as Cornet in Eliott's, or the 15th Light Dragoons; he was present the same year at the battle of Emsdorf, and his colonel, the Earl of Pembroke, wrote of him to the Marquis of Granby:

'Little Floyd, whom you have seen at Wilton, just past twelve years of age, behaved most gallantly, which I was very glad of. I could only have wished he had not had his horse shot under him, for it was an exceedingly pretty one I had lent him.'

After the war Floyd did the Grand Tour with Lord Herbert and Dr. Cox, reporting on the armies of Europe. After upwards of twenty years' service in the 15th Light Dragoons, he was, in 1781, appointed Lieut.-Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons (renumbered, in 1786, the 19th Light Dragoons), and took them to Madras in 1782. This was the first regiment of English Cavalry to land in India, and, as the 19th Light Dragoons, became famous in the Mysore wars.

On November 18, 1790, Floyd was promoted Colonel, and was in the same year appointed by Lord Cornwallis to command all the Cavalry upon the Coromandel Coast. In the three campaigns against Tippoo Sultan he greatly distinguished himself, especially before the walls of Seringapatam in February 1792.

Floyd was promoted Major-General on October 5, 1794. The first action of importance performed by Horse Artillery was by galloper guns attached to Floyd's Dragoons. The 19th Light Dragoons and guns met at the Gazalhatti Pass in 1790, the vanguard of Tippoo Sultan's army; the enemy was repulsed with a loss of 400 killed.

At the battle of Malavalli in 1799 Major-General Floyd commanded five regiments of Cavalry and led a charge that practically destroyed the enemy.

At the capture of Seringapatam in 1799 he was second in command of the army under General Harris. He was president of the Prize Committee after the fall of the place: then returning to England, and becoming Lieut.-General in 1801 he was appointed on the Staff in Ireland, holding various commands till his promotion to General in 1812. Having been appointed Colonel of the 8th Light Dragoons in 1804 he subsequently became Governor of Gravesend and Tilbury Fort, and was created a Baronet in 1816. He died in 1818.

He was one of the most distinguished Cavalry officers of his day, and may be considered as one of the founders of our Indian Native Cavalry.

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CAPTAIN L. E. NOLAN.

By an error, the presentation of the cloak of Captain L. E. Nolan to the museum of the Royal United Service Institution was ascribed to Lord Raglan instead of to Lady Russell. The cloak was not carried by the officer on his saddle at Balaclava, but was subsequently found in his tent. It was presented to the war correspondent, Sir William Howard Russell, and was presented by his widow to the Royal United Service Institution.

C. R. B.

'OPPOSITE VIEWS.'

We have received the following communication from Mr. Erskine Childers, the author of 'War and the Arme Blanche':—

DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly allow me a word of comment on General von Bernhardi's criticism of my book, 'War and the Arme Blanche,' in your issue of October 1910?

I am at a loss to understand what your readers will think of it. If I myself were a Cavalryman I should hotly resent a foreign defence of the *arme blanche* which can only be sustained by insulting the British Army in general, and the British Cavalry in particular. And permit me to say that I do, as a layman, hotly resent those insults. There is not one word in my book which is not expressly directed to the *armament* of Cavalry. I gave the fullest credit to our Cavalry in South Africa for the work accomplished by them as brave, enduring and devoted soldiers, and I over and over again expressed my high admiration for the abilities of our foremost Cavalry leader, General Sir John French. What I said was that, in my opinion, he and his Cavalry suffered heavily from their armament and education, and would have done infinitely better if they had been armed and trained originally as the pure mounted riflemen which, under pressure of events, they ultimately became.

General von Bernhardi's view, which is no less offensive for being expressed rather by way of insinuation than by bold affirmation, comes to this, that our Cavalry failed through sheer timidity. Let any one with an open mind read pages 472-4 of his article and try and find any other deduction. The South African War, he says, was 'peculiar' and 'abnormal.' Why? Because, *inter alia*, the Boers were 'peasants,' 'incapable of assuming the offensive,' 'tied to their ox-waggons,' 'ignorant of reconnaissance,' 'in disappearing smaller numbers against greatly superior forces,' 'directed by halting leadership,' and so on. Pitiful foes truly! The last foes, surely, who would be likely to upset the normal traditions of any good Cavalry! But there is the rub. Our Cavalry—your readers, sir—were, according to this German authority, more pitiful soldiers than the peasant rabble they were opposed to. They 'made no relentless pursuits,' they 'did not attack even when they had the opportunity,' 'they never attempted to overcome the resistance of small, well-posted flanking detachments, which barred their way for attack—*i.e.* at Poplar Grove,' and 'one would scarcely find any European Cavalry which was tied down to such an extent during the big operations as the Boers or one which against such little resistance did not

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try to overcome it as the English ' (*sic*). He takes Dronfield, where Sir John French himself was present, as an example, and in as plain language as it is possible to use without actually penning the word ' cowardice ' accuses our Cavalry of that unpardonable crime.

I wonder Englishmen can stand reading this sort of thing. It makes me burn with anger, and I should think every one of your readers would feel the same. And the effrontery of the parallel between our Cavalry and ' any European Cavalry,' coming from this particular author! Only this year he has published a book (' Cavalry in War and Peace ') about his own national Cavalry, whom he describes at this moment, eight years after the Boer War, and even after a drastic revision of the old Regulations, as ' totally unprepared for war,' ' left far behind in the march of military progress,' a prey to ' antiquated assumptions and mischievous delusions,' and whose ' spectacular battle-pieces ' and ' childish exercises ' (*i.e.* shock charges with the steel) he stigmatises and satirises from the beginning to the end of his book as ' survivals of the dark ages.' This is the Cavalry which, eight years ago, under its still more antiquated regulations, armed with a popgun carbine and totally ignorant of fire, would have taught the Boers lessons *with the steel* (that is the point; for otherwise, in a criticism of my work, his strictures are meaningless) which our timid leaders could not teach them! Well, speaking without national bias, I do not believe it. From the General's own account of his Cavalry (and I have only given a few examples of the indictment he brings against them), I should imagine that our Cavalry at this moment, through their knowledge of fire, could teach them many practical lessons; and not merely our Cavalry but our half-trained Colonial mounted riflemen, whom he elegantly describes as ' hordes of Militia from all parts of the earth.'

I beseech your readers to look behind the contemptuous patronage of this German officer and pin him to the point of this controversy. His own mission in life, as anyone who has read his two books knows, is to wake up his own ' indolent and ignorant ' Cavalry (I use his own terms) to a sense of the omnipotence of fire in modern war. In theory, he clings to the steel also, but his views on fire make nonsense of his views on the steel. You must have observed that on p. 475 he concedes my whole case. ' In one particular, however, I will own he is correct. The rifle rules tactics. That is indisputable. . . . To the will of the firearm everything must be subordinated in war.'

Between the last two of those sentences I have omitted one which I will refer to in a moment. Meanwhile, there is my whole case, in my own chosen words, fully and explicitly conceded by an author who says my ' ideas command little respect.' It is because I believe in this case that I pleaded in the opening words of my book that the lance and sword should ' either be discarded or denied all influence on tactics '—that is, that they should be denied, in peace training, a theoretical influence which they cannot exercise in war. They cannot exercise it, I argued, because ' the rifle rules tactics.' The official Cavalry view is precisely the opposite—namely, that the lance and sword rule tactics. If you are to defend those weapons at all, that, obviously, *must* be the view. The steel weapons *must* be able to impose tactics on the rifle; if they cannot, they are useless.

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Now for the omitted sentence. It runs: 'Nobody can with the *arme blanche* compel an opponent on his side tactically to use the *arme blanche*.' I puzzled over this strange proposition for some little time, as I daresay your readers puzzled too. It is a truism, but, in its context, an irrelevant truism. The Boers had no *arme blanche*. What the writer appears to be trying to say is: 'Riflemen can always compel Cavalry to use the rifle to the exclusion of the *arme blanche*,' which is only another way of saying 'The rifle rules tactics,' and which seems to me the plain moral of the great modern wars. The General, in the rest of the paragraph I am quoting, shows that he really agrees with me—so far as he has taken pains to understand me. 'To the will of the firearm everything must be subordinated in war. But, as a necessary corollary from this, to say that there can be no fight with the *arme blanche* is a mischievous sophism. Every Infantryman carries a *bayonet*, because he requires it for the assault. Even Lord Roberts will not take this away, and mentions specific cases in which Cavalry might use the bayonet—in night attacks, fogs, &c.' *Cadit quaestio*, then. The General and I are at one. I have never attacked the bayonet. If it should rightly be added to the armament of mounted troops on the ground that they constantly have to do the same work as foot-soldiers, by all means let it be added. I discussed the question in my book (p. 364), and ventured to regard it as an open one. But the question has nothing whatever to do with the lance and sword. These weapons are used *from horseback*, while the bayonet is fixed to the rifle and is used on foot at the culmination of a fire-fight. My whole book was an attack on the use of steel weapons from horseback and the tactics based thereon, and I repeatedly and emphatically pointed out the distinction between the lance and sword and the bayonet.

The General, like many other writers, misrepresents me on another point, about which I left not a particle of room for misrepresentation. Because I pointed out, by direct proof, the value of saddle-fire, he represents me as urging the substitution of the rifle for the lance and sword as a weapon for the 'mounted *mêlée*.' 'I maintain,' he says, 'that for the mounted *mêlée* the rifle is absolutely useless and in the collision of the mounted fight is as dangerous for their own people as for the enemy.' I never asserted the contrary. What the General is picturing is a system of shock-charges on the present lines, where both parties remain permanently mounted, but with rifles substituted for lances and swords. That is a grotesque travesty of my view. I based my views of saddle-fire rigidly and cautiously on the recorded facts of war, making full allowance for the exceptional skill on horseback of the Boer riflemen, and pointing out that saddle-fire was an optional accessory to, not an essential of, the mounted rifleman's charge. I pointed out that in South Africa, except in the very rare cases of a hot and close pursuit of mounted men by mounted men (as at Boschman's Kop), it was a case of *unaimed* fire, producing marked moral effect and appreciable physical effect, but that the terribly destructive mounted rifle-charge, whether used by the Boers or our own men, as we know it from the records of the war, was in no way dependent for its success on saddle-fire. On the contrary, it was dependent for its success on aimed fire after the act of dismounting, whether actually among the enemy or (as in most cases) within a more or less short distance of him. After all, within reasonable limits, what does the distance

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matter? What is an accurate magazine rifle for if not, in its character as a missile weapon, to overcome distance in a way that the *arme blanche* cannot overcome it?

The revolver (as I also pointed out) is a different matter. It can be used by trained men with freedom and accuracy from the saddle, and I believe that in those very rare cases where it is necessary to fight sitting on horseback the revolver would be a far better weapon than the lance or sword. But whatever we think about saddle-fire, the case for the *arme blanche* is made no better by decrying the rifle. At present the rifle-charge, as a proved, known, frightfully efficacious *fact*, holds the field. Yet, for all we know, science may soon eliminate all mounted ' charges ' in any form, except by way of complete surprise, by making it impossible physically to get a horse through a fire-zone into close quarters. Still there remains the rifle, ' which rules tactics,' and the immensely enhanced sphere given to it by the mobility of the horse outside the actual zone of fire.

Permit me, sir, one more word. General von Bernhardi repeatedly throws scorn on what he calls my ' speculative ' and ' theoretical ' opinions, though it must be known to everyone who has read my book that every proposition I advance, whether it be right or wrong, is directly based on a mass of unquestioned evidence from modern war. I have not gone an inch beyond the facts. His own case is different. On page 5 of his Introduction to his book of this year he dismisses all wars, ancient and modern, with the exception of the American Civil War of 1861-65, as presenting a ' total absence of analogy ' for the modern student of Cavalry tactics, and, after explaining why, he says : ' There remains, then, nothing for us—with no practical war experience to go on—but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from *theoretical* and *speculative* reflection.' He proceeds to do so, and very remarkable the result is. It could scarcely be otherwise, seeing that he wholly ignores the only wars in which the modern magazine rifle has been used and allows himself to forget that the American rifle of 1861-65 is now a museum curiosity. This is all the stranger in that he begins his book by saying that ' it was first and foremost the improvement in the firearm which wrought the transformation in the battlefield ' and made imperative those radical reforms which he is now pressing upon his own national Cavalry.

But if I once began on the amazing tangle of self-contradictions and self-refutations which characterise his last work even more strongly than his earlier work I should never end. May I add just this? He politely obliterates my humble personality at the beginning of the article I am criticising by saying, *inter alia,* quite gratuitously, that I ' am naturally devoid of all war experience.' Well, sir, it had never occurred to me till I read those words that my own war experience had any bearing on this controversy. I have never referred to it or argued from it. I have been content, as a historian, to rely on evidence. But, since the point is raised, let me say to General von Bernhardi that I, in common with some hundreds of thousands of my countrymen here and in the Colonies, have had the very war experience of which he, as a theorist about modern war, stands bitterly in need. We have seen the modern magazine rifle at work. We have had ocular demonstration of the ' transformation it has wrought on the battlefield,' and I say without hesitation that on this vital, fundamental point the experience of the humblest

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trooper, driver, or foot-soldier is worth more than the ' theoretical and speculative reflections ' of an officer, of however high standing in peace, who has never seen proved in war what forty years of scientific research have done for the perfection of the firearm, and who declines to study closely the evidence at our disposal because it presents a ' total absence of analogy.' This officer, as his recent work shows, has not even taken the trouble to find out how we Britishers, whether Cavalry or mounted riflemen, use the rifle and horse in combination. If he had, he would have saved himself from at least some of the astounding blunders and solecisms which distinguish his chapters on fire-action; blunders and solecisms which place fire-action in such a ridiculous light that his own countrymen reject with amusement the very lesson he is trying to teach them, and which only, I conjecture, escape ridicule in England because they are ignored in favour of the author's ' speculative ' views on shock.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

ERSKINE CHILDERS.

TAIL-DOCKING

In early English times agricultural work was chiefly done by oxen, yoked or brow-hitched.

In mid-English times much of agricultural harnessing was by hitching to the horse tail. Arthur Young (1776) found the practice existing in Ireland. The tail would, of course, get lacerated, diseased, sometimes even pulled off. Thus docking (that is, shortening) may first have come into vogue as beneficent surgery.

1.

These docked horses could not then be harnessed to the plough in the primitive way. They could still be used for pack work, baronial war, knights' service, chivalry, &c. Hence short tails may have come to be looked upon as more courtly and less agricultural.

Again, as the country in the Middle Ages was unfenced and in a state of open common, the habit of borrowing and stealing the use of horses was easier than now; but knights' horses would have to be protected from agricultural misuse. An odd way to protect them may have been to remove the tails of such as had not already lost them by ill-usage.

Thus the faster horses might come to be indicated by and associated with mutilation. So persistent is association that the writer remembers having a few years ago to make a mental endeavour to prefer whole tails, like that on King George's horse, to the stunted, useless, indecent, inartistic things like that on the German Emperor's horse.

The adjective ' smart ' is akin to the German *Schmerz*, pain. It means the good appearance consequent on painstaking.

The word is now affectedly used in cases where no pains have been taken.

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Yet in some vicarious sense 'smart' may certainly be used of docked horses likely to suffer fly persecution in stable and paddock for their life period of thirty-five years following the initial pain. Think of thirty-five years of pin-pricks! The initial pain would in comparison be very small.

We have now in the twentieth century entered on a curiously reversed phase.

The best *riding* horses, the racehorses, the troop horses, the 'riding horses and ponies suitable for hacking or park work, Class 76,' at the Olympia Show, 1910, are unmutilated in the tail.

2.

It is the hackney and fast *traction horses* that wear a stumpy badge to advertise their undoubted merits. Clearly the reason for this change is that tail-hitching has been relegated to savagery; that land is nowadays fenced; that horses for the most part are found to do their work and keep their health best when unmutilated; but that there is a real danger of accidents to life and property where the tails of fast traction horses get entangled with the reins.

In the Appointment Class, No. 57, at Olympia, 1910, judged by one English, one American, and one Continental judge, the winning pairs, owned respectively by Mr. Walter Winans and Mr. W. A. Moore, of New York, had stump-tail 'appointments.'

It is the rein danger, then, that is robbing horses of their 'first aid,' their 'first line of defence' against winged vermin, parasites, cold wind, and rain.

The illustrations show the tails of three horses that took part in the funeral procession of our late King.

1. King Edward's charger. The 'banging' is suggestive of conformity to army discipline.

2. Our present King's horse, the best civilian model.

3. The German Emperor's horse, a favourite which was taken on the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and might fitly have been dedicated to Baal-ze-bub, the sometime 'God of flies.' Notice that the knife docking is deliberately emphasised by up-to-date scissor work!

3.

A fallacy—still rampant, I believe, in Essex—that short traces mean much easier work probably contributes to the mischief. The rise of a kindred fallacy is explained by Sir Walter Gilbey's 'Early Carriages and Roads' (Vinton), pp. 86 and 87. Major Dwyer, in 'Seats and Saddles,' fourth edition, p. 231 (Whittingham), well said: 'If one or two feet more in a carriage trace could possibly make such a difference against the horse, as is pretended, what must the last waggon of a train that is 100 yards long do to an engine?'

And let us not forget that the horse-dealer achieves selling you your optical illusion (strong hind-quarters) at an enhanced price for a damaged article!

W. G.

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SOME NOTES ON PADDOCKS FOR INDIA.

The use of paddocks in India for turning out to rest horses of all conditions, is rapidly becoming quite a common practice. Why such a beneficial treatment has not received more wide acceptance is difficult to account for, as India, of all countries with its trying climate and hard going, peculiarly calls for some system where nature should be requisitioned to assist in alleviating many of the evils incidental to the artificial life led by the domesticated horse. In the hope that still wider use may be made of this natural rest cure, the writer sends the following :—

Most people who keep horses in India have roomy compounds, and often a great deal of the space therein is never used for anything. My first injunction to every horse-owner who possesses such a compound is to convert as much of this spare space into paddock as possible.

To do this one can employ a goodish variety of material, but the two chief ones are wire and bamboo. It is useless giving cost as prices vary so greatly. In places you can procure bamboos for the asking, in others they are unobtainable. Again, the cost of bringing wire from Bombay or Calcutta to any considerable distance makes the wire variety expensive. It generally resolves itself into using the local product whatever it may be.

There is no necessity to erect a sort of bullet proof palisade, it is astonishing how flimsy a fence will serve the purpose, and to save making it unnecessarily high the following expedient will be found valuable. Taking the height of your fence at 3½ feet, dig a small trench all round the inside of it at a distance of about 4 feet. This trifling obstacle prevents any animal jumping over or running into the fence. It prevents him jumping the fence, as just where he wants to take off he finds an inconvenient foothold, and it likewise keeps him, so to speak, at arm's length if he has any sudden inspiration to charge it.

As a rule, in an Indian paddock one is obliged to feed the animals. The feed should be of the very lightest, such as four or five pounds of bran a day with the usual hay and lucerne (the more of latter the better).

A good system of feeding two or more horses is that in use at the Ahmednagar Remount Depôt. An ordinary sheep feeding-trough kept off the ground by a wood frame. When the paddock is not in use the trough can be brought in or used in some other paddock, it can also easily be cleaned. It has been found by experience that it is necessary to tie up each horse when feeding, as otherwise the greedy pushers get too large a share. If the reader will refer to the sketch a simple and effective method of tying up the horse is shown. The piece of wood marked X is provided in order to prevent the animal getting his feet or



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legs tied up in the rope—an important consideration with young Australians. An ample supply of water must be arranged for.

Horses should be turned loose in the paddock with a head-collar or rope-halter on to enable them to be easily secured, especially when feeding.

From the day a horse is turned out till brought in again he should not be touched with any grooming implement.

If grooming is resorted to, it will mean jhouling up at night and high feeding, and thus two-thirds of the benefit of the treatment will be thrown away. This is a far more important point than many horse-owners have any idea of.

Experience has shown that if a horse is turned out in a paddock and regularly groomed he will fall away even if kept on a good feed, whereas, if grooming is dropped, feeding can be dropped.

If there is any choice of sites, try and avoid ground which, in rainy weather, may become a quagmire. Black cotton soil is particularly bad in this way although excellent at other times. The higher and more convex a site, within limits the better, as the surface water drains off.

Also avoid heavily-timbered sites; it is better to run up chupper shelters for protection from the sun and rain than to have too many trees about. A few are very welcome but by no means essential. If a shelter is erected it is well to divide it into two or three open stalls, as sometimes one comes across a selfish horse who plants himself in the middle of your chupper shelter and takes up too large a share of it. If wire is obtainable at a cheap rate, have no scruples about using it, the Remount Depôts have miles of wired-in paddocks. There is no danger in mixing Australian mares and geldings, but it is unwise to add to them Arab or country-bred ones, it often leads to kicking.

Arab and country-bred entires generally hit it off pretty well amongst themselves. I have seen fifteen of such animals feeding peacefully out of the same trough day after day. This may perhaps be contrary to accepted belief in India, but for those who doubt it let me recommend a visit to the Ahmednagar Arab breeding establishment.

It is surprising how beneficial are the effects of a three-months' rest cure in a paddock of even small dimensions, and it is unquestionable that such a cure would often obviate the necessity for blistering and firing or treating the many other ills to which the domesticated horse is heir to. Every cavalry regiment should have a large roomy paddock at its disposal at regimental Headquarters —grass farms are often too far away. One syce can easily look after ten or twelve animals, and much saving in grain and grooming would accrue from their more universal adoption, without any decrease in a unit efficiency for war.

For Regiments which do not send away their horses with their furlough men, the question of grooming in the off season is one of life's little worries, in fact, what with remounts, shooting, and various other similar occupations, one is often hard put to it in the matter of grooming Might not a wider use of the paddock as above suggested help matters?

For impecunious subalterns due for eight months' leave to England there is no more economical or safe method of dealing with two or three animals one cannot, or does not, wish to part with. On return from England the string will be found rejuvenated and healthy, and, to boot, with the minimum expenditure of cash

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MECHANICAL HEADS AND POSTS.

Advantages.—1. To prevent fatigue-men being called for to adjust objects pointed at, and thereby losing instruction or prolonging the time taken by the ride at this particular exercise.

2. To ensure that the point delivered is of sufficient strength to penetrate and the objects pointed at giving the natural resistance of an opponent.

3. The effort required to point off the ball balanced by its own weight (about three ounces) used in the present system is not of a sufficient serviceable nature to give the individual under instruction an idea of the force and grip required when successful in an attack.

4. The cost of this new track would in the end be much cheaper, give greater satisfaction to the pupils and more time for instruction.

The post is an iron tube from 4 to 6 inches in circumference, with a leather cap about 6 inches deep from the top. The head has a small chain or flexible wire passed through it, and fastened with a staple at the top. The end of the chain or wire (about 5 or 6 feet in length) has a counter-balance weight (*a*)



FIG. 1.



FIG. 2.



FIG. 3.

working down the tube. At the point of balance of the chain or wire (centre) is a small (*b*) toggle, which prevents the head from overbalancing the weight (fig. 1). On the point being delivered correctly, the head will be removed on the point of the sword, and when the force of the point is removed or the rider has passed the post the head will return to its former position.

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Instead of a ring, a disc working with a (*c*) swivel movement on the arm, so that it can revolve (fig. 2). On the point being delivered the disc spins round and then rights itself ready for the next man's run.

The low point at the ball. This is half a ball on a wooden platform; attached to the platform is a (*d*) spiral spring, the length of which is equivalent to the other half of the ball. The lower portion of the spring is attached to an (*e*) iron circle which has four (*f*) peg-holes, so that it can be pegged to the ground (fig. 3). On the point being delivered the ball is pushed towards the ground. If sufficient force is used—*i.e.*, enough to penetrate a man and his clothing if lying on the ground—the ball will go down and resume its former position when the force of the point is removed. This gives a good registration of the force of a man's point.

Automatic Tent Peg.—The front (*a*) platform is about 18 inches long and 6 inches wide, with two counter-sunk holes for fastening in the ground with pegs. Slightly below the surface (*b*), hinged to the end, is the upper portion of a tent-peg slightly inclined and working with a flat (*c*) spring fastened to the under part of the platform and running up the back of the peg (fig. 4). On the peg being struck it will lie flat on the ground, and on the weight of the lance or sword being removed will resume its former position. This is only intended for dummy lance or flat-pointed practice swords, for instructional purposes.



FIG. 4.

THE ROYAL NORTH-WEST MOUNTED POLICE.

The force is looked upon as the model police force of the world, and the better one knows it the more sure he is to acquiesce in the statement, sweeping as it is. The successful development of the North-West Territories of Canada, including the Yukon, a development as yet perhaps only in its infancy, and yet a development on foundations wide and deep, that development which has covered the last quarter of a century, has been made possible by the intelligence and self-sacrifice of the Royal North-West Mounted Police.

Though the Territories hold thousands of Indians quite as savage as those south of the line, no Indian war stains the pages of Canadian history with its atrocities, thanks, very largely indeed, to the R.N.W.M.P's.

The Riel Rebellion was a rebellion of half-breeds, participated in by only a few red-skins, but it might well have spread to the Indians and caused an infinity of suffering, but for the firmness and tact of the police.

In more recent times aliens have been pouring in in their tens of thousands, many of them men quite unaccustomed to British ways and institutions, and unacquainted with British laws. These men have peopled wide areas sparsely, and yet in spite of these facts, the whole movement has gone on as regularly as clock-work, crime has been rare, hardship not often met with and contentment the rule, all this chiefly owing to the firmness of these law officers, when dealing with rough characters, and their tact in handling the ignorant among the new-comers.

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Not even when confronted with the difficult task of keeping order in that usually most lawless of all communities, a mining camp, have the police failed.

When the Yukon rush was at its heaviest, when that golden country was still in the rough, while the adventurous, numbering the always large percentage of tough characters, were flocking there from all parts of the world, the police kept order, and made life and property safer than in many of the great cities of the old and new worlds.

But these fine fellows are far more than " police " in the general acceptation of that term. They are police, administrators, explorers, soldiers, all rolled into one, to say nothing of being the guides, philosophers and friends of the settlers over a region larger than many a great empire.

When the South African War broke out the Royal Police, somewhat to abridge their title, furnished the disciplined back-bone to the splendid corps ' Strathcona's Horse," making of it one of the finest bodies for the purposes required ever formed in any part of the British Empire.

The work done and being done is simply enormous in proportion to the number employed.

The recent Governmental report shows a present strength of only 649 men, whose duties cover a field no less wide than the whole of Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Yukon, and the other territories of the Canadian North-West.

The number employed in the Yukon has somewhat decreased, owing to the lessening of the population in that country consequent upon the exhaustion of the placer mines, but it is likely again to increase, as more scientific methods are introduced, bringing in their train a large augmentation to the labouring population there.

Among the many tasks of these brave and useful men are numbered fire fighting, of the bush, the prairie and the homestead varieties ; health inspecting, including the prevention of the spread of disease by enforcing quarantine and other regulations ; game guarding in the capacity of game wardens, and constant patrol work right to the mouth of the Mackenzie, and to Herschel Island.

On the conditions prevailing among the Indians and Esquimaux they constantly report, as also on the character of different little known parts of the country, as to its suitability for settlement, etc., etc.

Necessarily very much of the time of a mounted policeman is spent in the saddle, and it is doubtful if any force in the world of equal strength could produce so many fine horsemen and horse masters. Since administration enters so largely into their duties, education is a *sine qua non*, and the men make their reports in a way at once business-like and scholarly.

The head of the Department at Ottawa, is Lieut.-Col. White, and his chief man in the field of operations is Commissioner Perry. Both men have spent a fairly long lifetime in the Force, and it is largely owing to their ability and energy that it enjoys its splendid reputation.

When the history of Canada since Confederation comes to be written, many of the early chapters will have to be devoted to the achievements of these noble men, who help the weak, control the strong, and carry themselves with the modesty that always characterizes true heroes.

The Canadian Military Gazette.

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THE 16th. LIGHT HORSE MOUNTED CADET REGT., CANADA.

It may be of interest to know that there exists in Canada to-day an organisation known as the '16th. Light Horse Mounted Cadet Regiment,' which is attached to the 16th. Light Horse. (Canadian Militia).

The first squadron was raised by Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Gwynne C.O. 16th. Light Horse, during the year 1908 as a Nursery to 'D' squadron 'Grenfell,' and has been trained entirely by that officer; the second squadron was raised at Brodview about two months later and the whole of the original or Grenfell Squadron and part of the second squadron went into camp for one week in 1908. The Cadet Corps at Moosomin was taken over by the 16th. Light Horse and attached to 'A' Squadron; in 1909 a squadron of Mounted Cadets was formed at Wolseley and shortly another one at Indian Head.

During the month of August, 1910, a Camp was held at Grenfell of 14 days duration; the whole of the Grenfell Squadron and one troop of the other four squadrons were in attendance.

The daily parade state showed a strength of 178 Cadets and horses.

The Indian Head Troop rode into Camp a distance of 45 miles, and rested one night on the way.

The Moosomin Troop, being about 75 miles distant, proceeded by rail.

The O.C., 16th. Light Horse (Lieut.-Colonel Gwynne) was Camp Commandant, the Adjutant of the Regiment and also the Regimental Sergt.-Major were on the Camp Staff, other officers and N.C.O.'s. of the Regiment took it in turn to assist at the Camp.

The Regimental Sergt.-Trumpeter and Hospital Sergeant also attended, and a Civilian doctor attended to any sickness of the boys. Everything was done according to the very latest sanitary arrangements for Camps of Instruction; incinerators &c., being used.

The cooking arrangements were looked after by the Regimental Sergeant-Cook, and the ordinary field ovens used.

The ordinary routine at Canadian cavalry Camps of Instruction was carried out, except that every Cadet fired not less than ten rounds of Gallery Ammunition daily. Three Eslade targets were in use and proved a great success.

Mounted parades of 1½ hours duration were held daily, both in the morning and afternoon. After parade the boys were instructed in semaphore signalling and first aid to the wounded.

The Cadets were instructed in elementary musketry and triangular method of aiming drill, &c.

The Grenfell Squadron is thoroughly grounded in its work.

A sub-target gun was set up in Camp, and was used to decided advantage.

The Cadets had their own Regimental teamsters and did the teaming work in Camp and brought all provisions &c., to Camp.

On Sunday a large church parade was held which was attended by all Cadets not on duty, together with their Civilian friends.

There is a chapter of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire in connection with the 16th Light Horse, the members of which took great

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interest in the boys and gave a Cavalry sword for the best shot amongst the larger cadets; and the Children of the Empire a sword for the best shot amongst the smaller cadets. The shooting was extremely good.

The lines were laid out according to regulations for Cavalry, and exceedingly well kept.

Since Camp it has been decided by Lieut.-Colonel Gwynne to organise these five independent squadrons into the 16th Light Horse Mounted Cadet Regiment, with headquarters at Grenfell. The O.C., 16th Light Horse is *ex-officio* Lieut.-Colonel commanding the Cadet Regiment; the Quartermaster and Assistant Chaplain are in their same capacity for the Cadets, and the Adjutant of the Regiment superintends the work of the Cadet Adjutant.

The idea of the O.C. is to have Mounted Cadets at every place where there is a troop of the Regiment.

The Troop Officer of the Regiment is responsible to the O.C. 16th Light Horse for the drill and handling of Regimental Cadets at his point.

It is apparent that the Boy Scout movement has a difficult task before it in parts of the country where the Mounted Cadets exist, for the Mounted boys are taught Signalling, First Aid, Riding, Shooting, &c.

The Mounted Cadets carry swords on the saddle, mounted; and it is anticipated that, before long, a Rifle of 22 Calibre will be issued which will be carried on the saddle as was the old Cavalry Carbine. The Rifle at present in use is too heavy for the boys to handle when mounted.

The uniform consists of khaki jacket, riding breeches of same material, khaki putties, straw hats (for Summer) turned up on one side, with yellow puggarree, spurs, sword belts, and swords (Cavalry).

The 16th Light Horse Mounted Cadet Regiment is the first Cavalry Cadet Regiment in Canada, and it would be interesting to know if there are any others at present in the British Empire.

It must be remembered that the Cadet Organization is now part of the Regiment, and that the Regimental Cadets are trained entirely by Officers of the 16th. Light Horse.

Many of the cadets have taught their horses to lie down while they are on their backs; they then fire (blank ammunition) over them. They have copied this from their older brothers in arms, as it is a daily occurrence at Camp to see two or three squadrons 16th. Light Horse, firing over their horses which they have made lie down.

The O.C. Regiment hopes to have a large Mounted Cadet Camp this year.

At present the Military Authorities permit the use of tents, blankets, camp equipment &c., from ordnance stores, but the freight and other expenses must be paid from Regimental funds, which comes rather high.

It is understood that, hereafter, satisfactory arrangements will be made whereby expenses pertaining to the holding of this and other like camps will be paid from public funds.

Too much praise cannot be given to Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Gwynne for his untiring efforts in organising and maintaining the Mounted Cadet Corps of his Regiment.

It is hoped that the excellent example he has set will be followed by other officers Commanding Regiments of Cavalry in Canada.

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CAVALRY SCHOOL, SAUGOR.

Bridging Operations.

Swimming Horses.

Swimming Horses.

Bridging Operations.

Native Officers & N.C.Os

Hasty Demolition.

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

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THE KING'S BIRTHDAY.

The King's birthday will be celebrated in London and at all home stations on Saturday, May 27. At all other stations his Majesty's birthday will be kept on Saturday, June 3, the King's actual birthday.

THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONAL CAMP AT ALBANY, NEW SOUTH WALES

By Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Legge

The Introduction of Universal Training in Australia—the actual training for which will commence on July 1 of this year—required that the warrant and non-commissioned officers of the (permanent) instructional staff should be increased from 229 to 429.

These non-commissioned officers are obtained from the existing permanent and Militia forces of Australia, by competitive examination. They require special instruction themselves before taking over their duties, and, therefore, the 200 new Instructors were sent to this camp of instruction for training under the most expert officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers of the instructional staff. The training, which lasted five months, from August 1910 to January 1911, included Light Horse and Infantry drill and tactics, physical drill, musketry, topography, and signalling. All instructors are required to train either Light Horse, or Infantry, or both.

During part of the school 224 " area officers " attended for six weeks. These are citizen officers, who are paid an allowance of £150 per annum for carrying out certain administrative duties in their spare time. They were six weeks at the camp.

Sixty government horses were provided for the training, temporary stables being erected for them.

The commandant and chief instructor of the school was Lieut-Colonel G. L. Lee, D.S.O., who commanded the N.S.W. Lancers, the first contingent of Australians to arrive in South Africa.

From the copy of the Defence Act with recent amendments introducing universal training, the first lot of special regulations on the subject and printed notes of some lectures delivered by myself at the Albany camp, a general outline of the new scheme can be obtained.

This scheme will result in the existing eighteen Light Horse regiments being increased to twenty-eight. Although the increase is not as large as in other arms, due to the fact that universal training is at first applied only to towns, and country in this neighbourhood (Melbourne), the later extension of the training will eventually result in a very large increase in the Light Horse.

Registration for universal training began on January 1, and it is interesting to note that already about 150,000 lads are on the books.

The accompanying views are photographs of the special instructional camp, and it will be seen that the future working uniform of Australia consists of cord breeches, khaki woollen shirt, hat, and leggings.

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INDIA

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief lately inspected the Cavalry School at Saugor and expressed himself most favourably on its condition. He saw the students at work, at Equitation both on trained horses and on remounts, also at hasty demolitions, bridging and swimming horses.

NATAL

The affiliation of the Natal Carbineers with the 6th Dragoon Guards marks a distinct advance in the linking of Colonial Corps with the regular regiments of the British Army. It is, moreover, the first occasion on which such affiliation has taken place with one of our cavalry regiments, and the first time that such alliance has been cemented with any regiment in British South Africa. Six regiments of British Infantry have now for some little time past been allied with corps in Canada, Australia and Nova Scotia; and the fraternal bond now created between colonial and Imperial cavalry regiments leads us to hope that the system may be still further developed. In the first instance it was suggested that the Natal Carbineers should be linked with the King's Colonials, but the matter was then allowed to drop; and it was, we understand, on the initiative of Sir Matthew Nathan, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Natal, that the suggestion was put forward that the senior mounted corps in the Colony should be affiliated with the 6th Dragoon Guards (' The Carabiniers '). Correspondence led to a complete agreement, the consent of the War Office was asked for and obtained, and the approval of His Majesty King George V. was freely given. This seems an example which may well serve for other regiments to follow, for such relationships can only be mutually beneficial to the regular and irregular forces; each can learn much from the other, and closer union and more intimate communication will be warmly welcomed and operate towards increased efficiency. The units of the old-established army of the mother-country have learnt to know and appreciate the martial spirit of our colonial kinsmen; regular and irregular regiments, horse and foot, have fought side by side, and before the memory dies out of the dangers and privations shared in a long-protracted war, it would be well if the example now set was followed up and our regiments at home and beyond the seas were themselves to form the links of the chain which binds the Empire together.

FOREIGN

Austria.—The subdivisions of machine guns in the cavalry now number 197 permanent and 102 temporary, and it is this year proposed to increase these by the formation of 8 more permanent and 46 temporary subdivisions.

Belgium has never experienced any difficulty in obtaining sufficient remounts for her artillery from her own resources, but has always been obliged to draw upon foreign countries for remounting her cavalry. Of late years Belgium has depended upon middle men for the supply of suitable four and five year-olds from Ireland; some 80 remounts are bought annually for each cavalry regiment, 1200 fs. being the average price paid for remounts for the two regiments of Guides and 1100 fs. for those intended for the cavalry of the Line. It has now been decided to send a remount commission annually to Ireland to buy cavalry remounts for the Belgian service.

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Denmark.—The army is for the future to be administered on principles of total abstinence. A decree of the Minister of War has just been promulgated forbidding henceforth the sale and consumption by soldiers of spirits, wines, or of beers containing any proportion of alcohol, either in barracks, camps of exercise, or any other place under military jurisdiction.

France.—How to add to the number of cavalry divisions so as to place the French cavalry on something approaching a numerical equality with that of Germany in case of war, is a problem which continues to exercise the minds of all French army re-organisers. A writer in *La France Militaire* recently puts forwards the suggestion that all mounted companies of the Train should be done away with, and the officers, men and horses be transferred bodily to the cavalry. The author of this proposal—General X—contends that motor traction has completely displaced horse-drawn vehicles and that any necessity for mounted men with the Trains has now disappeared. They might now well supply two cavalry squadrons to each infantry division for employment as divisional cavalry, permitting the cavalry now thus employed to join cavalry divisions. Readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL will recognise what grounds there are for the contentions of General X— from noting the probable reductions in the horse companies of our own A.S.C. consequent on an introduction on a wider scale of mechanical traction behind our armies.

France.—The Report on last year's mobilisation exercises points out that as regards the horses requisitioned for the use of the troops, while the draught animals were wholly suitable the saddle horses were *insuffisants comme dressage et comme résistance.* It is recognised, however, that this is a drawback inseparable from animals thus obtained and one which cannot be overcome.

Germany.—At this year's Imperial Manœuvres a cavalry force, of not less than a division, will be attached to each of the two armies operating. Dirigibles will accompany the divisions, and a number of the officers now undergoing a course of instruction in aviation at Döberitz will also attend.

The experimental lances, of which mention was made in the last number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL as having been recently issued for trial by certain regiments, and which were made with a 'stop' a short distance below the point, do not appear to be found altogether satisfactory. It is thought that the 'stop' is likely to prevent the thrust being sufficiently effective.

Italy.—In continuation of the information already given in these 'Notes' in regard to the augmentation and fresh distribution of the Italian Cavalry, it is notified that the headquarters of the Frioul cavalry division will be at Udino with one brigade, the other being divided between Pordenone and Treviso. The headquarters of the division in Venetia will be at Vicenzo, one brigade being distributed between Vicenzo and Padua, the other between Ferrara and Bologna. The headquarters of the Lombardy division will, with one brigade, be at Milan, the other being distributed between Parma and Lodi.

Switzerland.—To the different journals specially concerned with cavalry may now be added one started last January and which is published at Zurich on the 10th and 25th of each month. Its title is *Der Schweizer Kavallerist* and the subscription is 5 fs. per annum.

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SPORTING NOTES

POLO.

The Army Polo Committee for 1911 is as follows: Brig.-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, President, and ten other members in addition to the inter-regimental sub-committee of three, viz. Major T. T. Pitman (11th H.), Major P. B. Cookson (1 L.G.), Major Romer Lea (20th H.), and Major Barry, Hon. Secretary. Besides Major-General Sir H. Rawlinson, Brig.-General the Hon. J. E. Lindley, Brig.-General E. Phipps-Hornby, V.C., Brig.-General Hon. C. Bingham, and Col. Kenna, V.C., the Committee includes four Commanding Officers, namely, Lieut.-Col Kirk (2 D.G.), Lieut.-Col. Miller (R. Scots Greys). Lieut.-Col. Milner (5th L.), Col. H. de la P. Gough (16th L.).

This year the Army Polo Committee will have four seats on the Hurlingham Polo Committee viz, General Kavanagh, General Sir H. Rawlinson, Capt. Sadlier Jackson (9th L.), and Major Pitman (11th H.).

An important change has been decided upon by the Hurlingham Club Polo Committee, viz. the suspension of the off-side rule for one year in all tournaments and matches played at Hurlingham. Other clubs are invited to try the experiment during the ensuing season. This movement arises from the approaching visit of an English team to America, with the hope of regaining possession of the International Polo Cup, as the off side rule is discarded under American rules, and also to discover practically the debated point as to whether it is for the good of the game or not.

Many claim that Polo with no off-side is a far better game, that it makes it faster, more scientific, more exhilarating to play in, less severe on ponies, and infinitely better to watch.

The question of the severity on ponies is much debated, and the Hurlingham Club announce that it is extremely likely that they will alter the periods of play; at present we play in periods of ten minutes each, whereas the Americans with no off-side play in periods of six minutes each. Towards the end of the year the Hurlingham Committee will meet to further consider the question, and the opinion of other clubs on this matter is cordially invited by them.

The recent form list has now been formally abolished, and its place taken by the Hurlingham Polo Handicap list. New members of the committee have been elected in Mr. F. Hargreaves representing the County Polo Association, Major T. T. Pitman, representing the Army Polo Committee, and Captain J. Hardress Lloyd representing the all Ireland Polo Club.

The British team to endeavour to regain the America Cup is practically settled and the players will reach America before the end of April. The players selected are Captain Leslie Cheape (K.D.G.s), Lieut. E. W .E. Palmes (10th Hussars), Lieut. A. Noel Edwards (9th Lancers) and Captain F. W. Barrett

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(15th Hussars), Captain Hardress Lloyd being the Captain. It will be noticed that this is entirely a Cavalry team and all the players have had good practice with their Regiments serving abroad during the past winter months. The great interest taken by His Majesty King George in Polo has been evidenced by his receiving the players at Buckingham Palace preparatory to their departure and wishing them every success, in which we heartily join.

Abroad.

The final in the All India Tournament at Allahabad was between the 10th Hussars and the Scouts resulting in a victory for the former by seven goals to three. Teams :—10th Hussars : Col. J. Vaughan, Capt. Hon. A. Annesley, Lieut. E. W. E. Palmes, and Lieut. W. L. Palmer (back). Scouts : Messrs. Burnham, Colmore, Hoare and Capt. Barrett (back). Ten teams competed, including the 17th Lancers, who were beaten by the 10th Hussars in the best game of the tournament by four goals to three after extra time.

The Lucknow Autumn Tournament for the Royal Dragoons Cup was won by the 17th Lancers who in the final beat the Scouts by five goals to nil. Lancers team : Capt. R. W. V. Bruce, Capt. T. P. Melville, Lieut. H. B. Turner, and Capt. V. Lockett (back).

In the Cooper Allen Tournament at Cawnpore eight teams competed. The final was between the King's Dragoon Guards and 10th Hodson's Horse, resulting in a win for the former by four goals to one.

The final of the Sealkote Tournament, in which eight teams took part, resulted in the Gymkhana A beating the 19th Lancers by four goals to nil.

For the Rhodes Cup Polo Competition played at the Rand, South Africa, eight teams competed and the final was between the 15th Hussars and Government House team ; the former won by eight goals to one. In this final match Major Tewson took the place of the Duke of Westminster in the Government House team, as the latter had to leave for England.

The Indian Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament at Meerut was competed for this year by the 10th Hussars, 13th Lancers, the Royals, the Inniskillings, the K.D.G.'s, the Rifle Brigade and the Guides, owing to an accident to Major Mort the 8th Hussars decided to scratch. They were an exceptionally fine lot of teams and after many close matches the final lay between the 10th Hussars and K.D.G.'s. The former won by seven goals to three and so carried off this coveted Cup for the fifth time in succession. Teams : 10th Hussars—Capt. Hon. A. Annesley, Capt. W. O. Gibbs, Lieut. E. W. E. Palmes, Lieut. W. L. Palmer (back), K.D.G.'s.—Lieut. L. H. Hawkins, Lieut. G. A. Wienholt, Capt. L. St. G. Cheape, Major H. F. Wickam (back).

The Indian Subalterns Regimental Tournament was played at Umballa this year. In the final the 2nd Batt. The Rifle Brigade beat the 17th Lancers by seven goals to two. The Lancers had previously beaten the 10th Hussars by five goals to two.

The final of the Lucknow open Tournament between the King's Dragoon Guards and the 2nd Rifle Brigade was won by the former by seven goals to one. After the game Lady Hewett presented the Cup.

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RACING.

Soldiers' riding has been greatly encouraged by some clubs holding valuable races at their meetings confined to the Army and Navy. At the Hurst Park February Meeting the Club gave such a race, value £500, viz., the Naval and Military Gold Cup, a 3-mile steeplechase, 11st. 7lb. with penalties and allowances. Seven started for this race, which was won by Mr. D. McCalmont's Ballymadum (owner), by three-quarters of a length from Mr. E. P. Brassey's Barbed Head (owner), with Capt. Paynter's Red Scot (owner) third. It was a fine race, ably ridden by Mr. McCalmont. Unfortunately, in the race Mr. Simon's Dustman, ridden by Mr. H. B. Escott, fell and seriously injured Mr. Escott's back. An operation has been successfully performed, and we earnestly wish him a complete recovery.

The Newbury Race Club most generously gave a two-day meeting in honour of the Services with reduced prices of admission On the first day the Services Selling Handicap Steeplechase (7 runners) was won by Mr. C. Berwicke's Blunderbuss (owner). In this race Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby's Diamond Hill made a bad mistake and shot him out of the saddle, but by a wonderful piece of dexterity he got back on to his horse and was only beaten a head for second place. The United Services Cup, a valuable 2½-mile handicap steeplechase of £500, secured 11 runners, and was won by Mr. W. McNeill's Sentry (Capt. V. Beatty), with Mr. H. Hartland's Baddi, 2nd, ; and Capt. L. S. Denny's Rustic Queen, 3rd.

The Military Maiden Steeplechase only secured three runners, and was won by Mr. F. Bibby's Irish Oak, with Capt. G. P. O. Springfield in the saddle. On the second day the United Services Hurdle Handicap, for which 9 ran, was taken by Major J. D. Edwardes's Wavespray (Mr. Phipps-Hornby riding), with Mr. King's Servitus (Capt. Springfield), 2.

The Army and Navy Handicap Steeplechase was won by Col. M. Lindsay's Apex, on whom Mr. M. Parbury rode a capital race ; the Lurcher, with Mr. Walwyn up, being 2, and Mr. McCalmont's Ballymecoll (owner) 3.

The United Services Hunters' Cup, a 3-mile steeplechase, was won by Mr. W. Macneill's Foolhardy (owner riding), with Mr. E. P. Brassey's Wardstown (owner), 2.

The Grand Military Meeting at Sandown this year was more popular than ever ; the attendance exceeded the previous best ; good fields, and some capital racing was witnessed. The chief event, the much coveted Grand Military Gold Cup, was a popular triumph for Mr. D. McCalmont, and he deservedly received a great ovation on passing the post, a good winner on Vinegar Hill. In this race Captain Paynter most sportingly carried 12 lb. overweight in order to ride his own horse, Red Scot, and finished third. No amateurs have worked harder than Captain Paynter and Mr. McCalmont to perfect themselves in steeplechase riding, both have brought many winners first past the post, and are accomplished horsemen. The big event of the second day, the Grand Military Handicap Steeplechase, was another extremely popular win for Capt. H. Brassey's Blue Hussar, which was well ridden by

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Mr. F. Brassey. Other winning riders at the meeting were Mr. Walwyn, another hard-working amateur, Mr. C. Sykes, Mr. E. Leatham, Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby, and Captain C. Banbury. Details :—

FIRST DAY.

SELLING STEEPLECHASE of 92 sovs.; second received 5 sovs. Two miles.

Capt. Holland's b c STORMCOCK II., by Missel Thrush—Philippize, 5 yrs, 11st 10lb.....Mr. Walwyn 1
Capt. Denny's b g BLUNDERBUSS, aged, 12st 3lb .....Mr. C. Berwicke 2
Mr. E. Brassey's br g YONDER, aged, 11st 12lb .....Owner 3
Capt. Denny's The Chemist, aged, 11st 12lb .....Capt. Springfield 4
Capt. C. N. Newton's Sexton, aged, 12st 3lb .....Owner 0
Capt. Paynter's Honey II., aged, 12st 3lb.....Owner 0

GRAND MILITARY GOLD CUP (Steeplechase) of 395 sovs. Three miles.

Mr. McCalmont's b or br g VINEGAR HILL, by St. Aidan—Phœnix Park, 6 yrs, 11st .....Owner 1
Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's b g VIZ, aged, 11st .....Capt. Springfield 2
Capt. Paynter's b g RED SCOT, aged, 11st (car. 11st 12lb) .....Owner 3
Mr. J. Astor's Schwarmer, aged 12st Owner 4
Mr. E. Brassey's Barbed Head, aged, 11st 7lb .....Owner 0
Mr. Parbury's Ruby Light, aged, 10st 7lb .....Owner 0
Capt. Phillimore's Siberia II., aged, 10st 2lb .....Mr. F. Duggan 0

Starting Prices: Evens VINEGAR HILL.

The Race: Vinegar Hill took the lead at the first fence, and though Ruby Light deprived him of it over the third and fourth obstacles the favourite soon raced into the lead again, being followed by Ruby Light, Viz, and Schwarmer, with Siberia II., jumping slowly, soon beaten off. Barbed Head made a bad mistake at the water, and refused at the stand fence, Vinegar Hill coming on with a useful lead of Ruby Light, who fell at the half-journey. Viz then went on second, and put in some strong work to reach Vinegar Hill, but without avail, for although the favourite blundered at the final obstacle he made a smart recovery and won easily by two lengths; a bad third. Schwarmer was close up fourth. Time, 6 min. 37 sec.

PAST AND PRESENT HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 127 sovs.; second received 15 sovs.; third, 5 sovs. Two and a half miles.

Mr. C. Sykes's ch g WAND, by Wiseman —Ashtwig, aged, 10st 7lb ....Owner 1
Capt. Holland's br h WORM PECKER, 5 yrs, 11st .....Mr. Walwyn 2
Capt. Denny's br m RUSTIC QUEEN, aged, 10st 12lb ....Capt. Springfield 3
Mr. H. B. Escott's Dustman, aged, 11st 2lb (car. 11st 4lb)..Mr. V. Simon 4
Capt. C. N. Newton's Flax Field, aged, 12st 1lb .....Owner 5
Mr. McCalmont's Johnstown Lad, aged, 12st 2lb .....Mr. Thornton 0
Sir R. Filmer's Tory Democrat, aged, 11st 8lb (car. 12st) .....Owner 0
Mr. MacNeill's Sentry, aged, 11st 4lb Capt. V. Beatty 0
Mr. C. P. Stedall's Ilovit, aged, 10st 8lb Owner 0

Ten to 1 against Wand.

The Race: Sentry quickly took charge, and made play from Rustic Queen, Worm Pecker, and Johnstown Lad, with Flax Field next, and Ilovit and Tory Democrat the last pair. In this order they ran for a mile and a quarter, where Sentry fell, leaving Rustic Queen with a ten lengths lead of Worm Pecker, Flax Field, and Wand, the latter of whom gradually closed on the leaders, and challenging over the final obstacle, showed the better speed on the flat, and won by four lengths; three lengths divided second and third. Dustman was fourth, Flax Field fifth, and Ilovit tailed off last.

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MAIDEN HUNTERS STEEPLECHASE of 68 sovs.; second received 20 sovs., and third 10 sovs. Two and a half miles.

Mr. E. Leatham's b g THE AIRSHIP (pedigree unknown), aged, 11st 4lb ..... Owner 1
Capt. Godman's br m MARCH BROWN III., aged, 11st 9lb ..... Owner 2
Mr. R. Beech's b g KATERFELTO II., 6 yrs, 11st 9lb ..... Owner 3
Mr. M. Graham's Rubicon III., 6 yrs, 11st 9lb ..... Capt. Lawson 0
Mr. B. Jackson's Highgate, aged, 11st 4lb ..... Owner 0
Capt. C. N. Newton's Naseby, aged, 12st ..... Owner 0

SECOND DAY.

THE UNITED SERVICE SELLING HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 137 sovs. Two miles.

Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby's br g DIAMOND HILL, by Berrill—Odious, 6 yrs, 10st 4lb* ..... Owner 1
Capt. L. S. Denny's br m THE TIGRESS, aged, 10st 10lb* .... Capt. Springfield 2
Mr. H. W. Ethelston's b g ROMAN KNIGHT, aged, 10st 5lb ..... Mr. J. B. Foster 3
Capt. C. Noel Newton's Sexton, aged, 10st 9lb (car. 10st 12lb) ..... Mr. R. Rowley 0

* 5lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

The IMPERIAL CUP (an open handicap hurdle race) of 825 sovs., including a cup value 50 sovs. to the winner. Two miles.

Mr. Sol Joel's ch c BENDY TREE, by Persimmon—Bendy, 4 yrs, 11st 4lb (inc. 10lb ex.) ..... J. Hare 1
Mr. C. T. Pulley's ch c HIMAN, 4 yrs, 11st 9lb ..... G. F. Butchers 2
Mr. Stoke's b g PEREGRINE PICKLE, 5 yrs, 11st 4lb ..... T. O'Brien 3
Mr. F. S. Watt's Black Plum, aged, 12st 7lb ..... W. Earl 4
Mr. W. Donald's Temnos, 5 yrs, 12 st 3lb (inc. 10lb ex.) ..... F. Morgan 0
Mr. A. Stedall's Combermere, 5 yrs, 11st 13lb ..... S. Walkington 0
Mr. G. A. Prentice's Montreal, 4 yrs, 11st 12lb ..... A. Anthony 0
Mr. A. Stedall's Orquil, 6 yrs, 11st 3lb ..... J. Dillon 0
Mr. C. R. Thompson's School Bat, 6 yrs, 11st 3lb ..... G. Wilson 0
Mr. H. D. Johnson's Master Tredennis, aged, 11st 3lb ..... W. Payne 0
Lady Torrington's Elstead, 4 yrs, 10st 13lb ..... Isaac Morgan 0
Mr. A. Fitzgerald's Nelson, 6 yrs, 10st 12lb ..... Owner 0
Mr. H. Reynolds's Perseus II., aged, 10st 10lb ..... Mr. S. J. Bell 0
Mr. E. Tanner's Billy the Verger, aged, 10st 9lb ..... R. Chadwick 0
Mr. H. Bottomley's Forerunner II., aged, 10st 9lb ..... L. C. Jones 0
Mr. C. Melville's Algy A., 4 yrs, 10st 5lb ..... F. Mason 0

20 to 1 against Bendy Tree.

After a couple of breaks away Peregrine Pickle came past the stands in front of Elstead, Combermere, Nelson, and Billy the Verger. School Bat, Montreal, Algy A., and Bendy Tree forming the next division, whilst Temnos brought up the rear. In the back stretch Billy the Verger took up the running from Elstead, Peregrine Pickle, Combermere, and Nelson, Perseus II., Algy A., Bendy Tree, School Bat, and Black Plum being the most prominent of the others, whilst Montreal had now dropped into the rear. Making the turn past the pay-gates there was a general scrimmage, and Nelson, Algy A., Orquil, Montreal, and Perseus II. all fell. Between the last two flights of hurdles Himan took the command from Bendy Tree. At the last flight Combermere came to grief, and Bendy Tree, challenging on the flat, won a good race by a length from Himan. Peregrine Pickle was third, half a dozen lengths behind the second; Black Plum was fourth, Elstead fifth, School Bat sixth, Billy the Verger seventh, Forerunner II. eighth, Temnos ninth, and Master Tredennis last. Time, 4 min. 8 2-5 sec.

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The GRAND MILITARY HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 224 sovs. Two miles and a half.

Capt. H. Brassey's b g BLUE HUSSAR, by Actor—Ohana, 5 yrs, 11st 2lb (car. 11st 4lb) .....Mr. F. Brassey 1
Mr. D. McCalmont's b h BALLYMADUN, 5 yrs, 11st .....Owner 2
Mr. E. H. Wyndham's br g ANOTHER DELIGHT, aged, 12st* .....Owner 3
Capt. G. Paynter's R.I.C., aged, 11st 10lb (car. 11st 11lb) .....Owner 0
Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's Warner, aged, 10st 6lb .....Capt. Springfield 0
Capt. T. Godman's Kennilworth, aged, 11st 8lb .....Owner 0
* 5lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.
7 to 1 against BLUE HUSSAR.

Warner made play from Another Delight, Kennilworth, and Ballymadun, with R.I.C. whipping in. The leader came to grief at the third fence, and Another Delight led past the stands from R.I.C. and Kennilworth, Blue Hussar now being last. A mile from home R.I.C. fell, and Ballymadun and Blue Hussar came on together. The former had a slight lead over the last fence, but Blue Hussar challenged on the flat and won cleverly by four lengths. Another Delight was third, half a dozen lengths behind the second, and nothing else finished. Time, 5 min. 30 3-5 sec.

The TALLY-HO STEEPLECHASE of 68 sovs.; 12st. each, with penalties and allowances. Three miles.

Mr. E. H. Leatham's b g THE AIRSHIP (ped. unknown), aged, 12st 2lb* Owner 1
Capt. C. Noel Newton's b g DOWNPATRICK, aged 13st 7lb Capt. Paynter 2
Mr. Malise Graham's RUBICON III., 6 yrs, 11st 9lb* .....Capt. Lawson 3
Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's Kineton, aged, 13st 7lb .....Owner 0
Capt. C. Noel Newton's Naseby, aged, 11st 9lb* .....Mr. R. Rowley 0
Capt. Noel Newton declared to win with Downpatrick.
*5lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

The ARMY AND NAVY STEEPLECHASE of 88 sovs.; weight for age, etc. Two miles.

Capt. E. Christie-Miller's b g SIR PERCY, by Pride—Belle Demoiselle, 5 yrs, 11st 5lb .....Capt. C. Banbury 1
Capt. G. Paynter's b g GENERAL TAYLOR, aged, 12st 8lb .....Owner 2
Mr. R. Gore's ch g BAHADUR, aged, 11st 12lb* .....Mr. S. Murland 3
Mr. A. G. Glenday's Bank Balance, aged, 11st 7lb .....Owner 0
Capt. R. H. Collis's Mighty Ocean, aged, 11st 12lb .....Owner 0
Mr. D. McCalmont's Counterpoise, 4 yrs, 10st 5lb .....Owner 0
* 5lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.
3 to 1 against Sir Percy.

Bank Balance fell at the first fence, and the next proved fatal to the chance of Counterpoise. Mighty Ocean settled down from General Taylor and Sir Percy, and this order was maintained for about a mile, at which point the leader dropped back, and left General Taylor in front of Sir Percy, who challenged on the flat, and won a fine race by a neck. Bahadur was third, four lengths behind the second. Time, 4 min. 20 sec.

The National Hunt Steeplechase, run for this year over a capital course at Cheltenham, was a record race. Despite the heavy-going and stiff course no less than thirty-eight faced the starter, and of these seventeen completed the course, and about thirty could have done so. It was a most sporting race, and was won by Capt. F. D. Gressell's Sir Halbert by Hackler (Mr. A. Smith riding). Major Purvis riding his own horse Our Philip, was second, beaten only by a neck. It was hard luck on Major Purvis, as it is the second time he has been second on his fine hunter Our Philip for this race.

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POINT TO POINT RACES.

The 55th and 56th Battalions Mounted Infantry commenced the season on January 19 by holding a meeting at Faringdon, Hants.

The Inter-Battalion Cup race in which teams of nineteen from each battalion competed was won by the 56th after a close contest.

A sweepstake for horses and chargers, the property of officers serving at Bordon and Longmoor, 12st. 7lb., about 3½ miles was won by Lieut. G. Phipps-Hornby's (Rifle Brigade) Parle. Thirteen ran.

The Inter-Battalion Cup for M.I. catchweights, owners up, was won by Lieut. P. S. Banning's (Royal Munster Fusiliers) Fanatic. Thirty-eight ran.

The officials were: Judge, Col. E. C. J. Williams, C.B., D.S.O.; starter, Major G. L. B. du Maurier, D.S.O.; Hon. Sec., Captain H. C. Jackson, Bedfordshire Regiment.

The Household Cavalry held their races at Hambleton, in the Cottesmore country, over a good course mapped out by the Earl of Lonsdale. The Royal Horse Guards race attracted twenty entries, and was won by Captain Viscount Castlereagh's Cambus More. The 2nd Life Guards race for light and heavy weights was won by Captain Newton's Silver Spring with Captain Ashton's Yeoman second, and Lieut-Colonel Trotter's Scout third. The 1st Life Guards race, catchweights over 11st. 7lb., secured seventeen starters, and was won by Captain Lord Hugh Grosvenor's Marburg.

The Brigade of Guards and 7th Hussars races took place in conjunction with the Pytchley Hunt at Holdenby, near Northampton. In the Brigade of Guards contest the Coldstreams were first, Grenadiers second, and Scots Guards third. There were twenty-one starters; Captain Banbury (Coldstreams) on Noble Boy was first, Captain Paynter (Scots Guards) on Miss Patkin second, and Lieut. G. Lambton (Coldstreams) on Suffolk third. The 7th Hussars race was won by 2nd Lieut. D. McCalmont on Carmel II.

The Open Steeplechase was won by Lieut. J. G. Lowther (11th Hussars) on Tertius.

The Pytchley Hunt Light-Weight race was won by Captain G. E. Bellville on Nero III., and the Heavy-Weight race by Lieut. E. H. Leatham (12th Lancers) on Mischief.

Owing to the heavy going there were unfortunately several accidents to riders and horses; Captain Cator in the Brigade of Guards steeplechases had the misfortune to break three ribs, and Sir M. E. Manningham Buller in the Pytchley races broke a collar bone.

The 4th Hussars races were held near Colchester. Results:

Colonel Kincaid-Smith's Challenge Cup: Lieut. A. V. W. Stoke's Susan (owner), 1.

The Garrison Cup: Lieut. C. R. Congreve's (D.L.I.) Daddy Morey (Owner), 1. Eighteen ran.

The Regimental race: Lieut. Sir J. H. Tichborne's (4th Hussars) All Gold (Owner), 1. Seventeen ran.

At the Grafton Hunt Meeting the Scots Guards Regimental race was won by Captain Orr-Ewing's Maroon (Owner), and the Grafton Hunt Open Military race by Captain W. Gibbs' (7th Hussars) Deighton (Owner).

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The 5th Royal Irish Lancers held their meeting at Glascarn, Ratoath. Results:

Regimental Heavy Weight Cup: Lieut. B. W. Robinson's Simon VI. (Owner), 1. Eight ran.

Open race: Mr. P. Rogers's Thurles Belle (Mr. Brabazon), 1.

Regimental Light Weight Cup: Lieut. the Hon. H. C. Alexander's Home Rule (Owner), 1. Seven ran.

At the Earl of Harrington's Hunt Meeting the South Notts Hussars' Regimental Cup was won by Sergt. Harrison's Blue Boy (Owner). At this meeting there was a ladies' race in which nine ladies competed, and Miss Elnor, on Marvel, won by twenty lengths.

The Duke of Lancester's Own Yeomanry race took place at the Kirkham Harriers' Hunt gathering, and was secured by Lieut-Colonel R. H. Tilney's Prime Minister.

The Staff College races were held at Hawthorn Hill. Results:

Light Weight race: Lieut. E. S. Chance's (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) Mayfield Lass (Owner).

Soldiers race: 2nd Lieut. G. Osborne's (19th Hussars) Mac (Owner).

Heavy Weight race: Captain F. Cavendish's (9th Lancers) Tip Top (Owner).

The Irish Army held their races at Knocklong, Co. Limerick. Results:

Heavy Weight Cup (presented by General The Right Hon. Sir Neville G. Lyttelton, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland); weight 14 st.; about four miles.—Major H. S. Morant's (Durham L.I.) Sudons (Owner), 1 Thirteen ran nearly all with their owners up.

Light Weight Cup (presented by his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant); weight 12 st.; about four miles.—Captain J. B. George's (R.I.R.) Bectives (Owner) 1. Twenty-one ran.

The Mounted Infantry races took place near Alton, and resulted as follows:

Heavy Weight race: Captain R. Brooks-Popham's (52nd M.I.) Mallow (Owner) 1. Fourteen ran.

Open Sweepstakes: 2nd Lieut. G. R. Elliott's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Brownie (Owner) 1. Thirty-one ran.

Light Weight race: Lieut. I. S. Matheson's (Cameron Highlanders) Remnant (Owner) 1. Mr. C. G. Forsyth was unfortunately thrown in this race and severely injured.

At the Royal Artillery and R. A. (Woolwich) races held near Upminster in Essex, Colonel G. Forestier-Walker riding his own horses won both the Light and Heavy Weight Steeplechases.

The Grand Military meeting was held this year at Dunchurch, near Rugby, in conjunction with the North Warwickshire Hunt meeting. The Military Light Weight Steeplechase was won by Lord Ebrington's (Royal Scots Greys) Nell III., with Major W. J. Lockett's (11th Hussars) Castlebagot second, and Lieut. G. Phipps-Hornby's (Rifle Brigade) Countess of Cork third.

The Military Welter Weight was won by Colonel Forestier-Walker's (Royal Artillery) Ned II., with Captain Poynter's (Scots Guards) Cahirman second, and 2nd Lieut. G. R. Elliott's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Brownie third.

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The 20th Hussars' races came off at Windgates, Co. Kildare. Results:
Chargers' race (over 12 st.) Captain M. S. Richardson's The Pedlar(Owner).
Chargers' race (over 14 st.) 2nd Lieut. W. A. Silvertop's Tipster (Owner).
Open race: Mr. H. B. Alexander's Ardscull Boy (Owner).
Regimental Cup: Lieut. C. N. Keyser's Spectral (Owner). Nine ran.

On the challenge of the Cheshire Yeomanry, a team race between the Cheshire and Derbyshire Yeomanry came off on the Meynell Point-to-Point course at Ednaston, Derbyshire, the result being a win for the latter by 120 point to 78, the winning team having four competitors in first. Teams: Derbyshire Yeomanry: Captain W. S. Power, Lieut. A. H. Betterton, Captain W. Wailes Fairbairn, Lieut. J. N. D'arcy Clark, 2nd Lieut. Sir P. Brocklehurst, 2nd Lieut. P. A. Walker, 2nd Lieut. G. Winterbottom, 2nd Lieut. J. G. Johnson.

Cheshire Yeomanry: Lieut.-Col. D. Phillips Brocklehurst, Lieut. C. Tomkinson, Lieut. J. J. de Knoop, Lieut. J. V. Hermon, Lieut. D. Jarmay, Lieut. M. Kingscote, Captain and Adjt. A. Fletcher (17th Lancers).

The 4th Dragoon Guards had a most successful meeting at Ditchling, near Brighton. Results:
Welter Cup: Lieut. J. W. Aylmer's Courtown (Owner).
Open race: Mr. J. Scott's Cingalee (Owner). Sixteen ran.
Subaltern's Cup: Lieut. A. Wright's Melton (Owner). Seven ran.
Regimental race: Captain R. J. B. Oldrey's Tim (Owner). Ten ran.
In the Subalterns' Cup Sir A. Hickman's Killara looked an easy winner, but was baulked by a boy in front of the last fence with the result that Melton won easily.

The 16th Lancers' races took place near Norwich. Results:
Chargers' Cup: Captain Onslow's The Poacher II. (Owner).
Light Weight race: 2nd Lieut. Tempest Hicks' Dr. C. (Owner).
Open race: Major C. D. Seymour's Minstrel (Owner).
Heavy Weight Race: Lieut. Malise Graham's Rubicon III. (Owner).

The Staffordshire Yeomanry Challenge Cup was run for at the Atherstone Hunt meeting, and won by Mr. L. H. Hardy's Battledore (Owner).

The 1st South-Western Mounted Brigade team race between the Royal Wilts Yeomanry, the North Somerset Yeomanry, and the Dorset (Queen's) Yeomanry took place at the Blackmore Vale Hunt meeting, and resulted in a win for the Royal Wilts by two points. The first three horses past the post were Major V. O. Thynne's (Royal Wilts) Fancy Boy, 1; Lieut. G. Buxton's (Royal Wilts) Lord Mayor, 2; 2nd Lieut. L. Kennaway's (Dorset) Prawn, 3.

The 5th Dragoon Guards held their races near Noas, Co. Kildare. Results:
Subalterns' Cup: 2nd Lieut. H. de B. Garfit's Stoneball II. (Owner).
Open race: Lieut. W. M. Royston Pigott's (A.S.C.) Caesar (Owner).
Regimental Cup: Captain M. A. Black's The Spider (Owner). Thirteen ran.

The Royal Scots Greys' Challenge Cup run for at the Hereworth and Bilsdale Hunt meeting was won by Lieut. M. Borwick's Rufus (Captain Long riding).

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The principal event at the South Eastern Brigade meeting held near Ashford, was the Inter-Regimental Challenge Cup between the Surrey and Sussex Yeomanry. Fifteen started, and although Sussex had two horses placed, Surrey retained the trophy they won last year. Lieut. A. I. Scott's Cingalee II. (Sussex Yeomanry) came in first, with Lieut. F. G. Coleman's Warrior II. (Surrey Yeomanry) second. Other events :—

Open race : Mr. G. H. Hoar's Poultry (W. H. Lane).

Ladies' Cup : Major W. J. Lockett's Castle Bagot (Owner).

Brigade Challenge Cup : Trooper H. Marsu's Snowflake (Owner).

The South of Ireland Inter-Hunt Cup for teams of two from packs in the South of Ireland was a sporting affair. Team placings : Black and Tan, 1 ; Duhallow, 2 ; Clonmel Harriers, 3.

RUSSIAN OFFICERS AND RACE MEETINGS

This translation of Russian Army Order No. 669, dated December 17, 1910, may be of interest to readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. It shows the desire of the authorities to encourage active habits among officers.

The committee of race meetings include in their programmes for each year a certain number of races for ' gentlemen ' only in which it is desirable that cavalry officers should take part.

There have hitherto been no proper regulations regarding leave for this purpose, and so it has occurred that while some officers take an active part in the races others frequent not the races but other popular establishments found in large towns of a totally different character and in no way connected with cavalry sport.

In such circumstances commanding officers have refused leave, and not without cause, to their officers for the purpose of attending race meetings ; and this form of sport, useful as it is for our cavalry, has showed signs of decline.

In order to make it possible for officers of cavalry to take an active part in race meetings without detriment to their military work, His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to approve the following rules :

1. Officers commanding cavalry regiments and batteries of horse artillery will furnish a report to their district headquarters showing the officers desirous of attending races who can be spared without detriment either to their own training or that of their unit.

2. The final decision as to granting such leave of absence will rest with general officers commanding districts.

3. Stewards of race meetings will report to garrison commandants the names of officers attending the meeting who do not take part in the sporting events. Such officers will at once be ordered to rejoin their units.

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RICHMOND HORSE SHOW.

Jumping always popular, is to to a stronger feature than ever at the Richmond Royal Horse Show, to be held on June 9 and 10 next. Some very attractive classes are being arranged. In addition to the many valuable money prizes, his worship the Mayor of Richmond (Alderman Clifford B. Edgar, J.P.) is kindly presenting a very handsome Coronation Challenge Cup, of the value of one hundred guineas, to be awarded to the champion jumper. There can be no doubt that such a valuable prize will attract keen competition and provide a display of horsemanship of a very entertaining character.

FOOTBALL.

RUGBY

The final for the Army Rugby Cup took place at Twickenham between the 1st Leicestershire Regiment and the 2nd Life Guards. Amid much enthusiasm the Leicesters won by two goals and two tries (15 points) to nil. The Guards had the weight but the Leicesters were quicker and more skilful in the scrimmage, and their backs superior.

H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught received the two captains and presented the Cup and medals. Others present included Prince and Princess Alexander of Teck, Maj.-Gen. Sir C. F. Hadden, Lt.-Col. Ferguson, Lt.-Col. Croker, Sir Edward Ward, and Brigadier General Davies.

The fifth annual match between officers Royal Navy and officers of the Army was played at Queen's Club resulting in the Army obtaining their first win by 2 goals and 4 tries (22 points) to 2 goals and a penalty goal (13 points). It was a grand game and the Army owe their victory to their superior scrimmaging and excellent half-back play.

Teams :

Royal Navy : *Lieut. G. H. D'O. Lyon ; Midshipman F. C. Peet, Lieut. G. C. C. Royle, Lieut. Guy D. Millar, and Engr.-Lieut. G. D. Campbell ; Mid. F. E. Oakley and Asst.-Constructor W. J. A. Davies ; Lieuts. *N. A. Wodehouse *S. Burgess Watson, A. H. Bissett, G. S. Brown, R. H. T. Raikes, Sub-Lieut. C. R. Peploe, and Lieuts. *C. H. Abercrombie and W. F. Wake-Walker.

Army : Lieut. B. C. Quill (Queen's Regt.) ; *Lieut. W. C. Wilson (Leicestershire Regt.) ; Gentleman Cadet R. F. Simson (R.M.A., Woolwich), Lieuts. J. N. Thomson (R.F.A.), and *J. T. Simson (R.A.M.C.) ; Second-Lieuts. H. Gardner (R.F.A.) and J. A. Pym (R.G.A.) ; Capt. W. S. D. Craven (R.F.A.), Lieuts. *W. E. Mann (R.F.A.), *H. C. Harrison (R.M.A.), *L. Robertson (Cameron Highlanders), R. P. G. Begbie (R.G.A.), C. A. S. Carleton (Welsh Regt.), J. D. Bowie (R.A.M.C.), and Second-Lieut. A. P. L. Griffith (R.F.A.).

Referee : Mr. V. H. Cartwright (Rugby Union Committee). Touch-judges : Eng.-Lieut. E. W. Roberts (Navy) and Capt. J. Rainsford-Hannay (Army).

* Signifies an International.

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ASSOCIATION

The Cavalry Cup

The Second Round resulted as follows :

3rd Dragoon Guards 5 goals—4th Dragoon Guards 1 goal. (A previous game having been drawn—3 goals each).

11th Hussars 9 goals—9th Lancers 1 goal.

19th Hussars 3 goals—2nd Dragoon Guards 1 goal.

Byes : 4th Hussars, 5th Lancers, 20th Hussars.

Semi-finals :

19th Hussars 2 goals—11th Hussars 0.

3rd Dragoon Guards 3 goals—20th Hussars 0.

The Final :

3rd Dragoon Guards 1 goal—19th Hussars 0.

In tempestuous weather this match was played before a good crowd on Wednesday, April 5, at Craven Cottage, Fulham. After about half-an-hour's play, Forrester, the centre-forward of the Dragoon Guards, scored, amidst much enthusiasm, the solitary point of the game. There was, unfortunately a serious accident shortly before half-time, owing to the treacherous nature of the ground, Stewart, the Dragoons' left full back, slipped in a charge, and fractured his leg. Though, perhaps, the quality of the game did not reach a high standard, it was fast, interesting, and keenly contested throughout.

At a Committee Meeting of the Army Football Association at Wellington Barracks, Major R. Ford, D.S.O., A.S.C., in the Chair, the resignation of Captain E. F. N. Urquhart as Hon. Secretary of the Irish Army Football Association was reported, and his successor, Capt. B. de Hodge, Royal Fusiliers, was elected to the Committee in that capacity.

Egyptian Shield. The final of the football association for the large units shield was played at Abbassia between the 4th Rifle Brigade and 3rd Coldstream Guards, the former winning by one goal to nil. Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Maxwell presented the shield to the winners.

Throughout the season, great interest has been taken by all ranks in the competition for the London Territorial (Association) Football Cup, many keen games having been witnessed. The final is arranged for Saturday, April 29, when " The Rangers " meet The Honourable Artillery Company, at the Herne Hill Athletic Ground. A closely contested match is fully anticipated.

ASSAULT-AT-ARMS

The Burma Divisional Assault-at-Arms was held at Mandalay where a huge programme was satisfactorily carried through. Events were competed for by British Troops, Native Troops, and the Military Police. The events comprised tent pegging, riding and jumping, foil, sabre, bayonet and gymnastic competitions. At the conclusion Major-General E. S. Hastings (Commanding the Mandalay Brigade) addressed the troops and Colonel C. J. W. Grant, V.C. (92nd Punjabis), distributed the prizes.

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BOXING.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards who have done so much for boxing gave a splendid tournament at Aldershot recently, at which over 2,000 spectators including Major-General Robertson and most of the officers in the garrison were present. Major W. Sykes was the popular M.C. and hon. Secretary, and under his direction many good contests were fought and much skill exhibited.

In India the Bangalore Tournament occupied over a fortnight. The 14th Hussars and O. Battery, R.H.A., tied for the cup for the best regiment in the competitions.

RACQUETS.

There were nine entries for the Military Championship played as usual at Prince's Club, Knightsbridge, this year. The class was well up to the average, and after many good contests the final rested between the 2nd Batt. Yorkshire Light Infantry, represented by Capt. A. C. G. Luther and Mr. C. E. D. Kemp, and the 12th Lancers represented by Capt. B. Macnaghten and Capt. A. B. Reynolds. The former won by four games to love (60 aces to 31). Scores: 15—6, 15—8, 15—6, 15—11. Whereas the Lancers played below their best form the Yorkshires played up brilliantly. The Yorkshire Light Infantry had then to play the holders, the Army Service Corps, represented by Major J. Puckle D.S.O. and Capt. A. Berger, for the Championship. This was a most exciting match in which the Yorkshires led off by scoring three games to love. then Captain Berger seemed to find his game and coming into fine form the Army Service Corps won the next four games and retained the Championship, Scores: 7—15, 5—15, 12—15, 15—5, 15—11, 15—6, 15—6. (84 aces to 73).

For the Singles Championship there were seventeen entries.—

In the semi-final round Capt. A. C. G. Luther (King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) beat Capt. B. Macnaghten (12th Lancers) by three games to love.

Capt. H. C. Richmond (Gloucestershire Regt.) beat Capt. A. A. Mercer (Devonshire Regt.) by three games to love.

In the final round Capt. Luther beat Capt. Richmond by three games to one and so won the Singles Championship for the first time. Scores: 15—12, 15—2, 13—16, 15—8 (58 aces to 38).

THE ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

The Committee are issuing new rules and regulations. The principal one is that the Territorials are eligible to enter for the Regular Army Competitions as far as individuals are concerned.

The rules for fencing have been revised. The old heads and posts competition has been altered; the cavalry sword being now adopted for thrusting only, the new competition is a dummy thrusting one, five dummies, four upright and one recumbent, and all bearing targets indicating vital parts, presenting themselves for attack.

Finally the riding and jumping competitions for N.C.O.s and men have been greatly stiffened, with a view to bringing them into alignment with the officers competition.

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HOCKEY.

The third annual match between the Royal Navy and the Army was played at Aldershot in miserable drizzling rain which made the ground very heavy. It was a good close match but thanks to the fine play of Lieut. Pattison the Army won by 3 goals to 1.

Oxford University easily defeated the Army at Oxford by 6 goals to 1.

The all-India Tournament played at Allahabad drew 17 entries. The final between the North Western Railway Volunteers and the 4th Worcestershire Regiment resulted in a win for the former by three goals to none. Lady Stanley presented the Cup to the winners.

The South India Army Tournament final at Bangalore produced a hard match between the 61st Pioneers from Secunderabad and the 81st Pioneers, the former winning by one goal.

In the Alderson Tournament final at Poona for the Native Army the 110th Mahrattas beat the 12th Pioneers by 2 goals to 1, and for the Regular Army the 2nd Leicesters beat the Royal Engineers by one goal after a splendid game.

CANADA

We have received the following account of sport in Canada :—

The Royal Canadian Dragoons had an exceptionally successful year at polo, in 1910.

They did not suffer defeat during the entire season, and won no less than four Championship Cups, the foremost of which was the " International Gold Challenge Cup ' (open to Canadian and American Polo Clubs). Others were the ' Canadian National Exhibition Challenge ' Cup ' (open to Canadian and American Polo Clubs). ' The A.O. Beardmore Challenge Cup ' (open to Canadian Clubs) and the ' Sweney-Bickford Cup.' The team was an exceptionally strong one and consisted of Captain D. D. Young, No. 1, Captain van Straubenzee, No. 2.—Major J. H. Elmsley, No. 3, and Lieut.-Colonel V. A. S. Williams, A.D.C., Back.

During the latter part of the season Colonel Williams was severely injured while at practice and was obliged to retire from the game for the balance of the season, his place being well taken by Lieutenant and Adjutant, J. H. MacBrien, R.C.D.

It is not known how strong the team will be this year, as three of its members will not be available, viz., Colonel Williams, on duty in England, Major Elmsley, Staff College, Camberley and Captain Young, transferred. Captain McMillan has rejoined the Regiment, from D.A.A.G. for signalling, and he is rated as a first-class player.

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It is understood that a team from Strathcona's Horse, Royal Canadians, stationed at Winnipeg, will send a team to compete in the various Tournaments in Eastern Canada. They are considered a strong aggregation and well mounted.

It is a question whether there will not be a very strong Military Team from Canada in England this year, what with Colonel Williams and Major Elmsley of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Colonel Meighan of Montreal and Major Ross of Calgary all there, (these players being the strongest players in Canada). It would be interesting to see how they would compare with the English Regimental Teams—of course, the ponies are the stumbling block for a Canadian team.

It had been anticipated that the United States Cavalry would send their best team to Canada to meet the Royal Canadian Dragoons for the 'International Cavalry Polo Challenge Cup' presented by Colonel Meighan of Montreal. In fact, such a match had been arranged; but at the last moment the Americans decided that they were unable to send a team.

The cricket teams have re-organised for the coming year, all Regimental and Station teams had a very successful season in 1910, the team of the R.C.R. at Halifax having had an exceptionally good year.

The team from Strathcona's Horse (R.C.) Winnipeg, were very strong and will be even stronger this year; they should have won in their league but were unfortunate in losing two or three of their best players just at the critical moment.

The Stanley Barracks team only lost one match during the year, but were not entered in any league, only playing friendly games.

The Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery, Quebec, had a good team, and showed up well in all their matches.

The Regimental and Station football teams entered in all leagues throughout Canada were most successful; especially so was 'A' squadron, R.C.D.'s team who won the 'Intermediate Championship' of Canada, not only winning their own district league but winning in the play off for the Dominion Championship.

The teams at Stanley Barracks, Toronto, R.C.R. Halifax and R.C.G.A. Halifax were successful in winning in their respective leagues, where they played as seniors.

Ice Hockey is played at nearly every station in Canada, especially so at Winnipeg, Toronto, St. John's, Quebec, Halifax and Fredericton, where they have very good teams. Most of the men are strong skaters and good stick handlers.

At each station there is a station league composed in some cases of six to eight teams. There is generally a cup played for, which is placed in the Sergeants' Mess for the year or in one of the Reading rooms. At each station there is generally an officers' team, but in some cases they are no match for the men; however, it is interesting to know that very many of the officers join with the men in all games and assist to promote sport of all kinds.

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YEOMANRY WINTER TRAINING

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(*Commanding the Notts and Derby Mounted Brigade*)

THE instructive article by Colonel the Hon. O. Lumley, lately commanding the 1st South Midland Mounted Brigade, on the training of a Territorial mounted brigade, which appeared in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL a year ago, dealt almost exclusively with the period of annual training in camp, which, as he pointed out, practically consists of only eleven working days.

It has been suggested that a few observations on the wider and more debateable subject of the possibilities of instruction during the winter, might also be of service; and it is obvious that, whereas even the best of management is afforded little scope during the few days of annual training, a far wider door is opened by the organisation of even slender opportunities spread over all the rest of the year.

Colonel Lumley's article dealt chiefly with the Yeomanry, and it is the training of this branch which chiefly requires improvement. The other units of the mounted brigades have the advantage, from the lack of which the Yeomanry suffers far more than is realised, of having in each case an exact professional model to work to—an apparently unrecognised, but absolutely indispensable, condition for the satisfactory training of Territorial troops; while, as no one out of a lunatic asylum would attempt to produce even a distant imitation of a horse battery without drill of the strictest kind, the Horse Artillery in particular is exempt from the effect of the destructive heresy so rife in some quarters that efficient soldiers can be produced out of civilian material without drill.

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Before suggesting, as it is necessary to suggest, that more time than is at present given should be devoted to military work by the officers and men of the mounted brigades, it must be frankly admitted that they already do more than the bulk of the nation either acknowledges or deserves.

There is no other class in the world which does so much hard and unpaid public work of all kinds as the country gentlemen, business men, and retired officers who furnish the bulk of the officers of the Territorial Force, many of whom, as well as the majority of the men under their command, depend for a living upon their own exertions in civilian callings; while their military work, far from being adequately rewarded, on the contrary too often makes demands upon their private funds. It is work performed only as a labour of love by men whose keenness outweighs the consideration of personal loss or gain, and whose love of soldiering is in many cases a hereditary instinct, handed down from forefathers who believed that the cultivation of the arts of war and the chase were the only occupations fit for a gentleman.

But this being allowed, and justice done, it may be admitted that more than is now attempted might be accomplished, and that at any rate in the case of the Yeomanry, a far higher ideal than is at present aimed at might be attained.

The first step in effecting this would be the complete reorganisation, by means of a few simple and easily effected changes, of the whole system of the training of the Yeomanry, which at present is faulty and uneconomical in the extreme.

The winter, the only time when the country is rideable, is almost completely neglected; a few lectures here and there, and occasional riding drills, being as a rule all that any but the exceptionally energetic even attempt, while after the prescribed preliminary drills in spring, the annual summer training in camp, at the time of year most suitable for instruction in the essentials of drill, discipline, and horsemanship, is mostly taken up in the futile attempt to teach to whole regiments or, still worse, brigades, while confined to the roads and hemmed in on all sides by crops, the reconnaissance and other detached duties to which the time wasted in the winter should have been devoted.

Several of the few days' training is generally taken up in unreal sham fights, the value of which may be gauged from the fact that they are carried out by officers mostly unpractised in giving orders, and men insufficiently drilled to obey them.

These are faults, however, not of the men but of the system; and all

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that is required to correct them is the organisation and enforcement of such a system of training as would provide that instruction in detached duties and all other work that can be taught without assembling a whole regiment should be given in the winter months, the only time when scouting can be properly taught in the greater part of this country.

Not only would these duties thus be more thoroughly learned, but time could then be spared during the annual training for the mounted drill which can be taught at no other time, and without which the discipline, horsemanship, and skill at arms which are the first essentials to all Cavalry, can never be attained.

Little of this short training need then be occupied by work which could be better learned at other times; whereas if, as is at present the case, practically nothing but detached duties is there taught, the men are made in no sense soldiers, and leave at the end of the training, as they came to it, a mere mob of mounted civilians.

The unsatisfactory results of the attempt to teach reconnaissance to large bodies in enclosed country in summer is well described in Colonel Lumley's article when he says, ' Enclosures, game preserves, cultivation, &c., so restrict the area for tactical operations, even on the smallest scale, that the work is practically confined to the roads. . . . Road work enables very few men to be practised at a time, and necessitates long periods of inaction for the majority. . . . But the attractions of military life presented on a high road, with a prohibited game preserve on his right, new-sown fields on his left, and a restricted view to the front, do not inspire a man with that interest in the elementary rudiments of the profession of arms which is so highly desirable ' ; while his opinion of the amount of handiness, order, and cohesion attainable by troops who, for the sake of such practices, neglect their only opportunity of drill, is indirectly shown by the abnormal modesty of his requirement that ' the leading men should not reach the position some appreciable time before the last men arrive.'

A system of winter training therefore has a double value: first, in providing an opportunity afforded by no other time of year for the practice of scouting and other detached duties in enclosed country; and, secondly, by thereby setting free the annual training in camp for instruction in equally essential duties at present largely neglected, and which can only be taught on that occasion.

It is the case, no doubt, that in addition to the prescribed preliminary drills a certain amount of theoretical instruction is already given in

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winter and early spring, and when given by officers who are really keen is often of real value, but it requires more imagination than the rank and file generally possess to fully grasp theories which Territorial soldiers so seldom see exemplified in practice; neither are officers exempt from the weakness which theory without practice entails, as aptly expressed in the quotation from Willisen on the cover of the 'Cavalry Staff Ride of June 1909.' 'There is always a great difference between knowing how a thing ought to be done, and being able to do it.'

But if to theory is added monthly practice in the field, new life is given which works a complete revolution in the course; personal experience, rivalry, and adventure illuminate every lesson, and discussion after action resembles rather the narration of the incidents of the hunting field than the dry lectures of untested theory.

To secure this result, and to counteract the natural tendency of every Englishman to declare that the carrying out of such an innovation is impossible, it must be admitted that a more complete organisation and a closer touch than is customary between officers, non-commissioned officers, and men is required.

The best method of effecting this is the subdivision of every squadron or troop into local sections, grouped according to locality, and each under the command of a non-commissioned officer living on the spot, whose duty it is to keep in touch with the men of his section and instruct them in all duties throughout the year.

This organisation should be emphasised by every man being given a printed roll of his section under the name of its commander, and the whole being carried out under the supervision of the troop leader and squadron commander, the system affords facility for instruction of every kind, and especially for looking up men able to take part in the monthly exercises in minor tactics, reconnaissance, and the training of scouts.

The interest of these is greatly increased if they are framed in accordance with a general idea issued in October, a scheme dealing with one of the functions of Cavalry being worked out every month, followed by a lecture and discussion on the result, each exercise being varied according to any advantage gained by one side or the other on the last occasion. The success of the whole greatly depends upon the care taken in the drawing up of the scheme; the assembling of men from their own homes for such a purpose is by no means such a simple matter as a parade ordered from camp or quarters, and officers who have been accustomed to draw up or work schemes under the latter conditions will find that

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calculations of time, pace, and distance must be far more carefully made for the present purpose if men are not to be set unreasonable tasks.

Officers may with advantage be asked to write appreciations before the day of exercise, but lectures are better held a day or two after, as the actual experience which has been gained in the field secures greater attention and makes less demand upon imagination.

The expense of the provision of horses is defrayed by the grant made for the instruction of mounted men, and probably varies greatly according to the locality.

In well-horsed hunting counties good work has before now been done without any allowance whatever, though the number of men who could afford to turn out entirely at their own expense was always very limited and in these days it is certain that in almost all cases the horse or an equivalent allowance must be provided.

The man also is frequently giving up a day's work to attend, but, speaking generally, it has been found that where men as a rule possess or can produce horses a sum of 5s. per man is sufficient to meet the case.

In more urban districts, however, where a much larger proportion of horses have to be hired, the expense is greatly increased: 10s. may probably be charged for hired horses, and in this case it is necessary to allow the same to every man who produces his own.

In such a district as this therefore, to take the cost at its highest, the present allowance for hire of horses permits of the instruction of fifty men from November to March one day in the field each month, leaving a surplus of £25 for instruction of recruits. This allowance is, however, now recognised as inadequate, and is being revised; and if, as is probable, it is increased by £100 or more per regiment, would provide for the instruction each month of eighty men, as well as a sum of £50 for other purposes.

It would no doubt be desirable that more men than this should go through the course, and if larger funds were available this might easily be effected. One of the Nottinghamshire regiments, in fact, one day last February turned out for practice 130 officers and men; but there are various reasons for allowing eighty to be considered a fairly satisfactory number.

Apart from the improbability of further increase in the allowance, this has been found about the largest number which under such circumstances can be satisfactorily instructed at one time in the necessary duties, it being understood that as all formed bodies should be skeleton,

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and represented only by a lance or flag per troop, every man out is actively engaged in scouting, dispatch riding, signalling, and the like, and although in theory every man in a regiment should know the whole duty of a Cavalry soldier, in practice this number of men per regiment thoroughly taught in the above duties would probably prove sufficient, and would be immeasurably more valuable than the haphazard detachments of ignorant or unequally taught yeomen upon which the force under present conditions depends.

It may be thought that it is a large claim to make for these five monthly days of practice that they reorganise the whole system of training, but this is nevertheless the fact. For, as before explained, these monthly days afford just the touch of actual experience which give life to the whole theoretical course; the study, the appreciation, and the subsequent discussion keep up the interest between one day and the next, and at the cost of these five days we get practically a training of five months, while they also to some extent supply what no amount of theoretical instruction can ever replace—actual practice in the field.

To sum up then, the contrast between the present system and that now suggested comes to this: that under the former, by the neglect of the winter, and by the devotion of the summer to what should be winter work, both seasons are largely wasted, nothing is done really well, and while the futile attempt is being made to teach the minority scouting in unrideable country with crops in every field, and the great majority of the men are loafing in main bodies on the roads where it is forbidden to move beyond a trot, the only opportunity of teaching the discipline, horsemanship, and ability to ride at speed which mounted drill can alone produce, and which are the first essentials to all Cavalry, is completely lost. Under the latter, on the contrary, not only are both seasons fully employed, but, each being used for the class of instruction most suitable to the time of year, the value of the whole training is greatly increased.

There are officers, no doubt, who will object that the Yeomanry are no longer Cavalry, but mounted rifles, that this is a branch in which a lower standard of these qualities is required, and that the present system therefore is good enough for them.

Such notions, often heard, originate in a dangerous fallacy of the kind that is apt to lead to disaster. The official instructions that the training of Yeomanry is to omit the duties connected with shock-action, are unwarrantably taken to convey the idea that the Yeomanry are likely to fight in some sort of 'second eleven' field, where such rough practices

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as charging are not allowed, and the objectionable custom in Yeomanry sham-fights of failing to assume that one side is composed of orthodox Cavalry tends to confirm the delusion.

It cannot be too fully realised that as our most probable future opponents possess practically no Cavalry that is not fully armed, it is these to which Yeomanry will be opposed and, whatever paper distribution of duty we may make, as likely as not on the same ground and under the same conditions as the regular Cavalry; and, further, that so far from any exemption from shock-action being their lot, it is certain that if there be any troops whom a foreign Cavalry officer will prefer to charge beyond any others it will be the mounted rifles.

The task therefore of the Yeomanry as mounted rifles in war will not, as the objectors think, be an easier one than that of the Cavalry: it will be more difficult. And the reason that the fallacy which pretends otherwise is a dangerous one is, that it is one of those theories which work out all right in peace but fail in war.

It *is* easier in peace to learn nothing with exactness, to move about in more or less disorder, to disregard troop-leading, horsemanship, handiness and cohesion, to pass pleasant summer days in such attempts at detached duties and tactics as have been above described, and the winter in doing nothing at all beyond a few odd lectures. But with war comes a change indeed.

For the mounted rifleman is ever fighting with one hand an opponent who has two, each the natural complement and support of the other—an opponent over whom he has no advantage in close country, and who has the better of him in the open.

He must be more wary than his enemy, for he has to guard against two forms of attack, his opponent but one.

He must have greater speed; for fire action, however effective, is at any rate a slower operation than mounted combat; while a body of riflemen can dismount, fire a few rounds, and mount again, a mounted force covers more than a furlong, and the slower nature of the operation must for success be compensated for by extra speed in the horses and smartness in the men.

He must have higher discipline if, in face of these exigent requirements, he is to sustain his *moral*, for, as Colonel Henderson says in 'The Science of War' on this subject, 'The opportunities' (of the hostile Cavalry) 'for outflanking or surprise may possibly be few, but the very fact that the enemy has both the power and the will to seek out such

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opportunities and to charge home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the *moral* of any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.'

With the reasons authority may have for assigning this rôle to the Yeomanry the present argument has nothing to do, but in face of the above facts it is at all events undeniable that those who flatter themselves that this force is thereby set an easier task than that of Cavalry are living in a fool's paradise, and that so far from its status as mounted rifles being any excuse for lowering its aims, it enforces the necessity for a vast improvement in its present training, and for a level of efficiency which, though imperatively necessary for success, it will tax its highest efforts to attain.

Nothing teaches so well as the continuous system above suggested how many details there are in the art of reconnaissance about which it is dangerous to generalise, and on which practice alone can produce the habit of correct judgment.

Take as an instance the passage from ' The Tactics of Home Defence,' by Colonel Callwell, on the meeting of hostile patrols. ' When a mounted detachment meets a hostile mounted detachment in this land of hedgerows victory will rest with that detachment which is quickest out of the saddle and ready to fire from a position at once covered and commanding. The thing must be instantaneous—the scramble to the ground, the rush to the knoll, the stream of bullets discharged while the opponents are still half on and half off their horses.'

Now if this means as it would appear to the casual reader, what is probably far from the author's intention, that the thing to do on meeting an enemy is under all circumstances to throw one's self from one's horse, and that the side which is quickest to do so wins, the matter is simplicity itself. But the smallest practice shows that this is not the case, that there is a time for all things, and that the question of when *not* to dismount, though it is one of which too little is heard, is one of the most difficult and important which the Cavalry leader has to face.

Half the regrettable incidents of which we hear result from these fine cut-and-dried theories not working out in war according to the book.

To dismount quickly is a more rapid operation than to do so slowly no doubt, but to remain mounted is quicker still !

To catch one's enemy ' half on and half off their horses ' would be satisfaction itself, but will our opponents always play up to this ? You never can trust these foreigners ! How if, never perhaps having read

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Colonel Callwell's book, they elect to act in accordance with their own regulations and, without comment, as the lawyers say, charge swiftly down upon us with the lance? Would not the boot then be rather on the other leg? Who would be half on and half off their horses then?

Yet if, instead of there being a handy knoll and a covered position, the case should be a meeting round some grassy corner with no obstruction, a short distance, a high wind, or a mist, the latter would infallibly be the situation, and any leader who in the absence of practice relies upon ready-made theories is likely to suffer the same disillusionment as befel the expert in the old sword exercise, who, on surprise being expressed at his dilapidated condition after an encounter in the Crimea, explained, 'It was all that cursed fool of a Russian. When I put up the first guard, the ignorant beggar cut "two" at me!'

Without practice, then, even the most up-to-date writing is apt to be misunderstood, and practice is what winter training can alone secure.

Their supervision of the suggested course will ensure improvement in the officers as well as in the men; but a staff tour or two in the spring and, if time can be spared, a few week-end tactical tours on a small scale for senior officers, in which officers of all the units of a mounted brigade should join, would complete a system of training which, though not put forward as necessarily the best, is one that has been attempted with some success, and which is, at all events, an improvement upon the present practice.

THE BIVOUAC COOKER.

We have just seen an inexpensive little article of interest to commissariat in the shape of a miniature grate which can be carried in the haversack or pocket and which is now being used by several Territorial units and at least one regular regiment, the commanding officers of which have expressed their high appreciation of the eminently satisfactory results. The grate's accomplishments would almost seem to be disproportionate to its diminutive size and weight—namely 18 ozs. The main object is that of enabling a man to obtain and confine a useful quantity of fire in the minimum of time under any conditions which will cook or heat the rations of from one to six men, and it appears that meat can be nicely grilled therewith. Being made of thin steel it is unbreakable and can be folded up immediately into five inches square by half-inch deep, no tools being required. For camping out and field work it seems to supply a much needed want, and we understand can be procured at most military stores.

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SOME DETAILS OF SQUADRON TRAINING.

By Major E. M. J. Molyneux, D.S.O., *12th Cavalry* (*I.A.*).

It is accepted as an axiom that the basis of all successful Cavalry training is the thoroughness of the instruction imparted to the individual squadrons. Manœuvres and staff rides are unquestionably necessary for the military education of the staff and leaders; and as ill-led Cavalry cannot be expected to accomplish anything useful, it is self-evident that the higher education of officers is a matter of the very first importance. But the equally obvious fact should not be lost sight of, that as we cannot make bricks without straw, so we cannot hope to obtain the best results from even the best led Cavalry, unless the individual instruction given be not only thorough, but all-embracing, and include provision for every contingency which may reasonably be anticipated. The rank and file learn comparatively little from manœuvres, for the sufficient reason that their leaders have then their energies and attention directed upon matters other than individual instruction.

In the most recent Cavalry training less than ever before is 'laid down' as a syllabus of instruction; although Cavalry training, to be complete, should be more comprehensive than ever. There are many details, including most of those embodied in this article, in which the efficiency of a squadron is not usually tested by Inspecting Officers. The satisfaction, therefore, which every good workman feels in knowing that his work has been thoroughly and conscientiously done, is the only inducement we have to train our squadrons in work in which they may never be tested, until the supreme test arrives. And, as even our most experienced soldiers cannot tell us with any exactitude what are the duties we may be called upon to perform in a war which may, in our case, be anywhere and against any kind of foe, I feel that no excuse is necessary for bringing to notice some details which in some cases might not be thought of, as they are not alluded to in the text books.

During the South African War, I had repeatedly to follow up Boer

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rearguards. In common with many others, I noticed with perplexity, annoyance, and admiration, the instinctive skill in the use of cover which baffled all efforts to get at the main body. A party of them, moving in loose order, would disappear over a rise or up a donga; when one endeavoured to follow up and regain touch, it was bewildering to find that they seemed to have sunk into the earth. When attempting to push on in the direction they had taken, one was met by a fire which was all the more difficult to locate or deal with from the fact that they had no recognised formation, and adhered to no fixed intervals, and were just as likely, if the ground favoured such a course, to be well wide of the flanks, as to be all together in front. If one pushed on too fast, there was every chance of having men or horses hit by the unseen fire—for they never let one see where they had got to—without result; if an attempt was made to push round a flank, one was, quite as likely as not, running up against the bulk of their rearguard, who would open fire from some position in which they could not be located, until they had fulfilled their purpose. What I more particularly noticed was that this procedure was adopted by all who could possibly be sighted by an enemy, irrespective of whether they expected the enemy to follow them or not. No part of a rearguard ever seemed to halt or take up a position anywhere where they could be seen.

I am convinced that, if sufficient time and trouble be expended on it, a degree of skill approximating to that shown by the Boers can be attained in this important duty; but I doubt whether the same intelligence is usually shown in it by our Cavalry—principally, I think, from the want of insistence upon it under all circumstances. It is only in exceptional cases that the rearmost small bodies of a rearguard to a retiring force would employ shock action: therefore it cannot be otherwise than sound to train them to become, whenever a halt is called, a chain of invisible outposts, whose strength and position are undiscoverable, located without reference to intervals, in the positions best adapted to checking an enemy by fire. This should be habitual and automatic, without an order from anyone. Where practice and training come in, are in the selection of positions where their presence will be as far as possible unsuspected, and which will fulfil the double purpose of giving protection and means of retreat to the group, and security to the body they are covering. The support behind should do the same; a rash enemy would then pay heavily for his attack, by first suffering from the fire of the unseen rearmost groups, and

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then, when they had galloped away beyond the flanks of their support on being no longer able to maintain their position, he would suffer more heavily still from the fire of the invisible support which he had never seen move into any positions. For an Infantry rearguard, such training is obviously not so essential: a very small amount of cover will hide a man on foot, and, even if in the open, he can always lie down and so give the smallest of targets. A Cavalry group, on the other hand, which halts in the open, is useless until it gets under cover: for the horse offers a perfect target. If, either from not expecting an attack, or from a mistaken idea of the importance of conforming to some formation, any group of mounted men halt in the open, then, if fired on by an advancing enemy, they not only run the risk of getting hit when halted or when scampering in confusion for cover, but they let the enemy know their exact strength and the position finally chosen, and so rid his advance of its strongest deterrent—uncertainty of their strength and location. Frequent practice, over all kinds of ground, can alone give the leader of a rearguard squadron confidence that all the little detached groups, out of reach of his orders, will do this properly. No matter how small the group, the duties within it should be definitely apportioned. If it consists of two men and a N.C.O., then one man—the horse holder, if the ground admits—should know that his whole duty when halted is to watch and keep touch with his own force, whilst the others devote their whole attention to the enemy.

There were very few occasions in the Russo-Japanese War in which formed bodies of Cavalry charged one another. It is known, however, that, on the principal occasion when this happened, the two lines of horses checked in surprise as they met, and had to be kicked together by their riders to close at a walk, thereby losing to both sides all advantage of momentum. This is only what might have been expected, unless the horses had had some special training to counteract the natural impulse to check. So far from any attempt being made to subdue this inherent tendency, it is accentuated in most armies by the ordinary manœuvre procedure of halting two lines instead of training them to close. When two lines of Cavalry meet, should one line check and the other crash into it, pace, and the moral superiority of the rushing attack, must instantaneously prevail. It did so, most dramatically, in the charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava.

The horse is the helpless slave of any habit he may be made to acquire, and cannot help charging through an opposing line if he has

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always been trained to do so on a given signal. I have found that Australian horses rapidly become accustomed to rushing through an opposing rank when trained by the following method; and I should be inclined to think that English horses would give little trouble if taken gradually. Indian country-breds, however, are far more troublesome, and a certain number of them are sure to require to be marked down for extra practice after the others have assimilated the training. With patience, every horse can be taught.

On returning from parade or exercise, when the horses have done work enough to make them disinclined to play the fool, I began by drawing up two squadrons facing one another in line at two or three hundred yards apart, with a horse's length intervals, and then making them trot through one another, then turn about, and repeat several times. The pace, after a week or so, was increased to a smart canter, and then the intervals gradually decreased to little over a yard: finally they were practiced in rushing through these small intervals at a gallop, the pace being increased on the two lines raising a cheer just before impact. The horses now know that they have to charge at top speed right through any line they meet, on a cheer being raised; and as they do it a couple of times a week, I doubt much whether any sowar could stop his horse doing this on hearing the cheer of his line, even if the sowar himself funked the impact. I cannot help thinking that a squadron so trained would ride down an opposing squadron in which no such training had been thought of.

A practice very similar to the above, is equally useful for making certain that the horses would face Infantry in extended order. One of the most dramatic episodes described in 'La Debacle' is the account of the charge of Margueritte's Cavalry on the German Infantry at Sedan. We know, moreover, that Zola was almost pedantically accurate in historical details. We read there that the French Cavalry, full of spirit and animated by a magnificent self-sacrifice, were unable to get their horses to ride down the Germans, as the frightened animals at the last moment shied off a fire which terrified them because they had never been accustomed to face fire and to consider it innocuous. We have no right to think that French horses are the only ones in which the instinct of self-preservation would have the same result. Plenty of blank cartridge is now available; and I know of no better use to which it can be put by Cavalry than in making their horses indifferent to riding over firing lines. They very soon get used to it. Dismount a troop

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or squadron in extended order, sending their horses to a flank: the remaining troops or squadrons, extended to about the same interval, then canter through them in turn, the dismounted men firing lying down until the horses are within fifty yards, then springing up and firing the last round standing—aiming high of course—when the horses are close: each rider being required to pass his dismounted opponent close enough to touch him, in passing, with his hand. Very soon all your horses will face any Infantry fire. Where a horsed battery is available, I have found a similar practice soon accustoms Australian horses to treat even Artillery fire with indifference.

I am personally strongly opposed to the idea that the shock action of Cavalry is no longer possible, or even that it is less important than previously was the case. On the rarer occasions in which it will be possible to use it, there is every reason to suppose that the psychological conditions induced by short service and the resulting want of cohesion and mutual confidence will make their opponents, looser knit and less under the controlling influence of long discipline than ever before, more than ever susceptible to a panic from a Cavalry charge. Still, there is the practical certainty that the Cavalry will be employed in fire action more frequently than formerly; the vast extent of the modern battlefield makes it certain that mounted troops must frequently be sent to reinforce a hard pressed point, at any rate until the arrival of the more slow moving Infantry, and so to stave off a disaster. It may not be the rôle of Cavalry to do this: but the General has to win, without any reference to pedantic considerations, and will employ any and every weapon in any and every way to do so, and the Cavalry cannot refuse a duty which may be quite as useful, and quite as glorious, as their traditional and more attractive function of riding at an enemy and knocking his head off. I hold, therefore, that it is our obvious duty to make the Cavalry soldier, once dismounted for fire, as perfect an Infantry soldier as possible—not merely as good a shot as the Infantry, which consummation was, not so long ago, scoffed at by old-fashioned Cavalry men as impossible—until he puts his foot in the stirrup again. For this, we have to give him instruction in the rapid and skilful selection of fire positions and perfect him in the use of cover.

One finds that quite a considerable number of men have no adequate knowledge of what constitutes cover, or, if they have, it is of no practical value to them in the field—for one frequently finds them indulging in such absurdities as huddling together behind a mud wall six to nine

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inches thick, or getting behind trees a foot or so in diameter, as cover from fire at close ranges. I make a practice of once a year taking them in to the rifle range, and ordering fire upon prepared cover of various materials and thicknesses, from one hundred yards distance. I order all old rectangular wooden boxes—these can be most easily measured—of varying sizes to be collected; the thinner the wood the better. These are filled with earth, sand, gravel, &c., one being placed in front of each target. Cover is first placed there which a bullet will go through: this is added to by smaller boxes of the same material, until a thickness is attained which affords protection. Beams, bricks, &c., are similarly treated; the men being brought up to the target after each shot and invited to measure the cover with a foot rule. I find that this fixes facts in their memory far better than lectures from a book.

For instruction in the principles which govern the selection of positions for fire, I know of nothing better than Major Swinton's 'Defence of Duffer's Drift'—if used picturesquely. Ill-educated men are usually deficient in imagination; this is particularly the case with Asiatics. The following method will be found useful:—Take a square of soft earth or sand, say five or six yards long, and on it construct the theatre of operations as in the simple map in the book; Incidentamba and Regret Table Mountain being a foot or eighteen inches high, the dongar a couple of inches deep. The spade work involved will be a pleasant reminiscence of childhood's days by the sea. Go through the first 'dream,' placing the men (represented by matches cut to scale for each man) in the actual positions. Go through the second 'dream' next day; but, before beginning, make one of the audience go through the 'dream' of the preceding day, pointing out especially the errors which led to disaster; and so on to the end. They should be encouraged to read up the text themselves. (For Indian troops an illustrated translation has been made by Major Molyneux and Jemadar Jaggat Singh; Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore.) For instilling a knowledge of the principles on which a defensive position should be taken up in the field, I know of nothing that will bring the lesson home more clearly and simply than this use of 'Duffer's Drift.' I have repeatedly had to gallop ahead and hold a position in South Africa until Infantry support arrived; any squadron may be called upon to do this. The squadron is more than likely to be scattered and involved in action before the Squadron Commander could indicate its position to each group along possibly a very wide

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front: consequently he would have to rely entirely on the knowledge and acumen of his group commanders in the selection of positions.

A well trained squadron should be able to rush up into any position and occupy it for fire action in the shortest possible time, without giving the slightest indication of its approach. Those who were in the retirement from Hussar Hill in Natal on the 14th February, 1900, will remember how admirably the pursuing Boers did this. For instruction in this kind of work I have found the following method excellent:—

Halt the squadron half a mile or more behind the position or cover which you propose to occupy for fire action by a 'rush.' Leave one trumpeter on the position, to pass on calls; ride with the other trumpeter to 600 or 800 yards the other side of the position. You represent the enemy. Then sound the 'Advance.' The squadron immediately gallops forward, opening out into extended order as it goes, so as to cover the whole position to be occupied; on arrival, each section of 4 closes in on its No. 3, who should rapidly mark down the best available cover for horses as he comes. The men, in dismounting and getting into their places to fire, should be careful to take the best cover for fire without any reference to intervals, so as not to be seen from the front. On the whistle sounding, the outburst of fire should be simultaneous. The Squadron Commander should time the whole practice, should carefully watch for the slightest exposure of the men in coming into their places, and finally ride along the position, noting and criticising the use of cover by each man, and note the positions taken by the flanking patrols, who should be detached automatically by the flank troops without specific order from the Squadron Commander, should he omit to give the order.

The formation of ambuscades by subordinate leaders is another useful practice. If one were to attempt this in war with a squadron to which the idea was new, some thick-headed men would probably give away the whole scheme. Ride out along a road where good cover and positions are to be found: when you have gone some way, tell the next senior that you will now trot on ahead out of sight for a couple of miles, dismount, and stay there half an hour; that you will then return slowly, searching the whole countryside with your glasses. His business is to lay an ambuscade for you at any point along the road from the starting point, so arranged that even with field-glasses you can see no trace of man or horse. The points to be noted in the above are:—

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(i.) That the best possible position has been selected, with covered approaches if possible.

(ii.) Absolute concealment even of look-out men, coupled with arrangements for simultaneous outbreak of fire.

(iii.) No unnecessary exposure at moment of firing.

(iv.) Unity and cohesion; no masking of fire nor danger of one portion of force firing into another, if on separate sides of road.

If your squadron does all this quite faultlessly the first time of asking, it will be somewhat surprising. On service, failure by even one man to adequately conceal himself, or a premature shot from want of full comprehension of a tactical opportunity, would render the scheme for an ambuscade abortive, no matter how excellent the opportunity and how sound the scheme of the leader. Ambuscades are still frequent in war, though theoretically they should be rare; both the recent great wars are full of examples. Cavalry, from the power which their mobility gives of turning up in unexpected places and of getting away undamaged, should always have the best opportunities.

Really serious training in the revolver for mounted use is rare. I do not know of any cheaper, more interesting, and more practical method than the mounted duel, with a distance within which it is forbidden for the combatants to approach each other, with wax bullets, as described by me in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India last year. I have now had this training in force for two years, and the improvement has been amazing. The precautions for safety, however, especially the use of the mask, blinkers, and hand-shield, should never be relaxed. Shooting with blank cartridge at air-bladders when cantering past—the bladders being on posts on right and left—is another capital practice, and very inexpensive. The revolver can be a splendid weapon in the hands of a mounted man who is a sure shot.

Another weak point, and one frequently neglected, is the delivery of verbal messages. Cavalry are a rapidly moving arm, and an officer has to dismount to write. In practice, not nearly so many written messages are sent between different portions of a mounted force on service as is the case on manœuvres. Once in the fighting line, there is surprisingly little writing done. On all manœuvres written orders are insisted on; this is as it should be, as it all tends to order and regularity, and facilitates the work of umpires by placing orders on record. But, in action, the same order, as a matter of mere hard fact,

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would probably be sent verbally; I cannot tell whether this is the case or not in Infantry, as that is outside of my own personal experience: probably not to anything like the same extent, as Infantry naturally move more deliberately. On manœuvres, therefore, by all means write the order, as directed by regulation; but make it a standing order in the squadron that the bearer of the order will give the order verbally to the recipient of it before the latter opens the envelope. The accuracy of the verbal order can thus be instantly tested by the recipient, who should be required to take a note of any material difference between the two, for the information of the Squadron Commander. This induces the greatest care in the delivery of verbal orders, as inaccuracy or carelessness are detected at once, without hope of escape. This training is, I think, specially necessary in Indian Native Cavalry, for two reasons; one being the greater excitability of the sowar, and the second the fact that very few British officers know the written vernacular well enough to write it rapidly and accurately in action.

Finally, the Squadron Commander should not omit to make provision, according to the Japanese practice, for the thorough instruction of his men in hygiene. I make it a condition of a recruit being dismissed his drills that he should be conversant with the code of health regulations which I have drawn up, based upon the Japanese instruction, as far as the latter is applicable. The instruction in this is given in the 'stand at ease' intervals of riding school or afternoon drill. For example, the squad halts, and the instructor asks something like the following: 'Leading File, do as many men usually die in war from disease as from wounds?' 'Many more die from disease, Duffadar-ji; three or four times as many.' 'Is this disease preventable, No. 2?' 'Yes, to a great extent, by strict attention to the sanitary principles which we are taught here.' 'No. 3, what would you do if your fingers were frostbitten; would you warm them at a fire? If not, why not?' &c. Until the Russo-Japanese War, it was resignedly accepted that the wastage from disease in the field must enormously exceed the proportion of those killed or disabled from wounds. We all know that the Japanese showed that it was possible, by careful training in peace, to reverse the proportions. No amount of trouble is too great to achieve this purpose. For Cavalry it is especially necessary, as, being more widely scattered, they are under less effective supervision.

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THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(Translated from an article in the *Voenni Sbornik*, February 1911, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. F. Matkovski, General Staff, Instructor at the Officers' Cavalry School, St. Petersburg.)

I.

The Necessity for Studying the Cavalry Work in this War.

In the war of 1904-05 our cavalry had a numerical superiority of more than three to one over that of the Japanese. Yet this did not save us from defeat, nor deprive the Japanese of the sweets of victory. Does this mean that under modern conditions of war cavalry is useless to an army, or does the cause of our defeats lie elsewhere?

With a view to the solution of this question we propose to examine the work of our cavalry and, incidentally, that of the Japanese, considering in chronological order its various phases as illustrated by certain specially characteristic examples.

The recently published work by the Military History Committee[1] supplies us with reliable and copious data as to facts. It only remains to draw conclusions.

We will commence with that branch of cavalry work which begins as soon as cavalry takes the field and continues almost uninterruptedly, viz.:— *Reconnaissance*, 'the daily bread of the cavalry.'

II.

Reconnaissance.

1. *General Mishchenko's mounted force at the outset of the campaign.*

The Japanese commenced hostilities on the night of the 9th Feb-

[1] *The Russian Official History of the Russo-Japanese War.* A German summarised translation is being published and two volumes of a French translation *in extenso* have already appeared. M.O. 3 (b).

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ruary 1904 by attacking our squadron at Port Arthur, but not until six days later, the 15th February, did we decide to send cavalry into Korea.

To this end General Mishchenko's 'detachment' was formed, consisting of the 1st Chita and 1st Argun Cossack Regiments, the 1st trans-Baikal Cossack H.A. Battery, and the mounted scout detachment of the 15th E. Siberian Regiment. It was decided to leave the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, belonging to Mishchenko's Brigade, to watch the coast from Pi-tzu-wo to the mouth of the Yalu, but it was left to that General's discretion to call up the regiment if the course of events at sea should permit of it.

Without waiting for the concentration of the force, two reconnoitring parties were sent on the 13th February from Wiju into Korea. One was directed on Pingyang, the other followed the coast-line. The first, covering 77 miles in a week, reached Hsia-chu-chai, where nothing was heard of the Japanese, on the 22nd February. Four days after the reconnoitring parties (*i.e.* on the 17th) the advanced guard started, composed of 3 squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kuklin, and on the 22nd February it arrived at Chyung-ju, with patrols at Pakchen. Thus these patrols were about 27 miles in rear of the independent reconnoitring parties previously sent out. The general situation of the detachment is shown in Diagram I.



DIAGRAM 1.—Situation on the 22nd February.

It was rumoured that 3,000 Japanese were approaching Pingyang. In point of fact, on the 21st February there was only a Japanese patrol at that place, and the 12th Cavalry Regiment did not arrive until the 23rd. The remainder of the 12th Division was still at Seoul.

On the 25th February General Mishchenko, having concentrated his force at Wiju, set out upon the 'search in the direction of Pingyang' which he had been ordered to carry out. Telegraphing on the 23rd Lieutenant-General Linevich had directed him to 'smash' the Japanese cavalry when he met it, and then 'resolutely to avoid disorganising our scanty cavalry at the very outset of the campaign.'

Here we may read between the lines the threadbare idea that cavalry is an expensive arm, and must be coddled. No; cavalry is too expensive an arm not to be used. It must not be spared, and it must be

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worked so that it repays with interest the sums that have been spent upon it. We say this because the caution of General Linevich, when translated into action by the still more cautious General Mishchenko, became slowness and slackness.

General Mishchenko decided to move in two echelons: the first, consisting of the Chita Regiment, reconnoitring on the front Pingyang-Gensan; the second, consisting of the Argun Regiment and the battery, reconnoitring on the flanks. The regiments took with them only half their baggage, packed in two-horse carts.

The first march was one of about 27 miles. The situation of the detachment on the 27th February is shown in Diagram No. 2.

Thus the main body of the detachment was pushed 47 miles, its contact squadron nearly 125 miles into Korea. The scattered disposition of the whole calls for remark, and was caused by the premature movement of its 'advanced guard' ten days in advance of the main body.



DIAGRAM 2.

The main Anju road runs in a narrow valley walled in by steep hills. The inhabitants were distrustful, but not hostile. The rumours as to a Japanese advance have already been mentioned.

On the 27th February the Chita squadron, on arriving before Pingyang, was received with rifle fire and retired, hearing from inhabitants that the town was held by 1,000 Japanese and that a Japanese disembarkation in force was proceeding at Chinampo. This intelligence proved correct, and the incident points to the importance of being able when reconnoitring to get the most out of a population which is not hostile.

But neither the squadron nor the whole force was to do anything more. On the 25th General Kuropatkin telegraphed from St. Petersburg, 'I am very uneasy as to the very advanced position of Mishchenko's detachment; I think that its reconnaissance having been completed, it should withdraw without waiting to be forced to do so by a superior hostile force.'

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We may point out that here we already see the *distrust* of subordinates which afterwards formed the keynote of the leading of the Army and which ruined the whole campaign.

And then in a series of telegrams on the 26th, 27th, and 28th February, General Linevich orders the detachment to return to Wiju, watching the roads to the Yalu from the south and east by means of *patrols pushed far out.* In these telegrams we notice a belief in the efficacy of *unsupported patrols* working at a distance, and we see telegraph operators sent along with the idea of connecting the patrols with Wiju. This idea is unsound and shows an astonishing ignorance of the reconnaissance duties of cavalry.

By the 7th March General Mishchenko's main body (3 squadrons of each of the Chita and Argun regiments, the battery and the mounted scouts of the 15th E. Siberian Rifle Regiment) had returned to Wiju. The disposition of the force is shown in Diagram 3.



DIAGRAM 3.

Thus the detachment, obliged to reconnoitre on three sides, surrounded itself with *reconnoitring squadrons.* In our opinion, this resulted from the disposition of the Viceroy. General Alexyeev, though disapproving of the recall of Mishchenko's detachment, did not overrule the orders issued by General Linevich, and directed that reconnaissance should be continued by means of *strong patrols* and that supply depôts, &c., should be destroyed. Then, upon the suggestion of the Viceroy's staff, General Mishchenko was ordered to regain touch with the enemy by means of patrols, which were to be supported by 3 squadrons moved up to Anju. Thus *support for the patrols had to be provided* in order to enable them to work with success.

As before, intelligence regarding the enemy was limited to that obtained from inhabitants. Only on the 7th March one of our patrols met a Japanese party at Kasan (13 miles beyond and S.W. of Anju) and scattered its horses. It was becoming clear that the whole force would have to move forward in order to gain contact with the enemy. On the 11th March, having been reinforced by the arrival of 2 squadrons of Ussuri Cossacks, it took up positions as shown in Diagram 4.

Our patrols did not go far, for on the 12th and 13th March they

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discovered the presence of Japanese posts and picquets on the line of the Chingan Han [1] (river), 8 miles from Pakchen. Here our 5 squadrons, though close to the enemy, remained inactive for three days and, as before, preferred to talk to the Koreans. On the 15th March Mishchenko himself arrived at Pakchen and attempted a reconnaissance towards Anju; but, taking only one squadron with him, he was obliged to content himself with skirmishing against a Japanese picquet without discovering anything.

We see from this that under modern conditions information cannot be gained by cunning and stratagem alone. These must be supplemented by force, and the reconnaissance must be carried out by units strong enough to fight the hostile cavalry, and even to engage the enemy's infantry. In the instance just quoted all 9 squadrons should have been employed in order to penetrate the enemy's outpost line and send out a swarm of patrols beyond it. This would have cleared up the situation at once.



DIAGRAM 4.

So for some days we stood with 9 squadrons within 7 miles of the enemy and 'were surprised at his inactivity.' The net result was that Mishchenko reported that on the 18th March there was a whole Japanese division at Anju, while in reality there were only 1 battalion, 6 squadrons, and a sapper battalion there by the 22nd.

Fearing an attack on his communications by Japanese cavalry Mishchenko decided to retire, and on the 22nd March withdrew towards Chyung-ju. Nothing more important than patrol skirmishes took place. The Viceroy was dissatisfied with Mishchenko's passive attitude, and the latter was told that he should 'seize every opportunity for energetic action against the enemy's cavalry, detailing strong parties for this purpose.'

On the 24th March the detachment was situated as is shown in Diagram 5.

Our patrols went as far as Chyung-ju and merely met the Japanese patrols. As before all our information was derived from inhabitants, spies, and a Korean newspaper. On the 27th Mishchenko, directed to

[1] Eight miles S.E. of Pakchen and immediately E. of Anju. M.O. 3 (b).

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act more vigorously, left Syonchyon for Kuaksan with the idea of executing on the 28th a 'wide' reconnaissance, and this led to the first fight of the campaign at Chyung-ju.

Thus the intervention of the Viceroy was necessary in order to secure the reconnaissance in force which should, of course, have been carried out much earlier.

Having once decided to fight, General Mishchenko quite rightly took steps to concentrate his scattered detachment.

At 10 A.M. on the 28th Mishchenko, leaving 7 squadrons at Syonchyon, marched with 6 squadrons on Chyung-ju, which proved to be occupied by the enemy with a reported strength of 1 company and 1 squadron. Our squadrons dismounted on the heights surrounding the place, and a skirmish went on for half-an-hour. Then 3 squadrons (?) reinforced the Japanese. Two of these galloped through into the village, while the third came under a cross-fire and turned back. The skirmishing went on for another hour, and then a Japanese battalion hurried up to Chyung-ju. Our squadrons thereupon retired 7 miles and bivouacked, having lost 3 killed and 16 wounded. According to accounts from Japanese sources the enemy's force, consisting of 4½ troops of the Guard Cavalry Regiment, subsequently reinforced by infantry, lost 5 killed and 12 wounded.



DIAGRAM 5.

Even here the work of our cavalry cannot be considered sufficiently energetic. For two hours on end our 6 squadrons amused themselves by skirmishing with hardly more than a single Japanese squadron. It is obvious that a resolute attack on foot, coupled with an enveloping mounted movement would have disposed of the Japanese cavalry long before its infantry came up. And how welcome this first success would have been!

On the 29th March Mishchenko retired on Syonchyon and then, acting upon 'reliable' reports to the effect that the Japanese had occupied Kusen, decided upon retreat to the Yalu. As a matter of fact there was nobody at Kusen. Considering that the best way of forestalling a turning movement is to meet it direct, the general moved 8 squadrons upon Kusen and Wiju, and 2 by the main road.

Between the 31st March and 2nd April the detachment retired behind the Yalu, and its work in Korea was over. The Japanese

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followed at a distance, and did not occupy Wiju until the evening of the 3rd April.

We have interpolated some remarks while reviewing the work of the detachment, and here we will content ourselves with enumerating the more important points.

In the first place, the *delay* which took place in sending our cavalry into Korea is remarkable. This was due not only to our exaggerated consideration for the feelings of other Powers, but also to the *defective organisation of our cavalry*. Foreseeing the possibility of war with Japan, at least a portion of our cavalry should have been got together as an independent unit and told off for work in Korea. Since this was not done, we had to resort to the makeshift, customary with us, of forming a 'mounted force.' Then we see a cautious advance and a speedy retreat, then a fresh advance followd by deliberate retirement, a third advance when demanded by the Viceroy, and a final retreat. In fact our force spent much time and energy in advancing and retiring. The reason of this was *bad cavalry leading* and divergence of view as to its employment on the part of the Viceroy and the Army Commander.

As regards *the cavalry itself,* things again were by no means right. The exhausting work of single patrols, the failure to support them, the disinclination to reconnoitre by means of fighting, all these faults must be attributed to the cavalry itself, and especially to its commander, who indeed *started service as an artillery officer*. The reconnaissance duties of cavalry have always been difficult, and under modern conditions have become particularly so. They require suitable and prolonged training in time of peace, and this neither the Trans-Baikal Cossacks nor their commander had received. The well-known German writer Verdy du Vernois says, 'Even talented cavalry commanders must have thoroughly worked-out methods.' Then reconnaissance duties are properly regularised. But in Korea, as we have seen, they were of a happy-go-lucky character. Thus the distance between the reconnoitring units and the main body of the force varied from 40 to 7 miles.

It is interesting to note that Mishchenko groped his way to a correct solution of the problem of distant reconnaissance and sent out whole squadrons, which in turn sent out patrols. But he tied down these squadrons to definite points, and consequently, when he moved forward himself, he was obliged to send out fresh squadrons on his flanks and

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rear, a course of action which resulted in the dissemination of his force.

The circumstances which led to the action at Chyung-ju, and the lessons to be derived from it, have already been touched upon.

Finally, all that the detachment could show for its work in Korea was information obtained through spies and inhabitants. And although its presence in Korea relieved us of anxiety as to the safety of our Eastern Force on the Yalu, still its work might have been much more fruitful. This was prevented by the ineptitude of its leading and the blunders of the cavalry itself. We see that in time of peace we must learn (1) to frame the problems of reconnaissance correctly, and (2) to secure unity of view as to the employment of cavalry in reconnaissance work. Then in war it will only remain to apply known methods to the particular case, and there will be no need to improvise.

2. *Reconnaissance during the period of development of the operations.*

(*a*) *Before Chiu-lien-ch'eng* Mishchenko's cavalry was aimlessly transferred to our right flank, and was consequently unable to detect the enveloping movement of the Japanese against our left.

(*b*) After Chiu-lien-ch'eng our cavalry operated in 3 groups, viz.:— Mishchenko on the right flank, Rennenkampf on the left and Samsonov covering the railway to Port Arthur.

The Army Commander was dissatisfied with its work. He required of it not only information as to the whereabouts of the enemy's advanced troops, but also regarding the strength, composition, and intentions of his forces. If the requirement last-mentioned may be considered too exacting, still we must admit that the remainder are reasonable.

The conditions were certainly against reconnaissance work. Hilly, roadless country, tracks mostly in a dreadful state from mud and frost, and, finally, the small detachments of all arms by means of which the enemy kept off our cavalry.

Still, it is impossible not to agree with the Austrian Count Wrangel, when he says that the Russian cavalry was strong enough not to shrink from attacking the companies or even battalions which formed part of the Japanese reconnoitring detachments of all arms. With pain we read the words of Captain Spaits, an Austrian ('Mit Kosaken durch die Mandschurei'), 'The Russian cavalry lacked train-

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ing, but above all it lacked willingness to sacrifice itself.' Indignant denial of this is one's first impulse, but, personally, our conscience compels us to admit it. The way to regeneration lies in frank avowal of our defects, not in cloaking them.

What we have described proves once more that nowadays reconnaissance should not be carried out by squadrons and patrols, but by strong bodies of cavalry—strong enough to open a way for their reconnoitring parties when they are stopped.

But our cavalry did not see this during the war. When reproached by Kuropatkin it was decided to send out officers, patrols on foot. But the few among these that ever came back brought no information of any importance. Nor was this to be expected, for, as we have already said, reconnaissance cannot nowadays be effected by cunning and stratagem.

(*c*) At *Wa-fang-kou* our cavalry was abreast of the infantry. Hence, although it detected the turning movement of the Japanese against our right, it did this too late. The leading was bad.

(*d*) On the other hand, at Liao-yang a dragoon brigade was rightly posted on our left flank, north of the Tai-tzu Ho, and reported in time Kuroki's turning movement and his passage of the river.

(*e*) At the battle of the *Sha Ho* we again find the cavalry badly handled. It was set to work on the left flank in hilly ground, where small hostile bodies had no difficulty in stopping it.

From the above we see how much depends upon the higher leading of cavalry. It is well said that the capacity of a leader may be measured by his handling of his cavalry.

3. *Reconnaissance before and during the battle of Mukden.*

We propose to discuss in some detail the reconnaissance work of our cavalry before the battle of Mukden, for it has been blamed for delay in the discovery of Nogi's flanking movement.

Early in February 1905 our armies were holding fortified positions on the line Ssu-fang-tai—Kao-tai-ling Pass, a frontage of 63 miles. On the right flank our IInd Army [1] was posted as follows on a frontage of 17 miles:—Cavalry, on the line Yu-pang-yu-lu—Chi-yu-to, with outposts on the line Ka-li-ma—Liu-ti-shan-tzu—Hsiao-ta-min. The Liao Ho detachment, the Rifle Corps and the VIIIth and Xth Army Corps were in first line, and the 1st Siberian Corps was posted in rear of the centre as army reserve.

[1] See general map of district W. of Mukden attached. M.O. 3 (b).

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Our armies numbered in all 377½ battalions, 144 squadrons, 11¾ engineer battalions, 1,089 field and 56 machine guns, with a combatant strength of 276,666 bayonets, 15,727 sabres and 7,700 sappers.

The Japanese armies held a front of 43 miles and comprised 263 battalions, 99 squadrons, 892 field and mountain guns, 17¾ battalions of engineers, and about 200 machine guns, with a combatant strength of about 300,000 men. Their 3rd Army, from Port Arthur, was in rear of the left flank, and their 5th was in rear of their right at T'ien-shan. Including these two armies, the total frontage was about 67 miles.

The front of the 3rd Army was screened by the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, organised as a division under General Akiyama.

Our 144 squadrons were distributed as follows:—

	Squadrons.
2nd Army	73
3rd ,, ...	18¾
1st ,, ...	49
General Reserve	3¼

In the IInd Army 51 squadrons and 24 guns formed a special force, 15 squadrons and 12 guns were allotted to the Liao Ho detachment, and the remainder were distributed among the Army Corps, 2 or 3 squadrons to each.

On the 7th February, the cavalry force already mentioned, under General Teleshev (vice Mishchenko wounded), moved from Ssu-fang-t'ai to Yu-pang-yu-lu, placing outposts on the line A-shih-niu—Hsiu-chia-tun. Its orders were 'to co-operate in the defensive task allotted to the Rifle Corps, and to maintain a constant and far-reaching reconnaissance' towards Hsiao-pei-ho (*i.e.* S.E. by S.) and also to the S.E. and S., from that place to the reconnaissance area of the Rifle Corps. The latter was told off to defend the section Ssu-fang-t'ai—Chang-tan, and to reconnoitre in the area Ssu-fang-t'ai—Ma-mi-kai—Ho-tsun-pu—Ta-tai.

Thus the cavalry force had two tasks, one of which called for a halt the other for an advance. Consequently a middle course was adopted, and the army commander, General Milov, was dissatisfied. By his order the fresh commander of the cavalry corps, General Rennenkampf, moved forward. On the 14th February the main body of the cavalry arrived at Hsiao-tien-tzu,[1] 8 miles S.W. of Hsiao-pei-ho, and its patrols,

[1] Not marked on map. M.A. 3 (3).

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directed on Liao-yang, nearly reached the railway. Parties of the enemy which were seen retreated.

The following day the cavalry moved *3 miles* towards the S., meet-



ing only 6 Japanese squadrons and driving off towards Hsia-pei-ho an infantry column which had appeared from that direction.

On the 16th February General Rennenkampf was ordered to send a

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brigade of the 4th Don Cossack Division north to Kun-shu-ling. He decided to *discontinue* his distant reconnaissance, and by the evening of the same day was back in his former zone. He was then ordered to send north the remaining brigade of the 4th Division.

The official account says, 'The cavalry was thus weakened by 24 squadrons, with the result that reconnaissance was not maintained and the position of Nogi's army was not ascertained.' But up to that time not a single brush which the cavalry had had with the enemy had pointed to the conclusion that it was not strong enough, and it seems to us that until it had proved by fighting, and fighting hard, that it was impossible to pierce the enemy's screen, it had no right to arrive at such a conclusion.

General Kuropatkin had appointed the 25th February for the assumption of the offensive by the IInd Army, but this was cancelled because the Japanese had got wind of the intended movement, and on the 24th they themselves attacked our left flank. General Kuropatkin consequently ordered (direct) the 2nd Brigade of the 6th E. Siberian Rifle Division and the 1st Siberian Army Corps to march thither. General Kaulbars, thus deprived of his general reserve, formed a fresh one by laying hands on the Liao Ho detachment at Ssu-fang-t'ai, but did not report his action to the Commander-in-Chief. The task of this detachment was now allotted to the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment, which remained at Ssu-fang-t'ai and was included in the cavalry force under General Grekov (Rennenkampf had been transferred to the left flank). Then an order came from the staff of the IInd Army to send another regiment from the cavalry corps to Ssu-fang-t'ai.

These dispositions undoubtedly (as Kuropatkin says) enfeebled our reconnaissance. In point of fact the cavalry corps was not only reduced in numerical strength, but, in addition, it lost the powerful support of the Liao Ho detachment of all arms, which would have enabled it to act more freely. As we shall see, if it had been supported by this detachment it might have been enabled to delay the enemy's turning movement instead of merely reporting its progress.

Thus the cavalry was crippled by order of the Commander-in-Chief, and on the work of this cavalry hung the fate of the whole battle. By this time Nogi's presence at Hsiao-pei-ho should have been known.

On the 26th February the cavalry under Grekov (32 squadrons and 18 guns) was on the right flank of the IInd Army in two wings:—

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Right Wing.—General Pavlov, 15 squadrons and 12 guns, protecting and reconnoitring on a front of 13 miles, Ka-li-ma—Hsiao-ta-min, with reserve at Yu-pang-yu-lu, behind the centre.

Left Wing.—General Eichholtz, 17 squadrons and 6 guns, on a front of 12 miles, Hsiao-ta-min to the right flank of the Rifle Corps, with reserve at Ssu-fang-t'ai, 2 miles in rear of the left.

Thus the position was closely knitted to the flank of the army, and projected only 5 miles at an angle towards the enemy.

According to Dennikin[1] there were numerous small parties of the enemy between the Hun and the Liao, which made things very difficult for our patrols. This bears out the principle we have already enunciated:—Alone, patrols can find out nothing. They must be supported.

We see that *the disposition of our Cavalry before the battle of Mukden was favourable for protection, but not for reconnaissance.* The two duties, although they supplement one another, are distinct, and must not be imposed simultaneously upon the same force.



DIAGRAM 6.

The leaders tied the cavalry to the army, and the subordinates would not send out even contact squadrons to try and dispel the fog of war. If any officer at a tactical exercise in time of peace placed the cavalry as it was placed at Mukden, there would be no two opinions as to the soundness of his position. It is not the fault of our theory that it was misapplied in time of war. We repeat, improvisation with human beings is inadmissible in war, when troops and their leaders can do well only that which they have thoroughly learned in peace.

On the 26th February our cavalry force, about 1⅓ division strong, with 3 horse batteries, scattered for protection on a front of 27 miles, passively awaited the approach of the enemy. Throughout the day the

[1] 'With the Cavalry force at Mukden.' Voenni Sbornik 1907.

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Japanese showed in front and then withdrew to the line Hei-kou-tai—Ma-mi-kai.

On the 27th the enemy opened with artillery against the left flank of our cavalry, and began to press its centre and right. First 3 squadrons pressed back our main picquet from Liu-ti-shan-tzu on Yu-pang-yu-zu. Infantry showed behind these squadrons, and about 1 P.M. three Japanese columns reached the line Liu-ti-shan-tzu—Ta-lan-to-tzu. The commander of the IInd Army. taking this movement for an attempted raid on our rear, directed Grekov to extend his observation to the Hsin-min-tun railway and to reconnoitre in rear of the advancing enemy. Accordingly, the 5th Ural Cossacks were ordered to move from Yu-pang-yu-lu on Ka-li-ma and scout across the Liao Ho, to be supported by 8 squadrons from Ssu-fang-t'ai.

At 3 P.M. a picquet at A-shih-niu saw that about 2 battalions and a cavalry regiment were marching northwards and turning Ka-li-ma. This clearly showed that the enemy was moving by his left against the right of our cavalry. Moreover, the 5th Ural Cossacks at 5.15 P.M. found columns of all arms moving on A-hsien-yu-lu, delayed their march, and bivouacked for the night north of that village, sending out 3 officers' patrols on Ka-li-ma. These reported at 9 P.M. that that place was occupied by troops of all arms.

The position of the right wing of the cavalry corps in the evening is shown in Diagram 6, and it will be seen that its 15 squadrons are fairly equally scattered on a front of 13 miles.

On the 28th February General Grekov attempted to drive the Japanese towards Liu-ti-shan-tzu and 'cut through the raid' towards Ka-li-ma in support of the 5th Ural Regiment. But by evening the advance of strong hostile columns forced the whole cavalry force to retire and take up a protective line from Pan-chia-wo-peng to Cheng-chia-wo-peng, *i.e.* in line with the IInd Army.

Generally speaking, General Grekov, by delaying and observing the enemy, had succeeded in ascertaining that a hostile column of a strength of about one division had broken through at Ka-li-ma, and that its advanced troops were actually ***abreast of the headquarters of the IInd Army.***

It is also to the credit of our cavalry that it seldom left the enemy alone, but continually delayed him, taking up successive positions

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and firing at him. It attempted 'fire attacks' from a flank upon the Japanese columns marching north, but these drove it off with portions of their forces, without halting. The right wing of the cavalry (15 squadrons, 12 guns) was, of course, too weak to bar the road to the enemy, and the want of the support which the disbanded Liao Ho detachment might have afforded was severely felt. Still, the cavalry should have recognized that the critical moment, when sacrifices must be made, was approaching. Every effort should have been made to ascertain the strength of the turning columns and delay them. This meant fighting, and hard fighting.

It is not for the sake of criticism, but for the sake of the future, that we are obliged to point out that the losses of our cavalry on this historically critical day—viz., 1 officer and 7 men—prove that it failed to grasp the need of sacrifice. Had it fought obstinately, losing even half its strength, things would have been infinitely better. In that case the commander of the IInd Army, sceptical as he was regarding the practicability of any great turning movement on our right, would have been convinced by the cavalry reports and would have taken timely steps to oppose it. From this standpoint it is impossible to praise the work of our cavalry on the 28th February.



DIAGRAM 7.

The information received regarding the enemy was forwarded from the IInd Army to the Commander-in-Chief about noon on the 28th. As the result, General Kaulbars concentrated 8 battalions at Ssu-fang-t'ai to cover his right flank, and General Kuropatkin moved the 1st Brigade, 41st Division, General Burger, to Kao-li-tun, placing it under Kaulbars.

On the morning of the 1st March the commander of the IInd Army issued the following instructions to General Grekov:—

'. . . . It is very necessary to ascertain exactly the strength of the enemy and the direction of his movements. You can do this only by placing the bulk of your cavalry between the enemy and Hsin-min-tun and on both banks of the Liao. If forced to retreat, fall back on Hsin-

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min-tun, keeping touch with the enemy. . . . To ascertain the enemy's strength, numerous patrols must be sent out in rear of the advancing enemy. Establish relay posts to Ssu-fang-t'ai. . . .'

Notable points in these instructions are:—

1. The order to reconnoitre on *both* banks of the Liao, which movement would, if carried out, have entirely isolated the cavalry force.

2. The prescribed employment of numerous, and consequently weak, patrols in rear of the enemy, which could lead to nothing, and

3. The order to establish relay posts to a place already occupied by the enemy.

These instructions were received by Grekov at 2.30 P.M. when the cavalry was being pressed by the enemy and was retiring N.E. He therefore postponed their execution to the following day, with a view to effecting a junction with Pavlov's wing, and halted for the night at Hou-chia-tai. The 5th Ural Cossacks, retiring alone, halted for the night 2 miles W. of Grekov, but only got their orders on the morning of the 2nd March.

A portion of the cavalry force, 6 squadrons under Pavlov, took up a position and held back the enemy advancing on Ssu-fang-t'ai and west of that place. In the afternoon Pavlov received *two orders*—one, to join Grekov; the other, direct from the IInd Army, to move to Ka-li-ma and scout in rear of the Japanese.

About this time the enemy's columns were advancing on the whole front, one of them being 4,800 yards in depth. General Pavlov therefore decided, when relieved by troops under General Eichholtz, to move N., join Grekov, and then get across by the N.E. to the Liao. But, halting by Eichholtz's request until 8 P.M., he only reached his bivouac at San-tai-tzu at 11 P.M. *The junction with Grekov was therefore not effected.*

On the evening of the 1st March General Grekov reported that 5 Japanese columns of from one to three regiments, with 14 guns, had been seen moving by the left bank of the Liao. He surmised that the Japanese were also marching by the right bank, adding that he was sending several squadrons thither the same night. Some troops of General Eichholtz's from Ssu-fang-t'ai, threatened by the enemy's turning movement, retired to San-tai-tzu.

On the morning of the 1st March 8 squadrons of the 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigade had been despatched west to the Liao in order

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to scout in this direction, and on the right bank of the river as far as the Hsin-min-tun railway and Ka-li-ma. This brigade halted for the night at San-lin-pu.

Thus on the night of the 1st/2nd March 21 squadrons were collected in three groups at the last-named place and 5 miles S. of it, all without connection with one another.

During the 1st March General Kuropatkin took a number of steps to stem the enemy's turning movement. He (1) sent the 25th Division and another division of the IInd Army to Kao-li-tun-iu; (2) ordered the IInd Army to send 32 more battalions 'to cut through the enemy about San-lin-pu and beyond.' He appointed General Kaulbars to command these 72 battalions (including Burger's brigade), and handed over the IInd Army to General v.d. Launitz. He also recalled the 1st Siberian Army Corps (24 battalions) from the Ist Army.

The gravity of the position was now becoming evident.

On the *2nd March* Grekov ordered the 5th Ural Cossacks to work north and watch the heads of the Japanese columns. He, after joining with the dragoons, proposed in the first instance to move west, but owing to the approach of columns from the S.W. could only get to a point 5 miles from Kao-li-tun-iu. He gave up the idea of crossing to the right bank of the Liao, hearing from Chinese that Hsin-min-tun was occupied by 700 Japanese cavalry with guns.

The 5th Ural Cossacks, observing one of the enemy's columns, retired and 'suffered no loss.'

Pavlov (10 squadrons, 6 guns) wished to join Grekov, but, seeing that nobody was watching some Japanese columns which were moving N.E., he resolved to cover the exposed front. Consequently he was cut off from Grekov and was subsequently ordered to hand over 8 squadrons to General Tolmachev,[1] commanding the cavalry, IInd Army. Being left with only 2 squadrons and 6 guns, he thought it best to hand these over as well.

General Tolmachev's task was 'To remain on the right flank, reconnoitre northwards, and watch the country for enveloping movements.'

On the 2nd March our cavalry thought it had located the northernmost column of the enemy at San-lin-pu; but in reality General

[1] Succeeded Eichholtz.

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Tamura's cavalry with some infantry formed the right of the Japanese turning movement, 10 miles farther north. This error arose from the circumstance that Grekov, striving to carry out Kaulbars' instructions to reconnoitre the right bank of the Liao, *crossed the front of and just missed the Japanese Ist Division, a reserve brigade, and Tamura's cavalry, never catching sight of them.* The result was that the troops (41st Division, &c.) which were sent out to form a 'shield' on this side met the enemy quite unexpectedly.

It will be seen from Diagram 8 that on the evening of the 2nd March our cavalry (36 squadrons, 18 guns) on the right flank was scattered over a space of 27 miles, at first in 5 groups, then in 4, with a gap of over 20 miles in the centre. Had this force been collected in one hand we should have had a cavalry corps which could easily have reconnoitred a front of 27 miles, and would undoubtedly have done so with profit, provided only that it reconnoitred *in force.* Such a force would have been a real help, and might have dealt effectively with Tamura.



DIAGRAM 8.

3rd March.—Grekov in the morning remained stationary, and towards evening retired. The 5th Ural Cossack Regiment covered his flank, and halted for the night at Liao-pan.

Thus Grekov's force, unmolested by the enemy and suffering no loss, was retiring N.E. when its co-operation was most necessary to the army at large, and to Burger's and Topornin's columns in particular.

4th March.—Grekov, leaving the Ural Cossacks to observe the enemy from the N., proposed, while keeping touch with the right flank, to get in rear of the enemy's column, which was moving on Mukden. The Ural Cossacks ascertained by means of patrols that the villages

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S. and S.E. of Liao-pan were held by the enemy, and passed the night at Hsi-shan-tai, having had *one man wounded.* The regiment had therefore failed in its task. Grekov himself reported that there were small columns of Japanese infantry and cavalry on the W. bank of the Liao Ho, adding that they were all turning N.E. He then moved, not S.W., as he should have done to get in rear of the enemy, but W. After going 10 miles, he turned back in order to carry out the work left undone by the Ural Cossacks.

Thus another day was wasted by the cavalry in moving hither and thither. All it did was to ascertain from inhabitants that the enemy had left Hsin-min-tun and gone S.E. *Again the losses of the whole cavalry for a whole day amounted to one Cossack wounded.*

Tolmachev's force, posted on the right flank of the army, held up the enemy's advance by fire, and then, acting under orders, its leader handed over 2 squadrons and 2 batteries to General Tserpitski, and retired behind the Hun Ho. His force was now reduced to 5 squadrons, command of which was taken over by General Prince Orbeliani.

Pavlov had reported to the headquarters of the IInd Army that his column no longer existed. Notwithstanding this, headquarters continued to allot him important work.

The Japanese, on the 4th March, while advancing energetically on the eastern flank, remained more or less passive on the western. General Kaulbars, considering it impracticable to take the offensive on the 4th, postponed it to the following day. The Commander-in-Chief had ordered him to throw not less than 50 battalions against Nogi's left flank. The Ist and IIIrd Armies were to maintain their positions.

5th March.—General Grekov's force was directed in operation orders to 'continue the work allotted to it in rear and on the flanks of the enemy.' In the morning Grekov reported to the IInd Army that Liao-pan was the most northerly point occupied by the enemy, although on the previous evening he had reported that a battalion and 3 squadrons had already passed through that place.

This point was not cleared up by the cavalry. Fearing for the communications of the IInd Army with Tieh-ling, Grekov finally resorted to active measures, which were at once successful. He sent 4 squadrons and a battery to K'u-chi-yang and seized that place; but he did nothing more, while all the time he should have been operating on the flank and rear of the enemy, and not on the flank of his own

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army. *Once more the losses for the day amounted to one dragoon wounded.* And it is sufficient to glance at the situation on the evening of the 5th (Diagram 9) to see what hard and constant work was demanded from the cavalry.

Orbeliani's cavalry took no active part and remained all day at the Hun Ho bridge.

Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the commander of the IInd Army had yet grasped the dimensions of the Japanese turning movement. From Kaulbars' operation orders for the 6th March it is clear that he supposed the great mass of the Japanese to be opposite his southern flank. This misapprehension was largely due to *General Tserpitski's exaggerated reports* that he had more than 3 divisions against him.



DIAGRAM 9. —Situation on the evening 5th March.

6th March.—Grekov only attempted a few skirmishes. He was at first successful, but the cavalry retired when opposed by guns. *Losses, one killed and one wounded.* No fresh information was gained. The cavalry was now relieved of watching the west bank of the Liao, and the 5 squadrons of Ussuri Cossacks which had been on that bank were directed to join Grekov.

Pavlov made some attempt to advance with 2 squadrons, but met hostile infantry and retired. The remaining squadrons of Orbeliani's cavalry remained inactive.

7th March.—Grekov was pressed back 7 miles to the N.E., and ascertained that more than a brigade of infantry and 6 squadrons with artillery had penetrated N.E. from Ping-lo-p'u. This movement menaced our only line of railway, but our cavalry was not thereby aroused to greater activity.

During the night of the 6th/7th March Japanese patrols began to show N. of Mukden, and one of them upset a telegraph pole. Littoral Dragoons and 2 squadrons of Orenburg Cossacks, about 4 P.M. on the

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7th, definitely ascertained that about a division of the enemy was deploying on the line Feng-chi-hu—Hu-chi-tun, and advancing on Mukden from the N.

On this day the IInd Army gained a certain success. The Japanese were checked at Yu-huan-tun and thrown temporarily on the defensive. It was now our duty to attack. But when this was proposed to Tserpitski and he was told that the troops were 'spoiling for a fight,' he rejected the idea.

The occupation of Su-hu-chia-pu by the Japanese laid bare the right flank of the IIIrd Army, and our loss of Han-ch'eng-pu led to the evacuation of our positions. About 2 P.M. the order was issued for the retreat by night of the Ist and IIIrd Armies, covered by the IInd Army, which was to maintain its positions.

The reconnaissance work of the cavalry before and during the battle of Mukden.

We do not propose to deal with the subsequent agonies of this battle, but to make our deductions.

A careful study shows that our cavalry may breathe freely. Although it did not discover the enemy's turning movement early enough, the higher leaders had plenty of time to take counter-measures. It was not the fault of the cavalry that they did not believe in the enemy's wide turning movement, and assumed that they had an ordinary flank attack to deal with.

Still, the work of our cavalry was unproductive. *It did not dispel the doubts of the higher leaders.* The causes of this we take to be as follows:—

First and foremost, the *faulty disposition of the cavalry, in that it was not concentrated on the right flank.* It acted in four or five groups and in various directions. There was no unity, and there could be no success. Then at first it was tethered to the flank of the army; subsequently it was directed to reconnoitre on *both* banks of the Liao. If the first arrangement gave the cavalry too little rope before the battle, the second isolated it, and the more so because the Liao Ho detachment at Ssu-fang-t'ai, which might have supported it, had been broken up.

A *cavalry corps,* or at least a division with 2 horse batteries, should have been formed and echeloned in advance of the right flank.

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Columns such as these would have been strong enough to gain *by force* the information which weak patrols failed to gain.

Then we must repeat what we have said regarding the methods of the cavalry itself. Attempts were made to reconnoitre with the *eye*, but patrols were frittered away while the main body remained completely inactive. The rare spurts of activity were consistently successful, but the desire to follow them up was absent. The higher leading begged for further enlightenment as to the strength and composition of the turning force, but the cavalry merely talked of the 'enemy's superior forces,' and *hardly lost a man*. Such work as this is a poor attempt at that co-operation with the other arms which is the *raison d'être* of cavalry.

If it be asked how a cavalry division should work, the answer is simple.

The front to be reconnoitred is about 27 miles. Send out four or five reconnoitring squadrons, and keep the remaining three regiments concentrated in rear.

Let the patrols feel the enemy's screen; the main bodies of the squadrons burst through it and push on the patrols. When a protective line is met, the main force pierces it and smashes it, and again pushes out *strong* feelers. When a force of all arms is met do not hurry back, but *fight and find out its strength*. Often, very often, this will prove to be exaggerated. If you cannot beat the enemy, hold him back and retire gradually. Do not make things easy for him, but keep facing him. If he breaks through and threatens the rear of your own troops do not wait for orders, for inactivity in such a case is a crime.

It may be urged that this involves the ruin of your cavalry.

What is the use of individual units except to expend for the sake of the whole army? If miserliness is a repulsive quality in private life, in the field it is a sign of small-mindedness.

Thirty years ago General Sukhotin wrote, 'Let it be in the blood and bone of cavalry that, once a duty has been assigned to it, it must carry it through to the last gasp.'

This is a profound but often forgotten truth.

To conclude, one final deduction. You must do one of two things. Either *reconnoitre or spare your cavalry*. That you cannot do both, the campaign in Manchuria clearly shows.

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

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THE COMBAT OF SAHAGUN

(21st December, 1808)

THE Cavalry action of Sahagun forms the subject of Mr. J. P. Beadle's this year's Academy picture, which he has kindly allowed us to reproduce. Professor Ooman in his History of the Peninsular War (vol. I. pp. 535-537) gives the following account of this dashing exploit in which the 15th Hussars so distinguished themselves:—

'On December 20, the army had concentrated at Mayorga. Somewhat to his disappointment Moore discovered that Soult had not begun the advance on Leon which Berthier's intercepted dispatch had ordered. Either no duplicate of it had been received by the Marshal, or he had been disconcerted by the report that the English were on the move for Valladolid. That they were coming against his own force he can as yet hardly have guessed. He was still in his old position, one infantry division at Saldaña, the other at Carrion. Debelle's Light-Cavalry brigade lay in front as a screen, with its headquarters at Sahagun, only nine miles from the English advanced pickets, which had reached the Abbey of Melgar Abaxo.

'The proximity of the enemy led Lord Paget, who showed himself throughout the campaign a most admirable and enterprising Cavalry Commander, to attempt a surprise. Marching long ere dawn with the 10th and 15th Hussars, he reached the vicinity of Sahagun without being discovered. Debelle had no outlying vedettes, and his main-guard on the high-road was suddenly surrounded and captured before it was aware that an enemy was near. Only a single trooper escaped, but he aroused the town, and Paget, hearing the French trumpets sounding in the streets, saw that he must lose no time. He sent General Slade with the 10th Hussars by the straight road into Sahagun, while he himself with the 15th galloped around it to cut off the enemy's retreat. As he reached the suburb he found Debelle forming up his

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two regiments—the 8th Dragoons and the 1st Provisional Chasseurs—among the snow-covered stumps of a vineyard. Nothing could be seen of the 10th, which was scouring the town, but Paget formed up the 15th for a charge. His first movement was checked by an unexpected ditch; but moving rapidly down it he crossed at a place where it was practicable, and found Debelle changing front to meet him. Catching the French before they had begun to move—their new formation was not yet quite completed—Paget charged into them without hesitation, though they outnumbered him by nearly two to one. He completely rode down the front regiment, the Provisional Chasseurs, and flung it back on to the Dragoons, who broke and fled. The Chasseurs, who were commanded by Colonel Tascher, a cousin of the Empress Josephine, were half destroyed; two lieutenant-colonels, eleven other officers, and 157 men were taken prisoners, twenty were killed, many were wounded. The regiment indeed was so mauled that Bonaparte dissolved it soon after, and replaced it in Franceschi's division by the 1st Hussars, which had just arrived from France.

'This was perhaps the most brilliant exploit of the British Cavalry during the whole six years of the war. When the Peninsular medals were distributed, nearly forty years after, a special clasp was very rightly given for it, though many combats in which a larger number of men were engaged received no such notice. While reading the records of later stages of the war the historian must often regret that Wellington never, till Waterloo, had the services of Paget as Commander of his Light Cavalry. There were unfortunate personal reasons which rendered the presence of the victor of Sahagun and Benavente impossible in the camp of the victor of Vimiero.'

NOTE.—In Lord Vivian's Memoirs, there is a note in a letter of Lord Paget's to his father shortly after the action of Sahagun in which he states that there were 12 men of the 7th Hussars present. (A. L.)

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W. B. WOLLEN.
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THE 10th LIGHT DRAGOONS AT BENAVENTE.
(RETREAT ON CORUNNA.)

THE ROYAL ACADEMY, 1911.

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SAHAGUN.

1808.

THE ROYAL ACADEMY, 1911

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THE BRITISH CAVALRY AT BENAVENTE

(29th December, 1808)

By Major P. A. Charrier, *Royal Munster Fusiliers*

The fight took place on the plain between the town of Benavente and the little River Esla at that time in flood.

The British were retiring on Corunna covered by the Cavalry at Benavente in contact with the French on the River Esla.

Colonel Otway, 18th Hussars, commanded the piquets, made up of sixty men of the 7th Hussars under Lieutenant Lowther, Major Quentin and sixty men of the 10th Hussars, Sergeant Jeffs and twenty-five men 18th Hussars, and sixty men of the 3rd Hussars (K.G.L.).

In the early morning the outlying piquets on the Esla reported the French crossing at the ford. Colonel Otway sent word to apprise Lord Paget, and gave orders that the main body of the piquets should join him without delay.

General Lefebure-Desnoetes with about 600 men in four squadrons of the Imperial Guard crossed at the ford near Castrogonzalo, and advanced in echelon of squadrons towards Benavente. The leading squadron far away from the others reached the north-eastern portion of the town. This leading squadron was now suddenly charged by Colonel Otway and the British piquets who had retired disputing the advance till they got to a position on the road where the mud walls of some gardens of the suburb afforded protection to their flanks. The French squadron received the shock and was severely handled, but being now reinforced by another echelon, the British piquets were obliged to retire.

Nearer the town the British piquets were reinforced by three troops

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of the 3rd Hussars (K.G.L.). They immediately re-formed and led by Brigadier General Stewart attacked the French.

The French were busy re-forming and had as yet only two squadrons at hand, the others being still distant. The charge of the British piquets again severely maltreated the French, but the fight remained undecided till the arrival of the remaining French squadrons threatening the British on their right flank forced them to retire further towards the town. On nearing the town the British were reinforced by 150 horsemen of the 3rd Hussars (K.G.L.). This arrival of reinforcements arrested for a while the initiative of the French.

Now that he had all his squadrons with him General Lefebure-Desnoettes decided to make use of his superiority and advanced to the attack. But when he arrived within 100 yards of the British piquets, he suddenly perceived a whole regiment of four squadrons, who had up to now been skilfully masked from view, galloping full speed into his left flank.

While the piquets were fighting on the plain, the 10th Hussars had been formed up at the edge of the town, and on receiving a signal, led by Lord Paget in person they galloped forward. The piquets perceiving the 10th coming forward to charge, gave a loud cheer and dashed at speed on their opponents.

General Lefebure-Desnoettes' situation was critical in the extreme. Just when he imagined himself sure of victory, he found he was opposed, in front by the piquets of General Stewart and on his flank by the 10th Hussars, to a force twice his own strength.

He had the choice of two solutions. Either to carry on full tilt, and, if necessary, cut his way back again, or go about and if it were still possible evade the shock. He chose the latter, which is a pity. He had just time to order 'Troops about,' which was done within a few yards of the British Cavalry, according to Colbourne, who was an eye-witness. The shock was thus evaded and they fled back to the Esla ford pursued by the British.

General Lefebure-Desnoettes was captured by Private Levi Grisdall, 10th Royal Hussars, afterwards promoted Sergeant-Major.

The broken French galloping with the British at their heels, plunged into the stream, and having gained the southern banks of the Esla wheeled round and appeared inclined to come forward again, but the British Horse Artillery opening upon them, they desisted.

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The French General suffered all the consequences of the mistakes he made. First: He did not reconnoitre; this led him into his final critical situation. Secondly: In the earlier part of the day he manœuvred with his echelons beyond supporting distance of one another, making mutual support tardy; his leading squadron being severely handled as a result of this. Thirdly: When finally surprised, he went about instead of dashing forward, trusting to cutting his way back again. On the British side the action demonstrated the ideal classical example achieved by Cavalry in many encounters, the final gallop against the opponent simultaneously on his front and flank.

What men and horses have once done can be done again.

The illustration is from Mr. William B. Wollen's picture in this year's Royal Academy.

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WHY THE HALF-SQUADRON SYSTEM FOR INDIAN CAVALRY?

By 'Rissalah.'

For the benefit of readers not *au fait* with Indian Cavalry matters and who yet may be tempted to glance at this paper I think it would be advisable, before going any further, to give a rough sketch of the organisation of the average Indian Cavalry regiment.

For internal administration a squadron of 156 men is divided into two troops or half-squadrons of seventy-eight men each. Thus a regiment consists of eight troops or half-squadrons, and they are known as the first, second, third, fourth, troops, etc., or as the right half 'A' (written shortly R/A), left half 'A,' etc., the terms troop and half-squadron being used indiscriminately. Each half-squadron or troop is commanded by an Indian officer of the rank of ressaldar or ressaider; each of these officers has under him a jemadar. The senior N.C.O. of each troop or half-squadron is called a kote dafadar, and corresponds to a troop sergeant. Each half-squadron is again divided into four squads or sections (both terms are used) commanded by N.C.O.'s. The squad or section consists of eighteen to twenty men, and is the smallest unit for internal organisation.

Each half-squadron, so to speak, runs its own show under the general supervision of the Squadron Commander or Squadron Officer.

Promotion and such like matters are generally confined to the half-squadron, even if both halves are of the same class constitution, and transfers from one to the other are the exception not the rule; to such an extent is this the case that Indian officers frequently resent any transfers that the exigencies of the Service demand even when such transfers are favourable to their own particular command. Above is a rough outline of the average internal organisation of an Indian Cavalry squadron.

Let us now turn to its parade one. This follows the British

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Cavalry, viz., four troops, each troop being led by an Indian officer and consisting of three or four sections according as sixteen or twelve files are ordered.

Thus in the Indian Cavalry there are two distinct organisations running side by side. If one inquires the reason thereof no one seems to know, the more common reply being given that the half-squadron system is peculiarly suited to Indian Cavalry. The writer would inquire why? The half-squadron system was not evolved with the view of aiming at indigenous institutions, for no such organisation as a squadron existed before our arrival in India. As far as I can ascertain it was simply copied from that of the British Cavalry which at the time most of our Indian Cavalry was in process of formation had an eight-troop organisation. Perhaps I am wrong on this point, if so, I shall no doubt be corrected. If the present organisation peculiarly suits Indian Cavalry needs then such suitability is merely the outcome of adaptation.

Nowadays one hears a good deal on the subject of increasing the responsibility of the Indian ranks. Would not the adoption of the British Cavalry four-troop system help in this direction?

Let each Indian officer have his own troop in the lines as he takes it on parade. This would at once give eight jemadars a chance of showing their administrative worth in the lines as well as test to some extent their powers of horse management.

Each troop would have its own funds run by its own officer. It must be admitted that eight senior Indian officers would lose a certain amount of responsibility, but I think the gain of the juniors would outweigh this small disadvantage. On the present system, during the drill season, the junior Indian officers are mere puppets in the lines, and do next to nothing. If the four-troop organisation were adopted they would have their own unit to look after, and the senior (specially selected) N.C.O. in each troop would occupy a similar position to the troop-sergeant of a British regiment. The objection generally urged against the change is that during the furlough season a troop or two per squadron would have no Indian officer present with it. This is true, but the troop dafadar would take his place, and consequently the Indian officer would take exceptional care that he only recommended really good men for this post or, indeed, for promotion to the rank of dafadar. If greater caution were observed in thus selecting N.C.O.s there would be no need to place the troop under the supervision of one

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of the remaining Indian officers. The Squadron Commander or Squadron Officer would be quite capable of exercising such supervisory control over the troop as to check at once any serious falling off in efficiency, and, if both British officers were absent, then the senior Indian officer present with the squadron would be responsible for all four troops.

Another objection urged against the change is, that on active service a squadron would probably very soon be reduced to only two efficient troops, and therefore it is just as well to leave things as they are. This may be sound, but if so then the British Cavalry organisation is at fault, and I take it the matter has been carefully thrashed out in their case, and their present system found the best.

If the four-troop organisation were adopted for the Indian Cavalry one kote dafadar could do the work of Squadron Kote Dafadar and the other (the less warlike one) the duties of Squadron Quartermaster Dafadar. With regard to the latter, he would be in charge of all issues of kit, arrangements for camps, ditto for musketry, feeding, transport, &c. Both would be on the squadron staff, so to speak, so also would all farriers, signallers, trumpeters.

The two half-squadron pay-orderlies would each do the pay work of two troops as they do at present. All would, of course, be assigned to troops for the purposes of pay, 'joris,' &c., as they are now, but that is all; the squadron staff would therefore consist of:—

The Squadron Commander,
The Squadron Officer,
The Squadron Kote Dafadar,
The Squadron Q.-M. Dafadar,
All Farriers,
All Signallers,
Trumpeters,
Two Pay Orderlies,
One Writer.

That the majority of present senior Indian officers would resent the change is unquestionable, but the existing half-squadron system is an anomaly, and ought to be replaced by the four-troop organisation in the lines as well as in the field. I believe one well-known Indian regiment has already adopted it, and it would be interesting to know how it worked.

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SIGNALLING IN THE INDIAN CAVALRY

By Lieut. A. A. H. Beaman, *1st Duke of York's Own Lancers*

A thorough system of inter-communication between all units is essential to the success of armies in the field, and this fact is so clearly recognised by even the very youngest soldiers that it is unnecessary to dwell on its importance here. The object, then, of these few remarks is to give those officers who have had no practical instruction in signalling some insight into the capabilities and limitations of this all-important branch, so that, having acquired some perception of the difficulties with which their signallers have to contend, they may, by the exercise of a little patience and sympathy, overcome many of these difficulties and thereby facilitate communication, and so increase the efficiency of their own particular unit.

Let us first examine the material with which we have to deal, the individual link in the chain of communication; and a brief sketch of the characteristics and peculiarities of the Oriental temperament will at once suggest a few methods by which these links can be strengthened and improved. Perhaps it would be as well to explain that there are two systems of catching signallers—one to enlist men permanently as such, the other to second them for a certain period of years on this duty. The latter system is practically universal in the Cavalry, and, I believe, too, predominates in the Infantry. It is quite obvious that it is inferior to the former, but that involves questions too deep to be gone into here, where we are only concerned with making the most of things as we find them.

We will now consider the case of the short-service signaller under existing conditions, and, honestly facing the fact that signalling is exceedingly unpopular, let us try to determine the fundamental reasons why the signaller so heartily dislikes his work and makes every effort to get back to regimental duty.

Now the native, generally speaking, is an ambitious man, though

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not quite in the sense that we use the word. He is anxious to get on, but he is anxious to do so with the very minimum of personal exertion. He loses no opportunity of pushing himself forward under the eye of his unit commander, and having done so a few times with or without success he does not hesitate to ask for advancement.

Again, the native is capable of much hard work (he dislikes it, but he is capable of it) for limited periods. On the other hand, long-sustained endeavour is quite foreign to his nature. You may ask much of him provided that he understands well-earned 'aram' will crown his labours, but if he knows or suspects that such will not be the case, then he is far from being a willing horse.

Bearing these points in mind, let us follow the career of the embryo signaller from his enlistment. He joins his regiment with high hopes; two or three of his uncles are sirdars perhaps, and a brother and cousin or two are rising N.C.O.s. As his family is so prosperous, it is probable that he is well educated, possibly even he can write a little English. He passes his recruit's course, and by virtue of erudition, combined with the assiduous pushing of his uncles, brother, and cousins, he is constantly brought to the notice of his unit commander, who exhorts him to go to school and get many certificates. This he sets about doing, buoyed up with dreams of a brilliant future, till one day the signalling instructor prowls round the school, and a little while later he finds himself in orders to join the next signalling recruit-class. He is not pleased. In the first place, it means leaving his unit for many years, with no prospect of showing up under the promoting eye. When he does get back, if ever he does—a fact about which he entertains some doubt—there will perhaps be another in the land who knows not Joseph, his kindly uncles will be eating their pensions, and he will have to start all over again. But, meanwhile, as a signaller he will have to work exceedingly hard; and the bitterest pill of all is that no one will know it or care except the instructor, who is usually such a very young sahib that there is no practical profit to be gained from this unique knowledge of his. When the hot weather comes on, his comrades will enjoy their well-earned 'aram' after the strenuousness of the drill season; but there is none for him, except musketry! Small wonder, then, that he rebels against his fate, and makes every effort to escape it. He affects defective eyesight, physical weakness, phenomenal stupidity, and many other little subterfuges, which are

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duly defeated. Then his uncle the risaldar bids him wait awhile. 'The signalling officer will shortly be going on leave,' says he, 'and we'll see what can be done then.' And so it goes on, till he either does escape or resigns himself to the inevitable.

It cannot be denied, then, that the signaller has some justification for his discontent; and if his condition has been depicted here in rather too sombre hues, it has been done so with a purpose, namely, to impress on Squadron and Double Company Commanders that to a very great extent the remedy lies with them—that it is in their power to do much towards the removal of this prevailing dissatisfaction.

Very naturally, they, Squadron and Double Company Commanders, object strongly to being deprived of their most promising youngsters, and one cannot be surprised if they sometimes attempt to substitute inferior material, or try to recover their 'stars' before these are irretrievably lost—that is to say, for the set term of years. But this is a very narrow view of the case, and they should remember that any attitude of this kind on their part makes things infinitely hard for the signalling instructor. One admits without hesitation that every officer must do his utmost for the efficiency of his own unit, *provided that* the interests of the corps are not sacrificed to attain that end. Looking at this case in its lowest aspect, there is every chance of a stupid man in the ranks escaping the condemning eye of an inspecting officer, but this cannot be so with the signallers, where the individual intelligence of each man is weighed in the balance to the last fraction of an ounce. Every officer recognises the fact that a perfect system of communication is of supreme importance; every officer should know that the report on his regiment is greatly influenced by its proficiency in this respect, and therefore he should not allow himself to be swayed by selfish motives, but in duty bound, for the honour of his corps and in loyalty to his commanding officer, he should make every effort to secure a high state of proficiency by establishing signalling on a popular basis in his unit.

First of all, face the situation honestly. Your best men will be required for this duty. Let them go without remonstrance, well knowing it is for the good of the corps. Let it be understood that you look upon them with high favour as skilful specialists, and let the impression prevail that it is an honourable distinction to be selected for signalling; and when a man is taken for it, do not let him suppose that he is quite

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out of mind. When you are in the lines remember the value of a sympathetic and encouraging word; it is much to the native to know that he is not forgotten. Attend their parades occasionally, and let them see you take a real interest in their work, as well you may, for so much depends on it in war. Remember, too, that their hours are long, and therefore compensate them by privileges such as exemption from all routine and fatigue duties, additional leave, and pay from regimental funds, and in any other ways which may suggest themselves. I then venture to assert that a promising youngster, on returning to the ranks after having had the benefit of, say, seven years' signalling experience, will have in him the makings of a better N.C.O. than if he had spent those years in regimental duty. He will have attained a higher educational standard, he will be accustomed to using his intelligence, and acting on his own initiative; therefore any consideration and encouragement which you may have shown him will be well repaid.

I venture to give a few hints which may aid the uninitiated in the expedition of messages in the field. Every message should be as brief as possible, almost telegraphic in form. Only the very shortest words should be used, and they should be written with *absolute distinctness*. It must be signed in space Z, that is, at the bottom right-hand corner. If officers would recollect these few points they would find their information coming and going through with gratifying rapidity. Unfortunately, it so often happens that a harassed officer scrawls his message in a hand which he himself would have some difficulty in deciphering, and generally omits to sign it. The signaller first points out this omission, and then has to ask to have many of the unintelligible words spelled out to him, as he cannot read the writing, with the result that the author becomes more and more impatient, till the signaller, fearing to exasperate him further, goes off and sends his own conception of the unintelligible groups. At the subsequent pow-wow one hears that various enterprises failed through faulty signalling. It should also be remembered that natives are often very timid and easily confused, and it is therefore unwise to approach a signalling station and converse with or even offer suggestions to the operators, for, however well-intentioned these suggestions may be, they will only impede the work, as the men will either become flustered,

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or else, with their innate native courtesy, will pretend to consider them with grave deference, ludicrous though they may be.

Many officers now declare that in these days of the field telegraph and telephone, visual signalling is an obsolete and useless science. No one would attempt to deny the incalculable value of these, especially the telephone, when worked successfully; but it is a fragile and treacherous instrument, very prone to injury. The long, thin, vulnerable line alone is liable to a thousand mishaps; while often, without any seeming cause, and invariably at some critical juncture, the magic voice of that capricious mechanism is stilled, and none but the expert hand can coax it into speech again. Occasions must arise, too, where the terrain prohibits the use of line instruments. The Japanese, relying entirely on their telephones, possessed only a most primitive system of visual signalling, and had bitterly to repent of their ill-advisedness in the operations around the Mo-tien-ling Pass.

A constant grievance of regimental officers has been that just when their signallers were most urgently required they were taken for head-quarters, and that a corps thus depleted had not sufficient material for inter-communication between its units. But now that the long-looked-for Communication Companies are a *fait accompli* this practice will be discontinued, with the result, one hopes, that unit commanders and their signallers will be drawn together by closer ties of confidence and sympathy to the great advantage of both.

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STRATAGEMS.

FREDERICK THE GREAT always preserved inviolable secrecy as to his political and tactical intentions, and one of his principles was that constant attention must be paid to hiding as far as possible one's plans and ambitions. It may be said that dissimulation or deceit is the resort of the weak, but who is so strong that he can afford to dispense with any available legitimate advantage in outwitting the enemy? It is the duty of a commander to assail the enemy under the most advantageous circumstances to himself, and we find that the antagonists in all wars take full advantage of any want of acuteness or discernment in their opponents, and the accepted code of honour may even on occasion yield place to expediency. Thus, declarations of war are almost a thing of the past, only made when it suits the political pose of the aggressor, and stratagem, which from its original Greek meaning, of leading one's friends, has come to signify the art of misleading the enemy, finds its place throughout the whole gamut of operations of war, from military policy to the battlefield, the skirmishes of advanced posts and individual enterprises.

The propagation of a definite military policy is not alone in the hands of the General Staff, but should be shared in by the whole army, and similarly if a stratagem is to be successful all ranks must enter into the spirit of it, and, if necessary, be fully instructed beforehand. The wise commander will not hesitate to take the rank and file into his confidence for surprises such as night attacks, and ambushes also, which depend for their success in no small degree upon the action of each individual. In darkness the men are no longer under the eyes of their officers, and yet they may be required to assume the most daring and difficult duties. De Brack gives the following instructions for a night attack by a Cavalry detachment :—' Be silent, manœuvre, seize in an orderly manner the keys of the position, such as the Commandant's quarters, the exits from the bivouac or village, and seize at once the horses and guards. If you *succeed*, one detachment at once files the prisoners to the rear, on their own horses, to our army, without waiting for the remainder. If you *fail* retire

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your force at once : the best mounted men form the rear guard and open fire, in order to lead the enemy on the wrong road, and drown the sound of the horses hoofs. If their ruse has succeeded they rejoin by a detour. If you wish only to harass the enemy, use a few men and merely capture a few vedettes and fire on the line.'

The day before the battle of Hochkirk, October 14, 1758, Frederick the Great selected the site of the Prussian camp so near to that of the Austrians that the Prussian right was commanded by them at Artillery range, and General Marwitz, the Quartermaster-General, refused to mark out the camp, and was put in arrest in consequence. During the foggy night part of the Austrian army was detailed to sing and cut down wood as if fortifying their camp. By this artifice the Prussian outposts were lulled into a sense of security, but 30,000 Austrians advanced under cover of darkness, each dragoon carrying a grenadier behind his saddle. As the village clock struck five, the signal for attack, the Prussian batteries were stormed and captured, and before sunset Frederick had been driven back to the River Spree with the loss of his baggage, 101 guns, 30 standards, 5500 killed and prisoners, and 3000 wounded, while Marshal Daun with 90,000 Austrians owed the victory to the simple ruse which encouraged a false sense of security in the Prussian camp.

The mounting of Infantry behind horsemen is a very old device, and a notable instance occurred on September 5, 1796, when Napoleon, having entered Trento and the troops not being fresh, he caused some voltigeurs to be mounted behind the saddles of Murat's Cavalry ; they thus forded the Avisio and pursued the Austrians beyond Neumarck.

Feigned Retreat.—In 1652 Marshal Turenne with 4000 loyalists was covering Gien, south of Orleans, where the infant King of France was in the care of the Queen Mother. The Rebel Prince Condé with 14,000 men passed Turenne on the march in the night without being aware of the proximity of the two forces. In the early morning Turenne moved into a position astride the road to Gien with a great wood between himself and the Rebel army and masked his batteries on a small hill commanding the only causeway traversing the wood. Turenne led 10 squadrons through the defile and then retreated as if in alarm. Condé, not to be so easily deceived, poured Infantry into the wood on the right and left of the causeway who soon opened a brisk fire. Turenne now retired a short distance, and then turned away with certain troops as if in retreat. Condé thereupon sent fifteen or twenty squadrons into the narrow roadway, but Turenne's flight was only a feint, for hardly had six squadrons been

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formed beyond the defile than Turenne fell on them with twelve squadrons of Royalists, and as the Rebel horsemen retired Turenne's guns were unmasked and did dreadful execution. The rest of the day was passed in a cannonade, and both sides withdrew during the night. The Queen said that Turenne had thus for the second time replaced the crown on the head of her son.

Ambuscade.—The capture of Blücher in November 1806 is thus described in Graham's 'Military Ends and Moral Means': 'At the time of the last siege of Dantzic the French General Serrurier, learning that Blücher and his Staff were established in a farmhouse at Neuhausen, south-east of Dantzic, ordered 300 horsemen to conceal themselves at a point that he had fixed upon, while he himself, impersonating a Commandant of French Artillery, went with only eight troopers to Preuss Holland, a town three leagues from Blücher's headquarters, and on his arrival beat a requisition for forage for 6000 horses, to be furnished in twenty-four hours. The magistrates sent instant notice to Blücher, which was precisely the object Serrurier desired. Blücher then at once sent all his available men to seize those who had made the requisition, and protect the magistrates in resisting the order. Serrurier then, leaving word that he was going to Brinheim, started with his small escort, but turning off the road joined the 300 horse he had previously placed in readiness, and with them made an easy capture of Blücher who had sent away all his escort to put a stop to the requisition.'

Blücher was subsequently exchanged for the French General Victor.

Napoleon's Ruse.—On November 17, 1796, during the 'Seventy-two hours battle' at Arcola, Napoleon had recourse to a *ruse de guerre* which, trifling as it may appear, turned the tide of victory in his favour. He was aware of how sensitive all troops are of an attempt on their flank and accordingly sent across the trestle bridge, to his right front, a Lieutenant of Cavalry and 25 trumpeters, who, sounding and galloping round the Austrian flank, just as Angereau advanced across the Alpon, shook the firmness of the Austrian line, who gave way, and two French battalions appearing from St. Gregorio gave reality to the trumpet scheme.

Disguise.—In May 1745 Frederick the Great was at Frankenstein, opposed by the Austrians on the line Schweidnitz-Glätz his ally the Margrave Charles had reached Jägerndorf. The Austrians pushed 20,000 men between the King and the Margrave. Frederick ordered Ziethen to fight his way through with his regiment of Hussars [1] and carry to the Margrave an

[1] Now the Brandenburg Hussar Regiment No. 3, but still known as 'Zieten's Hussars.'

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order to break up for Frankenstein. In case only a single man got through, each Hussar knew the object of their mission. Formerly these Hussars had worn a red dolman and a felt cap, but a new winter uniform, a blue pelisse and scaly cap, had just been issued and resembled the dress of one Austrian Regiment. Ziethen marched by night, and as morning broke joined an Austrian column which had been marching through the night, and sending Austrians who were serving in the Prussian ranks to talk with the Austrian soldiers, his regiment being mistaken for Austrian Hussars, was able to pass almost through the Imperial lines without recognition. Finally, by a smart gallop, under Artillery fire, he reached the Margrave, warned him of his danger, and the concentration was safely effected.

During the operations in Cape Colony in December 1899 it became desirable to give the Boers the impression that the British force at Arundel which consisted of the 'Carabiniers,' Horse Artillery, Mounted Infantry, and some Colonial troops comprised more regular Cavalry, which was unable to reach the front before December 10. On December 8 the 'Carabiniers' were therefore, formed to simulate two regiments; the front rank armed with their lances advanced on the right of the railway, the rear rank, sabres, on the left. They reconnoitred thus as far as Taiboschlaagte, where the enemy was located east of the railway, estimated at 2000, and shelling commenced on both sides. The Boers, mystified as to the strength and composition of the British force, undertook no forward movement before the reinforcements arrived.

Seven Weeks War, 1866. *Individual Resource.*—On the evening of the Battle of Königgrätz an officer of the Ziethen Hussars, who were forward in the pursuit, rode as far as the gates of Königgrätz, and, finding there were no sentries outside, rode in. The guard, immediately on seeing him in his Prussian uniform, turned out and seized him, when, with a ready presence he declared he had come to demand the capitulation of the fortress. He was conducted to the Commandant, and made the same demand to him, adding that the town would be bombarded if not surrendered within an hour. The Commandant, unconscious that he was not dealing with a legitimate messenger, courteously refused to capitulate, but the Hussar was conducted out of the town, passed through the guard at the entrance, and got off safely without being made a prisoner.

N. M. S.

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THE VALUE OF THE 'ARME BLANCHE,' FROM ACTUAL INSTANCES IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGN

AN ESSAY BY CAPTAIN T. KAMOZAWA, OF THE INFANTRY

(One of the three best sent in for the Seventeenth Prize Essay Competition)

Translated from The Officers' Club Magazine—Japan—by Lieutenant F. S. G. Piggott, R.E.

'Victory and defeat are independent of the relative strengths of the forces engaged: they depend solely on the possession or not of that fierce spirit of attack which demands the destruction of the enemy with the *arme blanche*.'

INTRODUCTION

THOSE people who are fascinated by the invention of smokeless powder, the fine mechanism of firearms, and the great advance in the standard of manufacture, are inclined to consider that the power possessed by these weapons is so great as to be practically unlimited in its effect, and that battles are decided solely by the fire action. Paragraph 232 of our old 'Infantry Training' states: 'An Infantry action is usually decided by the volume of fire . . . .' Paragraph 249 (1) says: 'Rifle fire in extended order is the principal method of conducting an Infantry engagement. This fire not only contains the enemy and prepares the way for our attack, but on occasions rapidly decides the result of the action. A charge is usually only carried out when either a great superiority of fire has been obtained at some decisive point, and the enemy has already begun to retire, or when he is only weakly holding a position.' It will be seen from this how much stress was laid on fire effect alone before the Russo-Japanese War; and the South African campaign only tended to confirm this tendency and further strengthen the opinion of the supporters of this theory. At this time the so-called decisive musketry range was a subject much debated, and

Works consulted: Detailed Reports on the War; *Infantry Training*; *The Officers' Club Magazine*; Major Yamada's *Elements of Tactics.*

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it was only after much investigation that it was fixed at about six or seven hundred yards for rifles. At this distance it was assumed that the result of an action was practically decided by fire effect, and that any subsequent charge was limited to driving off the remnants of the enemy. In short, the value of the *arme blanche* seems to have been temporarily forgotten by everybody at this period. The improvement in manufacture, and consequent increase of the killing and wounding power of the firearms then in use by the military Powers, tended only to further lead astray those who argued solely for fire effect as the deciding factor of an action. In the South African War the British Army failed to realise the right times and places for using cold steel, the reason being that study of this mode of attack had been neglected, and the use of the *arme blanche* almost disparaged.

Looking at instances in the recent Russo-Japanese War, where the combatants fought with the very latest firearms, one is convinced that the advocates of fire effect alone are mistaken in their arguments. Victory always attended the side which, with martial spirit roused and naked sword in hand, absolutely refused to yield; which fought on resolutely to the end, in combat after combat, and which had the grim determination of attacking and annihilating the enemy. However great the power possessed by rifles and cannons, it is not possible by their means, and theirs alone, to either drive the enemy from his works or to repulse an enemy who bravely advances with the intention of coming to close quarters. The final result in each case depends absolutely on the charge with cold steel.

Moreover, however accurate firearms may be, and however great their killing power, there are occasions when one cannot hope to make any use of them—*e.g.* in fog, on dark nights, in woods, in villages, or in close country. The only method of fighting then is to come to close quarters with the enemy and use the *arme blanche*.

General Dragomiroff remarks: 'It is often said nowadays that, though not absolutely unknown, bayonet fighting is very rare. The sole reason for this is that the enemy, like us, is unskilled in the use of this weapon. Yet it is a bayonet fight which shows the actual spirit and temper of the contending armies, and all other means of combat are only means to an end. For example, let us take two opposing armies, one of which, "A," considers that victory can be obtained by fire effect alone, and confidently believes that the enemy is unable to

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advance to a hand-to-hand fight. The other army, "B," while not belittling the power of firearms, still places chief reliance on cold steel. Now imagine a collision between the two armies: it is obvious that should "B" carry out a bayonet charge, "A" will be thrown into confusion and routed. It goes without saying that with present-day firearms bullets may be used instead of bayonets at close ranges, with this reservation, however. Unless the troops who resort to fire at close ranges are absolutely fearless, or, in other words, are well trained in the use of the bayonet, and prepared to attack with cold steel after their volley, rifle fire will avail little. If they are not so trained, rifle fire at close ranges is merely a waste of ammunition; in any case, if the soldiers are not prepared to engage the enemy with cold steel, their bullets will usually hit nothing but the air. During musketry instruction the men are behind cover, and are in the pleasant position of being able to destroy their imaginary enemy from a distance, while they themselves are absolutely safe, and consequently a feeling of dislike to facing danger is engendered. It follows therefore that if too much stress is laid on the value of shooting, though the soldiers will become very skilful shots at long ranges, they will strongly object to advance and engage in a fight with bayonets.'

There are probably many reasons why in our last war we were victorious in every engagement. But no one can deny that one of the most important factors was that everyone, from the officers downwards, being absolutely confident of victory, and exerting themselves to the utmost, was imbued with that spirit of attack which is satisfied with nothing less than a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy with the *arme blanche*.

Attack

The attacker's most earnest wish is to get in touch with the enemy without firing a shot, and settle with cold steel the issue of the engagement. But as the enemy will not allow this, one has to overwhelm him with fire as a means of approaching him. This fire is therefore only a preparation for the real attack, and is, in fact, an expedient adopted to enable the actual fight to be carried out. The progress of modern firearms has recently been very rapid, and their power enormously increased; the science of fortification has also advanced, so that the defender has many material advantages. His confidence is

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thus increased, and he is enabled to offer a more stubborn defence. In addition he has the feeling that a retreat under modern firearms means practical annihilaton, which also tends to make his defence more desperate. Before the recent war with Russia, those debaters who were obsessed with the study of the South African War leant too much towards theory, and put too much reliance on the effect of Artillery and rifle fire, so much so that it was enunciated that a bayonet charge should never be attempted in daylight.

But in the Russo-Japanese War there were a great many occasions when a bayonet charge, even in broad daylight, settled the issue of the day. I am therefore of opinion that the theory that it cannot be carried out by day is a futile argument based upon a mistaken conception of the workings of the mind. For it is usual, in the face of death, for men to be absolutely unaffected by the horrors of the battlefield—to be, in fact, like machines—and this point seems to me to be the flaw in the argument of those who maintain that the carnage of a daylight bayonet charge is such as will prevent its ever being successfully carried out. Again, the effect of Artillery and rifle fire is definitely limited. You may be able to overwhelm the enemy with fire, but you will not be able to drive him away or repulse him; and to capture his position you must use cold steel. In 'Infantry Training,' Part 2, paragraph 38 (1), it is accordingly laid down that 'as the enemy cannot be driven off by rifle fire alone, it is necessary for the attackers to carry out a charge, on which the final result must depend.' Two or three actual instances from the late war are given below.

The Charge of the First Division at Nanshan

At the Battle of Kinchou, on May 26, 1904, the First Division had approached the enemy's position at Nanshan. From about 9.10 A.M. the whole strength of the Division was engaged in a fierce preparation for an attack; but not only did the enemy's Infantry show no signs of wavering, but if even a small party of our soldiers showed themselves a hot machine-gun fire was directed upon them; in fact, the hopes of a successful attack were very slight.

In the case of the right wing of the Division, although the first line reached a point about 200 yards from the enemy's wire entanglements, our rifle and shrapnel fire had no effect against the strong

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parapets with loopholes and overhead cover which the Russians had constructed in three tiers on the north-east slope of Nanshan, and the difficulty of carrying out an attack was obvious. But the Division had received orders to advance to the attack, however impossible it might appear, from the Commander-in-Chief, and the General Officer Commanding First Division issued the following attack orders: 'At 3 P.M. the Commanders of both wings will again prepare for the attack; the right wing will prepare for action without any reserves, dividing the force into assaulting parties, and settling the order in which these parties should charge. The charge will be made on the road Kinchou —Ta-Fang-Shen, where there are no wire entanglements, the troops being formed up in column of fours to a flank.' At 3.30 P.M. the bugle sounded the charge for the right wing, and the first assaulting party (about one section) advanced by rushes from the southern extremity of Liu-Chia-Tien. Although some two or three dauntless soldiers succeeded in getting close to the wire entanglements, the whole force had fallen before traversing 50 yards. Following this, the second assaulting party (about one Company) bravely charged over the bodies of their dead and wounded comrades; but the men of this party too had all fallen before going 50 yards—in fact, the tail of the column had not left Liu-Chia-Tien.

The Officer Commanding First Infantry Regiment then placed himself at the head of the third assaulting column with the war flag, and led a fierce charge. At once the standard bearer was wounded, and the Adjutant fell; another officer took the former's place, but he, too, fell, and the Regimental Commander himself was wounded. In this way the third charge, like its two predecessors, proved abortive. But our first line of riflemen had been gradually creeping up until they were close to the wire entanglement. From here they poured a terrible fire upon the enemy, who at last, about 7 P.M., showed signs of wavering. A magnificent Infantry charge, in conjunction with a tremendous machine-gun fire, finally drove back the enemy, and Nanshan was occupied.

The Attack on Toyoda Yama at the Battle of Liaoyang

The General Officer Commanding Twelfth Division, during the Battle of Liaoyang, when attacking the enemy to the north of Chieh-Pang-Ling, divided his force into a right and left wing. He ordered

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the right wing to occupy the line from 'One Tree' Pass on the left to North Pa-Pang Ling on the right by 2 A.M. on August 26; advancing from there to endeavour to seize the line from Kitsuritsu Yama (about 1,000 yards north of San-Chia-Tzu) to Hun-Sha Ling by dawn. At the same time the left wing was ordered to occupy the line from the hill to the west of Enchozan to Sankakuyama by 2 A.M. on the 26th, and if possible to seize the enemy's defensive line from Ta-Han-Po Ling to Pang Ling by dawn.

On receipt of these orders the right wing Commander ordered Colonel Hirai to attack the enemy at Hun-Sha Ling with the 46th Regiment of Infantry (less one company), one section Horse Artillery, and one section Engineers. Colonel Harada was ordered to attack at Kitsu Ritsu Yama with two battalions and two companies of the 24th Infantry Regiment. Five Cavalry troopers were attached to each of these forces.

While the 46th Regiment was advancing from Chao-Chia-Pu-Tzu towards North Pa-Pang Ling at 10.35 P.M., one sentry of the enemy was encountered; he was run through, and at the same time about twenty troopers driven off. Advancing, forty of the enemy's Infantry, who were holding the crest about 200 yards to the south-east of North Pa-Pang Ling ('solitary pine tree'), were dispersed by a bayonet charge. From 1 A.M. on the 26th a part of the regiment began to attack a hill (Toyoda Yama) 273 metres high. This is the highest point in the range of hills running between North Pa-Pang Ling and Hun-Sha Ling, and, rising abruptly, commands the whole range. As this was the vital point of the enemy's position he had attached great importance to its defence, and held it stubbornly to the end. The slope of this mountain on our side was nothing less than a precipice about 45 feet high, and the width of the range along which we could advance was only wide enough for about one squad to deploy. Both sides of the mountain were just as if they had been cut clean away, they were so steep, and were consequently almost impassable for troops. The slope on the enemy's side of the mountain (the Hun-Sha Ling direction) was rather less steep, and the enemy's troops were just able to advance and retire upon it.

At 1.20 A.M. the 3rd battalion (Toyoda Battalion) of the 46th Regiment advanced under cover of the darkness to quite near the enemy, and with the greatest bravery attempted a charge. But owing

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to the desperate defence which the enemy made our men were unable to seize their position, which may well be described as impregnable. The attacking force then collected under the precipice and assaulted again, and after that a third and a fourth time; but the only result was many casualties, and not a single portion of the position was captured. So the time passed till 3 A.M. At 3.10 A.M. the party under Lieutenant Mudaguchi charged up from the enemy's left flank and just succeeded in reaching the summit of the hill, where they effected a lodgment. But the enemy holding the rest of the position continued their stubborn defence, and poured a heavy fire upon our men. Lieutenant Mudaguchi then charged into the midst of the enemy and was killed. Captain Uratsuji and 2nd Lieutenant Tomonaga were wounded, and casualties among the rank and file increased so fast that half the party were placed *hors de combat*, while all the time the enemy's strength gradually increased. Lieutenant Sagara then charged again with his section, but he fell, and half of his men with him. And the enemy's strength was now one battalion.

At 5.30 A.M. two field guns and two companies of Infantry opened a fierce fire from an eminence to the north-west of Pei-Kou, on the right flank of the 3rd battalion, who were still attacking Toyoda Yama. Our section of Artillery, in position on the ridge about 1,500 yards to the north-east of this hill, at once replied to this fire, and one company of the Toyoda Battalion itself engaged these troops.

The Officer Commanding 46th Regiment now sent two companies from his 2nd battalion to reinforce the 3rd battalion.

The action being fought by the regiment at North Pa-Pang Ling made very little progress towards a decisive result between 7 A.M. and 1 P.M. The 3rd battalion (Toyoda Battalion), in order to seize Toyoda Yama at all costs, were engaged all this time in a desperate struggle. The 1st battalion (Tachibana Battalion) were engaged with the enemy on Pe-Kou Hill, and the 2nd battalion (Hyojo Battalion) having occupied Hun-Sha Ling were carrying on a musketry duel with the enemy.

At 2.40 P.M. the 3rd battalion again attempted to carry the whole of the Toyoda Yama position, and massed under a cliff to the north of the hill. The enemy had been steadily bringing up fresh troops in this part of the position, and the comparatively small area was searched by a concentrated Artillery and musketry fire; on our side

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the casualties among orderlies and ammunition carriers were unusually heavy. After a time the opposing forces met on the summit of the hill, and a terrible hand-to-hand fight ensued for the possession of a small knoll. Aimed rifle fire at twenty or thirty yards' range, individual bayonet encounters, and even the hurling of large stones, combined to continually swell the casualties on both sides. When those in front fell the ones behind pressed forward over their comrades' bodies, and were themselves killed or wounded; some perished also by falling over the cliff—a drop of thirty or forty feet. The regimental Commander now sent the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion to assist the 3rd Battalion. But this reinforcement was separated from the scene of the combat by a very steep hill and deep valley, and was unable to advance to the support as quickly as desired. In addition to this, no sooner did the enemy observe the party than they turned a terrible artillery and musketry fire upon it and prevented its advance.

At 3 P.M. two companies of the enemy, with the apparent intention of recapturing the whole of Toyoda Yama, suddenly delivered a charge, and reached a point over the heads of our men massed under the cliff; the position of the latter force became momentarily more and more perilous. Lieutenant Yokoo, officer commanding 12th Company, climbed up the side slopes with his men and attempted a charge, but he and nearly all his force were either killed or wounded by the superior rifle fire, by bayonet thrusts, or by stones. It was now that Major Toyoda led a forlorn hope with the remaining men of his battalion. Captain Nishioka died with two bullet wounds and a stone wound. Lieutenant Kitajima and 2nd Lieutenants Kobayashi and Tomonaga were wounded again; and 2nd Lieutenant Kibumi and Sergeant-Major Niihara also fell. But the bravery of our officers and men became even more magnificent in their despair. The enemy were eventually overpowered rather by the abstract spirit of our men than by the actual concrete numbers of dead and wounded. Eventually, step by step, the enemy were driven over the edge of the cliff by 3.30 P.M., and a severe fire was poured upon them as they fled in disorder. Our casualties were 101 killed and 314 wounded; in addition to this there was scarcely a single officer or man in the 3rd Battalion who was scathless. The enemy's dead left on the field amounted to 130. These figures give some idea of the terrible severity of the struggle.

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The Attack of the Okazaki Brigade on Lan-Tung Shan at the Battle of the Shaho

On October 12 the enemy had offered a very stubborn resistance until the evening near Lien-Hua Shan, and on the northern part of the high ground west of Yang-Cheng-Sai. At 11.50 P.M. Major-General Okazaki's force (the 15th Infantry Brigade, four batteries of Artillery and one company of Engineers) had occupied the high ground south of Yang-Cheng-Sai, having proceeded by way of the high ground west of Shao-Ta-Kou and the highest hill to the north of that place. They there received orders to await the effect of artillery fire and then attack the enemy near Lien-Hua-Shan.

Major-General Okazaki's force having occupied all the ground from Chien-Shao-Ta-Kou to the high ground east of that place, engaged the enemy, who had halted on some high ground about 1,000 yards to their front. At 1.30 P.M. on October 13 about one brigade of the enemy began to mass at the north foot of the hill to the north of Shih-Miao-Tzu, and appeared to be going to deliver a counter-attack. Major-General Okazaki, seeing this, realised the importance of occupying Lan-Tung Shan before them, and at 2.30 P.M. sent forward the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment. But when the battalion reached within some 200 yards of the enemy, the latter received a fresh access of strength, and a severe struggle took place. On seeing the position of affairs, the Artillery of both sides also concentrated their fire on the spot, which became like a veritable shambles, so that it was impossible to say with whom victory would ultimately rest. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment now went forward to reinforce the 1st Battalion, and at 3.20 P.M. the commander of the regiment himself advanced with the rest of his force, but the enemy's strength steadily increased, and he showed no signs of yielding. At this time the 'Kobi' Infantry Brigade, belonging to the 10th Division, entered Yang-Cheng-Sai, but though reaching the north end of that place, could not advance further. The Officer Commanding 16th Regiment then asked the Brigade Commander if he could advance towards Cheng Shan. All the time that the fight was in progress the enemy's force continually increased, so at 5.10 P.M. it was decided to carry out a charge. After a tremendous struggle the enemy were finally driven from the top of the mountain, from whence a heavy pursuing fire was poured on them, inflicting severe losses. But the

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price we had paid for the occupation of Lan-Tung Shan was very great. Only about three or four officers per battalion were left, and the whole regiment mustered less than 1,000 rank and file. It will be understood from these figures how terrible the struggle had been. After the loss of this hill the enemy's position was rendered hopeless: they withdrew from Cheng Shan, and at about 6.30 P.M. part of the 16th Regiment, with some of the 'Kobi' Brigade of the 10th Division, occupied this hill without meeting with any resistance.

When the enemy's resistance is very stubborn, as illustrated in the above examples from the recent war, one might well argue that it would be better to abandon a charge by daylight, which seems to invite unnecessarily very great losses, and attempt to seize the enemy's position by a night charge, in order to lessen the number of one's casualties. This is undoubtedly so, and we are aware that the improvement in firearms must tend to make night attacks in future very common; yet, as in the case of the 1st Division at Nanshan, when the force of circumstances renders it necessary to issue orders for a daylight charge regardless of loss, what action is proposed? Will one merely say it is impossible to charge by daylight, and postpone it till night? As illustrated in the attack on Toyoda Yama, the intention was to drive the enemy off by night, but the object was still unattained when daylight came.

If one waits and is attacked by the enemy, or advances and attacks him, the losses are the same. But from the point of view of morale, an advance to the attack is better than being attacked, and has the additional advantage that it may end in the capture of the enemy's position. At such times it is obvious that the best plan is to charge straight into the midst of the enemy, prepared for annihilation. As laid down in our 'Infantry Training,' paragraph 121, 'However fierce the fire of the enemy, and however heavy the casualties, soldiers must be cool and collected, applying themselves to whatever they may be doing: they must never waver. Those who feel alarm, or draw back, will certainly meet with a crushing defeat. It must be always remembered that victory is usually obtained by a fierce and determined advance.' In cases where there exists a vital point for both armies, as in the attack on Lan-Tung Shan, in order to ensure the future success of the operations, it is absolutely essential to fight even though risking annihilation. As already discussed, one may

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be tempted to avoid the use of the daylight charge with the *arme blanche* on account of the accuracy and power of modern firearms. But there are times when one must use it, either because one is ordered to do so, or for other reasons: when one considers that victory usually attends a determined and resolute advance, there appears to be no argument in favour of abandoning a daylight charge. So we must realise that hereafter the charge with cold steel by daylight will frequently have to be carried out.

Although in this latest campaign there are plenty of instances where the charge with cold steel settled the issue of the fight, the occasions when the enemy has been driven out of his works by the bayonet alone are rarer. Further, the troops who have carried out a charge without waiting for the effect of their own side's artillery and musketry fire have been usually repulsed, and have invited a disaster verging on complete annihilation.

It is admitted that the value of cold steel from the point of view of morale is very great. What is it that accounts for our men standing in a rain of bullets absolutely indifferent to the carnage of the battle-field, which is such as appals both heart and eye? For their calmness in the firing line, and the way they do not waste ammunition, but pour in a telling fire? For their brave and resolute advance against the enemy? Simply this spirit of attack, and the prospect of using the *arme blanche.* And the result has usually been the defeat and destruction of the enemy.

Port Arthur, proud in its strong fortifications, fell not by the might of ordnance, but by the might of those so-called 'human bullets.' In fact, it might be stated without exaggeration that the fall of Port Arthur's iron walls was the gift of that spirit which sends men to the assault, burning to use cold steel.

One may use great cannon of immense power, which hurl devastating shells, or one may have recourse to mining, and blow up the enemy's walls. Yet one cannot compass the fall of a fortress by human intellect and machines only. For the enemy will also use similar means, and meet us on our own ground—the result being only the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the day. It is at such times that the fierce bravery which demands cold steel must urge us on, so that, becoming human bullets, we dash at top speed into the enemy's position. The final victory is obtained by this means only.

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Superiority of material can never break the spirit which is bent on using the *arme blanche*. And this spirit only becomes the stronger when steel actually meets steel.

From the arguments set forth above, we may learn the following points.

(1) The increase in the power of firearms gives the defender such material advantages as must considerably enhance his ability to make the attacker pause. Provided the defender is not of very weak mental calibre, he should aways be able to resist so stubbornly that it is impossible to drive him out by fire effect alone. Therefore the occasions when the attacker *must* use cold steel will continually increase; and the occasions when one will call upon that spirit which is determined on an assault with sword and bayonet will become ever more numerous.

(2) In order to destroy the enemy and achieve the object of the attack, recourse must be had to the *arme blanche*. Otherwise one cannot fire calmly in the firing line. One's confidence must be high and patience great, and the terrible sights of an Infantry combat must not affect one, if one hopes to bring the fight to a successful conclusion. Calm in the determination to use the *arme blanche*, we can overwhelm the enemy by fire effect; then, seizing the right moment, we can dash upon the enemy with indomitable and unyielding bravery.

Defence

The defender makes use of the nature of the ground, renders his position as inconspicuous as possible by means of works, prepares plenty of ammunition, determines the ranges to prominent objects, and awaits the attack. From a material point of view it is clear that most of the advantages are with him. Even when he is attacked by an enemy superior in numbers he can calmly think out the situation, and there is no reason why he should not hold the enemy in check, and eventually repulse him. As the attacker advances nearer and nearer, he shows a target to the defender ever increasing in size, and even if the marksmanship of the latter be indifferent, he should still be able to inflict very heavy losses on the attacking force. In fact, there is no end to the arguments in favour of the defender. But in spite of this, when the enemy approaches, the losses inflicted on him relatively decrease, despite the increasing size of the target he offers—a

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fact showing the actual state of affairs to be diametrically opposed to the arguments in his favour. The reason is that the defender lacks complete confidence, and his bullets fly aimlessly in all directions. The cause of this is that as the attacker approaches, the defender becomes less and less inclined to meet him in a hand-to-hand struggle. If the defender has the courage to meet the attacker, and engaging him with cold steel, fight to the end, there would be no such useless and stupid waste of ammunition. Rather would he inflict practical annihilation on the attacker, and force him to abandon his assault. Our 'Infantry Training' lays down, Part 2, paragraph 73, that 'Should the enemy enter our position, the garrison must fight desperately to the end. . . .' Again, Part 1, paragraph 122, says, ' . . . , should ammunition be exhausted, and the force completely surrounded by the enemy, you must rely on your bayonets, and still strive to obtain the final victory.' General Dragomiroff says: 'It is an accepted fact that with modern firearms at close ranges the bullet can be used instead of the bayonet. But this only applies to soldiers who have no fear of a hand-to-hand fight; *i.e.*, those who, thoroughly trained in the use of the bayonet, will not refuse a fight with cold steel after their volley. Otherwise firing at close ranges is a synonym for waste of ammunition. In any case, unless the soldiers are such as will not refuse a hand-to-hand combat, it is usual for their bullets to hit nothing but the air.' As an example of how important the *arme blanche* is to the defender, I give below an actual instance from the recent war.

The Defence of the neighbourhood of Pen-Hsi-Hu at the Battle of the Shaho

A little after 11 A.M. on October 11, 1904, the Artillery of the enemy in the direction of Pen-Hsi-Hu appeared at several places on the right bank of the River Tai-Tzu; the number of pieces was not less than thirty-six, and these, together with eight pieces on the left bank, opened a tremendous fire on every part of our position. At one period the smoke from the bursting shells completely obscured the front of our position. About the same time a large force of the enemy began to gradually come up from the east. At first the strength of the enemy advancing against the Shiba Battalion was about two or three battalions; against the Honda and Fuba Battalions about one

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regiment; and against the Hirata and Nakagawa Battalions about one battalion. At about 3 A.M. (P.M. ?) about 14 battalions of the enemy were visible, and a large force of their troops were also occasionally to be seen in rear—the total force of the enemy being between one and a half and two Divisions. As such a large mass of troops could not, from the nature of the ground, be deployed at one time, it was divided into smaller bodies; these, under cover of artillery fire, doubled along the folds of the hills, ravines, or similar cover, and collected in the dead ground in front of our position. Then, under cover of a fierce artillery fire from the rear, they began scrambling up the steep side of the hill in bodies of from two to five companies, according to the front they occupied, and, brandishing their bayonets, charged against us. Our troops, in desperation, poured a hot fire upon the enemy; where the nature of the ground prevented this, they hurled stones, or rolled down great boulders upon them. Rocks were fetched up from the rear slope when the supply on the top of the hill was exhausted. The enemy too fought with the courage of despair; when those in front were driven back, those in rear repeatedly charged, as if they would never give in until our position was in their hands. The Honda and Fuba Battalions and the Nakagawa and Hirata Battalions did not receive more than three charges in all; but the Shiba Battalion was charged no less than six times in succession. But at every point the enemy was repulsed on each occasion, and not a single foot of the position was given up. One reason for this was the great assistance received from the nature of the ground, but another was certainly due to the loyalty and bravery of our troops. Although the enemy's assault failed, he never desisted in his efforts for more than a short time, while retiring to a ravine or to the dead ground in front of our position; and from such cover, waiting for a suitable opportunity, he came on to the attack again and again. During the whole time the two forces were confronting each other, the distance between them varied from about fifty yards at the closest to two or three hundred yards at the farthest.

On this occasion the severest fighting was in the neighbourhood of the Shiba Battalion, where the enemy's strength was nearly three times as great as ours, and where also the supply of ammunition was on the point of giving out. Although the enemy came on to the attack on six separate occasions, each charge was successfully driven back. The

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reason why the battle of the Shaho resulted in a victory for our army is clearly to be found in the fact that our battalion commanders and their men all possessed that brave spirit of attack which made them prepared to fall upon the enemy with cold steel should he force an entrance into the position. We see from this that if one wishes to ensure one's defence being perfect one must certainly rely on the *arme blanche*. Otherwise, should the enemy get to close quarters, agitation is bound to make itself apparent, the fire of the defending rifle will be expended on the atmosphere, and the defence will fail.

Night Fighting

The general advance of all the military technical arts goes on from day to day, and shows no sign of stopping. Hence movements of troops under cover of night have become frequent, and the tendency nowadays is for these occasions to still further increase. During the late war it is said that the night attacks actually delivered by our troops were some fifty or sixty in number.

The secret of success in a night attack is to creep up stealthily to close quarters and then to suddenly attack with sword and bayonet. If the attacker makes use of fire he unnecessarily informs the enemy of his plans, and sacrifices the greater part of his advantage. If, however, he advances making no use of firearms, the defender is uncertain of the attacking force's strength, position, and direction of approach, and his anxiety is correspondingly increased. (The occasions when there is a bright moon, or the snow is on the ground, and it is of advantage to prepare for the attack by rifle fire, are distinct from the above.) In other words, if we can skilfully approach to close quarters and suddenly make use of sword and bayonet, we cause the enemy's consternation to be very great, and the result of the engagement is soon put beyond doubt.

It is unnecessary to point out the dangers of defence by night, but it must be remembered that the attacker also runs great risks. Hence, unless very great courage is shown, it is unlikely that either the attack or the defence, as the case may be, will succeed. Darkness makes cowards of us all; a slight obstacle or a small element of danger immediately causes undue agitation, and troops are thrown into confusion. Owing to the difficulty of seeing clearly a proper look-out cannot be kept; at such times this disadvantage can be overcome by the spirit

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which leads one to fight with the enemy at close quarters with sword and bayonet. In fact, the *arme blanche* is the only weapon which troops ought to rely on at night. Troops who do not possess this spirit necessary for such combats are, it is almost unnecessary to point out, not likely to be able to successfully carry out an attack.

By night the defender is able to depend on firearms much less than by day; however accurate they may be, he is hardly able to make any use of them. Owing to the difficulty of observation at night he cannot take proper aim at his target; he is only able, as the attacker gets close, to notice slight noises, and fire in the direction from which the sound comes. As he can thus only make use of fire effect at short ranges, is it likely that the defender will be able to roll back the attack of an intrepid enemy? At such times only those soldiers who, in General Dragomiroff's words, 'are well trained in the use of the bayonet, and will not refuse to use it at close quarters after their volley,' can be expected to fire calmly. As the enemy gets closer the defender must charge and endeavour to destroy him with sword and bayonet, otherwise he will merely invite destruction. In our 'Infantry Training,' Part 2, paragraph 89, we find: 'In a night defence it is not always possible at the right moment to co-operate with neighbouring troops or to expect help from those in rear. Therefore each party must be prepared to resolutely defend its own locality. At close ranges an attempt must be made to destroy the enemy with fire effect; the closer he gets the fiercer musketry fire must be poured upon him, hand grenades thrown, and at the crucial moment a determined counter-attack with bayonets must be delivered.' Does not this show to what an extent one must rely on the *arme blanche* during the defence of a position at night?

Some examples of night attacks and night defence from the late war are given below.

The Counter-attack of the Guards' Division at Oharayama

On October 12, 1904, the 3rd Guards' Infantry Regiment (less one battalion) began to carry out a certain movement. In order to advance from Oharayama to the high ground east of Pa-Chia-Tzu, the 2nd Battalion was sent along the right slope of the crest line, and the 3rd Battalion along the crest line itself and to the west of the crest line. The 8th Company was the regimental reserve. The 3rd Battalion

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advanced with the 9th and 11th Companies in the first line, and the opposing patrols, already very near, met almost at once on the skyline. The two companies drove off the enemy's patrols and advanced; the enemy covered the retreat of his men and opened a fierce fire upon us. Both companies, with the intention of driving off the enemy, at once resolutely advanced to the charge, but without success. In addition the enemy's strength on the crest line gradually increased, and all the ground in front was occupied by him. Owing to the disadvantages of the ground and the odds against them the two companies were quite unable to seize the position. They then took cover from the enemy's fire, arranged their ranks, and awaited the arrival of the battalion. In the meantime both company commanders had died a glorious death. The Officer Commanding 3rd Battalion now sent up his remaining two companies to the firing line.

After the 2nd Battalion had begun its movement it assembled on the north-west slopes of Oharayama and arranged its ranks. It was then that they heard for the first time the cheers from the direction of the battalion on their left. The enemy's left wing increased on the crest line, and opened a rapid fire against the battalion; the latter, without replying, sent the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies into the first line, and, throwing out scouts for a short way in front, advanced in co-operation with the 3rd Battalion.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, now in conjunction, arranged their ranks and prepared for the assault. After a rapid fire for a short time they climbed a very steep slope, and, forcing their way through some low bushes, charged with the greatest bravery against the enemy's line. The latter met our men as soon as they were near with a volley of bombs and stones from the shelter trenches they had constructed in rear of the crest line. Our intrepid officers, N.C.O.s and men, refusing to be beaten back by the enemy's resistance, charged into the enemy's actual position, where, in a series of hand-to-hand combats, it was impossible to count the numbers of dead and wounded. But the enemy, appearing to receive a fresh access of strength, resisted even more strongly, and the number of our men who fell was so great that it was impossible to say with whom victory would ultimately rest. In addition to this the 2nd Battalion received a severe enfilade fire from a circular-shaped trench on the left flank, and the difficulty of our task became even greater. Then both battalions arranged their ranks once more,

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and, charging again and again, eventually succeeded in driving the enemy from his position. The Russians left two or three times as many dead as ourselves on the field. At 5 A.M., when they retired—the main body north-west and another party due north—the sun had not yet risen, and it was still dark in every direction.

The 12th Division's Attack at Dawn near Ta Ling

During the battle of the Shaho, at about 4.30 A.M., on October 12, some two companies of the enemy assaulted our position at Gunkiyama (on the east of the main road), near Ta Ling. At almost the same time about one battalion attacked the position on the right flank, approaching from a valley east of the hill. The garrison, consisting of one section under Lieutenant Kugen, fought bravely against great odds, and kept the enemy at bay for some time, in spite of being attacked both in front and rear. The leader fell, nearly all his force were killed, and eventually the hill fell into the enemy's hands. Colonel Ota now came up to the support, but it was already too late. It was then determined to recapture the position, and an assault was made with the 1st Company, 2nd Company (less one section) of the Reserve, and the 3rd Company of the 24th Regiment. The attack was not successful owing to the enemy's withering fire and consequent heavy casualties on our side. The assaulting column then halted half-way up the hill, under cover, and waited a more suitable opportunity. One section of the 24th Regiment now came up as a reinforcement, and a second assault was carried out. The acting commander (Captain Saigawa) and the officer commanding 3rd Company (Lieutenant Kagamiyama) fell, and a great many officers and men were wounded. In spite of this the party came to close quarters with the enemy, but the latter held on obstinately to their position and showed no signs of yielding. Colonel Ota, seeing that the second assault was now about to fail, himself led one section from the 2nd Company (which formed the last reserve) to the charge. Just at this moment dawn broke, and our artillery in position near the main road opened a hot fire upon the enemy on Gunkiyama and on his reserves massed under the north foot of the hill. Seizing this favourable opportunity, the assaulting party charged with its whole line. The enemy now directed their bullets on the war flag, and Colonel Ota, the adjutant, and standard-bearer were all killed or wounded. The flag was handed on from man

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to man as each successive standard-bearer fell, and eventually one of the privates succeeded in planting it on the summit of the hill. As soon as the enemy on Gunkiyama were defeated they retreated into the valley, together with the force who had charged on the west side of the high road. The valley of Kao-Chia-Pu-Tzu was full of the enemy's men, as they fled north by whatever roads they could find. Our infantry, aided by a battery of artillery, opened a fierce pursuing fire upon the Russians, who, utterly routed, left many dead and wounded in the valley. Their numbers were at least three battalions. The enemy's artillery north of Ta Ling now opened fire to cover the retreat.

The Night Attack and Night Defence of the 12th Division near Shih-Huai-Yo

At the battle of Mukden the object of the 12th Division was to seize the first line of the enemy's position near Shih-Huai-Yo on March 5. The left wing was ordered to seize part of this line. The right wing was ordered to occupy the interval from the high ground north of Tai-Mai-Kou to Huang-Mu-Chang after the centre had wheeled, to engage the enemy in the direction of Che-Tou-Ling and Tung-Kou Shan, and to guard the interval between the 2nd Division and the left wing. The centre was ordered to start immediately the sun set and assemble in the valley north of Hun-Chi-Kou by dawn on the 5th at latest. These orders were issued at 6 P.M. on March 4. In addition the 1st Battalion of the 47th Regiment (part of the reserve) was ordered to come under the orders of the Officer Commanding left wing, after covering the wheel of the centre column. The Engineer Company attached to the centre column was also ordered to come under the orders of the Officer Commanding left wing.

During the evening of the 4th the Commander of the left wing distributed his force as follows, with the object of capturing the enemy's position on the high ground north of Pien-Niu-Lu-Pu-Tzu.

(1) The Officer Commanding 24th Infantry Regiment, with his regiment (less one battalion and two companies), a half-troop of Cavalry, and one section of Engineers, were to drive off the enemy from Pien-Niu-Lu-Pu-Tzu at 4.30 A.M.; they were then to attack the enemy's first position on the high ground north-west of Hua-Chia Ling.

(2) The Officer Commanding 47th Infantry Regiment, with his

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regiment (less one battalion), a machine-gun section, a half-troop of Cavalry, and one section of Engineers, were to combine with the 24th Regiment and assist in the occupation of Pien-Niu-Lu-Pu-Tzu; they were then to attack the enemy's first position on the high ground north of Chien-Ku-Chia-Tai.

In accordance with the above, the 3rd Battalion (less one company) of the 47th Regiment formed up at 4 A.M. near some sharply-rising ground about 1,500 yards north of Ta-Liu-Yo, and the 2nd Battalion (less one company) formed up near Hsiao-Liu-Yo at 3 A.M., preparatory to attacking. The 3rd Battalion had two companies and one section in the first line, and one company (less one section), the machine-gun section, and half a section of Engineers in reserve. The right wing connected with the 24th Regiment, and the line of advance was towards the sharply-rising high ground west of Shih-Huai-Yo. The 2nd Battalion had three companies (less two sections) in the first line, and a reserve of two sections of Infantry and half a section of Engineers. The line of advance was towards a salient spur east of Chien-Kao-Chia-Tai. Reconnoitring in every direction, both battalions quietly began their advance, and at 4.20 A.M. their first line arrived at the left bank of the River Pien-Niu-Lu-Kou, the right flank resting on a point west of the southern part of Pien-Niu-Lu-Pu-Tzu. The ranks were now arranged for the assault.

The first line of the 47th Regiment now advanced, with each battalion leading independently towards its objective. The 3rd Battalion, after crossing the River Pien-Niu-Lu-Kou and proceeding about 100 yards, was fired at from some high ground in front. Having silenced this, the battalion was about to advance again, when the enemy opened a fierce fire from the south end of Shih-Huai-Yo and from the high ground to the west of that village. At the same time the 2nd Battalion received a hot fire from Chien-Kao-Chia-Tai and the high ground to the west and east of that place. Both battalions then halted, and replied with a brisk musketry fire from their whole line, but being under a cross fire they suffered a great many casualties. Notwithstanding this, they continued the unequal fight with the greatest gallantry. Dawn was now approaching, and both battalions, bringing all their reserves into the firing line, made a determined advance. With a fierce charge they reached a point about ten yards from the enemy's first position. The enemy's work was not only a

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very strong one, but his force was also twice the strength of ours. Our casualties increased continually before the stubborn resistance we encountered. The companies in the first line now threw hand grenades; taking advantage of their effect, the 3rd Battalion charged with its full strength against the salient west of Shih-Huai-Yo and the high ground west of that again; the 2nd Battalion against the high ground west of Chien-Kao-Chia-Tai. After a terrible hand-to-hand struggle these positions were at last captured. The 3rd Battalion, with the machine-gun section, opened a hot fire on the retreating enemy, the 2nd Battalion chased them from the field with one party, while the remainder of the battalion directed a pursuing fire after them. The strength of the enemy against us was about four battalions, and one officer and fifty rank and file were left dead on the field as they retreated to their main defensive position. The defence here was even more stubborn. Our battalions now began repairing the position they had captured from the enemy, and putting the adjacent nullahs into a defensive state; shelter trenches were also rapidly constructed, and our occupation was made as secure as possible. The battle became less strenuous with the halt of our troops, but about noon the enemy near this place received an access of strength. Especially was this the case near San-Cheng-Tzu Shan, opposite the left flank of the position we had occupied, where reinforcements of from one to two sections of Infantry were every now and then brought up. In the afternoon a portion of the enemy advanced to a counter-attack, but the storm of shrapnel and rifle fire which we poured upon them threw them into disorder, and they retired again within their main defensive position.

From now onwards there was little change in the situation. The enemy's Artillery occasionally shelled our left flank and artillery positions, but did little damage. At 4.20 A.M. on March 6 some of their Infantry appeared on the high ground north-east of Pien-Niu-Lu-Pu-Tzu, but retired under cover again after our Artillery had played upon them for a short time. At 3.40 P.M. a small body of the enemy's Infantry began to move up to a counter-attack, and delivered an assault at three different places, but our musketry fire was so severe that they suffered great losses, and retired to their main defensive position, leaving about thirty dead on the field.

About dusk the enemy opened fire upon us from all along his line; his Artillery, and some machine-guns from a closed work in particular,

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fired very fiercely against our Infantry line. Then about two battalions of his Infantry advanced to the attack under cover of fire from the whole length of his defensive position. They reached points varying from twenty to eighty yards from our first line, and by 11 P.M. had delivered four desperate assaults, all of which were, however, driven back by our Infantry. During this time the Infantry of both sides used musketry, hand grenades, and stones, and a portion fought fiercely with their bayonets. Eventually the enemy's strength was broken, and he retired within his main defensive position, leaving many corpses on the field.

As these actual instances from the late war prove, both night attacks and night defences must be ultimately dependent upon the use of the sword and bayonet; if they are not so carried out success in neither branch of warfare will be achieved. If the Russian troops opposing our night attacks had realised that they must fight to the last with cold steel, and continued a little longer their stubborn defence, it is impossible to say whether our men would have driven them from their positions or not. Also, when our troops were defending against a night attack, it must be universally admitted that the reason the attackers were always beaten off was undoubtedly because our men had the brave determination to fight hand to hand with cold steel should the enemy come to close quarters. Consider also the conduct of our men in the attack. Was it not usual for them to show the utmost zeal to come to grips with the enemy and use sword and bayonet? In the case of the force attacking Gunkiyama all the officers fell, and the war flag had eventually to be carried by a single private soldier. Yet there was no halt in the advance; the brave determination with which the enemy's position was carried was sufficient to make the high gods weep at such heroism.

It must be admitted that the value of the *arme blanche* in night fighting is enormous.

Conclusion

As discussed above, provided the enemy's troops are not of very inferior quality, and are possessed of ordinary reasoning faculties, it is not possible to settle the issue of an engagement by means of fire effect alone—the final decisive struggle must depend upon the *arme blanche*. It is therefore laid down as the second principle of our 'Infantry Train-

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ing ' that ' the principal aim of an Infantry combat is to first overwhelm the enemy by musketry fire, and then to destroy him by means of a charge. Musketry plays a very large part in an action, and is of vital importance as a method of fighting for Infantry; but it is the bayonet charge which is the deciding factor at the end.'

Consequent on the notable advance of the military technical sciences, it goes without saying that everyone will be more and more terrified at the power exercised by them. But it has already been pointed out that those troops who are able to ignore the terrible state of the battlefield and fight successfully to the end are those who depend at the finish on the use of the sword and bayonet at close quarters. Accordingly the need of the *arme blanche* will hereafter continually increase. It may be said without exaggeration that the army which does not possess the courage to engage the enemy with cold steel at close quarters is practically incapable of sustaining an action. The *arme blanche* exercises such an influence on us that only those troops who are able to use it in a combat are capable of calmly directing an effective fire on the enemy when the two forces come to close quarters, and of dashing into the midst of the enemy regardless of his strength or weakness. The spirit which prompts one to engage in a hand-to-hand fight with cold steel is the most potent factor of victory; possessing it, we carry out our duties on the battlefield calmly and without agitation. Victory and defeat are independent of the relative strengths of the forces engaged—they depend solely on the possession or not of that fierce spirit of attack which demands the destruction of the enemy with the *arme blanche*. Thoroughly trained troops are those who have such an inexhaustible supply of this spirit that, even if their leader falls, the remainder of the force is undismayed, and charges into the midst of the enemy regardless of death.

As the second principle of our ' Infantry Training ' we find: ' Overwhelm the enemy with rifle fire and then destroy him by a charge.' In both individual and company training rapid fire has been eliminated, and steadiness and composure are obtained by ensuring skill in the use of the sword or bayonet. Company training teaches that in battle the company is the unit which, revolving round the company commander, unites the soldiers' martial spirit into the solid foundation of *morale*. One of the duties of both officers and men is to inspire the principle of the *arme blanche*, and even in the skirmishing line to

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endeavour to get to close quarters with the enemy as soon as possible. For this reason, advancing by rushes for short distances, or in small parties, must be avoided as injuring the spirit of intrepid advance. In addition to the above, the advantages of everyone being determined to get to close quarters with the enemy are explained in many places in the 'Manual.' The fact that there are no occasions when the *arme blanche* is not needed gives one some idea of its value.

It is the *arme blanche* which gives us the spirit to advance; it also decides the final stages of a battle. But, as explained in 'Infantry Training,' artillery and rifle fire play such a large part in the progress of any encounter that one must not ignore their effect. Ordinarily speaking, the charge with sword and bayonet should not be attempted until the preparation by fire effect has been fully carried out. If the effect of rifle and artillery fire is ignored or disregarded, and cold steel brought into use too soon, the result will be failure, and one will be merely following in the footsteps of the British Army in South Africa.

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CAVALRY SABRETACHES

(*Concluded.*)

By D. Hastings Irwin

Regiment.	Facing.	Lace.
19th Light Dragoons	Yellow cloth face, 1812	Gold
19th Lancers . .	Black patent-leather with gilt mounts, 1818 to 1821, when the regiment was disbanded.	
19th Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1861 to 1902. Figure 4, plate IV.	Gold
	Shows the sabretache last worn. The scarlet face is edged on three sides with gold lace of regimental design, with a white silk stripe down the middle, and with a gold cord across the top. The embroidery is all gold, with silver and coloured silk threads in the crown, which has a crimson velvet cap. Below the monogram is a silver embroidered elephant, having a dark-blue velvet scroll above and below it, edged with gold thread. The upper scroll is embroidered in gold letters with the word '*Assaye*'; and the lower one with '*Niagara*,' with laurel-branches on each side.	
20th Hussars . .	Crimson cloth face, 1861 to 1902 . . .	Gold
	The last sabretache that was worn is shown on plate IV., figure 5. The crimson face is surrounded on three sides by gold regimental lace with a crimson silk stripe down the centre, and with a gold cord across the top. The crown has a crimson velvet cap inside it, and is embroidered in gold, silver, and coloured silk threads. Two blue velvet gold-edged scrolls are inscribed '*Peninsula*' and '*Suakin*, 1884,' respectively. The remainder of the embroidery is of gold. Prior to the Egyptian War only one scroll inscribed '*Peninsula*' was worn below the regimental number.	
21st Hussars . .	Scarlet cloth face, 1861–1864 . . .	Gold
„ . .	French-grey face, 1864–1898	Gold
21st Lancers . .	Black patent-leather, 1898–1902	
	Figure 6, plate IV., shows the design of sabretache worn whilst the 21st was a Hussar regiment. The regimental lace bordering the sides and bottom has a silk stripe of French-grey down the centre, all the embroidery being of gold. The crown has a crimson velvet cap, and is embroidered in gold, silver, and coloured silk threads. The 1861–64 design was exactly the same.	

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Regiment.	Facing.	Lace
Royal Horse Artillery	The face of the sabretache has always been of dark-blue cloth edged all round with gold lace. Prior to 1837 the design was the Sovereign's cypher surmounted by a crown. The ornamental design shown on plate I., part I., was introduced in 1837, and was worn until the abolition of the sabretache in 1902.	Gold

Referring to the plates, figure 1, plate III., shows the last sabretache worn by the 4th Hussars. The face is of scarlet cloth embroidered in gold. The battle honours are embroidered in gold on dark-blue silk scrolls, and are '*Dettingen,*' '*Talavera,*' '*Albuhera,*' '*Salamanca,*' '*Toulouse,*' '*Affghanistan,*' '*Alma,*' '*Inkerman,*' '*Sebastopol,*' '*Balaklava,*' '*Ghuznee,*' '*Peninsula,*' *and* '*Vittoria.*' The regimental braid bordering the sides and bottom of the sabretache has a scarlet silk stripe down the centre.

Figure 2 shows the first sabretache worn by the 15th Hussars in 1815. It has a scarlet cloth face, surrounded by broad silver lace of regimental design, with a heavy edge. The double cypher '*G.R.*' is embroidered in silver, as are also the two scrolls. The upper one is inscribed in gold letters '*Merebimur,*' and the lower one '*Emsdorff.*' The Imperial crown is embroidered in gold, and coloured silks.

Figure 3 shows the sabretache worn by the 7th Hussars. The face is scarlet, and the lace and embroidery are gold. No battle honours or Royal cypher were ever worn on the sabretaches of this regiment.

Figure 4 represents the sabretaches worn by the 8th Hussars at its abolition. On the scarlet cloth face the Royal monogram is embroidered in silver; and the battle honours are embroidered in silver letters on gold-embroidered scrolls, as follows:—'*Lasswaree,*' '*Alma,*' '*Inkerman,*' '*Central India,*' '*Sebastopol,*' '*Balaklava,*' and '*Hindostan.*' The regimental motto '*Pristinæ Virtutis Memores*' is embroidered in silver letters on a gold-embroidered scroll between the Imperial crown and the Royal cypher. The rest of the embroidery and the regimental lace are of gold.

Figure 5 shows the sabretache worn by the 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards in 1830. The face is of dark-blue velvet, surrounded by broad gold lace of regimental design. In the centre is the Silver Star of the Order of St. Patrick, with the central design embroidered in gold, silver, and coloured silks, surmounted by an Imperial crown. The sprays of shamrock are embroidered in gold, as are also the regimental title number and battle honours.

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Figure 6 shows the design of the last sabretache worn by the 13th Hussars, one of the handsomest of the series. The cloth face is white (buff in the Dress Regulations), with gold embroidery, and with the battle honours '*Peninsula,*' '*Waterloo,*' '*Balaklava,*' '*Alma,*' '*Inkerman,*' and '*Sebastopol,*' embroidered in gold letters, on light-blue silk scrolls. The regimental number is surrounded by a light blue silk circle charged in gold letters with the regimental motto '*Viret in Æternum.*' The rest of the embroidery is in gold; and the Royal crown has a crimson velvet cap inside. The regimental lace on three sides of the sabretache has a white silk stripe down the centre.

Figure 7 is the last 'tache' worn by the 14th Hussars. It has a scarlet cloth face surrounded on three sides by gold regimental lace, and with a gold cord across the top. Below the monogram is the regimental crest, the Prussian Eagle embroidered in gold. The following battle honours are embroidered in gold letters on blue silk scrolls: '*Douro,*' '*Fuentes d'Onor,*' '*Vittoria,*' '*Peninsula,*' '*Chilianwalah,*' '*Persia,*' '*Goojerat,*' '*Punjaub,*' '*Orthes,*' '*Salamanca,*' and '*Talavera.*'

Figure 8 represents the last embroidered sabretache worn by the 1st (Royal) Dragoons in 1854. The face is of dark-blue cloth, all the embroidery and lace being gold. The words '*Peninsula*' and '*Waterloo*' on the upper and lower lace are embroidered in silver.

Figure 9 shows the sabretache worn by the 15th Hussars at the time of its abolition. The face is of scarlet cloth, and the embroidery is all gold with the exception of some of the arms in the central device, which are of silver. The following battle honours are embroidered in gold letters on gold scrolls: '*Emsdorff,*' '*Villers-en-Couche,*' '*Egmont-op-Zee,*' '*Sahagun,*' '*Vittoria,*' '*Peninsula,*' '*Waterloo,*' and '*Afghanistan,*' the whole being surrounded by gold lace of regimental design.

Figure 1, plate IV., shows the 'tache' worn by the 10th Hussars from 1820-1830. The face is of scarlet cloth surrounded on three sides by broad gold lace of regimental design, outside which and across the top is an edging of twisted gold cord. The Prince of Wales' plumes, the double '*G.R.*' cypher, and the olive branches behind the scrolls are embroidered in silver. The crown, regimental number, and the blue velvet scrolls are embroidered in gold. The battle honours are '*Peninsula*' and '*Waterloo.*'

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

DRESS SABRETACHES.

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

DRESS SABRETACHES.

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Figure 2 shows the sabretache worn by the same regiment in 1850. The lace and embroidery are all gold with the exception of the Prince of Wales' plumes, which are silver. The face is of scarlet cloth, and the two battle honours are embroidered on dark-blue velvet scrolls.

Figure 3 represents the 'tache' worn by the 16th Lancers in 1847. It has a dark-blue cloth face edged all round by gold lace of regimental pattern. All the embroidery is gold, and the pennons on the crossed lances are of scarlet and white silk. The following battle honours are embroidered in gold on crimson-velvet gold-edged scrolls: '*Talavera,*' '*Fuentes d'Onor,*' '*Salamanca,*' '*Nive,*' '*Bhurtpore,*' '*Maharajpore,*' '*Sobraon,*' '*Aliwal,*' '*Ghuznee,*' '*Peninsula,*' '*Vittoria,*' '*Waterloo,*' and '*Affghanistan.*'

Figure 7 shows the design of sabretache worn by the 18th Hussars in 1860. It is similar to that illustrated in figure 7, plate I., part I., but the regimental lace surrounds the four sides; and the regimental motto, '*Pro Rege, pro Lege, pro Patria conamur,*' is embroidered on a blue silk scroll below the two battle honours.

Figure 8 shows the sabretache worn by the '*Royal Malta Fencible Artillery.*' The lace and embroidery are all gold, with the exception of the Maltese cross in the centre, which is silver. The central garter is of blue velvet, embroidered in gold letters '*Royal Malta Fencible Artillery.*' The name is also embroidered on a scarlet velvet scroll below the gun, as is also the battle honour '*Egypt,* 1882.' The face is of dark-blue cloth.

In addition to the regimental sabretaches, in 1822 General Officers of Light-Dragoons, Dragoons, and Hussars wore sabretaches of special design, but I have been hitherto unable to trace them with sufficient accuracy to describe them. There is so much 'artistic license' introduced into old military pictures and portraits as to render many of them quite unreliable as records of uniforms. It is a matter of regret that no complete collection of uniforms exists in this country, as it is an interesting subject which has not received the attention that it deserves. We are in this respect a long way behind either France or Germany, where many very complete and interesting collections exist. The most complete collection in this country is that in the United Service Museum; but this is mainly due to individual effort, and might have been greatly enriched had the discarded sealed patterns from the War Office been added to it from time to time.

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SCHOOLS OF MUSKETRY AND CAVALRY FIRE-TACTICS

By Captain E. ff. W. Lascelles, *3rd (P.W.) Dragoon Guards.*

Almost every day sees the publication of fresh views, the advancement of new theories, or *réchauffés* of old or previously expressed ideas in regard to the action of Cavalry when on foot.

Much has been written and said by officers and others seeking for the solution of the problem, and perhaps still more has come from the pens of those ill qualified to express opinions. Very brief consideration of the question will suffice to eliminate the immaterial factors and enable a clear view to be taken of the broad principles. We start from the established premises that much of the work of Cavalry in future wars must be done on foot, and with the rifle, and that the importance of the arm has in no way diminished on this account.

The question then arises: 'What are to be the dismounted or fire-tactics of the Cavalry?' In regard to this question, there are among the soldiers of the world two clearly defined and unmistakable schools of thought, one of which is typified by the instructions contained in our 'Cavalry Training Manual,' and the other by those contained in the German Regulations for Cavalry.

To quote the first, we are told that 'A protracted fire-fight is unsuited to the action of Cavalry. Consequently a gradual reinforcement of the firing-line is out of place. It is preferable to employ as large a number of rifles as possible as soon as the enemy's dispositions are clear, and to develop the greatest fire-effect from the moment the leader decides to open fire. . . .'

This may be described as our doctrine in a nutshell. The essence

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of the opposing doctrine is as follows:—'Modern Cavalry is capable of opposing, even in attack, any and every enemy. . . They must not be content with mere threats—half-hearted dismounted action contains the germ of failure. The attack consists in carrying the firing-line forward, when necessary, to the closest ranges. It culminates in an assault which breaks down the enemy's resistance.' At a glance it is seen that there is as much difference between these two 'schools of thought' as there is between the proverbial chalk and cheese.

Each view has found able exponents outside the pages of the official manuals. Sir Douglas Haig has said: 'Whereas the ruling maxim for the employment of fire by Infantry may be said to be that fire should only be opened when it is considered likely to be effective; in the case of Cavalry the importance of securing the highest results by fire has to be considered in connection with the retention of the power to break off the action whenever it may be advisable to do so. Moreover, a prolonged fire combat will be the exception for Cavalry. Its action must be swift and decisive, and the object will usually be attained by means of accurate and highly concentrated rapid fire.'

Per contra, and as exemplifying the ideas of the opposing 'school,' we have the views of an equally well-known Cavalry soldier, General von Bernhardi, who says: 'For the conduct of the fight on foot the same principles hold good as for the Infantry. The duties and conditions of the fight are similar, and demand similar general tactical directions.'

The Germans contemplate the distribution of the troops taking part in a dismounted attack in *depth*—firing-line, supports, and reserves; the last-named body, however, remaining mounted. We do not contemplate such tactics as these—we look for the development of the greatest possible fire-effect from the moment that fire is opened.

The problem differs in the British and German Cavalries. Our Cavalry is numerically so weak that it is almost impossible for us to contemplate distribution in depth. Assuming that our one and only Cavalry Division of four brigades was acting dismounted according to the German theory, keeping one brigade mounted in reserve, and using three-fourths of the remaining three brigades on foot, we should only have some 2,000 rifles for firing-line and supports. By employing purely Infantry fire-tactics we should find it difficult to carry out a successful attack against, say, even one isolated battalion well posted;

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whereas, by using the mobility of our horses and making convergent attacks on front, flanks, and rear, we might easily surround and capture or destroy any unsupported battalion in a comparatively short time.

The Germans have forty-six brigades of Cavalry (not organised in divisions permanently). These brigades are composed of two regiments of five squadrons each in peace and four in war. Under our present arrangement for horse supply such German brigades of eight squadrons would be stronger than our brigades of nine squadrons.

The German theories are evolved under the assumption that Cavalry corps of three or four divisions might be employed under one commander, and in such case formations in depth might obviously often be advisable, for limitations of ground and positions of neighbouring troops might render converging attacks and galloping to close range impracticable.

So much for the general tactical principles governing the employment of Cavalry dismounted. Now to the question of what may be termed 'fire-tactics' proper. In the first place, it is necessary that any confusion likely to arise as the result of a misapprehension as to the meaning of particular terms should be avoided. Therefore some distinction between the term 'tactics' in its general application and the term 'fire-tactics' is necessary. 'Fire-tactics' has been adopted as a term to be 'conveniently used to describe all methods of fire action by which practical effect is given to tactical dispositions.' In this there is no ambiguity.

Assuredly if the principles underlying the 'tactical dispositions' in general of two given arms differ to a material degree, then also must the 'fire-tactics' of the two arms in question differ. The absolute interdependence of 'tactics'—considered in the broadest sense—and 'fire-tactics'—as applied in a necessarily restricted sense—needs no emphasis, being self-evident. The 'fire-tactics' of Cavalry whose employment dismounted is in accordance with the precepts contained in our Training Manuals must therefore differ in many essentials from the 'fire-tactics' of Cavalry conforming to the regulations laid down for the German Cavalry. This being so, the next question that arises is: 'Is the instruction afforded by the several Schools of Musketry to officers and non-commissioned officers of such a nature as to ensure complete adoption of "methods of fire action by which practical effect will be given to tactical dispositions?"'

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Further, 'Do the "Musketry Regulations" clearly indicate in what way the tactical dispositions of dismounted Cavalry may be given practical effect to?'

Before endeavouring to reply to these questions let it be clearly understood that the musketry training of the soldier is not in question. The mere manufacture of the tool is not under consideration—the method of its handling is the matter to which investigation is directed. It will be convenient here first to reply to the second question.

The 'Musketry Regulations' constitute the authority and guide not only for the Regular Army but for the Territorial Force at home and the various forces scattered throughout the Empire. No inconsiderable portion of the forces of the Oversea Dominions consists of 'Mounted Rifles,' whose tactics are those of dismounted Cavalry, and not of mounted Infantry; and what guidance do the Cavalry, besides the Yeomanry and other irregular horse, obtain from the 'Musketry Regulations'?

Three paragraphs only of the book are devoted specially to the question, and read as follows:—

'The principles defined in this chapter will be found generally applicable to the training of small units of Cavalry. But in the case of squadrons and larger bodies, where ground of sufficient dimensions is available, schemes should be framed to bring into prominence the circumstances under which recourse should be had to fire action, as laid down in "Cavalry Training."'

'The scope of the exercises will necessarily vary with the extent of ground at the disposal of the troops, but due consideration should be given to the practising of commanders in rapid occupation of successive positions, from which sudden bursts of fire from an unexpected quarter can be brought to bear on the objective selected.'

'Special attention should be devoted to skill in making fire effective from the first opening, preliminary orientation and ranging, anticipatory orders for fire direction, rapid advance to the fire position, simultaneous opening of fire in full volume and control of fire to ensure a means of rapidly breaking off an action if necessary.'

These paragraphs are open to the charge of containing nothing that is not of the nature of vague generalisation. The soldier having occasion to consult a Training Manual is entitled to expect that he will find within its pages some indication of how to do a given thing.

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As at present situated, the dismounted horse-soldier must wade through much that is immaterial to him, and winnow from the mass that portion which is applicable to his arm. And, be it remembered, that in many quarters where the 'Musketry Regulations' are to be found there is no one to interpret their meaning. Officers who have had to do with the training of irregulars are well aware of this fact.

Even so far as the regular Cavalry alone are concerned, the regulations cannot be considered satisfactory, as no clear lead is given, and too much is left to the caprice of individuals. The reply to the second question, then, is in the negative.

As to the 'Schools of Musketry,' during most courses insufficient attention is directed to the question of Cavalry fire action. Such lectures as are given are excellent as summaries, but of little value in aiding the Cavalry soldier to determine how the conclusions regarding Cavalry fire tactics are arrived at. It is all very well to say, 'Apply what is learned at a School of Musketry in conformity with the instructions contained in "Cavalry Training"!' But the student at the school is in most cases a junior officer, or non-commissioned officer ill qualified to sift the corn from the chaff.

Metaphorically speaking, the Cavalryman leaves our musketry schools with his ideas regarding Cavalry 'fire-tactics' very much 'in solution.' What appears to be necessary is something that will either crystallise or precipitate that portion of the teaching that is particularly applicable to the Cavalry arm. The answer to the first question, then, is also in the negative.

As to remedies, a point that appears worthy of consideration is whether it is not advisable that the courses of instruction should be modified in order that effect may be given to the 'mobile' idea as embodied in 'Cavalry Training' instead of maintaining the present system, which would appear to tend towards the inculcation of the ideas pertaining to what may, for want of a better term, be described as the 'immobile' school of thought.

The desired result might be obtained in two ways, the first and more preferable way being through the medium of the appointment of qualified Cavalry instructors to the staffs of the respective Schools of Musketry; the course undergone by the Cavalry officer and non-commissioned officer to be so modified that the concluding week or ten

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days should be devoted to work strictly applicable to the arm to which the students belong.

The alternative to this suggestion lies in the provision at the Cavalry Schools at home and in India of the necessary facilities for the study and application of Cavalry fire-tactics.

There can be no doubt in the minds of Cavalry officers who have considered the question that much is lost of the valuable instruction already afforded by the Schools of Musketry simply owing to the absence from the staffs of the schools of an officer trained as a Cavalryman, and to deal with the problems peculiar to Cavalry. The defect could be remedied with ease, and the results could not fail to be satisfactory.

'Cavalry Training' clearly lays down the principles that are to govern the action of the arm when dismounted. The Cavalry soldier is entitled to ask that every facility shall be afforded him of learning to give practical effect to those principles, and the writer is of opinion that at the present time the facilities fall short of requirements in the direction indicated in the foregoing pages.'[1]

[1] Since the above was written it has been stated in the Press that the appointment of a Cavalry officer to the staff at Hythe is contemplated.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Revue de Cavalerie.—The March number opens with two letters written by Cavalry officers, the one to General Berthier, the other to the First Consul. The first is an appeal for the retention of the cuirass, the existence of which then appeared to be menaced, and the appeal seems to have been made on sentimental rather than on material grounds. The second letter is written to the First Consul by the Commander of the Cavalry of the 2nd Polish Legion, pleading that his command may not be dismounted, it having been proposed to transfer them as Infantry to the service of the Cisalpine Republic. Murat would seem to have interceded on their behalf, and the regiment was transferred as Cavalry in 1802 and served in the Kingdom of Naples; was then re-numbered the 1st Lancers and sent to Spain, being finally made the 7th *Chevau-légers lanciers,* and serving to the close of the Napoleonic wars. 'L.N.C.' contributes a dismal paper on what he calls the *délaissement* of the French Cavalry, and declares that if matters continue to go on as at present, its uses on service will not justify the expenses incurred on its account during peace. Cavalry regiments have, he declares, nowhere any manœuvre grounds of a size suitable for instructional purposes, and consequently their only opportunity of practising manœuvre is during the periodical concentration. He further complains of the absence of an Inspector of Cavalry, and that even the number of divisional generals of Cavalry has been cut down in order to benefit the other arms. He urges, then, that every year the whole of the Cavalry should spend at least a fortnight in a suitable manœuvre area; that Cavalry divisions should be permanently organised; that horse artillery should be told off to them; that the divisions should have each their own general; and finally that an Inspector of Cavalry should be appointed who should act as director of all the more important Cavalry manœuvres. The recent election of General Langlois to the Académie Française is made the occasion of the inclusion in this and in the April number of an account of all soldiers who have been admitted to this honour from the foundation of the Académie in 1629 to the present day. 'The Study of the Dismounted Fight' finishes in this number; as previously mentioned, it is chiefly concerned with proposals for changes in the existing regulations, but it concludes with some more particular suggestions; the sword to be attached to the saddle on the off-side, since with the sword on the near and the carbine on the off-side, as now, the dismounted cavalryman has, we learn, to *faire le tour de son cheval* when seeking his carbine preliminary to the fire fight; it is admitted that to 'draw swords' from the off-side is less graceful, but it is claimed that it is more easily and more quickly performed than from the near side. The writer

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advocates equipping the Light Cavalry with one *fusil mitrailleur* per squadron —presumably something of the nature of the Rexer arm is meant—and that these should replace the present machine-gun sections. The writer then enters upon a discussion—which may occasion some surprise—as to whether the Cavalry bayonet is an offensive weapon or not, and decides in the affirmative; he suggests it be not worn in a frog on the belt, but attached, under the fore-end, to the carbine. He further proposes a reserve of ammunition per squadron at the rate of two pack animals each carrying two boxes containing 600 rounds. 'The study of the combined action of the three arms' is continued, examples being taken and commented upon, from the Franco-German and Russo-Japanese wars. This number concludes with another appeal for the early appointment of an Inspector of Cavalry in France.

General Canonge opens the April *Revue* with an account of a charge by Austrian Cavalry at the crisis of the battle of Magenta. General de Chabot follows, urging the all-importance of simplicity of manœuvre for Cavalry, and particularly for a Cavalry composed of men of limited service. "*Nous demandons un Chef*" is the title of another appeal for the appointment of an Inspector of Cavalry. 'The study of the combined action of the three arms' is concluded in this number.

Colonel Cordonnier opens the May number with a study on *la puissance morale dans la guerre,* illustrated by examples culled from the battle of Valmy, of which the writer considers that *la puissance morale n'a pas de plus beau triomphe.* This study contains a vivid sketch of the army commanded by Dumouriez, a short account of the battle, and a very brief biography of Dumouriez himself, at that moment *honorable, grand, l'homme nécessaire.* Then follows a paper bewailing the diminution in the strength of Cavalry regiments—particularly those belonging to the *Cavalerie de l'Est.* During last year the engagements and re-engagements in the Cavalry were so numerous, thanks to the special efforts which were made and the attractions which were offered, that many corps attained a strength of 1000 of all ranks. Lately, however, those in authority have felt themselves obliged to press the advantages of the Colonial army, and the number of men who have engaged or re-engaged therein seems to prove that such men do not 'take on' from patriotic motives, but are merely attracted by the high rate of pay offered, since the bounty for re-engaging in the Colonial Army appears to be exactly double that offered for the Cavalry. As a remedy it is suggested that men should only be allowed to re-engage for the regiments in which they are serving, no transfers being permitted. Captain D'Aubert writes on *La cavalerie de demain,* and urges a strong plea for the vigorous offensive, by and with the Cavalry, in any war on the eastern frontier. The Count de Comminges, who has done so much for horseflesh in France, has an interesting paper on 'The Trakehnen stud and the East Prussian horse,' and Lieut.-Colonel Sauzey describes the achievements of the brigade of heavy Saxon Cavalry at the battle of the Moskova, where the regiments composing the brigade—the Garde du Corps and the Zastrow Cuirassiers—captured the Russian redoubt occupying the key of the position, neither regiment counting eighty combatants at the close of the action. Incidentally this paper gives one some idea of the immense *variety* of nationalities there arrayed under

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Napolecn's banners—even to what is called, with some justice, the *Harlequin* regiment, made up by men from five different petty German Duchies. Captain Pourcher contributes an equitation study called *Légèreté*; there is a short but sympathetic paper on the decline of the English saddle-horse, with a statement of the proposals lately made for the improvement of military horse-breeding; and finally an article rather critical than descriptive of *Le Raid Hippique des officiers de Réserve et de Territoriale.*

Spectateur Militaire.—Under the heading of *Idées et faits du jour* in the number dated 1st April mention is made of the difficulty which the French and Germans now find, equally with ourselves, in recruiting their officer corps. In France there has for some years past been noticeable a diminution in the number of candidates for entrance to Saint-Cyr, and a constant increase in the tale of resignations on leaving the *Ecole polytechnique.* The reason for these is found in the present slowness of promotion, and the fact that the military career no longer offers attractions superior to those of the other professions. In Germany it is pointed out that the difficulty in regard to the recruitment of officers has now become acute, and for several years the actual effectives have been greatly below establishments, especially in the Prussian, Saxon, and Wurtemberg contingents. The deficiencies are especially great in the Infantry, where in 1910 the difference between strength and establishment amounted to no fewer than 1319 in the rank of lieutenant alone. In Germany, too, army service no longer offers the same inducements, and the remarkable development of commerce and manufacture has drawn to these many young men who under former conditions would have sought military service. Equal difficulty is said to be experienced in Germany in recruiting officers for the reserve. *Une année d'instruction tactique des cadres dans un demi-régiment de cavalerie* is continued and offers many problems as to the employment of a small body of Cavalry acting with a mixed force of no great strength. In the number dated 15th April the translation from the Italian is continued on 'the employment of large bodies of troops,' and is here mainly concerned with the occupation of a position and the preparations for its attack and defence. *Les Allemands dans le Gâtinais* continues, while the account of the action at Héricourt in January 1871 is brought to a close. It is an account of special interest to us since it deals, more or less, with a people's war, the French troops being for the most part *Mobiles,* who fought with great bravery but were none the less defeated. Captain Chanson, who writes the account, concludes with the following quotation: "il ne suffit pas," disait Bismarck à Jules Favre, "d'armer un citoyen pour le transformer en soldat; s'il en était ainsi, ce serait une duperie que de consacrer le plus clair de la richesse publique à l'entretien d'une armée permanente. C'est parce que vous l'avez méconnu que vous avez eté vaincu."

In the number dated 1st May the question of the experimental reclothing of the French army in uniforms of a neutral tint is discussed, and a note of warning is sounded as to the resultant danger of the impossibility of distinguishing friends from foes. We are reminded of what happened in broad daylight, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, at Ville-sur-Yron, on the 16th August 1870, when French dragoons charged and sabred the Lanciers

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de l'Impératrice, having taken that regiment to be one of German Uhlans. The suggested methods of instruction in a *demi-régiment de cavalerie* are continued, and in this number are concerned with convoys and the work of the cavalry portion of the escort. There is a good deal of cavalry interest in the translation from the Italian, continued in this number, of the general rules for the employment of large bodies of troops in war, since 'pursuit and retreat' are especially dealt with. In the continuation of *Les Allemands dans le Gâtinais en* 1870, the cavalry operating on either side are unsparingly criticised; the regiments of the 1st Cavalry division attached to the Second Army were all 'heavies,' and being without a fire-arm it was always necessary to attach infantry to them, while their commander was wanting in initiative and resolution. The divisional Cavalry, on the other hand, carried out its duties well, particularly on the march, but *in* action the German cavalry furnished no reports, and lost touch *after* it. Of the French Cavalry in 1870 the writer said that it knew *ni le service d'exploration, ni le service de sûreté*. The writer mentions as a remarkable fact that the French troops invariably bivouacked, scrupulously avoiding the shelter of *French* houses, wherein the Germans always billeted their men.

The majority of these papers are continued in the issue of the 15th May, which also contains an interestingly critical article on 'the German officer'; the writer describes his manner of education and upbringing, his life in the army, and comments on the importance attached in Germany to 'race' in the officer corps. He finds that the German officer has few ideas and less knowledge outside his own profession; he then gives the German view of the Frenchman—even less flattering; *'les Allemands,'* he says, *'nous considèrent généralement comme de véritables décadents!'* This number concludes with the first part of what promises to be an interesting study of the Battle of Coulmiers.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—The number for the 1st April contains a paper on 'Reconnaissance by the Divisional Cavalry'; the author is not satisfied with this work as at present conducted, believes it might be very much better performed, and considers that the 'hustle' of modern manœuvres is mainly responsible for the duty being rather scamped. The criticism is mainly destructive; it is not quite clear what the writer would suggest for obtaining better results. Veterinary Surgeon Görte writes under date of the 6th April on the care of the sinews of the troop-horse. In the number dated 13th April there is a eulogistic article on the Chinese remount, and the opinion of many German Cavalry officers is quoted in his praise; it is admitted that he is only a pony, but it is claimed that in regard to strength and endurance no European pony can compare with him, while it is said that the breed might very easily be improved. He is also, it is very truly pointed out, the only horse of the country, and the only one, moreover, which could withstand for any long campaign the vicissitudes of the North China climate. Under date of the 23rd May, Colonel Wenninger has a good deal to say that is interesting and of value in contribution to the discussion whether the lance should, or should not, be taken with him by the dismounted cavalryman in addition to his firearm. The writer commands a brigade of Bavarian

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Cavalry, and has recently caused experiments to be carried out, and full reports thereon to be submitted, by two of his regimental commanders. The result of the tests is considered by Colonel Wenninger to clearly and finally establish that for the lance to accompany the trooper in the fire-fight confers no more than one single advantage—that it enables the led horses to be far more easily controlled, while also facilitating and expediting remounting. To carry the lance dismounted has none of the other advantages which have been claimed for it by certain writers in Austrian military journals, while the men are slower in opening fire, and when the lance is required for use as a weapon of offence—as the bayonet with the infantry—time is lost while the necessary preparation is made, *e.g.* the carbine must first be slung across the back, thus giving the adversary clear and timely notice that fire is about to cease. 'The lance,' says the writer, 'is the weapon of the *mounted* man, for employment in the collision of the charge and for the pursuit of the swordsman; for hand-to-hand work on foot it is too light, too easily broken, and too long.' Colonel Wenninger gravely adds that it makes but an indifferent leaping-pole or alpenstock!

Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—The first three papers in the March number are concerned with items of regimental history and are not therefore of general interest. Major-General Buxbaum contributes something of a chorus to Count Brühl's article in last December's number, in which he advocated the lance accompanying the cavalry soldier, when dismounted for the fire-fight, in order that it might be used as his offensive weapon. General Buxbaum is in cordial agreement with Count Brühl as to the dismounted trooper taking both lance and carbine with him; thereby the horse-holders can very much more easily and rapidly bring up the led horses when required, and the dismounted men can more easily regain their saddles. General Buxbaum even suggests that so far from the lance being in the way of the dismounted man, it will be a real assistance to him, using it as an alpenstock in rough ground and as a leaping pole for surmounting obstacles. In an article entitled, 'Carbine and Pistol,' Rittmeister v. Galli gives his opinion that the detached cavalryman should be armed with an automatic pistol, since if fired upon, when dispatch riding, for instance, he cannot easily and readily reply. He considers that if by reason of the expense, such weapons cannot be issued to all ranks, a certain number should be on charge and thus issuable to men acting alone or in small parties—though the author is greatly in favour of a charge upon infantry or a battery being preceded by a rapid pistol fire from the saddle. This officer strongly urges that everyone of the soldier's weapons should be worn on the man and none of them on the horse.

Major von Chernel writes on despatch riding, in regard to which he considers that far more attention should be paid to instruction. Reliable and important information is generally sent in betimes from the front, but is often delayed in transmission owing to the report having been confided to any available orderly, rather than to a man who has been trained, with his horse, for despatch riding. Major von Chernel would replace the sword by an automatic pistol in the case of the despatch rider.

The April number contains the substance of a lecture, delivered by Major Count Zedtwitz, of the General Staff, at the Officers' Club in Vienna, on

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'The duties and employment of the divisional cavalry.' Space does not permit of dealing in any detail with the chief points touched upon in this important paper, but it may be sufficient to mention the following conclusions arrived at by the lecturer: (1) The duty of the divisional cavalry is above all to obtain security and to carry out close reconnaissance and reconnaissance during the fight; (2) for all other duties within the division, such as employment on outpost or for the maintenance of connection, the divisional cavalry should only be used in very exceptional cases; (3) it is not its business to try and open communication with the large cavalry bodies operating in the front of the main army. The maintenance of the necessary connection is the work of the army command; (4) the divisional cavalry must not be given work to perform to which, by reason of its numerical weakness and composition, it is unequal; (5) the divisional cavalry should be economised as much as possible and kept in hand for any all-important mission, for it must be borne in mind that, once used up, it cannot be replaced; (6) when circumstances permit, the divisional cavalry should be kept together so as to maintain it ready for action; (7) the work expected of the divisional cavalry must be most clearly explained and defined, while the actual execution must be left to the officer in command; (8) the adequate strength for the divisional cavalry is reckoned at two squadrons—it should not, however, fall below this; (9) every possible opportunity should be made use of, on the one hand, to instruct the divisional cavalry in the duties required of it, and on the other, to impress upon all commanders the manner and the limits of its employment. Major-General Gradinger contributes an appreciation of Prince Frederick Charles; this is to be continued. In 'Vollwertige Kavallerie' the suggestion is made that the three cavalry squadrons now attached as divisional cavalry to infantry divisions should be reduced to two, and that a hundred mounted infantry should take the place of the third squadron for duties of a less purely cavalry character. There is also a paper on 'Shying among horses,' an account of the operations of the Remount Department in the different German States, and an article on the horse supply for the Italian Army.

Major-General Buxbaum contributes to the May number of this journal a paper advocating that large cavalry bodies should advance upon as wide a front as possible; he admits that such a procedure, unless carefully practised in peace, will increase the difficulties of the higher command—both as regards dissemination of information and securing effective co-operation by the different portions of the mass, but, on the other hand, it is claimed that by moving on a very wide front the strategic cavalry will thereby mislead the enemy as to the objective of its advance. Major Kumme, of the 5th Dragoons, inquires 'to what extent can the cavalry of to-day exercise a decisive influence upon the battle?' He discusses the point with illustrations from different campaigns, and appears to come to the conclusion that the influence to be wielded by cavalry in the modern battle will depend almost entirely upon the personal attributes of the Cavalry Commander. Rittmeister Jagielski writes on the mounted and dismounted action of cavalry; while admitting that fire-power adds immensely to the value of cavalry, he does not consider that a cavalry body can set free enough men

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with rifles (or carbines) successfully to oppose regular riflemen. He would obtain the necessary fire-power by means of machine guns, and urges that four of these should be attached to every regiment of cavalry. 'O. W.' has a short paper welcoming the proposal to arm the Austro-Hungarian cavalry with a bayonet, when, as he points out, *die ganze Reiterei des Dreibundes* will be armed in similar manner. Other papers are on the organisation of the Russian Reserve Cavalry, on the command and training of a Horse Artillery Battery, and on the Veterinary Service in the Austro-Hungarian Army, with several other short articles, among which is one describing the last 'Grand National,' which the writer considers to have now ceased to be a real test of a first-rate steeplechaser, but as rather belonging to the category of bull-fights and long-distance competitions; the result of the race is now, he declares, decided by pure chance.

'Kavallerie Voran!' by Major-General Buxbaum. (Leipzig: Fried. Engelmann, 1911.) Price M. 4.50.

This is a reprint of nine short cavalry studies, all, or the majority, of which made their first appearance in the pages of the *Austrian Cavalry Journal*. The proposals and criticisms they contain are, naturally, primarily applicable to the German cavalry, of which arm General Buxbaum was a distinguished exponent, but there is much in them which British officers may find interesting and useful. In 'What Fashion lays down,' the author suggests that cavalrymen are inclined rather to overdo dismounted work, irrespective of the conditions prevailing at the moment; in 'Tradition' he warns his comrades against holding fast to old forms, because they *are* old, and that it is the *spirit* rather than the *forms* of past endeavour which should be preserved and held sacred for all time; 'Cavalry Corps' is something of an *apologia* for the meagre results of these new organisations in recent manœuvres, and which he attributes mainly to the hasty manner in which units, strange to one another and to whom their higher commanders were unknown, were brought together. In 'The Mounted Fight,' the author decries anew the tendency to take on all and every occasion to the carbine, and expresses the opinion that cavalry will find its opportunities for the charge under good leaders and in the more 'nervy' opponents of modern armies. There are two other purely cavalry studies on 'modern inspections' and on 'die Lanze beim Fussgefecht'—the latter of the nature of a reply to another writer, who had apparently advocated the dismounted cavalryman taking with him not only his firearm but his lance as an offensive weapon—a suggestion which has General Buxbaum's hearty approval. The General is already the author, if we are not mistaken, of a valuable biography of Seydlitz, and the concluding pages of this little book are occupied by a very interesting and human monograph on 'Seydlitz as a man,' which will well repay perusal and one would be glad to see translated into English, in which language there is no satisfactory biography of that Paladin of the Prussian cavalry.

'Questions and Answers for Cavalry, Yeomanry and Mounted Infantry.' By Major C. H. Anderson-Pelham, late 12th (P.W.R.) Lancers.

This booklet has run into its sixth edition, which vouches for its utility.

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'Wider Napoleon! Ein deutsches Reiterleben. 1806-1815.' 2 vols. Newly edited by F. M. Kircheisen. (Stuttgart: R. Lutz, 1911.) Price M. 9.

This is a new edition of the memoirs, which originally appeared some fifty years ago, of one who has been called the German Marbot, but who differed from his French prototype in so much that while Marbot fought only for and under the flag of France, the anonymous hero of the adventures herein recounted took service with the armies of any nation which could assist him to bear arms against Napoleon. Born in 1786, the son of a Rittmeister of Hussars, and a particular friend of Blücher, the writer of these reminiscences joined the 5th Blücher Hussars (now Queen Mary's Regiment) and made the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, which resulted in the utter downfall of Prussia and caused her to sink more and more under the dominion of the Corsican. The writer was concerned in many of the risings which had for their object the overthrow of the Napoleonic power, and finally joined the forces collected by the Duke of Brunswick, accompanying him in his progress through Germany. When this project also came to nothing, and the Duke betook himself with many of his followers to England, our Hussar also fled from Germany and for some time occupied a semi-military, but unpaid, position in Guernsey. Eventually, however, seeing no immediate prospect of active employment with his Brunswick Corps, he sailed for the Peninsula and joined the Allied Army at Lisbon shortly before the battle of Busaco and the subsequent retirement within the lines of Torres Vedras. Of quite exceptional interest to Englishmen is the account by the Blücher Hussar of all that he saw of our soldiers in the Peninsula, and of the impression made upon him by their conduct in the field and in quarters. Of our cavalry he says 'it was magnificent, mounted on big north-country horses, combining power with breeding.' In outpost duty he considered them inferior to the cavalry of the German Legion, but their charges were carried through with immense energy, and were wonderfully effective. 'The artillery,' he says, 'had splendid horses, guns and equipment. The British infantry were slow marchers and shot very indifferently, but charged bravely with the bayonet and ever evinced a steadfast courage which was not easily shaken.' Of their outpost work also he seems to have had no very high opinion, though it will be new to hear from this officer that, knowing this weakness in his British troops, Wellington habitually placed the outpost duty in charge of his Spanish and Portuguese allies!

The German Hussar officer joined the Light Division as attached to the staff of General Craufurd, and was frequently engaged until, having been badly wounded at Aldea del Ponte, he was invalided to England. Arrived here he determined to enter the Russian service, and proceeding *via* Sweden to St. Petersburg, he was appointed squadron commander in a regiment of Russian cavalry on the very day that Napoleon crossed the Niemen. At Borodino he was again seriously wounded, but recovered in time to assist in following up the remnants of the French army in its retreat from Moscow—of the scenes of which retreat he furnishes some ghastly details. When Prussia again drew the sword, our Hussar returned to her service, was engaged in several actions and won the Iron Cross at Leipzig. Despite his intense hatred of Napoleon, he cannot withhold his praise for

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his conduct of the campaign of 1814—comparing the Emperor to a lion, wounded and encompassed by the hunters, but turning upon and rending each in turn. Early in the campaign in Belgium the Hussar was temporarily attached to the British headquarter staff, renewing his acquaintance with comrades of Peninsular days, and reiterating his admiration for the physique and steadiness of the British infantry, and for the appearance of our cavalry regiments, magnificently mounted on horses '*mit denen wir Preussen uns freilich nicht messen konnten.*'

At Waterloo he was again severely wounded at the very moment when the Prussian troops arrived upon the field, losing his right arm.

These memoirs—which might well be translated into English—give a deeply interesting account, from many fields, of the stormy period they cover; the writer tells us much also of the barbarities of the guerilla war in Spain, and of the horrors of the winter campaign in Russia; but Englishmen will find their chief interest in the light the author throws upon Wellington's operations, and upon the qualities, good and bad, of the fighting men by whom those operations were carried out.

'Vade-Mecum of Organisation and Administration.' By Captain I. Demangel. (Forster Groom and Co.) *2s.*

This is a handy little pocket-book about four inches by three, containing a mass of useful information for everyday peace soldiering as well as for examination purposes.

'The Army Annual, 1911.' Edited by Lieut.-Colonel Brunker. (London: William Clowes and Sons.) *7s. 6d.*

This is a very complete work, dealing with all matters concerning the Army, from the annual estimates to the pay of the private soldier. All the latest developments, such as the air battalion, signal squadrons and mechanical transport, are reported. There are also included reports of last year's manœuvres at home, a lecture on 'Requisitions in War,' a summary of the Armies of Foreign Powers, an article on our 'Diminishing Army,' which gives the reverse view to that usually indulged in of the progress of our Army, and all subjects of interest to the Army generally.

'The American War of Secession, 1863. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.' By Colonel P. H. Dalbiac. The 'Special Campaign' series. (Messrs. George Allen and Co., Rathbone Place, Oxford Street.)

This history consists of eleven short and lucid chapters, and should be studied by all officers. It clearly brings out the fact that Hooker's misfortunes at Chancellorsville and Lee's unsuccess at Gettysburg were due to the wrong use of the cavalry by the Federals in the former and the Confederates in the latter case. There is not a superfluous word or phrase in the author's terse account of the happenings, whilst his criticisms bring out the causes of success and failure in bold relief. There are sufficient maps to illustrate the text, but all the places mentioned in the text are not to be found in the maps; this is a usual fault in such studies. We hope that every officer will study and digest this valuable little book.

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'Guide for Officers and N.C.O.s of the Territorial Force.' By Captain J. Atkinson. 2nd Edition. (Gale and Polden.) *2s.* net.

This book deals with everything a Territorial should know, from the choice of a tailor to the Conduct of a Rear Guard. There is a section on Horse and Stable Management of two pages, and another on Protection. Both these sections might with advantage be fuller, because they are two subjects on which great ignorance exists in England among all classes. There is also an appendix on Hygiene of one and a half pages to which the above remarks equally apply. It is a useful little book.

'Story of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, in Europe.' By Lieut.-Colonel Brunker. (Forster Groom and Co., London.)

As the author states in his preface, this book has been written as an outline to assist candidates in various Military Examinations from May 1911 to October 1913.

'Bussaco.' By Lieut.-Colonel G. L. Chambers. 260 pp., with maps and illustrations. (Swan, Sonnenschein and Co.) *7s. 6d.*

The author briefly reviews the events leading up to the battle, and deals in detail with the course of the battle itself. The description is put in an interesting way and easy to follow. The special feature of the book is the careful study of the ground which it affords by means of a number of excellent photographs.

'The Outlines of Military Geography.' By Colonel A. C. Macdonnel, late R.E. (Hugh Rees and Co.) *12s. 6d.* net.

The author commences with a general summary of the manner in which geography affects strategy. He then states shortly the influence of geography on questions of interest at the present time and examines the lines of invasion and defence of various European countries. Separate chapters are devoted to Africa, the Near East, the Far East, and to Canada. Other chapters deal with strategic waterways and canals, projected railways, defended ports, dockyards and coaling stations, and, finally, food supplies, cables and wireless telegraphy.

Explanatory maps, which in some cases fail to show places mentioned in the letterpress, are contained in a separate volume.

Any book of normal size in which so many important subjects are reviewed must necessarily be of the nature of a summary. This book, therefore, will be of use only to those who are beginning to study military geography, or to those who are going up for examination and who want to obtain a superficial knowledge in a short space of time.

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NOTES.

RESULT OF PROBLEM NO. X.

This problem, which appeared in the January number, has evidently created much interest throughout the various Mounted Branches of the Regular, Territorial, and Colonial Forces, both at home and abroad.

The solution of Sergeant W. Reeves, 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars, Rawal Pindi, India, which is given below, has been adjudged the best, and the prize of the 'Cavalry' Watch has been forwarded to him.

Solution :—

When I arrived at village 'B' I should send back and ask my squadron leader to post a signalling station on hill 800 at village 'B.' This hill commands all the surrounding country, and is quite close to the squadron.

The snipers who were retiring S.W. of 'B' would in no way make me follow them. I would send on a small patrol consisting of one Corporal and three men to reconnoitre hill 700 W. of 'C,' and if the reports sent back were satisfactory, I should then occupy it with my troops.

I should then send a Corporal and one section to reconnoitre through village 'C' and also the river bed. I should send another Corporal and three men to hill 700 further W. of my position, to try and watch which direction the snipers had taken.

The village of 'C' has been recently occupied, but a few single horsemen are seen at hill N. of 'D.' These may be the enemy's rearguard moving towards Sopot. I should leave a small post on hill W. of 'C' and move with the remainder of my troop and reconnoitre village 'D.' On arriving at village 'D' I should occupy hill N. of that village, and should at once try and get into communication with the signalling post on hill 800 at village 'B.'

From village 'B' the messages would be taken to the squadron leader at village 'A' by mounted orderlies.'

The Committee of the CAVALRY JOURNAL desire to thank Major R. E. McI. Lomer and Captain E. ff. W. Lascelles, 3rd (P.W.) Dragoon Guards, for kindly setting the problem and acting as referees.

His Imperial and Royal Highness Frederick William Victor Augustus Ernest, Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia, K.G., has recently been appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars.

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LONG-DISTANCE SIGNALLING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

By Major W. G. Home (*The Carabiniers*).

An account of a Signalling Communication between the Compass Berg (District, Middelburg, Cape.), (Long. 24 deg. 35 min. 33 sec., Lat. 31 deg. 45 min.) and the Cockscomb (District, Uitenhage), (Long. 24 deg. 47 min. 6 sec., Lat. 30 deg. 45 min.). Distance 125.96 miles, with the *Five Inch Heliograph*.

The conditions governing long-distance signalling are dependent on four factors :—

(*a*) Clearness of atmosphere.
(*b*) Brilliant sunshine.
(*c*) Visibility of points.
(*d*) Vision range of mirror used.

With regard to (*a*) and (*b*), the haze which is so detrimental to signalling may be occasionally avoided if there are hills of sufficient altitude and by choosing the time of year best suited to a clear atmosphere. In South Africa, coming between the rains, the months of February and June are generally blessed with this climatic nature of things, as well as brilliant sunshine.

Under the heading (*c*) we must consider the curvature of the earth's surface, coupled with the interference, to a greater or lesser degree, by such features of the ground as may lie between two points. For although the two points may each be many feet higher than the intervening country, yet owing to this curvature, proportionate to the distance, so is the range of vision governed. We are assisted, however, by 'refraction,' for when a ray of light passes from one 'medium' into a second of different density, its path in the second is inclined to its path in the first, and this bending of the ray is termed 'refraction.'

To take an example : if a pencil or stick be placed in a glass of water it will appear bent to the eye. Similarly, the stratum of light which reflects objects to our vision is, so to speak, curved, and we are able to see objects which are really below our line of sight or horizon.

Refraction being at its lowest while the sun is high, military surveyors in hot climates like the Soudan will tell you how hills which during the heat of the day were quite invisible would, a couple of hours before sunset, suddenly begin to show their peaks, while at dusk the whole mountain from crown to base would become visible; this phenomenon occurring similarly at early dawn.

Captain W. L. Lloyd, 'The Cameronians,' who has an extensive surveying experience, relates how early one morning in the Kordofan Province the Gebel Kon, a well-known hill with an altitude of 200 to 300 feet, showed up unmistakably, though from the locality in which he happened to be it had never before been visible. Seizing the opportunity he took its bearing, and on arrival in camp plotted it on the map, and found his surmise to be

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correct. Colonel Talbot, R.E., who was with him, declares this to be the most extraordinary case of refraction he has ever witnessed.

Hence, when considering the visibility of two distant points, it is necessary to note the heights of the 'intermediate' country and determine by a simple mathematical problem (taking into consideration the refraction, which is generally accepted as one-third the height) whether vision is, or is not, a possibility.

(i.) Let us take the two points in question, viz., the Compass Berg, 8,209 feet, and the Cockscomb, 5,774 feet, respectively, and work out, by the aid of prepared Tables, if these points are mathematically visible. (See the Traveller's Guide.)

$$8{,}209 + \tfrac{1}{3} \text{ for Refraction} = \begin{array}{r} 8{,}209 \\ 2{,}736 \\ \hline 10{,}945 \text{ feet.} \end{array}$$

(Vide Tables), this altitude gives a visible horizon at sea-level of 112 geographical miles. Now one geographical mile equals 1·15 statute miles. Therefore 112 geographical miles equals 32·24 multiplied by 4 equals 128·96 statute miles.

(ii.) Taking the Cockscomb $5{,}774 + \tfrac{1}{3} = \begin{array}{r} 5{,}774 \\ 1{,}925 \\ \hline 7{,}699 \text{ feet.} \end{array}$

7,699 feet gives a visible horizon at sea-level of, roughly, 95 miles. But as all the country intervening between these two points is (according to Bartholomew's Map) not exceeding 4,000 feet, if we subtract 4,000 feet from each respective height and take the total in miles it will tell us whether the two heights are visible to each other or not, by being over or under the measured distance, (125·96 miles).

Thus, 10,945 Compass Berg — 4,000 = 6,945 feet = 87 statute miles.

7,699 feet. Cockscomb. — 4,000 = 3,699 feet = 64 miles.

87 + 64 = 151 miles.



(iii.) *As a rough rule.* Approximately the distance visible in miles is the square root of the height in feet.

(*d*) As regards range of mirror (direct, not lateral), this is more or less determinable by experiment, and is naturally dependent on (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*); as well as the angles at which the rays strike and leave the mirror.

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The idea of signalling between the Compass Berg and the Cockscomb originated in the latter part of 1901, when, having been employed in signal work in Cape Colony, and having made use of the former peak on several occasions as a central signalling station, I had remarked what extraordinary distances were visible to the eye. So with the aid of a map and local information, several prominent heights were noted; amongst them, the Cockscomb, or main peak, of the Great Winter Hoek Range.

Circumstances, as it so happened, never permitted this communication to be tested, but we succeeded in signalling from the Cockscomb to Desolation Kop (Graaff Reinet), a distance of 92 miles, with a five-inch heliograph (Sunday 8th June, 1902), being on that occasion assisted by Signalling Sergeant McMaran, 2nd Coldstream Guards, Signalling Sergeant Clifton, 7th Dragoon Guards, and other signallers attached to General Sir John French's staff.



After a lapse of several years, my regiment having returned to South Africa, the first suitable opportunity was taken to attempt the transmission of signals between these aforementioned points. Accordingly on May 3rd, 1911, two parties, under Captain Sadler of my regiment and myself, proceeded *via* Middelburg and Kleinpoort, C.P., to the Compass Berg and Cockscomb respectively.

In addition to the long railway journey from Bloemfontein, O.F.S., both Compass Berg and Cockscomb, particularly the former, are difficult of access.

Compass Berg.—To reach the Compass Berg a ride of 45 miles (or eight hours) has to be undertaken, with a fair road as far as the Willows (Maurice Hall, Esq.), 22½ miles. Thence *via* Oppermans Kraal (Dannie Du Toit's), to the northern slopes of the mountain, over a very bad road; the total rise from Middelburg (the starting point), being approximately 2,000 feet.

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Cockscomb.—From Kleinpoort railway station (J. W. Grewar, Esq., J.P.), there is a fair road *via* Bosman's to Willow River village (22 miles), which, lying by the northern foothills of the Cockscomb, is a suitable camping place preparatory to the ascent.

The weather conditions at the outset were most unpropitious. On the 5th and 6th May, mist and rain precluded any possibility of intercommunication. But on Sunday, 7th May (Census day throughout the Union), the dawn broke showing a cloudless sky and every prospect of brilliant sunshine.

The Ascents.

Owing to the configuration of the ground, the ascent of the Compass Berg commences at the base of its peak, which is very precipitous, and, when



Signalling Post on Cockscomb Mountain (Uitenhage District, Cape of Good Hope Province) 7th May 1911
From a Panorama Sketch by Major W. E. Home

carrying signalling equipment, will take even a good climber well over two hours to ascend. One has also to contend with the heavy winds and icy cold, for generally in the months we have spoken of the summit is covered with snow and ice. The mountain itself is geologically a mass of 'Dolerite' columns, the sketch giving a good idea of the huge boulders which constitute its apex.

The Cockscomb, on the other hand, consists of a main precipitous 'Dolerite' peak, protected on its spurs, which run north and north-west, by similar subsidiary peaks. On the main peak is the second beacon; for the purpose of signalling to the Compass Berg the first or lower beacon is of sufficient altitude. The ascent from Willow River is steep until the top of the main spur is reached, but is then gradual to the first beacon. The going, however, is very bad owing to the boulders strewn everywhere in the long

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mountain-grass. This ascent occupies an hour and a half, while to reach the main summit is a good three hours' climb.

It would be impossible to camp on the Compass Berg except at the foot. On the other hand, it saves much time if one camps on the main spur of the Cockscomb, getting up water daily by local arrangements.

The sketches show how distance lessens the proportionate size and altitude of the highest ranges of mountains. One might imagine the Tandjes Berg to be infinitely higher than the Compass Berg; so distant is the latter. As a matter of fact, it is more than 1,000 feet lower. With the two-power lenses of the signallers' telescopes (15 and 30 magnification respectively), it was found (so clear was the atmosphere) that the lower-power eyepiece



View of the Cockscomb 130 miles distant from the Compassberg. The beacon is directly behind.
Vertical exaggeration double of Cockscomb & Distant Hills.
From a Panorama Sketch by Captain H. Sadler, The Carabiniers. 7th May, 1911.

made reading quite possible. Captain Sadler, at Compass Berg, sheltered from the wind behind the huge boulders, was using for some time a Ross prism binocular of 12 magnification. It was quite easy to keep the glass steady, though, of course, there is not the shadow of a doubt that, of the two, the telescope is the more practical and satisfactory.

It had beforehand been arranged between us that, while the station on the Cockscomb would be half-way up that mountain, that on the Compass Berg would be at its apex. So, consequently, we were both able to align not only our telescopes, but our 'shadow spots' on more or less the exact spots where the stations were in position; the mountains being, of course, visible with the naked eye. Careful bearings were taken at the same time

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with the prismatic compass, and on being checked, when we met later on in Middelburg, were found to differ only by a matter of 3½ degrees, which, considering the variation of the compass, due to local magnetic influence and other causes, was not far out.

As a curious but practical fact, in view of the theories of lateral range of light increasing proportionately to the distance, which by calculation in the case in point should have measured 950 yards approximately, Captain Sadler purposely tested the possibilities of reading at distances for 15 yards to 25 yards on either side of the heliograph, and found our Cockscomb light almost possible to read, while at the reader's telescope itself the light was clear and sharp, resembling the burning end of a cigarette in the dark at a distance of a few yards.

Of course, with a ten-inch heliograph which we also had with us (in case of accidents) the light was very much brighter, Captain Sadler stating that with the naked eye the flash was visible, though, of course, not readable; but the object of using the five-inch was to demonstrate the possibilities of an instrument which, compared with the other, is portable, on man or horse, and, as far as the question of carrying up mountains is concerned, might be likened in the same ratio as the revolver to the rifle.

Owing to difficulties inseparable to the ascent, it was 11.45 A.M. before communication was opened, and, after (in signallers' parlance) the interchange of several 'P.P.' messages, official messages were sent to Regimental Headquarters, and the School of Signalling, Pretoria, for this purpose Compass Berg transmitting to a terminal station at Middelburg, Cape (30 miles), whence they handed to the telegraph.

Clouds coming up obscured Compass Berg and stopped communication about 2 P.M., and although each party attempted on the two successive days to get touch, the weather was all against us. Our leave was up, and we had to return to Bloemfontein.

The five-inch heliograph had, however, enhanced its reputation, and the wonderful clearness of the South African atmosphere has been demonstrated to an extent that it never was before.

It must not be presumed from the foregoing remarks that it was just a 'fluke' that the weather conditions favoured us so well on 'Census day.' On the contrary, this year the rains have been abnormally late, and anyone who remembers South Africa's cloudless skies will agree that with a little better luck permanent and practicable communication at such long distances is a certainty in that country.

The detail of signallers made up from the 'Carabiniers' were distributed as follows:—

Compass Berg.	Sergeant Instructor Costin; Corporal McKnight.
Cockscomb.	Sergeant Instructor Fisher; Private McGarry.
Middelburg.	Private Taylor; Private Robinson.

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SOME EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE PRIZE ESSAY BY CAPTAIN NIEMANN, OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GENERAL STAFF (VII. ARMY CORPS): 'THE ORGANISATION OF THE STRATEGICAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION'[1]

THE author remarks that though the Field Service Regulations of 1908 are on the whole based on experience of modern war, the part dealing with reconnaissance is to some extent theoretical. He recognises the lack of historical models for strategical reconnaissance, and the resultant necessity to base guiding principles on theoretical suppositions.

However, reconnaissance exercises on a large scale have been carried out, and have led him to the conclusion that the main difficulty in extended reconnaissance is organised cohesion.

The Regulations referred to lay down that the Cavalry of an army must try to obtain an insight into the conditions of the enemy as soon as possible. But, as the patrol advances more quickly than the squadron, and the squadron than the Division, enormous distances must ensue.

Thus, taking as a normal day's march,

Advanced patrols	60 kilometres.
Reconnoitring squadrons	40 ,,
Cavalry Division	30 ,,

on the third day the distance between patrols and supporting squadrons is 60 kilometres, and that between squadrons and the Division is 30. Over such distances the transmission of reports is impossible.

The author goes on to say that 'if we do not desire the certainty of success of a strategical reconnaissance to depend on mere chance, we must institute a methodical economy of physical strength and a moderate distribution in depth.'

He utters a warning against trusting too much to technical appliances for bridging distances. Use them to the utmost; but remember that, when they fail, a despatch service of orderlies is the last resource.

So far his views are in accordance with our own principles and doctrine.

Discussing the object of the reconnaissance and the method of conducting it, the author says: 'The object as a rule will be to ensure freedom of operation for the army. Headquarters alone can correctly measure the extent required for the operations, and they must determine it daily in advance.'

This seems to us unsound. (*a*) The Regulations referred to by him ask the Cavalry to 'obtain insight into the conditions of the enemy.' Our own Regulations, too, say that its first duty is to obtain for the Commander-in-Chief the information he requires. (*b*) Daily interference by Headquarters with the movements of the Cavalry Division will undoubtedly hamper the Cavalry Commander. Better, far, the teaching of our own Field Service Regulations, that 'The Commander of the independent Cavalry will receive from the Commander-in-Chief definite instructions as to the *rôle* he is to fulfil, but should be allowed complete freedom of action in accomplishing it.'

Again, in recommending distribution in depth on similar lines, the author thinks that headquarters should order the extent of the distribution.

[1] Published in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* of October 1910.

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The breadth of front for a Cavalry Division to reconnoitre is given as 60 kilometres, or thereabouts, its distribution being accommodated to the system and importance of roads.

It is pointed out that possible changes of direction call for adaptable organisation.

Reconnoitring squadrons should be sparingly used, but should be able to place an officer's patrol on every main road leading to the enemy.

In the normal procedure of reconnaissance, according to the author, the advanced patrols precede the squadron by 30 kilometres; behind them are protective patrols; behind these, again, are the security patrols of the squadron. Naturally, this results in great loss of fighting power; and, owing to distance, the squadron cannot collect reports from or give support to its patrols.

He makes the reasonable suggestion that patrols should not advance further than about 15 kilometres from the squadron, and should conform to its movements; orderlies can traverse 15 kilometres in an hour. But he enunciates a heresy when he claims that advanced reconnoitring patrols give protection and absolve the squadron from the duty of special protective scouting.

That patrols as well as squadrons should advance by bounds from stage to stage is all in accord with our own views.

The reconnoitring squadrons are to receive orders as to their stages of advance in this way :—

'The reconnoitring squadrons will be in observation as follows :—

From 8 A.M. to 9 A.M. on the line e to f;
From 11 A.M. to 12 noon on the line g to h;
From 2 P.M. onwards on the line i to k.'

Should strong bodies of the enemy's Cavalry be observed, the squadron in whose area the enemy is advancing will fall back towards the Division, maintaining touch with the enemy.

The author recognises that this last instruction will meet with some opposition. 'It will be urged . . . that it would be better if the squadron were to advance round one flank of the hostile Cavalry, and maintain communication with the advanced patrols'; but 'in the case of a reverse to the Cavalry Division a further advance into the area commanded by the enemy would be a very doubtful undertaking.' 'But, if the Division is victorious, the pursuit immediately leads to the establishment of touch with the advanced patrols. In addition, the great advantage, as regards tactical security of the Division, must be borne in mind if the touch once gained is maintained up to the actual moment of shock action by a squadron which has thrown forward a net of protection patrols.'

Now in the foregoing paragraph the services of information and protection are confused. To trust for the security of the Division to a reconnoitring squadron is directly opposed to the principle laid down in our manual of Cavalry training, that 'the two systems should be kept separate, and each patrol should know clearly for which it is intended.'

More in accordance with our views is the following: When advanced patrols are sent out from the Division unsupported by squadrons, passing of

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information and replacement of *personnel* is not possible over a distance of more than 20 or 30 kilometres, and posts must be pushed forward to collect reports. The whole system will be at certain times at rest; and these pauses, so important for the transmission of information, will be arranged at the same hours throughout the distribution in depth from Division to advanced patrols.

But we encounter heresy in the assertion that the advanced patrols will to a certain extent look after the protective reconnaissance of the reconnoitring squadrons, and the latter after that of the Division.

Should the Cavalry Division be defeated and driven back by hostile Cavalry, the author suggests that the safest means of restoring communication lies in disposing stations for collecting reports on as wide a front as possible; and the first measure after an unsuccessful combat must be to establish these stations on the flanks of the hostile Cavalry, with an efficient relay system.

Moderation in distribution of depth also facilitates rapid concentration when it is a question of breaking through an extended hostile screen. In order to maintain the necessary cohesion the distance from advanced patrols to squadrons is laid down as from 10 to 20 kilometres, and that between squadrons and the Division from 20 to 30. 'The suitable distribution in depth of the reconnaissance net would, therefore, be from 30 to 40 kilometres, while the distribution in breadth must not exceed 60 kilometres.'

The use of the expression 'reconnaissance net' is dangerous. It suggests the old thin, continuous screen, useless either for information or for protection.

The author has not a clear conception of the distinction between the services of information and protection, and apparently entrusts both to this 'net,' spread, under direct orders from Army Headquarters, over an area 35 kilometres in depth and 50 in breadth.

If the advanced patrols cannot pierce the hostile line of protection, the reconnoitring squadrons are to clear a way for them. If the squadron is too weak for this, the Division itself must come up.

It is pointed out that in such a case the dispositions for the strategical reconnaissance cannot be organised until the chain of the hostile defence has been broken.

In conclusion, the author remarks, with some truth, that there are so many possibilities in war that the organisation of the strategical reconnaissance will always remain a system of expedients.

The Army Council consider that a Cavalry soldier should at all times use his own service sword for all practices except mounted combat, and have decided to permit such use as a tentative measure, pending further experience as to the damage which may be caused to the swords thereby. It has, however, been decided to restrict this use of the service sword to trained men only, and to issue twenty swords, pattern 1899, to each regiment for the use of recruits.

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PACK MAXIM GUNS FOR THE USE OF CAVALRY

By CAPTAIN E. H. W. WILLIAMS, 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars

I

Training and Strength of Detachments

UP to a comparatively short time ago, machine guns were a very questionable advantage to a Cavalry regiment or Cavalry operations.

The reasons for this may be briefly summed up as follows :—

(1) There were very few men in the gun detachments who thoroughly understood the management and working of a machine gun.

(2) There was no method of carrying the gun, tripod, and ammunition so as to ensure its being of any use to its regiment or squadron at the critical moment.

(3) There was no adequate form of drill whereby men could be trained to manipulate the gun quickly.

(4) Not enough importance was attached to the advantages of getting the gun in and out of action quickly, and the detachment which could make the best practice on the range was generally considered the best *ipso facto*.

The gun detachment was usually instructed by a N.C. Officer, who held a certificate from the School of Musketry, but whose actual experience with the gun was limited. At the end of a month's instruction, almost every man in the class would be able to 'give' the action and the mechanism of the gun—viz. : 'supposing the gun to have just fired, &c., &c.'—but their knowledge would practically end there. When the gun, later in the year, was produced for regimental field-firing practices, the whole detachment would be at sixes and sevens the first time the gun jammed, which would occur pretty often in the hands of its unskilled manipulators.

There can be no doubt that, to remedy this, the primary instruction should be given by an officer, or at any rate by a very highly trained and experienced N.C. Officer.

Every man in the detachment should be able to strip the gun and know exactly where every little pin and screw fits.

The detachment should be frequently taken on the range and each man allowed to handle the gun and put things right, without assistance, when the machine fails.

Special care should be taken to teach the men to fill the ammunition belts : the majority of men do not ram the cartridges far enough into the belt, thereby causing faults in the feed.

Accuracy in shooting is naturally the first object to be aimed at when dealing with firearms; but in dealing with machine guns in conjunction with Cavalry, it is questionable whether mobility is not of equal importance.

The moral effect of a hail of lead being pumped into an enemy at the right time and place may possibly often obtain the required result, even if the bullets are going a little wide of the actual object aimed at.

On the range it is quite possible to see a whole belt of cartridges fired at a dozen falling plates, and in the end only perhaps a couple will be knocked

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down, but the ground all round will be riddled with lead in such a way as to convince any observer that none of those plates would have stood their ground for more than a second or two had they been animate objects.

The opportunities for coming into action with machine guns will often be very fleeting, and if fire is not opened at once, the opportunity will be missed, and in that case it does not signify whether the detachment can hit bull's-eyes or whether they cannot.

For instance, supposing the detachment commander sees a column crossing a bridge.

In order to make use of his guns he must gallop to a position from which he can command that bridge. If he is not quick the column will be across the bridge before he starts to off-saddle his guns, or he will only come in for the tail end of it, which will hurry up as soon as the presence of a machine gun is detected, and little or no damage will be done. Again, except under very favourable circumstances, a machine-gun detachment will usually present a good target to an opponent. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the gun detachment should get into action and have first say in the argument and clear out as soon as the opponent begins to respond.

This cannot be effected until a very fairly high standard of mobility has been reached, and to obtain this mobility the detachment must be supplied with *thoroughly reliable horses*.

The general opinion in regiments up to the present has usually been that any horse that was of no use in the ranks would do for the machine-gun detachment.

In a sense this is right. The detachment horses are not required to do figures of eight or elaborate riding-school exercises, but they must have three qualities, and without them they are quite valueless.

The qualities required are :—

(1) Docility.
(2) Soundness.
(3) Capability of getting over any sort of country.

The following illustration may perhaps help to prove this :—

The squadron 'A' having located the hostile squadron 'B,' the squadron leader of 'A' decides to attack. 'A' has a machine-gun detachment attached to it.

Obviously the squadron leader of 'A' will endeavour to manœuvre his enemy into the flat, open country, where he can charge him. He consequently despatches his machine guns to the hill 'X,' where

(1) 'B' may attack the guns, in which case 'A' charges into his flank;

(2) 'B' may attack the squadron, in which case the guns fire into his flank;

(3) 'B' may refuse to attack at all, in which case the guns can fire at him while he retires, or co-operate with the squadron while it follows 'B' up.

If, however, the gun-detachment horses are not up to the required standard, the detachment will never get over the rough ground which must be crossed before 'X' can be reached, or they will get there too late to do any good. The machine-gun detachment should, therefore, be able to move every bit as fast as a squadron, and in many cases over worse country.

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Accuracy of fire is very difficult to obtain in the field under service conditions. It is often not possible to get the gun quite level when it is brought into action quickly.

The vibration of the gun mounted on a tripod which has been subjected to the rough usage of active service, and the fact that the men are often more or less blown and out of breath by the time they get into position, all help to make accurate shooting a matter of extreme difficulty. This only enhances the value of volume of fire.



There are very few occasions on which the two half-detachments which make up the regimental gun detachment can be advantageously used separately.

When fighting a rear-guard action, where a display of strength is often important, or holding a defensive position for any length of time, where ranges are known and the accuracy of fire can more or less be depended on, the two guns may possibly be separated, but it is doubtful whether such a course of action is ever advisable.

If one of the guns jams, then it is nothing more than a public danger, unless the other gun is there to keep up the fire while the damage is being repaired. On the other hand, it may frequently be very advantageous to put all the machine guns of a Cavalry Brigade together and under one commander and use them as a separate unit.

The volume of fire which can be produced by six machine guns, all trained on the same object, is enormous, and if one of them jams or becomes temporarily damaged in any way, the effect will not be so detrimental as if only one pair was being used.

Brigaded machine-gun detachments may be employed with great advantage in conjunction with, and as an escort to, the Horse Artillery of a Cavalry Brigade. The large volume of fire produced from the machine guns will be far greater support to the Artillery than the few rifles which could be brought into action by a troop of Cavalry, and the Cavalry will not be stripped of any of its strength for striking a decisive blow at the enemy.

The Artillery will also benefit by having the services of six trained scouts, viz., two per detachment.

As regards the strength of a machine-gun detachment for a Cavalry regiment, the following men will be required :—

For each gun (half-detachment)—

1 scout,

4 men to carry the gun and tripod into action and work the gun,

1 man to lead the horse carrying the gun and tripod,

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4 men to lead the ammunition pack-horses,
1 supernumerary, in case of accidents or casualties.

This gives a total of 11 men per half-detachment, or 22 men per detachment. There should also be a sergeant to lead the detachment, the whole being under the command of an officer.

To sum up, a machine-gun detachment should consist of—

1 Officer,
1 Sergeant,
2 Corporals (the Number 1 of each gun),
20 Troopers,

which make a total of 24 all ranks.

In time of peace there would usually be only one ammunition horse in use, and consequently of the above-mentioned troopers six could be dispensed with, making a peace establishment of

1 Officer,
1 Sergeant,
2 Corporals,
14 Troopers,

making a total of 18 all ranks.

In time of peace two spare horses should be allotted to a detachment, and on a war establishment four spare horses, in case of accident or casualties.

It may possibly be argued that it is not necessary to have both an officer and a sergeant in the detachment. Experience has shown that both are absolutely essential.

The officer should ride at some distance from the detachment, and his time is chiefly occupied in—

(1) Looking for an opportunity to come into action;
(2) Looking out for likely positions for his guns;
(3) Watching the effect of his shots.

The sergeant is required to ride in front of the detachment and act more or less as a troop leader, thus bringing the detachment into position and getting it out again, and supervising and controlling the fire in accordance with the instructions of the officer in charge.

As regards the preliminary training of the detachment, the first things to impress on the mind of the novice are—

(1) The machine gun is not an infernal machine which must be handled with extreme caution;

(2) It is not an elaborate piece of machinery which requires an expert mechanic to understand;

(3) It is not a fragile article, incapable of standing any violence of any sort (we have never found a man who went to the opposite extreme in this case);

(4) That all parts of the gun and its action and mechanism can be readily understood by careful examination of the gun itself.

Most men prefer to discount the gun altogether and learn pages out of the book by heart, which they will find have slipped their memory when something is required in a hurry in the field.

The instructor should strip the gun more than once and let each man put it together again.

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It might be good thing if every regiment were provided with a spare gun for instructional purposes in this respect.

In about six weeks the men should know enough about the gun to start on the drill.

The first thing to impress on the young detachment is that every man must have his own separate job and not interfere with anyone else.

The Numbers ' 1 ' and ' 2 ' off-saddle and saddle-up the gun. They must, therefore, know exactly which straps each one of them is going to manipulate; otherwise they will both make for the same one and get in each other's way. This applies equally to the Numbers ' 3 ' and ' 4,' who work the tripod.

When the men are working against the stop-watch, this is no very easy matter to get right, because one man will have finished his job and think he can hurry things up by assisting his neighbour. Nine times out of ten he will only retard matters, whereas if he had jumped on his own horse as soon as his own job was completed all might have been well.

This must not be taken as quite a hard-and-fast rule. With a well-trained and experienced detachment the men can sometimes give each other assistance, but with novices the principle of making each responsible for his own individual share of the work is best.

The training of the detachment scouts must necessarily be somewhat different from that of the ordinary regimental scout. They must have their eyes trained to pick out likely positions for the guns quickly. As a rule, their *rôle* will be something of this sort :—

The officer tells the scout that he intends to bring his guns into action on a certain hill or in a certain locality. He points out the place to the scout as nearly as he can, but he will probably be too far away to see exactly where the guns will actually be placed. The scout gallops out and arrives at the place; he must take in at a glance whether there is a good place for the guns or not, and also shelter for the horses. He may often have to go some way to the right or left of the position indicated by the officer before he gets what is required. Having found his position, he holds up his helmet and waves to the officer to let him know that the detachment can come on. If there is no place where the guns can come into action with advantage, he must gallop back and say so, but in any case *he must be quick.*

Another important function in preparing a detachment for drill is the loading of the gun and ammunition pack-horses. It is easy enough to lead a horse at a trot, but when it comes to galloping, things become more difficult, especially when there is a lot of twisting and turning to be done.

The horse-leaders must also get into the way of keeping the horses' heads close together when the gun is being off-saddled and saddled-up, so that their quarters will be splayed out, and give the men more room to move about with the gun and tripod. Of the remainder, the Numbers ' 1 ' and ' 2 ' manipulate the gun. When in action the Number ' 1 ' fires the gun and the Number ' 2 ' looks after the belt. The Numbers ' 3 ' and ' 4 ' manipulate the tripod. When the gun is in action it is the business of the Number ' 3 ' to see that the Number ' 2 ' is properly supplied with ammunition belts. He carries up the first belt box when the tripod is being carried up to the place which the gun is to be fired from. It is the duty of the Number ' 4 ' to

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provide any cover or shelter for the gun that may be available while the detachment is in action.

It should always be impressed on the men that a gun detachment provides a very fair target to an adversary, and after the first few shots have been fired there is no concealing the fact that a machine gun is in action. The detachment must, therefore, be trained to lie down as flat as possible when in action. Shields are useless impediments as far as Cavalry machine-gun detachments are concerned. They take several seconds to adjust and take off. They increase the weight of the equipment, and even if the Number ' 1 ' is protected by the shield, the Number ' 2 ' will be exposed. If a Cavalry detachment finds itself under such a hot fire as to necessitate a shield, and no other cover is available, it will be far better for that detachment to make use of its mobility and gallop off to some place where things are not so hot.

II

Outline of Machine-gun Drill

The detachment will be formed up in the order illustrated below. For one gun (half-detachment) :—

Note.—In this formation there is no gun or ammunition pack on a flank. Consequently it will not strike the eye at once that this is a machine-gun half-detachment. It will look like a troop at a little distance.

When the detachment is formed up in line, Number ' 2 ' half-detachment forms on the left of Number ' 1 ' half-detachment.

Thus it will be seen that the Numbers ' 1 ' and ' 2 ' are close to their gun and the Numbers ' 3 ' and ' 4 ' close to their tripod. Also Number ' 3 ' has an ammunition pack next to him, so that he can readily bring up the first ammunition belt box into the firing position.

Moving along a road the detachment will usually be in half-sections thus :

Half-sections from the right.—The scout advances, followed and covered by the first ammunition pack, then the Numbers ' 3 ' and ' 4,' then the gun, then the Numbers ' 1 ' and ' 2,' then the remainder of the ammunition packs, and, lastly, the supernumerary.

Half-sections from the left.—The supernumerary advances, covered and followed by the ammunition packs in succession, then the Numbers ' 2 ' and ' 1,' then the gun, then the Numbers ' 4 ' and ' 3,' then the fourth ammunition pack, and, lastly, the scout.

Column of half-detachments can be formed in the same way as column of troops.

When coming into action, where space admits of it, it will be found expedient to wheel the detachment or half-detachments about before off-saddling the guns. By doing so the horse-holders can keep the horses' heads close together, thus splaying out their quarters, thereby giving more room to manipulate the gun, &c. The horses will also be facing the right way when the order is given to saddle-up and move off somewhere else.

This movement will not always be found practicable when moving along narrow lanes or in villages. Under such conditions it will usually be best to

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advance in column of half-sections and then go half-sections right or left, as the case may be, so that again the horses' quarters may be facing the firing position, if the position to be taken up is to a flank, or they will be to a flank if the position to be taken up is to the front.

When training a detachment, the commander must ensure that his detachment is thoroughly efficient in wheeling by detachment and half-detachments, forming detachment from column of half-detachments and half-sections, and *vice versâ*, before actually starting on taking up and relinquishing gun positions.

It is a matter of the utmost importance that a detachment commander should train his eye to pick up likely positions for his guns quickly. The opportunities for coming into action will usually be of such short duration that he will have no time for long deliberation. Thus he must perpetually have his eye on likely places, and then when the opportunity arises he can make use of his detachment without hesitation.



He must further remember that it is better to put a few shots into an enemy from a bad position than to get a really good one and perhaps find that the enemy has gone and left nothing for him to fire at at all.

The 10th Hussars' equipment for transport of maxim guns is composed of four leather hangers lined with numnah (two for near- and two for off-side, and each two connected by an extra side-bar). There is also a cross-head strap, lined with numnah, two supporting straps, and a double-buckled overgirth. Keeper straps are connected to each hanger to avoid possible accidents.

Milled head-covers are adopted to prevent any loss of camel-hair brush or jelly spoon through the leading rein rubbing against them.

Adjustable asbestos carriers are provided for use on service, and these are fitted with a leather handle to facilitate the moving of the gun, either in changing its position or in limbering-up when barrel-casing is hot. They are fitted round barrel-casing.

An extra wooden block is also issued to ensure the gun and mounting being kept clear of the horses' hips, through any peculiar conformation, or from other causes, such as falling away when on service, &c.—6 in. by 3½ in. by 2 in.

Ammunition boxes are carried in leather panniers, containing four com-

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partments on either side. Three are used for ammunition and one for water. (See description of 10th Hussars' water-carrier.) Each ammunition pack-horse thus carries 1,500 rounds of ammunition and about four gallons of water.

The 10th Hussars' water-carrier is exactly the same size and shape as an ammunition belt box. It is made of zinc, and contains an opening at the top left-hand corner for filling. There is at the bottom a screwed plug, which can be fitted with a brass spout for filling the gun. The whole is leather-covered.

A hold-all for spare parts is carried on the top of the gun saddle.

Tools and spare parts carried in the above are: Lock, muzzle attachment, screw spanner, screwdriver, punch (No. 2), gib key, and bent.

Weights

Weight of saddle, with breast-piece, breeching, and girths, 40 lb.

Weight of equipment, 12 lb.

Weight of gun and mounting, 118 lb.

Total weight of gun and mounting, saddle, and equipment, 170 lb.

Total weight of ammunition panniers, six belts and boxes, and two water carriers, 130 lb.

Dimensions of Saddlery and Equipment.—The equipment is carried on a No. 3 saddle (Cavalry Pioneer pattern), the dimensions of panels being 24 in. by 26 in. Breast-pieces are of Artillery pattern, and breechings have the chains removed and straps 24 in. by 1½ in. substituted, to prevent noise.

Web girths No. 2 are also used.

No. 1 hanger, near-side front . . . . 25 in. by 3½ in.
No. 2 hanger, near-side rear . . . . 25 in. by 7 in.
No. 3 hanger, off-side front . . . . 25 in. by 3½ in.
No. 4 hanger, off-side rear . . . . 24 in. by 3½ in.

Nos. 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 are screwed on to the extra side-bars, the dimensions of which are 24 in. by 4½ in.

At both ends of each hanger are loops to fit on the hooks of the saddle, and the top loop of each hanger is fitted with a keeper strap, 12 in. by 1¼ in.

The cross-head strap has a ring at either end, and is used on the off-side front. It is placed on the saddle, under the hangers. It has a buckle near the centre for adjusting purposes, 22 in. by 2 in.

The supporting straps are passed up under the side-bars of the saddle, and then passed through a runner fixed at the top end of the strap. Dimensions of straps, 40 in. by 1½ in. The above straps are connected by the double-buckled overgirth, 4 ft. by 3½ in.

Dimensions of ammunition panniers: Length, 18 in.; breadth, 20 in.; depth, 10 in.

There are straps under each pannier, 22 in. by 2 in., to buckle under the horse, to prevent the load from jolting off the hooks of the saddle.

The Putting on of Saddlery and Equipment.—Fold saddle-blanket in four folds and place it well forward over the withers. Place saddle in centre of horse's back, and as far back from withers as possible; then cross the girths, so that the front one on the off-side is fastened on the rear strap on the near-

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side, and *vice versâ*; and then fasten breast-piece through the front girth on either side. Straps on breeching to be fastened through back rings of the panels of the saddle.

(1) Place cross-head strap ring on front hook of saddle 'off-side.'

(2) Now place hangers Nos. 3 and 4 on front and rear hooks of saddle 'off-side.'

(3) Place hangers Nos. 1 and 2 on front and rear hooks of saddle 'near-side.'

Everything is now ready for receiving the gun and mounting.

Nos. 1 and 2 now take the gun (No. 1 the breech and No. 2 the barrel end), and double to near-side of saddle. The gun is then laid flat on the 'extra side-bar' (barrel to the rear), and each man places the bottom loop of the hangers Nos. 1 and 2 over the gun and on to the hook of the saddle, and makes fast the keeper strap. At the same time No. 2 places the supporting strap over the gun (between the barrel-casing and feed-block), and makes fast (one end of) the double-buckled overgirth.

Nos. 3 and 4 double with tripod to 'off-side' of saddle and lay it flat on the 'extra side-bar,' with feet to the rear. No. 3 (at front end) then passes the cross-head strap round the projecting shield-bracket and places the ring on the front hook of the saddle. He then passes the hanger (No. 3) over the two tripod legs nearest the saddle, and places the loop on the hook of the saddle over the cross-head strap ring, and makes fast the keeper strap. No. 4 passes the hanger (No. 4) over the two legs nearest the saddle and makes fast the keeper strap. No. 4 then passes the supporting strap over the upper (or outer) leg of the tripod, and takes a turn of the strap round the leg (this prevents the tripod slipping), and makes it fast to the end of the double-buckled overgirth.

To take off gun for action or any other purpose, the whole of the foregoing is reversed.

(1) Unbuckle overgirth;

(2) Unfasten keeper straps;

(3) Lift gun and mounting smartly, and hangers will fall off hooks;

(4) Double to rear of gun-horse and take orders from commander.

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Gun-hangers ready to receive gun.
2. Gun mounted on saddle.
3. Tripod mounted on saddle.
4. Ammunition pannier mounted on saddle.
5. Ammunition pannier open.—Note the water-carrier.
6. "X" is a block of wood which can be taken out and substituted by a thicker block. This is very useful when horses begin to lose condition, as it keeps the tripod away from them.
7. The best way of putting on the girths. The saddle never slips like this.
8. Saddling up the gun.—Note the supporting strap in front of the feed-block, which buckles on to the over-girth.
9. Mounting up the tripod.—Note the cross-head strap, also the supporting strap, which has not yet been buckled on to the over-girth. The over-girth can be seen hanging down under the horse's belly. The breast-piece does not ruck up the girth as it is in the photograph. Everything was purposely made more or less loose when the photographs were taken.

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

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

THE LATE CAPTAIN ALFRED HUTTON.

1839-1910

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THE LATE CAPTAIN ALFRED HUTTON

CAPTAIN ALFRED HUTTON, who passed away on December 18 last and whose portrait by Mr. W. Howard-Robinson we have reproduced, will be long remembered for his skill as a practical swordsman and as one of the great authorities of his time on the whole art of fencing.

Born on March 10, 1839, the fifth son of William Henry Hutton, of Walker Gate, Beverley, he joined the Cameron Highlanders as an Ensign in May 1859, becoming a Lieutenant in January 1862. Two years later he joined the 7th Hussars, and in October 1866 was transferred to the King's Dragoon Guards, obtaining his step to Captain in September 1868; from the latter regiment he retired in March 1873.

Captain Hutton was not only a man of an unusually handsome and striking appearance, but was also a man of many and varied accomplishments. He was one of the first to formulate a system of bayonet-fencing for the British Army, two of his earliest published essays being on 'Swordsmanship and Bayonet-fencing' and 'The Cavalry Swordsman,' which in 1882 he reissued as one treatise. As a practical master of the sword himself, he always most strenuously urged the adoption of a straight sword for thrusting rather than a cutting sword as the weapon for our Cavalry.

In 1889 he published an interesting work on swordsmanship, entitled 'Cold Steel,' a practical treatise on the sabre, based on the old English backsword play of the eighteenth century, combined with the method of the modern Italian School, a work which gained for him considerable notoriety. In the same volume are short essays on 'The Game of the Sword (Le jeu de l'épée),' 'The Short Sword-Bayonet or Dagger,' and on the use of the 'Great Stick,' in contradistinction to the one-handed stick or single-stick used in England, a two-handed weapon, practice with which is employed in the Italian and French armies, partly to supple the men, for which purpose it is, in Captain Hutton's opinion, an admirable and highly interesting gymnastic exercise, and partly to lead to proficiency in wielding the musket and sword-bayonet. The system of instruction in both those countries is somewhat different; the Italian method bearing a very close resemblance to the practice of the two-handed sword as taught by Achille Marozzo in 1536; while the French graft upon a portion of that ancient play certain movements analogous to those of the old English Quarter-staff. To add to its interest, the book is profusely illustrated with figures and also with reproductions of engravings from old masters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In 1892 he brought out 'Old Sword-Play,' another interesting work in which he describes the systems of fence in vogue during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, with lessons arranged from the works of various ancient masters. Like 'Cold Steel,' 'Old Sword-Play' is also profusely illustrated, containing some fifty-seven plates of typical examples, reproduced from old prints after A. Marozzo (sixteenth century), Di Grassi, Thibault, Alfieri, Angelo, and others. In his Preface Captain Hutton states that his object has been to arrange the lessons 'so as to make the antique

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methods accessible to the student without the labour of searching the pages of books in various languages, many of which are very difficult to procure and much more so to understand,' and in this aim he unquestionably succeeded. Among his other works are 'Fixed Bayonets,' in which he gives a complete system of fence for the British magazine-rifle, explaining the use of points, edges, and butt, both in offence and defence, to which he also added a useful glossary of English, French, and Italian terms common to the art of fencing, with a bibliographical list of works affecting the bayonet; 'The Sword of the Centuries,' and 'Notes on Ancient Fence,' all of which helped to establish his reputation as a writer upon this special subject.

In comprehensive and cultured knowledge of the art of fencing, especially of medieval swordsmanship of the Italian, French, and Spanish schools, he was an acknowledged authority, and achieved a high European reputation. He was one of the oldest members of the Royal United Service Institution, where he on occasions lectured, and to the Journal of which he contributed more than one paper; he was also one of the founders of the Central London Throat and Ear Hospital, was President of the Amateur Fencing Association, and for many years a prominent member of the London Fencing Club.

FOREIGN

Austria.—A new brigade of Landwehr Cavalry has recently been created, but no increase will result in the actual number of regiments. Hitherto the six existing regiments of Uhlans composing the Landwehr Cavalry have been organised in two brigades each of three regiments—the First Brigade at Wels comprising the 2nd, 5th, and 6th, and the Second Brigade at Olmütz containing the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments. By Imperial decree, dated April 18, a Third Brigade is to be created, and will be stationed at Lemberg, when the three brigades will be composed as under:—

First Brigade, 5th and 6th regiments, at Wels.

Second Brigade, 2nd and 4th regiments, at Olmütz.

Third Brigade, 1st and 3rd regiments, at Lemberg.

In the Cavalry Manœuvres to be held this year near Grodek, in Galicia, twelve regiments of Cavalry and a certain number of machine-gun detachments will take part. The operations will be preceded by a long-distance reconnaissance, wherein Infantry drawn from neighbouring garrisons will assist, the advanced reconnoitring detachments being linked up with the Cavalry body by means of electric and visual signalling, carried out by the Cavalry signallers and civilian telegraphic operators.

France.—The French Cavalry contains at present: (*a*) 79 regiments on home service—viz., 13 of Cuirassiers, 31 of Dragoons, 21 of Chasseurs, and 14 of Hussars. Of these 79 regiments, 24 have an establishment of 780 men and 702 horses (exclusive of officers' chargers); 22 an establishment of 730 men and 702 horses; while 33 are on the lowest establishment of 680 men and 642 horses. (*b*) There are 10 Cavalry regiments in Algeria and Tunis—viz., 6 of Chasseurs d'Afrique on an establishment of 680 men and 677 horses, and

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4 regiments of Spahis, with 920 men and 894 horses. The total strength equals 64,580 men and 61,116 horses, not counting 8 remount companies not reckoned in with the field army.

Under the new law the actual number of regiments and the total peace establishment is likely to remain practically unaltered, one Cuirassier regiment being converted into a regiment of Dragoons. It is rumoured, however, that there is an intention so to redistribute the Cavalry regiments that each of the five armies to be created shall have a Cavalry division, while the chief command shall have at disposal six Cavalry divisions, each of three brigades, or three Cavalry corps. France is so well off for Cavalry reserves that it is believed that, after the commencement of active operations, the strength of the Cavalry could be raised 50 per cent. by handing over the Cavalry divisional duties altogether to the reserve Cavalry, thus freeing the regiments actually performing the work of divisional Cavalry for duty in the first line.

At last, after forty-one years, it appears to have been finally decided that a medal shall be struck and issued for the Franco-German war of 1870! A motion in favour of this measure was brought forward by the Deputy for the Seine, supported by 215 members of every political party, and Ministers have promised that the matter shall be at once attended to. The medal is to be *en métal sombre,* hung from a black and green ribbon—symbolising and emblematic of Grief and Hope; but it has been suggested that, instead of bearing the dates 1870-1871, the medal shall be inscribed '*aux combatants de la Défense Nationale.*'

Germany.—The advance of automobilism does not appear so far to have had any ill effects upon the military horse supply in Germany, there being an ample number of suitable animals, although the prices have slightly risen. During the year 1909 remounts to the number of 14,047 were purchased, out of 27,278 offered for sale; in 1908 10,891 were bought, out of 23,820; and in 1907 10,170 were bought, out of 23,376 in the market. During 1909, the last year for which statistics appear to be at present available, the highest price paid for a remount was 1700 marks, and the lowest 800 marks, while the average price was 1065 marks, the average price paid in the two previous years having been 1045 and 1025 marks respectively. East Prussia continues to supply the majority of the remounts—some 60 per cent. of the whole number obtained—Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein coming next in order. In the South German States the horse supply is wholly unable to meet the military demand; in Bavaria only 612 remounts were offered and 350 bought; in Würtemberg 283 were purchased out of 413; while in Saxony no more than 236 were offered to the remount agents, who were able only to accept 96 of them.

Switzerland.—The reorganisation of the Swiss Army, recently voted by the Chamber on the basis of the project brought forward by the Conseil Fédéral, provides for the increase of the Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers, but not of the Cavalry. This arm, therefore, remains as heretofore, at a strength of four brigades of Dragoons—eight regiments each of three squadrons, with four machine-gun detachments—and of twelve squadrons of Guides, divided into six groups.

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SPORTING NOTES

POLO

THE first test match for the American Cup at Meadow Brook resulted in a win for America by four and a half goals to three after one of the finest games ever played. The second match was again a win for America by four and a half goals to three and a half, so that America retains the cup. The sides were :—America : Mr. L. Waterbury, Mr. M. Waterbury, Mr. H. P. Whitney, Mr. D. Milburn (back). England : Capt. Leslie Cheape, Mr. Noel Edwards, Captain Hardress Lloyd, Capt. Herbert Wilson, D.S.O. (back). Both matches were near things and it was a gallant attempt of England to regain the cup, which a few more ponies might have enabled it to do. Our representatives, whom it is is satisfactory to notice were all Cavalry officers, were entertained most hospitably; the matches were played in the most sporting spirit and with the greatest fairness and have done much to increase the friendly spirit between Americans and Englishmen. A gigantic crowd witnessed these two great matches spellbound, and good critics who had the fortune to be there declare that no finer polo has ever been seen.

The final for the Army Cup at Ranelagh was fought out between the 4th Dragoon Guards (Past and Present) and the Brigade of Guards, and resulted in a win for the former by ten goals to four. Teams :—4th Dragoon Guards (Past and Present) : Capt. Oldrey, Capt. Heseltine, Mr. Gill, Capt. Hunter (back). Brigade of Guards : Mr. Wyndham, Capt. Hopwood, Lord Francis Scott, Capt. Gibbs.

On Aldershot Day at Ranelagh this year a distinguished crowd again witnessed the 7th Hussars (the holders) win the Aldershot Challenge Cup, and the Infantry Cup was carried off by the Coldstream Guards. Both trophies were presented by Mrs. Codrington, the wife of Major-General Codrington, the Officer Commanding the London District.

THE OPEN CUP AT RANELAGH

The final tie resulted in a grand match between the Royal Horse Guards and the Old Etonians, the former winning by seven goals to five. It is the first occasion on which a regimental team has won an open tournament in London and the success qualifies the Blues to compete in the King's Coronation Cup. Teams :—Royal Horse Guards : Capt. Bowlby, Capt. Lord Innes-Ker, Capt. E. H. Brassey, and Mr. Harrison (back). Old Etonians : Mr. R. Grenfell, Mr. F. Grenfell, the Earl of Rocksavage, and the Duke of Roxburghe (back). At the conclusion of the match the Duchess of Roxburghe presented the cup.

The record number of twenty-one teams have entered for the Inter-Regimental Tournament which is now taking place.

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Abroad

The final of the Madras Polo Tournament was played at Guindy, when the 20th Deccan Horse beat the Bangalore Gymkhana by 10 goals to 7. Lady Lawley presented the Rajah of Venugopal's Challenge Cup to the winners, who, having won it three time, retain it. The Rajah generously offers another cup, value 1,000 Rs.

The South African Subalterns' Tournament took place at Pretoria. Teams entered from the Carabiniers, 3rd Hussars, 15th Hussars, 12th Lancers, and the Cameronians.—The final between the Carabiniers and 15th Hussars was a victory for the former by 4 goals to 3. The cup was presented to the winners by her Excellency Lady Gladstone.

The Beresford Cup Tournament at Simla was won by the King's Dragoon Guards, who in the final defeated the Bashi-Bazouks by 6 goals to 4. The Viceroy complimented the winners. Lady Hardinge presented the Cup, and in the evening their Excellencies gave a large dinner-party at the Viceregal Lodge, to which all the polo-players and their wives were invited.

The South African Polo Championship was played at Johannesburg. Four teams—viz., the Carabiniers, 3rd Hussars, 15th Hussars, and Karkloff, Natal—competed for the trophy, which is a cup presented by Captain the Hon. J. Beresford, 7th Hussars, in 1897.—The final between the Carabiniers and Karkloff resulted in a win for the former by 5 goals to 4, after a fine match. Teams : Carabiniers—Captain Rasch, Mr. Kennard, Major Watson, D.S.O., and Mr. Anstruther. Karkloff—Mr. Edwards, Mr. W. J. Shaw, Mr. C. Shaw, and Mr. Ross.

RACING

The Household Brigade Meeting, which took place as usual at Hawthorn Hill in April, was marred by the atrocious weather, rain and perfect blizzards of snow prevailing. The going was slippery and falls numerous. Results :—

First Day

The Scots Guards Challenge Cup : Capt. Cator's Call Boy III. (Mr. G. Loder).

The Irish Guards Challenge Cup : Capt. Butler's Blackcock III. (owner).

The Grenadier Guards Challenge Cup : Mr. Claud Sykes's Talbot II. (Lord Gort).

The 1st Life Guards Challenge Cup : Lord Somers's Maid of the Mist II. (Lord H. Grosvenor). 10 ran.

The Household Brigade Cup : Mr. Claud Sykes's Wand (owner).

The Coldstream Plate : Capt. Banbury's Noble Boy (owner). 15 ran.

The 2nd Life Guards Regimental Challenge Cup : Capt. Noel Newton's Silverspring (owner).

The Royal Horse Guards Regimental Race : Mr. Colwyn Philipps's Starlight VIII. (owner).

...

Second Day

The Household Brigade Selling Hurdle Race : Capt. Noel Newton's Port Meadow (owner).

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The Open Military Selling Steeplechase: Mr. Claude Sykes's Highstep (Mr. Rowley).

The Household Brigade Hunters Challenge Cup (about 4 miles): Capt. Hugh Ashton's (2nd Life Guards) Yeoman (owner). 18 ran.

The Household Brigade Handicap Steeplechase: Capt. E. Christie Miller's Sir Percy (Capt. Banbury).

The 16th Lancers ran their Regimental and Subaltern Challenge Cups at the Bungay Races, both being won by Mr. Beech's Katerfelto (owner).

There was a magnificent attendance at Punchestown Races this year, although the weather was, as usual, rather unsettled. Their Excellencies the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Countess of Aberdeen brought with them a large party from the Viceregal Lodge, many sporting notabilities from the other side of the Channel were present, and, of course, the rank, fashion, and beauty of the Emerald Isle were in strong evidence. On the first day Mr. Walwyn had a comfortable ride in the Military Steeplechase, and Capt. H. Dixon's Lord Charles won the Kildare Hunt Cup with the Hon. B. Bingham riding. On the second day Capt. Pallin won the Irish Grand Military with Prince Hugo, and Count Stolberg won the Conyngham Cup (a four-mile steeplechase) on his own horse, Victor Olympic, by a head from Capt. Higgin's Dysart, Mr. H. Ussher up. Result of Military Races:—

The IRISH MAIDEN MILITARY HUNTERS RACE of 120 sovs; weight for age, &c. About three miles and a half over the last part of the National Hunt Cup Course.

Mr. G. R. Benson's (R.F.A.) PHIL, by Phillip, dam by Bedgrove, aged, 12st. .....Mr. Walwyn 1
Capt. J. B. George's (R.I.R.) BECTIVE, aged, 12st 2lb.....Owner 2
Major C. Dalton's (R.A.M.C.) THOWL PIN, 6 yrs, 12st Capt. Pallin 3
Capt. M. A. Black's (5th D.G.) THE SPIDER, aged, 11st 9lb .....Owner 0
Mr. J. G. N. Bomford's (R.F.) SHERRY, aged, 11st 9lb .....Owner 0
Mr. M. Crawshay's (5th D.G.) ISON, aged, 12st .....Owner 0
Major A. Dibley's (R.D.F.) HADDINGTON BOY, 6 yrs, 12st 7lb Hon. B. Bingham 0
Mr. H. de B. C. Garfit's (5th D.G.) STONEHALL II., aged, 11st 9lb Major Pinwood 0
Capt. J. H. Gibbon's (R.F.A.) PETONE, 6 yrs, 12st 2lb.....Owner 0
Capt. G. S. Higginson's (R.D.F.) CHERIE, 6 yrs, 11st 9lb .....Owner 0
Mr. C. N. Keyser's (20th H.) SPECTRAL II., aged, 11st 9lb Owner 0
Capt. R. A. B. Chute's (Manch. R.) CRUCKBOULTHAUNE, 5 yrs, 11st 7lb Owner 0
Mr. —— SIMON, aged, 12st 2lb Owner 0
Mr. Dash's VERMILLION, aged, 11st 9lb (car 11st 11lb) Mr. F. G. White 0

Betting: 6 to 4 each agst Thowl Pin and Bective, 6 to 1 each agst PHIL and Stonehall II., and 10 to 1 bar four. Won in a canter by six lengths; four lengths divided the second and third. Petone, Spectral II., and Ison fell.

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The IRISH GRAND MILITARY of 200 sovs; weight for age, &c. About three miles, over the Old Course.

Capt. W. A. Pallin's (A.V.C.) PRINCE HUGO, 5 yrs, 11st 3lb
Owner 1

Capt. Hon. M. Ruthven's (R.H.) BLACK WATCH, 6 yrs, 12st 2lb
Owner 2

Mr. E. K. Bradbury's (R.F.A.) HOT WATER, 5 yrs, 10st 12lb
Capt. Higginson 3

Mr. J. P. G. Worlledge's (R.E.) KRAMERI, aged, 12st 11lb...Owner 0

Major J. B. Jardine's (5th L.) JIM HICKEY, aged, 12st 5lb (car 12st. 6lb.....Mr. B. W. Robinson 0

Hon. H. C. Alexander's (5th L.) HOME RULE, aged, 12st 2lb
Owner 0

Mr. K. Parbury's (R.F.A.) EL CHICO, aged, 12st 11lb
Capt. B. George 0

Mr. K. Parbury's (R.F.A.) RUBY LIGHT, aged, 13st 2lb
Mr. C. Walwyn 0

Mr. H. McMaster's (R.F.A.) COMMODORE II., 6 yrs, 12st 2lb
Owner 0

Mr. H. McMaster's (R.F.A.) LORNA, 6 yrs, 11st 8lb....Hon. B. Bingham 0

Betting: 3 to 1 agst PRINCE HUGO, 4 to 1 agst Ruby Light, 7 to 1 agst Home Rule, 8 to 1 agst El Chico, 10 to 1 agst Black Watch, and 20 to 1 bar five. Won by six lengths; thirty lengths divided second and third. Jim Hickey, Commodore II., and El Chico fell.

POINT TO POINT RACES

At the Royal Engineer Races in April near Bracknell, the 1st Cavalry Brigade team race was won by the 19th Hussars (22 points), 3rd Dragoon Guards (28 points), 2nd Queen's Bays (35 points), Royal Horse Artillery (51 points).

The 18th Hussars races were held at Coate, near Swindon, the Regimental race being won by Mr. W. Joynson's Cup o' Wisdom (owner) and the Chargers race by Capt. F. W. Sopper's Melton (owner).

The 16th Lancers races took place at Caistor St. Edmunds. Results:

Chargers Cup: Capt. McArthur Onslow's Poacher II. (owner).

Light-Weight race: Mr. Tempest Hick's Dr. C. (owner).

Open race: Major C. D. Seymour's Minstrel (owner).

Heavy-Weight Cup: Mr. Melise Graham's Rubicon III. (owner).

The Hunt races comprised enormous fields and splendid finishes, Lady Dudley's Cup being won by Major Purvis's Our Philip (owner).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade held their races near Hawthorn Hill. Results:—

Queen's Bays Welter Race: Capt. Ing's Gamecock (owner).

19th Hussars Regimental race: Heavy-Weights—Mr. Settle's Minnie (owner); Light-Weights—Captain Parson's Dandy Dick (owner).

3rd Dragoon Guards Regimental race: Mr. Elliott's Brownie (owner).

Queen's Bays Regimental Light-Weight race: Mr. Sloane's Toddles II. (owner).

19th Hussars Subalterns' race: Mr. Platt's Black Knight (owner).

3rd Dragoon Guards Subalterns' race: Mr. Elliott's Brownie (owner).

Major Percy (19th Hussars) was starter and Brig.-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, C.B., judge.

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ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

This popular Tournament was again one of the features of the London season and was on two occasions honoured by the presence of their Majesties the King and Queen and many Royalties. On the opening day the Duke and Duchess of Connaught were the principal visitors, and on the second day the King was accompanied by the German Emperor and Empress, Queen Mary, the Prince of Wales, Princess Louise, Princess Mary, and the Duchess of Connaught. Olympia, where the Tournament was held, was fittingly adorned as a Tudor tiltyard. One of the features of the Tournament was a well-managed pageant, 'Heroes of British History,' commencing with Alfred the Great and King Harold, and wandering through the ages to Nelson and the Peninsula period. Most of the old and favourite exhibitions were retained, including smart displays by 12-pounder naval batteries, clever riding and jumping by the Royal Field Artillery and Cavalry School, and the delightful musical rides and drives by the 1st Life Guards and B.B. Battery R.H.A. Some of the results of the competitions, for which officers and men had previously qualified to enter in the local tournaments, were as follows :—

Sword *v.* Sword (Regulars and Territorials, officers): Capt. W. Paget-Tomlinson, 7th Hussars.

Sword *v.* Sword (N.C.O.s and men): Squadron Corpl.-Major Coggins, 1st Life Guards.

Dummy Thrusting (Regulars and Territorials, officers): Capt. W. Paget-Tomlinson, 7th Hussars.

Dummy Thrusting (N.C.O.s and men): Sergt.-Major Hiscock, 18th Hussars.

Sword *v.* Lance (Regulars and Territorials, officers): Lieut. G. E. Dunsterville, 1st Devonshire Regiment.

Sword *v.* Lance (N.C.O.s and men): Regt. Sergt.-Major Stewart, 3rd Dragoon Guards.

Tent-Pegging (Regulars and Territorials, officers): Lieut. T. Lawrence, V.C., 18th Hussars.

Tent-Pegging (N.C.O.s and men): Squad. Sergt.-Major Bailey, 3rd Dragoon Guards.

Lemon-Cutting (officers): Major W. F. G. Percy, 18th Hussars.

Lemon-Cutting (N.C.O.s and men): Sergt. Vesey, 18th Hussars.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Royal Navy, Regular Army, and Territorials): Sergt.-Major W. Palmer, Army Gymnastic Staff.

Sword *v.* Lance (Navy and Army Championship): Corpl. Humphries, 7th Hussars.

Dummy Thrusting (Navy and Army Championship): Capt. W. Paget-Tomlinson, 7th Hussars.

Officers' Jumping Competition: Lieut. R. Bruce, 11th Hussars, 1; Major Percy, 19th Hussars, 2; Lieut. D. McCalmont, 7th Hussars, 3.

Best Man at Arms (dismounted): Lieut. J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff.

Best Man at Arms (mounted): Sergt. C. Vesey, 18th Hussars.

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CAVALRY SCHOOL, SAUGOR

The Cavalry School in India at Saugor is rapidly making a name for itself. Following the first inspection of the Commander-in-Chief, which was an extremely successful one, during which His Excellency and Lady Creagh made themselves most popular, a sporting week was commenced. This opened with a Polo Tournament, for which Mr. R. G. Baldocks had generously presented a fine challenge cup. It it hoped that this week will become an annual event, and it has been suggested that the India Cavalry Polo Tournament might well be played there every two or three years in succession, as Saugor is an excellent centre. On the second day point-to-point races took place near the village of Kondari on the Jhansi Road. The vale of old Saugor furnished a good course of nearly four miles of country with the usual obstacles met with in India; the addition of some artificial brushwood fences and a wall or two made up eighteen jumps, the pony course being somewhat shorter. The start was made away in the country, and, after jumping a stone wall, a bit of jungle with some nullahs had to be negotiated; then, crossing a piece of light plough and the Jhansi Road, the way lay through some high grass, on jumping out of which competitors began to ride the hill, which acted as a grand stand and enabled a good view to be obtained throughout the course. Skirting the hill a point of over a mile was made before the red flag showed that the course had turned due east; another mile in which the Jhansi Road was crossed for the second time brought the field to the home-turning flag. A straight half-mile with a nullah and a couple of fences remained before the winning post, which lay on the east side of the hill, was reached. Results :—

First race. Indian officers (owners up): Ressalder Rahtore Mull Sing, 27th Light Cavalry.

Second race. For ponies, heavy-weights: Major Andrew's Calm (owner).

Third race. Horses, light-weights, for a cup presented by the officers, past and present, of the Cavalry School, Netheravon (owners up): Mr. M. H. Jackson's (29th Lancers) The Treasurer, 1; Mr. A. K. Fraser's (2nd C.I.H.) Sir Walter, 2; Mr. D. G. Bromilow's (14th Lancers) Peter, 3. Twelve started and a good race resulted in a clever win for The Treasurer, a neck only dividing the second and third. Since this race Peter has run second in the Hog Hunters Cup at the Kadir Meeting.

Fourth race: Mr. Henderson's (1st C.I.H.) Zulu.

Fifth race. Ponies, light weights: Mr. Trench's (7th Lancers) Banshee.

Sixth race. British N.C.O.s first-class remounts: R.S.M. Vaughan's Fairy (owner).

The Cavalry School first annual horse show commenced next day. The entries were splendid and the competitors keen. For the chargers over 14-2 first prize was taken by Major Neil Haig's (Inniskilling Dragoons) Sentiment. Thirty entries.

In the Olympia jumping for ponies 14-2 and under, Mr. Powell's (36th Horse) Acushla and Mr. Lamb's (10th Lancers) Red Hackle divided the first prize. Jumping for British Warrant and N.C.O.s was won by

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S.S.M. Hill's Morry. The best stable of three horses or ponies was secured by Major P. Hambro (15th Hussars), the same officer securing first prize for chargers 14-2 and under with Sans Reproche.

Jumping for horses 14-2 and under: Capt. Edward's Coquette. Twenty-five entries.

Jumping for Indian officers and Indian N.C.O.s: Dafadar Hussan Shah (Cavalry School staff) Henhar.

The final of the Baldock Polo Tournament now took place, and after a splendid galloping game D Ride beat A Ride, who were favourites, by three goals to one. For the winners Mr. Greenway did good work, and Mr. Sprot was prominent for the losers.

In the final classes of the Horse Show the Olympia jumping was won by Capt. Jackson's (27th Cavalry) Dashing Down (owner) and Lilly Bart (Capt. Reynolds up).

A general parade of the prize-winners followed, after which Mrs. Wapshare distributed the prizes and General Wapshare congratulated all who had made the week such a great success, especially Capt. Jackson, who had managed the Horse Show, Sir Douglas Haig, Mr. Craddock, the Chief Commissioner, General Groven, and Mr. Baldock, for their handsome donations of challenge cups.

BOXING

The 6th Inniskilling Dragoons held a fine boxing tournament at Mhow, open to all India. The light-weights open to India was won by Private Crane (Inniskilling Dragoons), and the feather-weights by Driver Chandler (X Battery R.H.A.).—A wrestling match also took place between Private Hennington (Inniskilling Dragoons), the middle-weight champion of India, and Corporal Miller (Gordon Highlanders). Hennington threw his man in 4min. 38½sec., and secured his second fall in 4min. 44sec.—At the conclusion the prizes were presented by Major-General Blomfield, D.S.O.

HORSE SHOWS

Space will not permit of a full account of the great International Horse Show at Olympia, which attracted competitors and spectators from all over the world. The event which evoked the greatest interest in military circles was the King George V. Gold Cup, value £500, for jumping over the course by a military officer of any nationality in uniform. It was a near thing between Captain Dimitri d'Exe (Cuirassiers of the Guard, Russia), with Piccolo, and Lieut. Léon Ripet (2nd Chasseurs, Belgium), on Kitty. Both jumped the course without disturbing anything, but Captain Dimitri d'Exe's was a faultless ride, and he was proclaimed the winner of this coveted Cup, with Lieut. Léon Ripet second, and Lieut. D. Ivanenko (Alexandriesky Hussars, Russia), on Barynia, third. Of the English officers, Lieut. G. E. M. Thorneycroft did best, with Mr. Green. The Connaught Gold Challenge Cup for jumping over the course by British officers was won by Lieut. Geoffrey Brooke's (16th Lancers) Alice; Lieut. C. T. Walwyn's (R.H.A.) The Nut second, and Lieut. M. Crawshay's (5th Dragoons) Princess Charlotte third.

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ATHLETICS

The London Territorial Championship Meeting took place at Stamford Bridge in the presence of over 6,000 spectators. The entries were enormous and the performances good. The London Scottish again won "the military Marathon," arriving in splendid form with Lieut. J. C. Farquharson at their head. With 22½ points the same corps won the Grand Aggregate Challenge Bowl presented by His Grace the Duke of Fife, "The Rangers" being second with 19 points, and the "Artists" third with 16 points. Lady Kinnaird kindly distributed the prizes.

'RAIDS HIPPIQUES'

The following account of two Military Competitions lately held at the annual Concours Hippique, Paris, has been kindly contributed by Colonel W. E. Fairholme, C.M.G., M.V.O., Military Attaché, Paris:—

These two competitions, or 'Raids Hippiques,' which aroused considerable public interest and were, moreover, very popular in the Cavalry and among the Reserve officers, were organised, with the approval and co-operation of the military authorities, under the auspices of the *Matin* newspaper, assisted by the Société Hippique de France. The *Matin* took upon itself the greater portion of the expenses, while the Treasury granted the same allowances as if the officers had been called out for training, and some of the numerous prizes were offered by individuals or public bodies.

The first of the two competitions to take place was open to all officers of the Army Reserve. Its main conditions were that the competitors should cover a distance of 312 miles in a period of nine days, the sixth of which was to be a day of complete rest. The average on the eight marching days was thus thirty-nine miles.

There were certain restrictions with regard to pace, and the stages to be performed in each day's march were laid down, as well as the hours of departure and arrival. Each officer had to look after his horse unaided, except during the nightly halt, when soldier grooms and stabling were provided.

The competitors were divided into four groups, according to their places of residence, each group having a different itinerary assigned to it; but all four routes, which had been carefully selected to represent as nearly as possible the same effort, converged on Paris from the four points of the compass.

Uniform was worn, but without swords, and any pattern of saddlery was permitted.

Strict supervision and control were exercised throughout by a numerous umpire staff, consisting of officers of the Regular Cavalry and Artillery, so that serious injury to horses through over-exertion was rendered impossible.

The start was on the morning of March 15, and, in view of the very unfavourable weather experienced, which included snowstorms and heavy rain, it is greatly to the credit of the French Reserve officers that 186 out of 203 starters completed the course and fulfilled the conditions laid down. There were originally 274 entries.

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The ninth day's stage was so arranged that the competitors left in at the finish, on all four sections, met in the park of Bagatelle, in the Bois de Boulogne, where they were subjected to the closest scrutiny, their performances being duly marked and classed.

Next day, on March 24, they paraded in the arena of the Concours Hippique, where they were put through their paces, at a walk, trot, and canter, and where it was open to such of them as liked to go over a series of moderate jumps.

The prizes, consisting of thirty-six sums of money, ranging from £80 to £8, and a number of cups and other objects, were then presented, amid the applause of the spectators.

The second competition, which was of a rather more professional nature, took place from April 8 to 11.

It consisted of a 'Raid' ridden by patrols, composed of an officer, a sergeant, and four troopers, each patrol being furnished by a different Cavalry regiment. The distance, which had to be covered in three days, was 186 miles, and the routes, of which there were eleven, all converging on Paris, had been carefully worked out so as to be fair for all.

Twenty-seven patrols were entered, and of these twenty-two fulfilled the conditions prescribed, and came in intact and apparently none the worse for their exertions. Most of the patrols contented themselves with doing fifty miles on the first day, reserving their main effort for the second day, when seventy-five miles were covered in most cases, which left about sixty for the last day.

On April 11 the successful twenty-two patrols were paraded, in review order, in the arena of the Concours Hippique, where they were judged for condition, in the presence of a large and enthusiastic gathering, which included the Minister for War and most of the leading generals in Paris.

The condition of the men and horses was remarkably good. I did not see a single horse which looked tucked-up. The various teams were strikingly level, and I was impressed, as on other occasions, by the excellent quality of the French Cavalry horses. The Hussars' and the Chasseurs' mounts showed much breeding, while the heavier stamp of Anglo-Norman ridden by the Dragoons and Cuirassiers seemed to have stood the test equally well.

The first prize was taken by a wonderfully well-matched and nearly thoroughbred team from a Hussar regiment.

One of the conditions of the competition was that each team should consist of horses drawn from the same remount depôt, the object being to compare the staying powers of the various breeds of horses indigenous to the several provinces of France.

About one month's previous training had been allowed, and I am informed that two-thirds of the troopers were short-service men who had completed only eighteen months' service with the colours.

In the case of both 'Raids,' the competitors were greeted with the greatest enthusiasm all along the several routes, the population in many of the towns and villages passed through having decorated their houses in honour of the Army.

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

J. P. BEADLE.

"THE EMPTY SADDLE."

(South Africa—1901.)

THE ROYAL ACADEMY, 1911.

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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

OCTOBER 1911

THE BATTLE OF NASEBY

By Colonel J. Vaughan, D.S.O.

At Naseby, in Northamptonshire, now so familiar to those whose pleasant lot it is to follow the Pytchley Hounds, was fought on June 14, 1645, a battle which every Cavalry soldier should study. Of it the German soldier critic, Captain Hoenig, writes:—'There can hardly be an instance in military history in which Cavalry has been employed to better purpose than by Cromwell at Naseby.'

Cromwell's success was only made possible by the high state of training of his squadrons. This was based on the training of the individual man and the individual horse, a principle which is reasserting itself in the British Cavalry to-day. Thoughtless and unread persons will say: 'What can you learn from a battle fought 265 years ago with primitive firearms?' Consider well, my thoughtful friends, these extracts from Colonel Maude's excellent work, 'Cavalry: Its Past and Future.' 'Since the Middle Ages to the present time Cavalry have always gone into action against Infantry with the preconceived impression that "Cavalry cannot charge unbroken Infantry," an impression sound enough when the object to be charged was a solid twelve-deep block of foot soldiers protected by 16-feet pikes—an insuperable physical obstacle that no flesh and blood could overcome until its order had been loosened by fire effect. But with every improvement in weapons this physical obstacle has grown less and less, whilst its fire power has not increased in the same ratio as the improvement in firearms would lead one to expect; for, in order to derive the full advantage

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of the improvements in the fight of Infantry against Infantry, the fighting formations of the latter have been progressively reduced in density, *the actual number of bullets per yard of front to be encountered remaining practically unchanged.*

'Thus in Cromwell's time a line of men standing twelve deep could deliver a continuous fire of twelve shots a minute, each bullet being a substantial bone-smasher guaranteed to stretch a horse dead in its tracks.

'In Frederick's time the Prussians could deliver from nine to eighteen bullets per yard of front per minute. During all the flintlock period good Cavalry under a resolute leader swept the battlefield, no matter what quality of Infantry was opposed to it, as at Zorndorf, Roszbach, and Baireuth. . . . Then the breech-loader appeared on the scene. The French Infantry were practically invariably ridden down by the German Cavalry (1870-71). Then came the day of the small-bore and magazine rifle, and again theories have been built up on the same fallacious assumption, viz. that accuracy of fire was a specific quality of the weapon *independent of the man behind it.* Experiments show that the chances of hitting vary inversely, as the square of the number of rounds fired, once a rate of from four to six rounds a minute is exceeded. . . . Again, we have entirely failed to note the want of stopping-power in the modern humanitarian bullet. Yet, if charges are to be stopped, the horses must be brought down, and in a very short length, too.'

Remember, then, in reading this account of the battle, that charging Infantry in those days was probably a more formidable task than it would be nowadays. The great advantage that the generals of those times had over those of our own time lay in the shorter distances that separated the combatants, and hence the ease with which observation could be kept on the crises of the battle, and charges launched at the correct moment.

The account which follows is taken from 'Cromwell,' by Captain P. A. Charrier, Royal Munster Fusiliers:—

'During the winter of 1644-45 the Parliamentary party reorganised their army on the "new model," which meant the extension of Cromwell's system of organisation and discipline of his own regiment to the whole of the Army then paid by Parliament. All recriminations and attacks upon hitherto incompetent leaders were put aside as a futile

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waste of time, and they determined, at all costs, to pursue the war vigorously.

'Towards the end of May, 1645, the Royalists' Army had captured Leicester, the Parliamentary forces being engaged upon the siege of Oxford and many more minor places. It was a fault on the part of the Parliament to allow the Royal Army to move about the country as it pleased, but the House of Commons had not yet understood that the enemy's forces in the field should be their aim. The capture of



Leicester brought them to their senses. "As soon as the news of the capture of Leicester came, Fairfax was ordered to leave Oxford and to march against the King. Taught by experience, the amateur strategists of the Committee (Committee of both Kingdoms in the House of Commons) left him free to order his movements as he thought fit, and removed all limitations that they had before imposed. . . ."

'On June 5, Fairfax, leaving the blockade of Oxford, set off in search of the King's Army. Arriving at Sheriton, a petition was drawn

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up to Parliament praying that Cromwell should be appointed to the command of the Cavalry.

'"It is evident," says Colonel Baldock, "that among the officers themselves Cromwell was considered the best Cavalry leader on the Parliamentary side."

'At Killingsbury Cromwell rode into Fairfax's camp with 600 horse, and was welcomed with a mighty shout: "Ironsides," they cried, "is come to lead us."

'Fairfax's force would now amount to some 7,000 horse and 7,000 foot.

'The Royalist Army, marching from Leicester, had reached Daventry, where they had halted for some days. Contact was now established between the two armies. The Royal force amounted to some 4,000 horse and 3,500 foot.

'On June 13 "the King's forces all astir about four in the morning (near Daventry), firing their huts rapidly, making off northward, as it proved, Major Davidson, with horse, is sent towards Daventry to explore; Ireton, also with horse, to the northward, after the King's main body. Fairfax's main body, now set towards Harborough, flanking the King; and that night, Friday, June 13, arrived at Guildsborough.

'"The King's van is now, this Friday night, at Harborough, his rear is quartered at Naseby, where Ireton beats them up (probably about half-past nine), taking prisoners, and so the fugitives rouse the King out of his bed at Lubenham, who thereupon drives off to Prince Rupert at Harborough; arrives about midnight; calls a council (resting himself in a chair in a low room till Rupert and the rest get on their clothes); and there after debate determines on turning back to beat the Roundheads for this affront. Fairfax, starting at three in the morning from Guildsborough, reaches Naseby at about five, where he is informed by his Cavalry scouts that great bodies of the King's troops were coming over the hill towards them.

'"The position of the two armies before the battle satisfied all modern requirements as to concealment; every advantage had been taken of the cover the ground afforded.

'"From east to west parallel ranges of low hills, broad, blunt, clayey masses, swelling towards and from each other, like indolent waves of a sea."

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'The northernmost ridge is separated from the more southerly one by a broad plain, and on this plain the actual encounter took place.

DIAGRAM SHOWING CROMWELL'S MANŒUVRE TO THE ATTACK OF SIR M. LANGDALE'S CAVALRY AT NASEBY.



The Cavalry fell in in six ranks on parade, one horse length distance between ranks and one horse length interval between files.

All manœuvring was done in this formation.

When attacking, line was formed of three ranks by the simple process of the men of the 2nd, 4th and 6th ranks moving up on the left of their own files in the 1st, 3rd and 5th ranks.

As far as possible an endeavour was made to have no intervals between squadrons in the attack. They rode in the closest knee-to-knee order possible.

Note.—The diagram could not show all Cromwell's Cavalry, as it would take up too large a space.

Whalley attacked straight to his front in two overlapping lines.

On the east the ground was cut up by numerous rabbit warrens and gorse bushes, and on the west the field was limited by a substantial

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hedge and ditch, which ran perpendicular to the fronts of both armies, and on the Puritan side was lined by Oakey's Dragoons.

'Cromwell had himself reconnoitred the ground, keeping well up to windward of the enemy, so as not to be inconvenienced by the dust of his own movements—a point quite as important nowadays as then.

'The troops (on the Puritan side) were at first marshalled across the crest of the slope, but at Cromwell's suggestion were drawn back a hundred yards or so, in order to prevent the enemy advancing in the valley below from seeing their numbers and dispositions.

'"It may be remarked," says Colonel Maude, "that cover was only used to conceal their strength, not for the purpose of avoidance of loss."

'For it must be remembered that the Parliament's force was twice as strong as the Royal force, and now that Fairfax was unhampered by restrictions from the amateur strategists alluded to by Mr. Firth, he desired a battle while the advantage lasted, and had no wish, by permanently disclosing his strength, to frighten the enemy into a retreat, and so put off a decision.

'The Royal Army advanced to the attack, on seeing which the Puritans advanced also, and "the battle joins on the very brow of the hill."

'As the Royalist Infantry pressed back the Puritan Foot in the centre, the Cavalry attacked on both sides, so that their collision must have ensued almost simultaneously with that of the Infantry, Rupert riding over and through Ireton's men, and pursuing them up to and beyond the baggage laager and Naseby village.

'When Cromwell observed the victorious advance of the enemy's Infantry he ordered Whalley's regiment of horse (on the left of his line) to attack the Royalist Cavalry in his front in two overlapping lines.

'Whalley threw himself in this order on the right wing of Langdale's Cavalry, over-rode both the opposing lines, and pressed forward as far as the Royal Reserve of Infantry. Whilst Whalley was attacking the Cavalry in front, Cromwell, in three lines, took ground to the right, then changed direction to the left, and, suddenly wheeling up into line, thundered down on to the left of the King's Cavalry with five regiments and two squadrons, the remaining regiment (Rossiter's) following well away to the right as a cover for his flank. The result was the complete and immediate overthrow of the Royalists.

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'Cromwell at once called off his men from the pursuit, and rallied them, whilst Rossiter, with his fresh horses, continued to follow up the beaten enemy.

'Rupert, lacking Cromwell's self-possession—that wonderful control over himself and his men—which is the greatest but perhaps the rarest quality a Cavalry leader can possess, had loosed his squadrons in full pursuit of Ireton's flying horsemen. Galloping towards Naseby, he came across the Parliamentary baggage. Mistaking him for one of his generals on his own side, the commander of the escort stepped forward to ask him how the day went. Rupert replied by asking him if he would take quarter, but was answered by a curt "No." Collecting a few horsemen, Rupert set them at the train, but the musketeers beat them off.

'The King and Langdale were rallying all the men they could to try and retrieve the fortune of the day. Rossiter now rallied; Cromwell, leaving him to keep them in check with the rest of his horse, fell on the Royalists' Infantry, who fought with great tenacity, but, attacked simultaneously by horse and foot, they were soon broken, and regiment after regiment lay down its arms. A brigade of bluecoats stood "with incredible courage and resolution," beating back charge after charge with their pikes. At last Cromwell charged one face of the square, whilst Fairfax, bareheaded, led his lifeguard against another. It, too, was broken, and Fairfax took the colours with his hand. Of the King's Infantry scarcely a man escaped capture.

'Rossiter's rallied squadrons procured for Cromwell his complete liberty of action, and gave Cromwell the time necessary to accomplish the work he was engaged in.

'Rupert with the greatest difficulty rallied his scattered troopers and led them back to the field.

'Arrived on the field, Rupert found himself too late. Streaming away from the place where the foot had joined issue, a disorderly mass of fugitives represented the King's gallant regiments. Half a mile away Langdale and the King had succeeded in re-forming their beaten troopers. Between these and the foot rode Cromwell's steel-clad horsemen, their unbroken ranks and steady movements testifying to their superior discipline. Rupert rejoined the King, and together they formed a new line of battle with the Cavalry. Of Infantry and guns none were left. Cromwell, about a quarter-mile off, formed his

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squadrons into two wings, leaving a place between them for the foot, now rapidly being re-formed in rear by Fairfax. Rupert urged another charge, but in his own squadrons the horses were blown and exhausted. Langdale's men were demoralised by their defeat. Neither could be brought to charge again. For a short space the opposing Cavalry stood facing each other. Then Fairfax's Infantry moved forward into the space left for them by the horse, and Cromwell gave the word to charge. The Royalist troopers never awaited the onslaught. Wheeling about, they galloped from the field as fast as they could spur.

'Then Cromwell let go his men in pursuit. No more need of serried ranks; it only remained to push victory to the utmost.

'We pursued the enemy from three miles short of Harborough to nine beyond, even to the sight of Leicester, whither the King fled.

'Nearly five thousand prisoners, more than one hundred colours, all of the King's baggage and artillery, and his private papers fell into the hands of the victors.

'The fight began at ten o'clock, and lasted three hours.

'It is worth pointing out that Cromwell himself had been hard pressed in the fighting, having a blow over the head which caused the loss of his helmet, but he continued to fight bareheaded, and it is evident that neither the excitement of the combat nor his personal danger had any effect in clouding the clearness of his judgment.

'There are many lessons in leadership to be learned from this battle, showing how Cromwell retained the mastery of the fight in his hands, leaving nothing to mere chance.

'After he had routed Langdale's Cavalry he sets Rossiter's regiment in pursuit, and immediately rallies his other regiments for the next effort. His own Infantry were hard pressed by the hitherto victorious Royalist Foot, the left wing of the Puritans, the Cavalry under Ireton, were routed. Actually on the field no Cavalry remained except his own, for Rupert had gone off towards Naseby. He attacks the Royal Foot and, in close co-operation with Fairfax's Infantry, defeats them. But as all this takes time, and some clear space is also required to manœuvre in, he gets Rossiter, who is rallied, to secure that time for him. Rossiter rallied opposes Langdale rallying, and prevents Langdale interfering with Cromwell. The threat of Rossiter's rallied squadrons is enough here, and Cromwell was not interfered with by the enemy whilst he was, in conjunction with Fairfax, destroying the

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

(From an old engraving in the Royal United Service Museum.)

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Royal centre. After the Royal Infantry had been completely defeated all the Puritan chiefs set to re-forming as quickly as they could, and here again they gained the time and space necessary because of Rossiter, who is rallied and quite fresh. He is the last reserve they had, and the mere threat of his fresh and well-ordered squadrons was enough to gain time for the rest of the army to rally under cover of his horsemen. Once all ready, again the final blow was delivered, but Cavaliers did not meet it.

'In the Cavalry fight of Cromwell against Langdale Cromwell relies for success on his good order, his cohesion, and the rapidity of his movements, and he keeps a reserve of horse (Rossiter) to influence the final decision. When he judged the moment of attack, the first line, under Whalley, attacked straight to the front, without any fear for its flank. Cromwell secured that by his manœuvre on Langdale's flank, fulfilling the law of the Cavalry combat that all the efforts should be simultaneous. They attacked first, and their efforts were simultaneously dealt out on the front and on the flank of Langdale. The respective places of the different lines had nothing absolute in them, and depended on the circumstances of the combat. Every leader knew the rules of the game, and played to win. There was no normal form of attack; an attack was decided on the spot, and the best line of conduct to hold was so fixed in their minds that they required few instructions.

'Constantly keeping a reserve, and constantly re-forming into good order for the next effort, was the secret of the hold Cromwell had over the battle, which, when allied with discipline, with intelligent initiative, with rapid decision, with energy, with self-control, with perseverance, with endurance, with capacity for prolonged efforts, with bravery, and with knowledge, makes for success in walks of life, as well as on the battlefield.

'Between 10 A.M. and 1 P.M. that day Cromwell had solved the battle-rôle of Cavalry in all its phases (he had already done so at Marston Moor); the defeat of the hostile Cavalry, the co-operation of his Cavalry with the other arms, to the destruction of the enemy's forces still on the field, and the pursuit to reap the fruits of the victory.'

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A COMPETITIVE LONG-DISTANCE RIDE

[Communicated by the General Staff, War Office.]

In the month of February this year, four officers, four N.C.O.s, and twenty men of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment—Japan—were selected and formed into four sections of equal strength.

The sections underwent a preliminary training a fortnight before the ride began. Nine horses were attached to each section for the preliminary training, and seven of these were selected for the ride.

The length of the ride was 325 miles, and the route was a circular one, beginning and ending at the headquarters of the regiment—Nagoya. "A" and "B" Sections started at the same time but in opposite directions, and were followed four hours later by the remaining two sections—"C" and "D."

The winning section accomplished the ride in 91 hours 53 minutes, which was spent as follows:—

In the saddle . . .	73 hours	58 minutes.
At the halt . . .	15 ,,	5 ,,
Crossing rivers . .	2 ,,	50 ,,

No restrictions whatever were placed upon the sections in connection with halts, quarters, or the rate of march; their orders were simply to complete the ride as efficiently and quickly as possible.

Umpires at the different stations were to arrange for the supply of food and forage to the sections. Orders were given to the latter that they were not to feed their horses elsewhere along the route unless they halted for over half an hour to do so.

Weather.—The weather throughout the ride was very cold, windy, and inclement, and the progress of the sections was much retarded by a violent snowstorm and a strong wind during the passage of the Rivers Kiso and Ibi. The temperature at night was always below zero; but the ride was successfully continued by means of the clear moonlight. It was noticed that the horses did not perspire so

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much, and that their respiration was easy in consequence of the cold temperature.

The Roads.—The rate of marching was regular, even in places where the surface was bad and muddy owing to the snow, and where steep slopes were encountered.

Feeds.—Feeds were issued at each umpire's station as follows:—

Barley	between 3 and 5½ quarts
Bran	1½ quarts
Carrots	between 1½ and 4 lbs.
Hay	4 lbs.
Straw	between 4 and 8 lbs.

Horses were given 2½ quarts of barley at every halt of over half an hour. A few carrots were carried by the men to encourage horses who had to be led. Horses were allowed to be watered even at short halts. In the event of horses becoming exhausted a small quantity of brandy and water was administered, and was found to possess considerable stimulative effect.

Rate of Marching and Difference in System between the Preliminary Practice and the Actual Ride.—The difference between the total number of hours calculated as necessary to complete the ride and that actually required varied between 9 hours and 50 minutes and 25 hours and 15 minutes, caused by:—

(*a*) Miscalculation of distances at the beginning of the ride.

(*b*) The inclemency of the weather.

(*c*) Insufficiency of sleep.

Horsemastership.—Horses were led at steep hills and also at the walk. At a long halt legs and back were carefully rubbed, and other treatment was given to those requiring it. Adjustment of saddles was carried out at halts, however short. Shoes were examined at each halt. Horsemastership was, however, unavoidably neglected to a certain extent after the second day of the ride, owing to the lack of sleep. The result was horses suffered to an appreciable extent.

The Condition of the Men.—Men had a three hours' halt at each umpire's station to rest and to feed and look after their horses, but the duration of the halt, being insufficient to permit of this, was spent solely in feeding and grooming, and no time for rest was possible. Consequently most of the men slept mounted while at the walk at night; more particularly on the fourth night, when almost all were

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sleeping, even at the trot. This could not, however, be said of "D" Section, which performed the ride in the best time, and arrived with its horses in good condition.

Condition of Horses.—No horses were cast on account of injuries received during the ride.

Mounted Orderlies.—Each section sent back orderlies to their units both at the end of the first and second day's ride. Those of "A" and "B" Sections were to advance along a route unknown to them, while those of "C" and "D" Sections were directed to cross the Otoge and Aoyama Passes at night, when the snow was falling heavily. One man of "D" Section, whose horse went lame shortly after starting back, was obliged to lead him all the way to Nagoya from Hisai, a distance of about 52 miles.

Reconnaissance.—The reconnaissance was on the whole unsatisfactory, having been carried out mostly by night, in a comparatively short time, with men in a state of exhaustion.

Tests of the reserve of strength available after a rest were carried out after a rest of 12 hours from the return of the horses to their units. The test was carried out at the walk, trot, and canter, and lasted for 20 minutes. It was found that they had recuperated to the extent of being able to carry out fairly severe exertion for a short period.

Treatment on Return.—(*a*) *Grooming.* Legs were rubbed carefully with straw at the end of each grooming—once in the morning, noon, and afternoon—and treated with recuperative medicine three times a day. (*b*) *Exercise.* For the first three days walking exercise was given twice a day. From the fourth day the amount of exercise given was gradually increased up to the normal. (*c*) *Feed.* At first $4\frac{3}{4}$ quarts of barley and 3 of bran were given in addition to the regulation ration of straw and hay. From the fourth day this allowance was gradually increased till by the seventh they were getting the normal ration.

Recuperative Power of Horses.—After seven days' easy exercise horses quite recovered from their fatigue, but the loss of weight was noticeable even after the tenth day.

Conclusion

So far as the actual rate of marching is concerned, there is nothing remarkable in the results of this ride when compared with those

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undertaken by other regiments. The noteworthy points about it are the high average mileage per day—between 80 and 95 for four consecutive days—and the tactical duties that were achieved.

In comparison with the ride of the 1st Cavalry Brigade in November, 1906, the actual distance covered by the latter is greater by 50 miles, but twice as much time was spent by it at halts.

The conclusion has therefore been reached that the power of endurance of an officers' patrol should be as much as that shown by those taking part in the present ride. These results were achieved by men whose only sleep throughout the ride was 3½ hours on the second night of it; but at the end of the fourth day they were so much exhausted that without a long halt further progress was impossible.

Had "A" Section not forced the pace as it did on the afternoon of the second day, it would easily have achieved an average of 95 miles a day, and have returned in good condition.

These conclusions point to the fact that the present standard of the Cavalry School is too high—viz. a continuous average of from 80 to 95 miles a day for a selected officers' patrol. Under present conditions of Japanese men and horses this average cannot be maintained for more than four days and nights.

Regarding Future Exercises

1. *Selection of Men and Horses.*—(*a*) *Restive horses should not be selected.* They may possibly be the best for a competitive ride of not more than 300 kilometres (188 miles), since their high spirits may be sufficient to counteract physical hardships and shortage of feed for this distance. They are, however, unsuitable for a collective ride of over 400 kilometres (250 miles) on account of their expenditure of unnecessary energy from the start, whereby they exhaust themselves much quicker than other horses. Nervous horses, troublesome to ride, are also unsuitable, as their riders become tired before they do themselves. Horses of fair activity and good manners are therefore best fitted for competitive rides; at the same time, a strong but obstinate horse is often found to be as good as any.

(*b*) *A horse's paces should be carefully considered.*—Sound feet and good hoofs are, of course, essential, but a horse's powers of endurance depend very much on his paces. High-steppers not only exhaust them-

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selves much quicker than others, but are liable to suffer from inflamed feet or knees from the continual heavy concussion.

(*c*) *Good and quick feeders must be selected,* as on this depends in a great measure the power of endurance.

(*d*) *Horses of approximately equal powers should be selected.*—This, though of great importance, may be a difficult matter. The officer commanding a section must take as his standard the worst horses he has when drawing up the scheme for his ride, so as to reduce casualties to a minimum. Usually an officer commanding a section is liable to make the mistake of taking his own horse as the standard, forgetting that he is riding one of the best in the section.

(*e*) *Selection of men.*—Men of the best physique should be selected, in order to reduce to a minimum the neglect of proper care of the horses consequent upon excessive fatigue.

2. *Preliminary Practice.*—Preliminary practice is of great importance, but should be completed at least one week before the actual ride, so that men and horses may have plenty of time to recover from the effects of it, and start the ride fresh. The seven days' rest thus obtained should be spent in training horses in feeding, the amount of forage being increased daily, and in other branches of horsemastership. It is not possible to carry out preliminary practice for periods of two or three months on account of the routine duties in barracks. It should therefore be completed within two or three weeks at most; and an officer commanding a section should not attempt to cover a distance equal to that to be performed in the ride, but should try and bring his section to the highest pitch possible of training and efficiency.

3. *The Ride.*—Plans of the ride should be drawn up as precisely as possible with reference to maps. Once they have been determined, officers and men must adhere to them to the best of their ability. Eight kilometres (5 miles) per hour is the best average distance for the present class of troop horse for rides between 400 and 500 kilometres (250 and 312 miles). The chief points for consideration in drawing up plans for the ride are as follows:—

(*a*) A careful study of the route and distances from the map.

(*b*) The differentiation of distances over difficult ground and those over open country, and the decision of the various rates of marching over them.

(*c*) The arrangements for halts of two or three hours at different

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stations throughout the ride, so as to give rest to men and horses. Plans should also be made to continue the ride through these hours should a halt be necessary elsewhere owing to some unforeseen occurrence, which must be made good.

(*d*) Arrangements for the supply of rations for men and horses as accurately as possible.

(*e*) Arrangements for water supply for men and horses at different places.

(*f*) Arrangements for alternative plans in anticipation of casualties when crossing streams or mountains.

(*g*) The provision of maps of difficult sections of the ride, so that they can be read easily, even by starlight.

4. *Difficult Ground.*—In crossing a mountain an officer commanding a section would almost certainly find himself obliged to modify his plans in consequence of some unforeseen difficulty. He should therefore increase the rate of marching two or three hours before reaching the foot of the incline, and men should lead their horses both ascending and descending. They should trot, however, at a very gentle slope or on a flat part of the hill, no matter how short it may be.

5. *Rate of Marching and March Formation by Night.*—The rate of marching need not be reduced at night should there be a moon. In starlight it would be dangerous to move at the trot except on a broad road. Under such conditions horses should either be walked or led. Leading horses should be frequently changed, so as to reduce the exhaustion consequent on excessive straining of the eyes in the dark. File is the best formation for a night march. Horses go better in pairs than singly.

6. *Connection between the Weight carried on Horses and their Powers of Endurance.*—The power of endurance of a horse is in inverse proportion to the weight carried by him. This was confirmed in the present ride. "D" Section, which proved to be the most efficient, carried the least; and "A," whose performance was the poorest, carried the most.

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A FAMOUS GUERILLA LEADER

By Percy Cross Standing

Nathan Bedford Forrest was the Prince Rupert of the American War of Secession. In no way bred to the grim trade of war, this intrepid Southerner raised and equipped a troop of Cavalry as soon as the trouble began in 1861. His peculiar genius lay in the direction of initiative, daring, and resource in conducting swift Cavalry operations. It was his misfortune, not his fault, to 'assist' at one of the earliest disasters to the Confederate arms, namely, when Fort Donelson surrendered to General Grant in February 1862.

Forrest commanded the Cavalry of the garrison, and when a council of war sat to discuss a capitulation he jumped up and vehemently said, 'I will never surrender myself or my command!' He was as good as his word, for no trooper of his participated in the surrender. He made his whole brigade swim the freezing river that flowed under the walls of the fort, in snow and sleet and by night, and got away to Nashville with 1,340 men and their horses. It was a dare-devil feat, and he *was* a dare-devil. Soldier by nature, he was an ideal of the *beau sabreur*. From beneath the upturned brim of his soft felt hat, 'which bore no tawdry plumes,' his large deep-set blue eyes alertly peered. Six feet two inches in height, broad-shouldered and of athletic frame, well might one say:—

> A combination and a form indeed,
> Where every god did seem to set his seal
> To give the world assurance of a man!

This Confederate Rupert celebrated his forty-first birthday, on July 13, 1862, by his first great achievement as a commander. It was due entirely to his matchless playing of the game which our Transatlantic cousins denominate 'bluff.' At the head of 2,500 Cavalry, and with *no artillery whatever*, he captured the big town of Murfreesboro', with its garrison of a brigade of Infantry and Cavalry. His written demand for the surrender is a 'gem' of its kind: 'Colonel, I must demand an unconditional surrender of your force as prisoners of war, or I will have every man put to the sword. You are aware of the overpowering force I have at my command, and this demand is made to prevent the

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effusion of blood. I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant, N. B. Forrest, Brigr.-General, C.S.A.'

There is a grim story in connexion with this masterly stroke of war. A few Confederate prisoners confined in the gaol at Murfreesboro' had been maltreated by their captors—in fact, when the Southern forces came in sight there had been a most inhuman attempt to fire the prison and burn them out. When the Federals became in turn the prisoners of Forrest, the latter asked to have pointed out to him the man who had ordered the burning of the gaol. This was done. Later, when the roll of the prisoners was called, there was no answer when it came to the name of this man. 'Pass on,' said Forrest, quietly, 'it's all right.'

By this brilliant *coup* he captured stores to the amount of 500,000 dollars, and his total losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Forrest was very romantic, and in one of his despatches he refers to a Kentucky belle and how 'her untied tresses, floating in the breeze, infused nerve in my arm and knightly chivalry into my heart.' Another extraordinary feat of his was the capture of Colonel Streight and the whole of 'Streight's Rough-riders.' In this he was greatly aided by the heroism of a young girl of sixteen, Emma Samson, who rode at the General's saddlebow that she might point out the ford by which he might—and did—effect the capture of the raiders. 'General Forrest and his men,' wrote this Alabama maiden, 'endeared themselves to us for ever.'

His name was an absolute terror to the foe. However long the odds and insuperable the difficulties, this audacious cavalier was ever on the enemy's lines of communication, cutting off isolated garrisons and detachments and sometimes carrying the war into the hostile country.

At the bloody battle of Chickamauga, Forrest directed the Cavalry of the left wing of General Bragg's army, and had his horse shot under him. Seeing a soldier in the act of running away at a crisis of the fight, Forrest drew his revolver to shoot the man. 'Oh, General, think!' cried a staff-officer at his elbow—and the soldier's life was spared. After the battle General Bragg for some reason deprived Forrest of his command, and the latter in a blaze of fury proceeded to Bragg's tent and addressed that officer thus:—

'General Bragg, I am not here to pass civilities or compliments with you. You began your cowardly and contemptible persecution

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of me after the battle of Shiloh, and you have kept it up. You did it because I reported to headquarters facts, while you reported abominable lies. You did it to ruin me and my career, and I have stood you and your meanness as long as I intend to. You have played the part of a scoundrel and a coward, and if you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws and force you to resent it. You have threatened to arrest me for not obeying your orders promptly. I dare you to do it, and I say that if you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path, it will be at the peril of your life.'

But he was given a much more important command elsewhere. A bloodthirsty episode was his storming of Fort Pillow in 1864, called by some writers 'the massacre of Fort Pillow.' The place was partially garrisoned by black troops, and the cry had been raised that the Confederates would have no mercy on negroes fighting for the Federals. What really happened at Pillow was, that the negro section of the garrison, believing no quarter would be granted them, went on firing at their conquerors long after the demand for surrender had been put and complied with. It was a deplorable business.

In this war, Forrest with his own hand shot *thirty-two* of the enemy! He exercised great personal magnetism, and men were content to follow him to death. 'It is going to be as hot as h—!' was his apt forecast of a fight known as the battle of Brice's Cross Roads, where with far inferior numbers he won a notable victory. None other than General Sherman, the hero of the 'March to the Sea,' wrote to the War Department in Washington: 'Forrest is the devil! There will never be peace in Tennessee till he is dead.'

But this Southern Rupert was not destined to die in battle. On one occasion his prisoners included a chaplain, who was firmly convinced that he would be taken out and shot. Judge of his surprise when at the supper table his captor reverently uncovered and said: 'Parson, will you ask a blessing?' And at the close of the meal General Forrest added, 'Well, parson, I should have liked to keep you here, but I reckon you'll be of more use to the sinners on the other side.'

Forrest was one of the last to surrender to the Northern conquerors, and on April 11, 1865, his command captured a hostile outpost. On May 9 their General took leave of the gallant men who had fought so long under the Stars and Bars of the Confederacy. Rather than give

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up their shot-torn flag, they cut the silk into fragments and each secured a piece. This banner had been the gift of a young lady of Aberdeen, Mississippi, and was made from her bridal dress.

It was rumoured that Forrest would be arrested instead of being treated as a prisoner of war, on account of the affair at Fort Pillow. But this inglorious climax did not take place, and the great soldier lived in comparative repose until October 1877. An old man at fifty-six, he only survived the lost cause he had fought and bled for by about a dozen years.

He was immeasurably the greatest Cavalry leader produced by America's great Civil War. General Maury wrote of him that he was 'born a soldier as men are born poets.' And our own Lord Wolseley has beautifully said: 'As long as chivalrous deeds find poets to describe them and fair women to sing of them, the name of this gallant General will be remembered with affection and sincere admiration. A man with such a record needs no ancestry.'

Throughout that awful war of 1861-65, the volunteer fought side by side with the professional soldier—and in thinking of Forrest in this connexion one is reminded of Grant's summing-up of Garfield as a success in the war because he was '*not* a West Pointer.' This interesting question of the merits of the professional and the less well-trained soldier received many an apt illustration during our own long war with the South African Republics. General Forrest most powerfully illustrated this type. Lord Wolseley has paid him the highest of compliments in the written word, whilst one of the greatest Confederate soldiers, General J. E. Johnston, said of him that if Forrest had been professionally trained he would have become 'the great central figure of the war.' And a comparison of him, in Cavalry attack, with some of the qualities of our own General Sir John French becomes almost inevitable.

I may conclude with a quotation from Lord Wolseley, who summarised Forrest's brilliant and characteristic capture of Murfreesboro' and its garrison in the following eulogistic terms: 'His operations that day showed a rare mixture of military skill and what is known by our American cousins as "bluff," and led to the surrender of the various camps attacked. It was a brilliant success, and as it was Forrest's first great foray it established his reputation as a Cavalry leader to be dreaded by all Federal commanders of posts.'

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THE CAVALRY SWORD AND HOW TO USE IT IN WAR

By Major C. W. H. Crichton, 10*th* (*P.W.O.R.*) *Hussars*

While apologising for taking on and disagreeing with so formidable and experienced an antagonist as the writer of the article on this subject in the Cavalry Journal of April last, I wish to point out that my chief object is to promote a discussion on a subject which, I think, has not had nearly enough attention paid to it.

There are admittedly different Schools of Fencing, and similarly there are several ways of fighting mounted.

Some four or five years ago, half a dozen swords of a new pattern, which have since been issued to regiments at home, were sent to us on trial, were well tried for six months, and I hope to be able to explain what was thought of them.

For the purposes of this article it will be as well to leave out of consideration altogether what might happen when pointing at dummies stuffed with straw, lying about the ground of a riding school or stuck up on a wooden horse, and to try and think of the result in war where the Hussar charges his foe, both going at the utmost speed of their horses, meeting at the rate of perhaps 40 miles per hour, and of the awful crash that must follow when the Hussar, with his sword arm straight out and body inclined forward, gets his sword well home.

Let us in this case imagine that the enemy are not cloaked, and by good luck our sword misses bandolier, ribs, backbone, and every other obstruction—the point then enters as if through butter, but when it reaches the hilt then comes the jar. Can it be expected that the grip as advocated by Colonel Poore is going to stand this? No! of course it will not, no more perhaps will any grip; but I think the one I advocate stands a better chance and will do more damage than the former.

If you examine Fig. 1 (fig. 4, Cavalry Journal, page 192) you

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will see that the hand is unnaturally bent down at the wrist, and that the forefinger is also bent sideways at the third joint supported by the other fingers, and has to resist at right angles this crash, which could be measured in foot tons. Also assuming the sword is pointing straight at the adversary (as recommended), it cannot be held in the same straight line as the fore-arm, nor in the prolongation of this line, but pointing slightly up, and even if this was not so, the central line of the sword prolonged backwards would pass an inch or so clear below the arm.



FIG. 1.

During the trials of this sword with the grasp of the hilt recommended, the inevitable results were decidedly painful to those who followed it, viz. sprains in several (in some cases all) of the following places:—

Third joint of the fore-finger.
Third joint of the second finger.
Third and fourth joints of the thumb.
Sprained wrist and broken thumb nail.* My own thumb and wrist have neither quite recovered yet.

Now examine Fig. 2. This is a sword held as we practised holding it, up to about twelve years ago; in this case the heel of the hilt is in the middle of the hand, resting against a pretty firm butt, the fingers and thumb well round it, not to resist any of the 'crash,' but simply to hold it in position.



FIG. 2.

A few more cases are worthy of notice during the charge at full

* If the soldier grips properly at the moment of impact this mishap will be less likely. Possibly a lengthening of the handle and the setting back of the resistance block an inch or so would meet the difficulty. [Ed.]

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gallop. There are six directions in which to attack at the gallop—you cannot call them six points because you do not point at all, you ride with the sword held straight out to meet three kinds of adversaries on either side.

1. Cavalry mounted.
2. Infantry standing.
3. An enemy lying down.

In case (1) 'edge of the sword to the right and slightly up' we are told is correct. Now the more the edge is turned up the more the two bones of the fore-arm become twisted, and the same applies to the elbow-joint: this must be a source of weakness. Again, it may look very nice galloping down dummies keeping your arm straight and pushing them out of the way as you pass by, but you cannot do that with a big heavy man; he will not be held off at arm's length so easily; something must give, the arm must bend, and with bones crossed and joints twisted probably that something will break.

In case (2) you naturally want to turn the edge slightly down.

Case (3) should be treated exactly the same as tent-pegging, edge down, back of the sword up.

Now on the left. In each case the natural tendency is to turn the edge a little up, and this happens also to be correct: the lower the target the more the edge should be turned up. The reason for this is, that as you gallop past anything solid which your sword is in, the arm cannot keep straight, it must bend or break, and it should be held so as to fold up at the elbow, the hand swinging back, thumb leading towards the left shoulder.

In Figs. 3 and 4 the swordsman is at the halt, but assuming the same positions he would at the gallop.

Before leaving the subject of the charge it must be clearly understood that no kind of point can for a moment be allowed: by point I mean any kind of movement in the way of bending and straightening the arm; it must be straight and rigid before reaching the adversary or else the point will either miss or be late and lose most of its force.

I put charging first because a cavalry soldier must primarily be trained to charge, then allowed to think about what follows; train him how you like—at the walk, canter, then gallop, and bring him up to the one idea that whatever happens he must attack* and not think

* See *Cavalry Training*, 1907. Appendix I, Section 191, para. 1 (a) and (b). [Ed.]

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about anything else, such as deviations, feints, or covering himself with the forte of his sword.

One more thing before we leave the subject of the 'grip' during the charge: it is highly probable that your first and only charge will be made in the early hours of a cold raw morning when fingers and thumbs are numbed and grip is weak. How would you hold your sword then?



FIG. 3.

Hitherto I have only been referring to the way to hold the sword during a charge; there are other occasions when a sword may perhaps be held differently, but these will be mentioned later.

After the charge, then, one of two things happens; either you pursue or else fight it out in a melée: I decline to discuss a possible third situation, viz., what is the best thing to do in the way of defence if pursued—clear off to one side, rally a few men, and attack again, as the drill book tells us.

FIG. 4.

Both in the pursuit and melée the whole method must be changed. In pursuit little damage would be done by continuing to gallop after a flying enemy going about the same pace as yourself, with your arm straight, as you would be slowly overtaking him, and as slowly would the point reach, prick, then enter the body, even if it did succeed in piercing his clothing. Nor do I think the following would be much use:—

('Cavalry Training,' 1907, p. 292.) From the *position* of engage.

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'Point'—The point will be delivered with the utmost promptitude horizontal or low, at cavalry or infantry, in any required direction, as follows:—

Keeping the sword and fore-arm in line with one another, direct the point of the sword at the object, and straighten the arm vigorously, at the same time bending the body forward to gain extra reach.

Is there any power behind such a point?

No! *

The following is copied from 'Cavalry Drill,' 1898, p. 162. Personally I think there can be no doubt which method will do the most damage.

'Pursuing Practice'—

(Make cuts one and two in succession at Cavalry) and prepare for point to the right front, the hand in front of the shoulder, back of the hand up, elbow well raised.†

'Point'—

'Deliver the point to the full extent of the arm. . . .'

I do not for one moment advocate riding to the attack laying for a point as we were once taught:—'Come to the engage in the required direction, then when the moment comes, quickly draw back the arm, hand right back to the shoulder, and back to the shoulder too, then instantaneously drive the sword home by straightening the arm, hurling the shoulder forward backed by the weight of the whole body.' ‡

The point of the sword in one method (by pointing from the engage) goes forward at the most eight inches, and this includes the reach gained by bending the body forward. In the old method a man with a long arm will drive his sword forward more than its own length, and his body swing has a great deal more force in it too.

The next three diagrams show the difference between the two methods under discussion. In Fig. 5, if at the engage the point is within an inch of a man's chest the sword will not quite go through him; in Fig. 7 the point would go through several men.

Fig. 8 shows another method of holding the practice sabre as taught

* See C. T. 1907. In the 'engage' the arm is slightly bent at the elbow. Therefore there should be enough strength. [Ed.]

† This entails slowness and bad direction. [Ed.]

‡ If a man *hurls* his right shoulder forward it will be found that he also applies his left leg to his horse with violence and the horse will consequently swerve. [Ed.]

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by Infantry experts to Cavalry would-be experts at a gymnastic school of instruction in India. Notice how the first joint of the thumb is bent up, which loosens the grip of the thumb altogether; it might



FIG. 5.



FIG. 6.

possibly make one quick with a foil or sabre, but I even doubt that; it is certainly not intended for a Cavalry sword.

The same school has a method of its own of galloping at low dummies on the right, with the edge of the sword up. Imagine that dummy a heavy man and the sword well home in his chest; the arm must bend at the elbow, the latter flying out to the right and the right hand passing back under the arm-pit, and the whole arm being badly twisted and probably smashed or dislocated.



FIG. 7.

I believe the idea of turning the edge up pointing on the off side is prompted by the desire to do two things at the same time, 'Guard and point,' whereby both are rendered futile.

Now imagine two squadrons going into action:—

'A' beautifully trained to all the niceties of 'fencing' on foot, every man master of the art of feinting, deviating, disengaging, and parrying, and thinking of how he is going to parry a possible attack.*

The other, 'B,' every man trained to attack and nothing else, and, what is more, to put as much force in his attack as he can. What is morale? Surely the effect of these wild fellows determined to stick everybody they can will do more than the careful and neat sabre-play of the former.

* C. T. 1907, distinctly asserts the prime importance of the attack. [Ed.]

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Many points may miss and some men be put out by not guarding, but it is certain that any points that do get home will empty those saddles.

Then comes the moral effect of men whose one and only object is to attack and attack.

Now I am going off on a different tack altogether. 'Cavalry Training,' 1907, p. 280. '. . . it is therefore necessary to teach our soldiers how to cut, in order that they may be able to defend themselves from cuts.'



FIG. 8.

I don't quite agree with this. The old sweeping cuts are useless and always were. 'Direct cut,' 'circling cut,' and 'cut over,' as per pages 287 and 288, are ridiculous for mounted combat with heavy weapons. The only cut that could be any use is a head cut that will batter down the adversary's guard, and thence into his head and shoulder.

Seize the sword in the full of the right hand along the lines 'a' (fig. 9), as if it were a heavy stick, and bring it down, edge leading, on the enemy's head.



FIG. 9.

I do not believe any other cut could do any harm.

One hears of 'sheep cutting' extraordinary by marvellous swordsmen with a slight movement of the wrist and elbow and a razor-sharp sword, but who can waste time teaching a whole regiment that?

Two methods of grasping the sword in the charge have now been discussed. When a soldier is considered proficient in the attack he may be taught how to defend himself: and on this subject there is a great difference of opinion; some swordsmen hold their weapon close to the hilt, others the same way but back as far as possible; just in the same way great cricketers and tennis-players do not all hold their bats and racquets exactly alike.

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Once in action it is very bad to be changing the grasp for points or guards, but I see no objection after the charge to change the position of the thumb for the side in Fig. 2 to straight down the back in the direction of the point.

To sum up, I advocate:—

1. The straight sword, but with a handle very much like an officer's sword.

2. That the sword be held with the butt of the handle in the middle of the hand firmly, but not too tightly, with wrist and arm straight.

3. That the Cavalry soldier be taught to attack at full speed with the point of his weapon; and that his teaching should consist mainly in galloping at dummies on both sides in different positions. This practice need not be at the gallop, but at a slow canter or even walk until he gets into the correct positions.

4. When proficient at the charge he should be taught how to fight at a slower pace as in the melée: for this he should circle his horse about among dummies, using the points of the old pursuing practice. In teaching the difference between the two kinds of points I would call the first the galloping practice, and the second the cantering practice.

5. That all fighting in a ring with sabres be abolished; if this is not agreed to, let the fighting take place with sticks—not strong ones, but like those that the Native Cavalry use, and made heavy and clumsy as near as possible to the balance of the sword in use and with its handle.

6. That some men who show special aptitude be taught and encouraged to fence on foot not with a sabre, because it is not the weapon of a Cavalry soldier, but with a foil.

7. And lastly, that some new method of training the Cavalry soldier in the use of his weapon be introduced into our Drill Book.

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SWORDSMANSHIP.

Captain Kelly (Life Guards) attacking a Cuirassier at Waterloo.

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From the painting by Chinnery—Calcutta, 1814.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT ROLLO GILLESPIE, K.C.B

1766—1814.

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MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT ROLLO GILLESPIE, K.C.B.

By Colonel Hugh Pearse, D.S.O.

Robert Rollo Gillespie was born in January, 1766, the eldest son of a Scottish gentleman of good family, who had inherited the estate of Comber, County Down. Soon after Gillespie's birth his father left Ireland and settled at Bath, so that Gillespie was educated in England, and, perhaps unfortunately, in small private schools. Gillespie, though of slight physique and short of stature, was a boy of a turbulent, headstrong character, much in need of judicious discipline. This he appears to have received neither at home nor at school, with unfortunate results.

At the age of seventeen Gillespie obtained a commission in the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), then styled the 3rd Irish Horse, and entered on a wild career in the Ireland of the year 1783, depicted for us in the pages of Barrington and Lever; the land of mad extravagance, of drunken revelry, of incessant duels. Into this welter of dissipation the thoughtless youngster plunged with a light heart, with the result that at the age of twenty he had made a secret marriage, and at twenty-one killed a young Irishman named Barrington in a duel fought across a handkerchief. Barrington's relations accused Gillespie of cold-blooded murder, and local feeling ran so high that he was compelled to fly the country. In 1788, however, Gillespie returned, stood his trial at the autumn assizes at Maryborough, and, in spite of an adverse summing-up by the judge, was acquitted by the jury.

Gillespie took this sad occurrence much to heart, and, his father dying in 1791, was inclined to leave the Army and settle on the family estates. On further consideration, however, he decided to devote himself to his profession and make a new start in life. With this object he exchanged in 1792 into the newly raised 20th Light Dragoons, a

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regiment recruited in England but paid by the Government of Jamaica for service in that island. Narrowly escaping death by shipwreck on the outward voyage, and by yellow fever—then the almost inevitable penalty of tropical service—Gillespie, who became a captain in January, 1794, volunteered in the following month for service in the expedition against the French Republican forces in St. Domingo. In this forgotten campaign Gillespie established a reputation for courage and enterprise. In the first undertaking of the expedition, the attack on Fort Tiburon, he led the assault; at Port-au-Prince he swam ashore under fire to demand the surrender of the city; he was distinguished by his gallantry at the capture of Fort Bizoton, and received several wounds at the assault on Fort de l'Hôpital.

Gillespie became a major in his regiment in 1796, but again volunteered for active service, first at St. Lucia, and later, for a second time, at St. Domingo, being appointed Adjutant-General to the Army there. In this capacity Gillespie was much dreaded by the Republicans, and an attempt was made to murder him. Eight men broke into his quarters, attacked and wounded him, and killed his servant. Gillespie, a small man, but active and determined, killed six of his assailants with his sword, and the two survivors fled in terror. Gillespie was once more sent to England to recover from his wounds, and it is said that on his attending a levée King George III. was much astonished to find the hero of so surprising an exploit so small a man.

At the peace of Amiens the 20th Light Dragoons were transferred to the English establishment, the Government of Jamaica presenting Gillespie with a sword in token of their high esteem of his services.

In 1804 Gillespie, whose life was stormy throughout, was accused by a brother officer of malpractices in regard to regimental funds, and was tried by a general court-martial. By this proceeding Gillespie's character was completely cleared. He was "most honourably" acquitted of all the charges brought against him, and he was proved to be a generous and considerate commanding officer, who, far from enriching himself improperly, had freely spent his private fortune on his regiment.

Soon after this event, Gillespie, still bent on active service, exchanged into the 19th Light Dragoons, then in India. To this country he travelled overland, and once more proved the truth of the saying that "adventures are to the adventurous." At Hamburg he

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was molested by the agents of Napoleon, and rescued by the intervention of no less a person than Napper Tandy. The famous rebel could not look on and see grief befall a brother Irishman, though in the wrong camp. Gillespie escaped in disguise to Altona, and thence made his way, by Aleppo and Bagdad, to India, finding time to fight a duel at Constantinople with an inquisitive Frenchman who was annoyed by his refusing an invitation to dinner.

On arriving in India early in 1806, Gillespie was appointed Commandant at Arcot, a name linked for ever with that of Lord Clive, and then, almost before he had time to turn round, came the great opportunity of his life, of which he took such glorious advantage.

Fourteen miles from Arcot lay the great Muhammadan fortress of Vellore, a huge square of solid rock, with lofty walls and bastions, enclosing a great parade ground and roomy barracks. Here were quartered some 400 white soldiers of the 69th Regiment and four times that number of Madras sepoys.

On July 10, 1806, Gillespie, now a man of forty, hard, spare, active, grim on service, though cheerful and pleasant when off duty, was, after the manner of Anglo-Indians, taking his early-morning ride. To him, without warning, came the sudden news that the sepoys at Vellore had broken into mutiny, had murdered in their sleep many of the white officers and soldiers, women, and children, and were in course of completing their foul work.

Gillespie realised at once the emergency that had come upon him—the fate, not of Vellore only, but of all southern India, trembled in the balance. His decision was taken on the moment. Near him, in the plain, a squadron of his own regiment was at drill. Hastily informing Wilson, its captain, of what had happened, and sending orders for the remainder of the regiment to fall in immediately and follow him, Gillespie, at the head of his single squadron, headed straight for Vellore. If he was the right leader for such an emergency, so, too, was the 19th the right regiment. Thus were they described by one who knew them well and rode with them that day to Vellore: The old 19th Light Dragoons, excepting that their habits were not the most temperate, were a fine specimen of what a regiment ought to be. By almost constant field service and the manly game of "long bullets," which the old Indian regiments used to practise under the hottest sun, these men became perfectly bronzed, and were as hard as iron—

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proof against the sun without and any amount of arrack within. They used to call themselves "the Terrors of the East."

Of such men was composed the squadron that now galloped for Vellore, while far in advance rode Gillespie, alone, splendidly mounted, the lightest man there, and grimly set on his task of rescue and punishment.

The story of the relief of Vellore has been so often told that it need here be merely sketched. Suffice it to say that when, two hours after he received the news at Arcot, Gillespie and his squadron arrived before the great gate of the fortress, they found it bolted and barred, while from the countless loopholes came a hail of bullets. All over the fortress was the rattle of heavy firing, showing that in every quarter the massacre of isolated portions of the white garrison was still proceeding. On one bastion, not far from the gateway, a knot of some sixty English soldiers, headed by the surviving officers of the 69th and two young surgeons, still held out stoutly, but they had not a round of ammunition left and their power of resistance was well nigh exhausted. Gillespie, aided by Captain Wilson and twenty of the 19th whom he ordered to dismount, with desperate courage forced the wicket beside the gateway, and under a tremendous fire at close quarters (the phrase is his own), endeavoured to break down the great gate. This was found impossible, so Gillespie, ordering Wilson so to post his men as to prevent the escape of the mutineers, had himself hauled up the lofty wall by the men of the 69th, the rope being, it is said, made of their belts and the sashes of the sergeants. This done, he took command of the exhausted men, many of whom were wounded. Seizing a colour and calling on the soldiers to cheer and charge, Gillespie, with a rush, carried a small flanking battery near at hand and turned one of its guns on the crowded mass of sepoys. The gun could not be fired, but a little time was gained and that little turned the scale, for presently the main body of the 19th, with the two "galloper guns" at that time attached to Cavalry regiments, arrived under the walls. Gillespie, from above, shouted orders to the Artillery sergeant in charge of the guns to run them by hand close up to the gate and blow it in. This under the supervision of Major Blakiston, an engineer, was presently effected, and then the end was near. From the gate a long winding road, commanded by loopholed walls, led into the fort, and this was speedily cleared by a bayonet charge of the 69th, led by Gillespie. As

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he and his men reached the gate, the leading squadron of the 19th galloped in, knocking Gillespie over as they went, and formed up on the great parade ground. Here a terrible sight met their eyes. Scattered over the open space lay the bodies of murdered officers, soldiers, women and children, while before the hospital lay in a huddled mass fifteen sick men butchered in cold blood. From the stern soldiers of the 19th arose a yell of rage, and the hearts of the mutineers died within them. Their resistance was slight, and they who had shown no mercy to man, woman, or child, received none that day. Hundreds were cut down in the fort, on the glacis, and in the streets of Vellore, and all who were captured in the barracks and other buildings were, by Gillespie's order, formed up before a high wall and summarily shot. The massacre of Vellore was terrible in its details and its victims were of both sexes and of all ages. Its punishment was hardly less terrible, yet it was just and it fell on men, and guilty men, only.

The relief of Vellore is the most famous incident of Gillespie's stirring life, yet his subsequent services were brilliant in the extreme. In 1811, with the rank of Brigadier-General, he commanded the advanced Brigade in the capture of Java under Sir Samuel Auchmuty. Java has long ceased to belong to the Empire and its capture is a forgotten enterprise, yet it had great importance in its day. It was a success achieved when Napoleon was at the summit of his power, and when the Coalition against him, with the one exception of England, was in a state of collapse. The most important incident of the campaign was the capture of Fort Cornelis, a striking victory in which Gillespie displayed the highest qualities as a leader. Auchmuty, a generous commander, attributed his victory largely to Gillespie's gallantry, energy, and prompt judgment. When, at a later stage of the campaign, Gillespie succeeded to the chief command in Java and Sumatra, he performed feats of arms that can only be described as marvellous. A capable witness, an experienced soldier, thus refers to them: * "His conduct at Yodhyakarta, when with little more than 1,500 men he stormed a capital fort defended by 30,000 men, and thereby saved the lives of all the British in the island of Sumatra, had so much of romance in it that, were it not so well known, I should be almost afraid to mention it. No exploit in the East ever surpassed this, either in judgment, daring, or success." Gillespie, who became a

* *Military Reminiscences*, Colonel James Welch.

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Major-General in April 1812, left Java in the autumn of that year in consequence of differences with Sir Stamford Raffles, the Governor. On arrival in India Gillespie was appointed to the command of the Meerut Division, at the head of which, two years later, he entered on his last campaign.

Through the growing encroachments of the Gurkhas, war against that warlike nation had for some time been inevitable, and Gillespie's Division formed one of the four columns with which Lord Moira, the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of India, decided to invade Nepal. The line of advance allotted to Gillespie lay through Deyra Doon, a beautiful valley now familiar to many visitors to India, and the task before him was, as he plainly saw, no easy one. The Anglo-Indian army of 1814 had no experience of mountain warfare and was unprovided with regular transport. The country in which it was to operate was of great strength, absolutely without roads, and covered with dense jungle; it was defended too by a robust mountain race, well disciplined to war, and flushed by previous conquests.

The nearest of the frontier defences erected by the Gurkhas against the British advance was the little Fort of Kalanga, held by a small garrison, but very difficult of access and skilfully fortified. Gillespie's force attacked this post on October 31, 1814, his orders for the occasion being fully adequate and careful.

Owing to the difficulty of the ground the four columns of attack failed to arrive simultaneously before the fort, and the Gurkhas, bold and enterprising soldiers, seized the opportunity to sally forth and attack the column which first came within their reach. The sally was repulsed, and Gillespie attempted to follow the Gurkhas into Kalanga and thus carry the fort by a *coup-de-main*, a perfectly legitimate enterprise. The attempt, however, failed, as did a second assault, and Gillespie, while encouraging his men to persevere, fell, shot through the heart.

Thus died Robert Rollo Gillespie, a soldier of the type that every army needs; one of the men who will attempt any enterprise; who fail once, perhaps, but who certainly succeed twenty times. By such men our Empire has been created. By such men it must be maintained. Gillespie's name should be held in honoured remembrance by all branches of our Army, but above all by the Cavalry, which can boast of few finer exploits than the relief of Vellore by Gillespie and the 19th Light Dragoons.

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THE MECHANICAL LAWS OF BALANCE, FLEXION AND BITTING

By "Xenophon II"

The horse's skeleton is the framework of the machine which is *the weapon of war of a Cavalryman.*

The horse in the picture (fig. A) is an ordinary well-bred animal, standing naturally "at rest."

A greater proportion of its weight rests on the fore than on the hind legs.

The spinal processes of the foremost thirteen vertebræ incline backwards, whereas the 15th to 18th and the six lumbar vertebræ incline forwards.

But the special process of the 14th vertebra stands upright.

This is the keystone of the arch thus presented and of the equilibrium and movement of the horse.

That is to say, the 14th vertebra is the centre of motion of the horse's body.

The *centre of motion* is that point about which the several movements of the fore and hind legs are performed with varying degrees of rapidity, either simultaneously or successively. These constitute the "paces" of the horse.

This is further exemplified by a study of the distribution and points of attachment of the muscles of the back, loins, hips, and shoulders.

The principal muscles of these all coalesce into the large flat tendon which covers this identical portion hereafter known as the "centre of motion." This tendon is devoid of contractile power, it remains inexertive whilst the muscles in front and behind it exert their contractile force upon it.

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This system may be compared to a pair of window curtains, which are "drawn" to the centre by cords.

Take the case of a horse grazing. The horse puts forward a fore leg and at the same time the hind leg of the opposite side is brought forward in order to maintain and secure his "equilibrium."

Two factors are deducible from this:—

(*a*) That the fore legs are essentially "bearers" and the hind legs essentially "propellers" (though to a certain extent "bearers" also).



FIG. A.

(*b*) That a perpendicular line falling through the centre of gravity would be nearer the shoulder than the perpendicular EF, which falls through the centre of motion, *i.e.* the 14th vertebra, and would probably fall through the 12th vertebra or even the 11th in a short-shouldered horse.

The Centre of Gravity.—By a simple illustration the theory of the centre of gravity can be rendered intelligible and practical.

Reference Figure B.—Let *a b c d* represent a board nine inches long by four inches wide, at whose corners four legs about seven inches long are attached by ball sockets, so as to permit of movement (9 : 7 : 4 is the approximate proportion in a horse).

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Let the four legs be adjusted square as at *x*. Place a small weight, *w*, at the true centre of the board.

Now, if the weight be removed towards one end, say to *w* 1, the board will incline towards F. But if the legs at this end are bent back to *x* 1, the board will support the weight, but be slightly inclined towards F. Likewise, if the weight be moved towards H the board will remain in position if the same two legs are now moved to *x* 2 or, in this case with weight at *w* 2, the board may be made to stand by the other pair of legs (representing fore legs) being moved to *x* 3.



FIG. B.

Now this is precisely what takes place when a rider is placed on a horse's back in analogous positions.

(The influence of the head and neck is left out of the question for the moment.)

The two points of support of a horse's back are at the hip and shoulder joints.

In this figure the hip joints are represented by *a b*. Shoulder joints are represented by *d c*. *w* corresponds to the 14th vertebra, that is to say (still leaving out the question of head and neck), that the weight of a rider placed as at *w* would not only be directly over the centre of motion, but over the centre of gravity as well.

But the head and neck play an important part in the equilibrium of the horse.

It must, however, be noted that the points on which the horse's feet stand seldom lie precisely under the hip and shoulder joints respectively.

The toe of the fore feet very seldom reaches the perpendicular dropped from the shoulder joints.

With "Eclipse," a horse of perfect symmetry, they did so naturally, but with ordinary well-built horses they do so only when the horse is "standing up" or "set up" beyond the natural.

It has now been seen that the alteration of a weight upon a horse's back affects directly the centre of gravity, and that to counteract this alteration of the centre of gravity a horse will have to move his legs in precisely a similar manner to the theoretical exposition of the "board."

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How does the distribution of weight affect the horse's speed?—In dealing with the horse "at rest" both pairs of legs have been taken as being practically equal "bearers" (which one is justified in doing, because the proportion is about 7 to 5).

But in dealing with the horse "in action" the fore legs are chiefly "bearers," the hind legs are essentially "propellers."

The deduction is that the propelling power of the hind legs may be favoured by "weighting forward" (within certain limitations). The best exponent of "weighting forward" is the well-known forward seat of the jockey.

The exact extent to which the centre of gravity can be advanced with advantage to the propellers, and the point at which such advance becomes a disadvantage, owing to an excessive proportion of weight on the bearers, is difficult to decide.

Let the above be granted correct, then it is equally true that placing the weight too far back will inversely diminish the propelling powers by converting them unduly into "bearers."

The case of the *haute école* horse exemplifies this assertion.

In this case the horseman educates his horse to bear an increased proportion of the weight upon its hind legs (*i.e.* places the centre of gravity behind the 14th vertebra), these latter being brought under the horse with bent hocks, the object being not *speed* but certain attainments. Some English riders scoff at *haute école* for this very reason, but the *manège* horseman is justified in acting as he does in order to obtain specified movements to perfect his horse as a fighting machine.

Now the Cavalry soldier sits upon the hinder part of his saddle, and, together with the weight of his "arms and accoutrements," he distributes the weight upon the horse in such a manner as to cause the centre of gravity to fall considerably behind the 14th vertebra. To resist this alteration from the natural the horse stretches his legs behind him (as demonstrated in fig. B by position *x x*), and therefore even "at rest" he is some distance towards the utmost extent of his stride.

Also, neither the propelling nor raising action of the legs can be performed to the best advantage unless their several component levers (bones) form certain angles with each other.

These angles influence the imposition of the hoof upon the ground

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and the consequent celerity of "renewal" of action. Moreover, the greatest leverage is obtained for propelling power when the horse "in action" is able to bring his hind legs to that forward position which gives the greatest power.

Therefore, under the weight of a Cavalryman and his equipment, the speed of a horse must be diminished, not solely on account of the weight carried but also on account of the distribution of weight.

Head and Neck (in reference to equilibrium).

Up to now the influence exerted by the overhanging weight of the head and neck on the animal's equilibrium has not been considered.

The equilibrium has been taken as being analogous to that of the board theory in fig. B.

It has been shown, however, that the centre of motion is, as ordained by Nature, situated in a perpendicular line drawn through the 14th vertebra.

It has also been shown that the centre of gravity of a horse "in action" (unmounted) falls in front of the centre of motion.

Now, with the centre of gravity in front of the centre of motion (as described), the horse is favourably in equilibrium for racing and to a lesser degree for hunting. Inversely, with the centre of gravity behind the centre of motion, the horse is favourably in equilibrium for *haute école*. But it is essential that these two centres should be made to "coincide" for horses for use in the work of Cavalry.

In racing, a horse is only required to move in a very gentle curve or "on the straight," but, however slight that curve may be, the horse's centre of gravity is closer to the rails than it would be in the straight.

In the *haute école* the horse is required to make distinct turns at a slow speed. But the Cavalry horse is required to make sharp turns at a high speed.

In all cases the balance is materially affected by the carriage of the head and neck.

It is known that too heavy a jibboom will destroy the builder's trim of a boat. It is precisely the same with a horse; but, as we cannot alter the head and neck of a horse like a jibboom, the question arises of how to correctly place it. (See fig. C.)

Fig. C, *a d*, is the edge of the board already described, *d x*, *a x* being the legs.

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In fig. C there are three levers of equal length, all pivoted on a common centre, *d* N, *d* O, *d* P. These three levers represent three different necks set on at different angles corresponding to junction of vertebræ of the neck and back.

Take a common instance. If *d* was a man's hand, *d* N a stick with a weight at N, it is obviously much heavier when held at *d* N than if held at *d* P; and if the reader will try for himself he will find that in the position of *d* N he will involuntarily advance one leg to enable him to support the weight and stick—*i.e.* alter his balance.



FIG. C.

This will suffice to demonstrate that the relative weight of the neck and head *d* N is diminished in proportion as their position is brought nearer to that represented by *d* P in fig. C.

The true expression is: "That a given weight acting on a lever exercises a perpendicular pressure in direct proportion to the distance at which the perpendicular through it falls from the fulcrum (prop)."

Therefore the relative weight is represented by the distance by which the point N lies outside the line of the fulcrum *d x*.

Hence, if weight is at O, the relatively shorter distance *d* N represents the weight; likewise *d* N 2 represents relatively a lesser weight.

The neck of a horse is not like the inflexible lever here shown, because the head (which forms a large portion of the total weight) can be flexed at varying angles to the neck. Therefore we see that by flexing the head and neck we can materially alter the balance of the horse—that is, flexion will alter the horse's centre of gravity.

In fig. D the natural unimproved position of the head and neck is such as to make the centre of gravity fall through *x y* in front of the centre of motion.

However, by elevating and flexing the head and neck as at D O the "centre of gravity" can be made to coincide with the "centre of motion."

This is claimed to be absolutely indispensable for the purposes of Cavalry work.

Figure D and plate A, when compared, bring us to the final result at which we have been aiming, *i.e.* the equilibrium of the horse "in motion" as compared with the same "at rest."

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Under the latter supposition (at rest) it has been shown that the 14th vertebra indicates by its peculiar shape and position a different function from that of the other vertebræ, all of which admit of movement "towards" it, whilst this vertebra, not being adapted for any movement, may therefore be taken as the centre of motion, as intended by Nature.

But the construction of the horse's legs and the relative position of the various bones composing them furnish a very clear proof of this same vertebra being the real centre of motion when the horse is "in action."

For there is one bone in each of the hind and fore legs on which the remainder of the limb acts as a lever in the whole frame, either for the purpose of:—Propelling, bearing, or raising.

These are the thigh-bone and the arm-bone (*t* and *v* respectively in fig. D), whose upper ends have their points of support (fulcrum) in the hip-bones and shoulder-blades; the power being supplied through the medium of the remaining portions of the legs at their lower ends.



FIG. D.

The greatest result of lever action is exercised at a right angle to the lever, and by drawing the lines P Q, R S, through the lower ends of these two bones at right angles to them we find that they intersect precisely at this same "14th vertebra."

This fig. D shows us indeed the horse "at rest," but it is necessary to recollect that the "propelling action" of the hind leg commences and exercises the maximum power when the thigh-bone is in the position as fig. D, and that it diminishes in intensity as the leg is stretched towards R, whereas on the contrary the "raising" and "bearing" action of the fore leg expires when the fore leg is as shown, and diminishes in intensity as the leg goes forward towards P. Therefore it is evident that the 14th vertebra is the centre of motion "in action" and "at rest."

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It is from our "practical" knowledge of this mechanism that "judges" attach so much importance to the length of these two levers and to their lying at right angles to the hip-bone and shoulder-blade respectively, which is recognised as a "good shoulders and good quarters."

It is claimed from the above that the "length of stride" and its power, that is the "power of propelling," known to be essential in "practice," is thus "theoretically" proved to depend, to a very great extent, upon those proportional particulars which may be termed the factor of conformation.

Now by the use of its neck the horse adjusts its equilibrium according to the degree of velocity that is set in force and according to the action intended.

Anyone who has watched the movements of a horse "at grass" will have noted that the position of the head and neck is constantly varied in order to suit the exigencies of the moment.

It is for this reason that control over the horse's head and neck is of such value to the rider.

We have hitherto taken the horse's neck to be a lever or practically a straight line, but in reality the neck contains a double curve, one being an upward and the other a downward curve, the resultant mechanism being a straight line forming the axis of the whole.

A strong, well-shaped neck, or the axis of it, is sufficiently straight to admit of the application of the theory of lever action. For it only deviates from a true line at its extremity near the head—the head also acting as a lever, and thereby imparting to the animal that graceful curvature, the acme of perfection in all saddle-horses, which "takes the eye" of even the uninitiated. This, however, is much more than a visible pleasure, for it is evidence of perfection of equilibrium, and accordingly of power.

Now it has been shown that the position theoretically required is D O (*vide* fig. D) with a horse whose head is bent right and neck flexed as shown, for in this case the leverage, if actuated from the right direction and together with the weight of the rider, meets directly the action of the hind legs, *i.e.* the propellers.

A Cavalryman has one hand for reins and one for his weapon; his efficiency depends upon using his horse as a means of using his

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weapon, and he requires his horse to follow the movement of his legs and hands instantly.

Unless the head of a troop-horse is in the proper position, it is obvious that the lever action cannot be effectual, and it is unnecessary to state more than the well-known instance of a star-gazer, who appears to have his fore legs driven into the ground by a pull at the reins, whilst his crop and hind legs fly (or seem to) wildly about, no pressure of the rider being able to steady them, all because of the simple fact of the lever action exercised by a pull at the reins.

Therefore it is most important that the head of the Cavalry horse should be in a proper position, which can only be obtained by a judicious system of training and flexion, maintained by correct bitting. It is seen how inseparably the question of bits and bitting is interwoven with the whole system of training horses for Cavalry work.

After this digression it is now necessary to show the relation of head to neck. Just as the neck has been proved to be the key to equilibrium, so is the head the key to the command over the neck. Now the effect produced by lever action depends not so much on the absolute power applied as on the direction of application.

For instance, taking the head as a lever which acts on the neck and brings it towards the bridle hand, it is obvious that if the head is stretched out in prolongation of the neck, as is the case with a race-horse, there is no lever action at all. Again, it is seen how powerfully the theory applies to the practice, for the leverage is greatest when the head is at right angles to axis of neck. Accordingly, the more a horse either pokes his nose out or over-bends his neck the less will be the lever action obtained. This is all so obvious to anyone who has watched pullers or even so-called bolters, for they assume one of these two extremes, and practically it is obvious that the rider can get no control. Theoretically it is proved that he can get no control because the lever action of the head on the neck, and subsequently of the neck on the centre of motion, is reduced to *nil*—*i.e.* the rider is deprived of command because he can only master his horse when he has a true command over his hind legs (the propellers)



FIG. E.

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and the point in which his hind legs act, which point is the centre of motion.

As the head is the key to the neck, so is the mouth the key to the head.

We must be able to turn a Cavalry horse at any pace, under perfect control, without impeding the straightforward swing of the gallop. Therefore the adjustment of weight and bitting must admit of a horse passing smoothly from one style to another when required to do so. It is impossible to lay down a regulation that a horse must have his head at so many degrees to the ground.

Colonel Von Eiyshausen briefly summarises the subject as follows:—

"I consider, as a general rule, that position of the head to be the best with which the horse's paces are 'clean' and 'free' (to be *clean* they must be equable and their rhythm perfect, to be *free* they must be made without apparent effort or labour).

"Which allows him to turn willingly and without an effort or disturbance of his pace, to diminish or increase this without hesitation, to rein back preserving a proper degree of feeling, and immediately to advance again if called upon to do so."

The most perfectly adapted bit will not convert a raw remount into a trained horse nor give him the correct flexion, feeling, or carriage.

Carriage is not the result of bitting; *it is maintained by bitting*. It is obtained by a judicious system of training and riding, the bitting being the finishing touch which makes or mars the whole, especially for soldiers who must ride with one hand. All the good results of training may be undone by bad bitting. The bit is the key to the maintenance of good carriage, which renders Cavalry efficient, and does not waste energy by fretting or undue weighting of fore legs. It affects the *moral* of the soldier in that it gives him a sense of security and power which is of the utmost importance.

It is needless to enter into the technicalities of the numerous varieties of bits. Government provides one bit made in three sizes, and it is with that article that it is necessary to maintain the carefully trained and balanced horse.

The action implied by the bit is purely a system of leverage.

In a lever of the second order the power and fulcrum act, or are placed, at the opposite extremes of the lever (the weight being between

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the two). The mechanical advantage is proportional to the relative distances of the power and weight from the fulcrum. For instance, let P F=3; W F=1 (fig. F).

These numbers will express relative amount of power gained. (N.B.—Power and weight rotate in same direction around fulcrum.)

This order of leverage is what is required for bitting. The weight in this case is represented by the pressure on the bars (of the mouth), the fulcrum is represented by the curb, the power is exerted through the reins.



FIG. F.

It is necessary to adjust every bit wholly on this principle of a lever of the second order (*i.e.* by converting the curb into a prop or fulcrum), for the lever action on the bars of the mouth can be effected by rendering the curb perfectly painless, so that the small amount of pressure exercised upon the bars (acting in the proper direction and not being counteracted by pain at fulcrum) is all that is required to make the horse "give his jaw." This enables leverage to be put upon his neck, and, consequently, as shown, upon his whole construction.

Fig. F shows that if power=5 units be applied by the reins it can, in consequence of various arrangements and proportions of the cheeks and curb, be made to exercise either (*a*) three parts act on curb, two parts act on mouth; *result*, the horse will have pain in two directions, and he will "bore"; or (*b*) three parts on mouth, two parts on curb. Thus there remains a difference of one in both (*a*) and (*b*), whereas by reducing the painful action of curb to o we find that the whole amount of action may be applied to mouth, and this may be reduced to *two*, and give us the same result, *i.e.* available surplus of one.

This is the key to the whole theory and practice of bitting, and it is easy to understand that upon this principle the bits of small dimensions are equally efficient and certainly more true in their action than any mass of steel not duly proportioned.

It is now desirable to prove:—

1. The absolute total length necessary.
2. Relative proportion to each other.

The measure of the upper cheek of the bit should be made from the line of bearing to the point at which the curb hook acts. This should

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correspond to the distance from chin groove to bars of mouth. This may be taken as 1.88 in. or 1¾ in., very seldom less, and hardly ever more in Cavalry horses. It would be easy to show mathematically why these two dimensions should correspond. But an example is more convincing.

1. A bit without a curb will turn right round and exercise no leverage.

2. The same thing will happen if the curb is loose—*i.e.* it "falls through."

3. The opposite occurs when the curb is too tight—*i.e.* it "stands stiff."

Good bitting lies between these extremes.

In fig. H the length of the upper cheek will of itself cause the bit to stand stiff or "fall through" if it exceeds or is short of the "height of the bars" (represented by *d e*). When a pull of rein acts at f^1 the curb will be drawn closer to the chin.

The mouthpiece will be drawn closer to the mouth (tongue and bars).

The bit with a long upper cheek ($d\ a = d\ f = 2\ d\ e$) will assume position *a d f*. It will be stiff, and the curb will act upwards and consequently press a sensitive part of the jaw above the chin groove. Also, there can be no true lever action, the two arms of lever being equal ($d\ f = a\ d$). Result, the horse will lean or bore.

In the other extreme let $d\ c = \frac{1}{2}\ d\ e$; upon application at f^1 the bit will assume position $c^1\ d\ f^1$—*i.e.* it falls through. The curb will in this case probably remain in chin groove and act towards $e\ c^1$, but owing to its forming a very acute angle with the bit will have scarcely any value as a "prop." But the lever action will be very great, a power of 4 to 1 ($f\ d = 4\ d\ c$). In fact, it is too great, and therefore reduces prop to nullity.

In the third instance, the intermediate upper cheek ($d\ b = d\ e$) will assume position $b^1\ d\ f^1$—*i.e.* will neither "stand stiff" nor "fall through"—and the curb will remain in the chin groove acting towards *e b*, and will afford a sufficient prop. The lower branch of lever *f d* being to *d b* as 2 : 1, the lever will be sufficient and effective.

Upper, 1¾ inches; lower, 3½ inches, measured from line of bearing to point at which curb chain acts (*vide* fig. H) are correct proportions of a bit. Upper cheek is half of lower and equal to *d e*.

Now it is obvious that if the bit be correctly placed in the horse's

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mouth, the curb chain must be in chin groove without any tendency to "run up" and press on sharp bones of the lower jaw; for if it does so, it ceases to be a painless fulcrum, and renders the best-constructed bit useless.

The mouthpiece must be placed on that part of the bars exactly opposite to the chin groove. Theoretically, it is only in this position that the right-angled triangle *e d b* is obtained. Practically, it is this part of the bars which is best suited for the action of the mouthpiece. The majority of the absurdities and defects of bits and bitting may be traced to ignorance or inattention to this simple fact.



FIG. H.

A soldier is ordered to fit his bit at a regulation standard of "one inch above the lower tush," etc. He may happen to measure his inch and hit off the right place, and with a well-constructed bit he will have control of his horse. But unless he gets it right, and his curb chain right as well, he will find his horse will bore at him and pull. The best-placed and best-constructed bit cannot work properly unless the curb be exactly of the proper length.

Curb Chain.—It has been realised how essential it is that this should cause no pain. Therefore it is necessary to get it as broad as possible; but this breadth is limited, for if it be so broad as to more than fill the chin groove, then, upon the slightest pull, the upper edge will come in contact with the sharp jawbones and cause pain.

In order to get the minimum of pain it is necessary that the curb chain should press upon as much of the surface as possible. This is attained when the *mouthpiece exactly fits* and the *curb chain is exactly* of the correct length. If the excess of width of the mouthpiece exceeds ½ inch the curb will bear altogether upon one spot and set up a "sore." The chain itself should be 1¼ times width of mouth (exclusive of hooks). If the hooks are calculated it should be 1½ times width of mouth.

The chain cannot possibly be set to fit properly if the links are too large, for obviously if the links are ¼ inch long or more, as some are, then the happy medium may lie between one link which makes it too tight and the next which makes it too loose.

The reader will now understand how it is that people, in order to prevent a bit with a very short upper cheek "falling through," are driven to using a tight curb chain—the result being that the whole

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leverage is changed, and, although the animal may stop from pain, yet his movements are not controlled as a "horseman" desires.

It has already been shown how much depends on the angle at which the power is applied to a lever, and that a right angle is the correct angle. This shall now be proved in a manner independent of theory.

If the bit (fig. K) were pulled in direction *b* or *c*, it would evidently have no lever action.

Therefore the nearer any other direction (of pull) G or H approached these absolutely inoperative ones *b* or *c*, the less would be its value. Therefore it is obvious that the direction *a*, which is equally remote from both, must be the most efficient—that is to say, a right angle.



FIG. K.

To secure the maximum result of the leverage, a man's hands must be in the continued direction *a*, which is a point of some import.

It has been shown by fig. H that maximum height or length of upper cheek should be $1\frac{3}{4}$ inch, and that the lever should be to upper as 2 : 1. There are a great number of men who ride horses who feel themselves to be perfect masters of the horse provided that they can prevent the animal from running away, but a "horseman" (whose numbers are very small out of the enormous numbers who ride horses) requires that by a turn of his wrist his horse shall shorten his stride—that is to say, in scientific terms, that by application of a correct lever the mechanism is affected.

That leverage applies to the centre of motion, which is under the rider—thus the horseman feels his horse collecting *under* him in as precise a manner as a "man who rides horses" feels his horse flying away from under him, as previously stated in the case of the star-gazer, and a feeling of instability seldom experienced by "horsemen."

The theory of the bit as related above has withstood the attack of false theorists and the test of time. How often have we seen Cavalry remounts, having arrived at perfection of balance and training, sent to the "field," and returned to the school within a few days condemned as unmanageable? And why? Because a soldier has placed a bit in the horse's mouth, hooked up the curb chain as tight as possible, and, having become excited in the "field" and oblivious to the fact that his bridle hand is in his chest, has consequently made the action of the

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bit an action of torture to the young animal; whereas in the school the soldier's hands would have been in a correct position and thus have caused the correct action of the bit to be painlessly applied.

Having now mastered the intricacies of a bit, we call to memory that it has been found by experience that a certain bit suits a certain horse. The reason is simple.

"Good hands" are "the hands of a horseman who has acquired the art of controlling and restricting the motions of the horse without discomfort to the horse or waste of energy on the part of either."

This definition is also applicable to the bit. Often enough, the bit which has been found to "suit" a horse will, upon examination, conform precisely to the measurements derived from the mechanical laws here discussed. We thus arrive at the conclusion that it is not by "mere luck" that horses can be quietly controlled.

Further, it must be remembered that most horsemen carry their hands higher than is the presumption in the case we have examined mechanically, and that the higher the hands are carried the more are the mechanical laws violated or rendered abortive. We all know that the lower we keep our hands the more control we have over the horse.

It has now been shown that this control is not acquired by luck or a hazy knowledge of mechanics, but is, indeed, a purely mechanical problem, and, as such, one which, owing to its simplicity, has often been overlooked. "The Art of Bitting" is the keystone to the maintenance of perfection of balance and movement in a trained horse. Ignorance of this art will nullify the results of the highest training.

The art of bitting, then, consists in placing "something" "somehow" in the horse's mouth, which enables us to govern the mechanical action, resultant to an application of the legs and reins, in the proper degree and right direction for every horse for every movement.

There are few points in horse-mastership which are so essential as regards Cavalry as this art of bitting. For upon its fulfilment the steadiness of a squadron in its evolutions is to a great extent due. On active service, whether scouting, marching, skirmishing, charging, or rallying, the preservation of energy is attainable only by a study of the bits of the horses.*

To a horseman with a well-trained horse the bitting forms "*Le couronnement de l'edifice.*"

* Provided that the horse receives sufficient forage to generate energy before preserving it.—Ed. C. J.

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THE PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HORSE

By Major N. Birch, R.H.A.

The importance of scientific physical development for youths is beginning to receive attention in England, and the day will come when its value for young horses will also be recognised, its immediate and future benefits being as great in the case of the animal as in that of the man. It is also safe to prophesy that sprains and other injuries of the horse, resulting from defective training and overwork, will in the future be treated by massage in much the same way as is now so universally the case with ourselves; but this is a line of research which is as yet hardly in the experimental stage.

The proposed training is a thing quite apart from the work of a hunter in the early autumn or the preparation of a racehorse for a supreme effort, being designed to give the youngster a development of the body which shall be fixed and permanent and unaffected by temporary loss of condition.

Up to about fifteen years ago the soldier was almost the only member of the Imperial population who underwent any systematised and prolonged course of physical drill, though not on reasoned lines; its chief feature was the attainment of exaggerated chest expansion, which, on the whole, tended to sacrifice the man's agility and endurance and sometimes produced a weak heart. The special exercises which were thought necessary in the past for *haute école* horses may be likened to this old setting-up drill of the recruit.

The bed-rock principle of modern bodily development for men is gradually and systematically to strengthen every muscle, and by teaching the pupil the value of will power and of concentration of the mind, to give him full control over his movements. If we wish to educate the young horse on sound principles we must be equipped with the same elementary knowledge of his anatomy and physiology

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as is the present-day gymnastic instructor of that of the human frame, and we must work on the same lines, keeping in mind that the ultimate object of horse training should be to produce a finished animal who is as well balanced for riding purposes as nature will allow him to be. Balance is a subject to which I shall frequently refer.

The following are the principal anatomical facts to remember; they are very clearly stated in Hayes' "Points of the Horse," and in many other veterinary works. The movements of the horse's head, neck, and shoulders are intimately connected. His fore limbs are designed and constructed to bear weight; they are attached to the body by muscles only, which act like a spring in saving the effects of concussion, and are furnished with ligaments which strengthen the joints and take the weight off the animal's legs while he is resting. The hind limbs, on the contrary, while admirably adapted for propulsion, are poor weight-bearers, connected as they are with the spine by the pelvis, and having no apparatus to assist them in carrying weight without fatigue. We see the horse, when standing in the stable, drop first one hind leg and then the other to rest himself. It is therefore clear that the less weight and strain are imposed upon the animal's hind legs when he is first mounted the better, and that slow work with frequent rests should be the rule. Fitness and condition are in the main a question of heart and lungs; no more blood must be pumped into the lungs than the latter can discharge into the heart, and the trainer must be particularly careful to bring on his pupil gradually and to avoid severe exertion.

Having very briefly surveyed the special structure of the horse, we may consider his difficulties when first backed. The colt instinctively learns to balance himself from birth; by raising or lowering his head and neck he shifts his weight backwards and forwards, and does not feel it any more than we do ours; but when he is ridden, some 150 lbs. weight is placed over and behind his centre of gravity, and he has to adjust himself to the new conditions. This, and the undeveloped state of the muscles of his back and limbs, account for his awkward gait when first mounted. If a horse is well made, equilibrium comes to him easily, and his muscles strengthen in the right proportion, assuming that he is well ridden. Why is this? the reader may perhaps ask. Because, if his head and neck are well set on and his shoulders are good, it is easier for him to use them under a rider, *i.e.* to move

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them upwards and forwards. If his back is the right length and he has a good loin he can bear weight better, and the muscles strengthen more quickly; if his hocks are well placed he can carry and propel his new load with greater ease; if his girth is deep he will in all probability have an excellent heart and lungs, and the muscles of the former can develop sooner and thus remove the greatest cause of fatigue and dullness.

The colt stops himself by planting his forelegs and lowering his head in the act, and will always turn on his forehand unless he is in a confined space. He must be taught to pull up and swing round on his haunches, and the gradual accomplishment of this change of balance is one of the chief items of his physical development.

The locality of his early home will to a great extent determine the amount of work the youngster can be given and the time that will be required for his training. Good food makes strength and helps development, but up- and down-hill runs and miniature jumping lanes are of equal importance. It is obvious that wherever he has been reared his weight-bearing muscles have had no work to do, and it is also obvious that until he can carry a man for short periods without tiring easily very little can be done in the way of teaching him to use himself. The colt's back muscles must therefore be the trainer's first consideration if he wishes to avoid injury to his pupil's tendons and temper. To develop these muscles easily and comfortably the animal must at first only be asked to walk forward with a free rein; he has, as before stated, to get used to balancing himself in the new way, and his difficulties will be increased if he is not allowed reasonable liberty of the head and neck. If he is at once made to carry his head high, or if the trainer goes further, like the *haute école* enthusiasts Newcastle, Bourgelat, Baucher, and Fillis, and tries to raise the horse's crest and bend his neck at the poll, he immediately puts additional weight on the animal's back and makes his task harder. When the back and legs have become to a certain extent accustomed to their burden, the trainer's next care, and one of great importance, must be full development of the shoulder action, without which no horse can be at its best, either as a hunter, polo pony, or racehorse. As Hayes says: "The more the forelegs are lifted by the play of the shoulders, and not by the mere raising of the knees, the safer, more brilliant, less fatiguing, and faster will be the action of the horse." We all try to buy animals

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with good shoulders and arms; how few of us take the trouble to develop their full powers after purchase!

The Parthians (*circa* 200 B.C.) made special tracks with a view to teaching their horses the perfect use of their shoulders over rough ground. On these tracks they placed rows of chalk at irregular intervals. After some practice the colt learnt to lift his legs and shorten or extend his steps as circumstances required. Lawrence, Bracken, and Berenger are writers who lay particular stress on shoulder action, the latter remarking that "the perfection of all the paces depends upon the united qualities of extension and action."

The horse must now learn to travel with his head up and sufficiently extended, so that he may acquire this upward and forward play of the shoulders. If nature has been kind to him, and he is a free mover, the desired carriage will come naturally. During the whole of this time the animal's back and hindquarters have been gaining muscle, and we can safely begin to put more weight on to them by making him go collectedly, turn, and pull up on his hind legs.

The racehorse must be excluded from the last part of this physical training. His work is of a special description; not only must the rider's weight be carried on the animal's shoulders if he is to develop his utmost speed, but he must get his own weight as far forward as possible, and keep it there, in order to assume that exaggerated "instability of equilibrium" which is a condition of all fast paces. The racer must gallop with his head and neck high, though extended; if he is taught to arch the latter his stride is automatically shortened, as no horse can put his forefeet down beyond his nose. The American overhead bearing-rein was devised to keep the match trotter's head up and out, and thereby to lengthen his stride.

Jumping at liberty (unmounted) over small obstacles on soft ground should be practised during every phase of the horse's physical development; its all-round value is beyond dispute. It is important that some of the jumps should be, comparatively speaking, broad, in order that the animal may preserve his full powers of extension.

Full details of how to carry out the suggestions put forward in this article cannot possibly be given here—the whole subject of horse training is involved.

In conclusion, I will recall a truth known to all and neglected by not a few, namely, that it is useless to exercise tired muscles, and that the practice results in strains.

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ONE OF THE "TENTH" AT KARA HASSANKOI.

(Reprinted, by kind permission, from the "10th Royal Hussars Gazette.")

THE little town of Kara Hassankoi (the village of the black horse) is in Bulgaria, on the right bank of the Black Lom River, about 30 miles south-east of Rasgrad (on the White Lom), and a little over 40 miles to the north-west of Eski Djuma. These two rivers run nearly in parallel curves from south-east to north-west, with fairly open country between them except towards the south, where there are some terraced heights called Karadirli Tepe.

During July and the early part of August 1877 the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Abdul Kerim, by the most criminal apathy and negligence of the most ordinary precautions, allowed the Russians to seize and cross the whole line of the Black Lom from the Danube to the Balkans.

When he was relieved by Mehemet Ali Pasha (a German by birth), things began to look better for the Turks.

To justify his selection, the new Commander-in-Chief began by vigorous measures. He drew up a plan of campaign by which the lower parts of the Lom towards the Danube were to be held defensively, while an energetic defensive was to be carried out by his left wing moving from Rasgrad and the White Lom as a base.

This brought on the battle of Kara Hassankoi, which was fought on August 30.

The day was frightfully hot—not a cloud on the face of the sky.

The Russians were commanded by General Leonoff, whose force consisted of about 9000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, and eighteen guns.

The Turks were commanded by Nejib Pasha, Salih Pasha, and Fuad Pasha; the forces which took part in the battle being about 14,000 Infantry and thirty guns, with about 1200 regular Turkish

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Cavalry, this last body being under the command of Baker Pasha, a born Cavalry soldier and leader of men, who had formerly been an officer in the 10th Hussars.

At the break of the day on the 30th, Baker's advanced Cavalry, numbering about 300, suddenly stumbled on a body of Cossacks, about six *sotnias,* or 800 strong. The Pasha in command was with his main body, and his advanced party was driven back, wth a loss of about forty or fifty in killed and wounded. The Turks came flying back, closely pursued by the Cossacks, and Baker saw them. He deployed the rest of his Cavalry, and falling on the flanks of the Cossacks, killed or wounded the greater part of them, putting the rest to flight. This took place near the village of Sadina on the Rasgrad road, and by the time this body of Cossacks were cut up, the battle had become general all along the line.

It was now about eight o'clock in the morning. I was with a battery of Artillery, in a redoubt, on a height, on the Turkish left. In our immediate front, but slightly to our right, was the village of Hairdarkoi, further on Kara Hassankoi.

The whole battle-field stretched out before us like a panorama, the Lom winding through it like a silver ribbon.

Nejib's Infantry, pushing in on the right, came under the fire of a well-concealed Cossack battery and began to break, when two battalions of Russian Infantry came down on them at the double. Then they fell back, and some of Fuad Pasha's Infantry and guns hammered the two Russian battalions hard on the flank.

It was now getting on towards mid-day, and the heat was terrible. In the very middle of the battle the Turkish Infantry threw themselves by dozens into the river to cool themselves, burying their heads and faces in the water, and swilling it up like thirsty wild beasts.

At times it was very hard to tell how the fight was going, on account of the dust and smoke, but it was always possible to guess which side was getting the best of it by the hoarse, deep, continued roar of the Russian, or the short, sharp yell of the Turk.

Away on the right was the Turkish regular Cavalry; and behind them about 2,000 irregular Cavalry, Bashi-Bazouks. These latter were under command of an old *sowar* of the Indian Frontier Force Cavalry, who called himself Safvet Pasha. He was a most frightful ruffian, but the whiff of battle to him was as the breath of his nostrils, and as a

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fighting man he had few equals. The only officer in the whole Turkish Army who could do anything with him or for whom he had any respect was Baker Pasha.

The Russians fought well, and the line of battle was swaying backward and forward till about three o'clock in the afternoon.

Just then I saw eight squadrons of Turkish regular Cavalry come out from behind a low round hill on the Turkish right. They were led by a man on a fine grey Arab, the grandest horseman I have ever seen. They came round the hill at a trot, then broke into a gallop and came swooping down on the left flank of the Russian Infantry, tearing through them like an express train through a flock of sheep.

Then the whole line of Turkish Infantry rushed forward, sweeping everything before them like a raging mountain torrent. There was not, in all the campaign, a better example of the tremendous effect of a successful Cavalry charge.

I could not help watching the man on the grey Arab, and I saw his sabre go sweeping up and down, and all round, like lightning flashes. He made a lane through the ranks of the Russian Infantry in whatever direction he went. Some bodies of Russian Cavalry came out to meet him, and they came into contact in a large field of high maize.

But there was no holding back Baker and his Turks, and the Russian Cavalry was soon tearing back as hard as they could go, to get under the shelter of their guns. The Turkish Cavalry followed them hard, like tigers who had once tasted blood, and longed for more. I saw a shell explode within a few yards of the Pasha; his horse fell, and down he came. That was the end of the grey Arab but not of his master, for Baker was up again in a moment, on the charger of a common trooper, in the middle of his men, hissing and grunting and hacking like a very Hercules.

The old Artillery officer who was standing quite close to me laid down his field-glasses and said: "I swear by the Great God and the Prophet that the infidel who commands our Cavalry fights with the courage of ten thousand tigers."

"And yet," said a younger Artillery officer, "Allah has smitten the English with such mad blindness, that they allowed a man like him to leave their Army. May dust be on their mouths, and the graves of their fathers defiled by yellow dogs." "*Ai-ee,*" chimed in

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the veteran of the battery, "he should be one of us in faith, as he is in heart; for the Divine Ali himself would give him to drink from a silver cup the sweet and pleasant waters of the heavenly streams of Kausar."*

The battle of Kara Hassankoi was won by the Cavalry charge of Baker Pasha's regulars, that is by Baker himself. No man has ever attempted to deny this; least of all his opponents, who felt the power of his leadership and the weight of his terrible blows. They paid him the very highest compliment they could think of when they said that he was the "Turkish Skobeleff." There was no man who could get such an amount of work out of the Turkish Cavalry as Baker Pasha: none of their own blood and faith in whom they had such absolute confidence, or for whom they had such respect and admiration.

And the man fully deserved it. He threw himself into their cause with an enthusiasm, an energy, and unselfishness which the grateful Ottomans have never forgotten.

After the war was all over, I was riding along a wheat-field near Adrianople one sultry afternoon, when the reapers lay under the shade of a tree listening to the song of a maimed old minstrel, who sang of war, and love, and death.

I joined the party, and asked the minstrel to sing of the heroes of war, and he sang of Solyman the Magnificent, Sekunder Bey, and Baker Pasha.

(The above short sketch is given from notes made at the time by the *only* newspaper correspondent who was with the Turks at the battle of Kara Hassankoi.)

* The head waters of the River of Paradise, given to the victorious ones (ghazi) by the son-in-law of the Prophet.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF FIGHTING DISMOUNTED FOR CAVALRY, AND THE PLACE TO BE ASSIGNED TO IT IN ACTION AND INSTRUCTION.

By Major Immanuel, Infantry Regiment, No. 158.

Translated from the *Internationale Revue* nach *Kavalleristische Monatshefte.*

The discussion on the subject of the importance to be accorded by Cavalry to the *arme blanche* and the *fire-arm* is far from being at an end; each weapon has its advocates, who claim with an equal amount of energy preference for their favourite. The one side is unwilling to admit that fighting dismounted has acquired any greater importance than formerly, and absolutely denies that it may be necessary to have recourse to it, if cavalry is to maintain itself at the same level of efficiency as the other arms. The true reason for this opposition is the fear of seeing too much time devoted to dismounted instruction, without which the employment of Cavalry in fire-combat can never give good results, to the detriment of mounted drill. The holders of this view only see in fire-combat an expedient, a last effort, which ought not to be resorted to except in extreme cases, for in their eyes to resort to this method of fighting is in truth degrading to the proud Cavalry arm, the pure and true spirit of which suffers from the moment that it quits its legitimate path for one contrary to its true nature.

The opposite opinion is quite as frank, quite as categorical. We know that there exists, as a matter of fact, a strong idea—outside the Cavalry, be it understood—according to which Cavalry can no longer appear on the battle-field, and must confine itself to the work of scouting

The champions of this view contend that every charge of Cavalry against even half-broken Infantry would infallibly fail in presence of the accuracy and rapidity of modern rifle fire; they even assert that the effect of such a charge would be null, even when the Cavalry should have traversed, with more or less heavy losses, the line of the enemy's sharpshooters, a loose and almost invulnerable formation. The chances of success of a charge of Cavalry against Artillery are scarcely better, because the quick-firing guns will discharge a veritable hail of shrapnel,

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which, as the distance decreases, would be absolutely annihilating, and if by chance some few riders escape this hurricane of lead, they will pass at the charge through the line of shield-protected guns, without being able to do the least harm to the men serving them. In short, the protagonists of this school consider great Cavalry charges as useless, without object. Other military men, who are of a similar opinion, but whose views are formulated not quite so dogmatically, only see—although they do not frankly say so—in modern Cavalry a Mounted Infantry; that is to say, an Infantry which is in a position to move itself rapidly to the spot where it can most usefully intervene with its fire.

The alleged lessons of the South African War, and of the gigantic struggle waged in Manchuria, have been the reason why, in different quarters, it has been assumed that the day of Cavalry is over; that this arm, as such, belongs to the past.

We will not go into the arguments which superficial observers have brought forward in support of their views. It will suffice for us to briefly recall the absolutely abnormal conditions under which the Anglo-Boer War was waged, where the English Cavalry was, in effect, equally powerless against the Boer trenches and their mobile and numerous commandos. In Asia, the Japanese only disposed of a very weak Cavalry, while that of the Russians was not at all prepared, either for its proper *role* or for the various duties which fell upon it. It is evident that from these two great wars a number of lessons and new ideas may be drawn, principally for Cavalry, and we insist on this point, because nearly as valuable lessons are to be learnt from the negative as from the positive results of a campaign.

But what are the lessons to be learnt from these two campaigns by the Cavalry?

Why, above everything, before all, that Cavalry has not become superfluous; has not retrograded; and that it ought not to abandon its proper *role*.

It remains, as formerly, the eye of the army, to employ an old and much used, but very true, formula. If it discharges its *role* of scouting efficiently, the commander-in-chief should be informed with sufficient detail and accuracy of what the enemy is doing, early enough to enable him to gauge the situation correctly, and to make such disposition of his forces as will enable him to overthrow the enemy. Only that leader who shall clearly see through the designs of his opponent, will be able to forestall him in resolve and action, and force his own will upon him.

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That is the great problem for the commander-in-chief and his principal leaders. It is, in truth, the penetration, decision, and daring of the general-in-chief that, as Moltke so well puts it, 'will pierce the veil of uncertainty which envelops the situation; will make him appreciate exactly the value of what he has learnt; divine what he has not been able to learn; make him arrive rapidly at a decision, and then carry it out with energy and without hesitation.' It is therefore clearly necessary for the commander-in-chief to be furnished with trustworthy information in order to enable him to form a sound judgment as to what the enemy is doing, and this information can only be furnished him by a strong Cavalry, well directed, and absolutely competent to carry through the various duties which fall upon it. This is a fact which cannot be disputed, and will hold good as long as we have wars. The Cavalry drives off that of the enemy, opening thus the way for the scouting parties, as well as to the various units which follow, and leaving it free to investigate and fathom the enemy's dispositions.

But the *role* of Cavalry is not limited to long distance scouting, and to scouting only; it extends to the field of battle itself. A good deal is heard in these days of the 'Void of the field of battle'; this phenomenon, due to the careful use of ground by Infantry and Artillery, both in the attack and in the defence. But the more careful these arms are to shelter themselves from the sight and blows of the enemy, the more does tactical scouting become necessary. And by tactical scouting we mean scouting close up to the enemy, which should be carried out both before and during battle, should pass round the enemy's wings, and never for a moment lose close touch with him. To this must be added the necessity of protecting the flanks on the field of battle against attacks by the enemy, of driving back his scouting parties, and of detecting in good time enveloping movements. In short, Cavalry must operate in close and intimate correlation with its sister-arms; it ought to intervene actively in the action, whether by charging—if there is no other way of achieving any result—or by fire-combat, either alone or reinforcing the fire from the horse or machine gun batteries attached.

After the battle, Cavalry should find the opportunity of reaping laurels, even in presence of the weapons of to-day. If it knows how to seize the right moment for acting; if it moves with the necessary rapidity; if it is independent and daring, Cavalry will always find itself in a situation to take the largest share in the pursuit, with the assistance, if possible, of Artillery and machine guns. The weighty words of the training

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regulations for the German Cavalry (Pars. 376–378), have lost nothing of their importance, nothing of their appropriateness; on the contrary, they have acquired a still greater importance, owing to the conditions of modern warfare. It seems well, then, to give, *in extenso*, the words of the regulations in question :—

'The leader of every Cavalry unit, even if this unit is only momentarily independent, should, on his own personal responsibility, take all the measures necessary for discovering the enemy in retreat and pursuing him hotly.

'But much better than following on the heels of an enemy who is falling back, is it to outstrip him and, supported by the Artillery, attack him in flank, either sword in hand or by fire, in such a way as to intercept his retreat, and throw his columns and convoys into disorder.

'Such pursuit ought to be undertaken by the whole Cavalry and continued without rest or repose, and without consideration for the men; even with the horses fatigued, it ought to be continued night and day.

'Every horseman of the victorious army ought to endeavour to outstrip the enemy in retreat, and every commander of troops must exert himself to this end. After victory the mass of the army can dispense with Cavalry. A pursuit pushed relentlessly home may save the army a new battle, and sometimes bring the whole campaign to an end.

'The pursuit at all cost is then a duty which must be impressed on the Cavalry, all the more as the difficulties which have to be surmounted (fatigue, exhaustion of the troops, dispersion of the enemy) are never really experienced in peace manœuvres.'

It is necessary to bear well in mind that the fighting of modern Infantry, which may go on for days and nights, using up all their energies, shattering their nerves, will create the greatest disorder in the ranks of the beaten, while the victorious Infantry will also be exhausted and often not in a condition to continue the action or even make a forward movement.

The task of the Cavalry will be all the more decisive and richer in results, and its chances of success will lie above everything in the rapidity of its movements and the energy of its action. Hurrying continuously forward, it will overthrow by a vigorous charge the enemy's Cavalry and will thus open the road towards his line of retreat. At a favourable spot, preferably on the flank, it will deploy a line of skirmishers and open a destructive fire on the retreating columns, with the powerful support of its horse artillery and machine guns.

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If the enemy shows himself still sufficiently strong to make success doubtful, the rapidity of movement of the Cavalry allows of its rapidly breaking off the action, retreating again to a distance and then renewing the attack at another spot, under better conditions. If it thus wears down the enemy, giving him no rest, it reaps the success for which the deadly struggle of the other arms on the battle-field itself has prepared the way. If we take the Russo-Japanese War, where the success obtained by the Cavalry was so small, we will ask what would have happened after the battle of Mukden, if the mounted troops had played their proper *role?* For fourteen days the opposing armies had struggled, up to the point of exhaustion.

The Russians, finally beaten, fell back towards the north under the most unfavourable strategical and tactical conditions; that is to say, enveloped on both flanks, only able to use a few roads, with the disorder, discouragement, and trouble constantly increasing in the columns, the tactical links of which had been much loosened in the course of the action. The Japanese Infantry, itself extremely fatigued, was not in a condition, with the best will in the world, to overcome the need for repose, and pursue them. If, in place of the sixty widely dispersed Japanese squadrons there had been two or three divisions of Cavalry in close order in hand, they would have advanced rapidly by the plain to the west of the Mukden-Tieling route, getting ahead of the masses of the enemy, and would thus have been in a position to have inflicted on them very serious damage, and might even have brought them to the point of almost complete disaster. The issue of the whole campaign depended on this moment. The situation was not taken advantage of by the Japanese, because they had not the requisite Cavalry at their disposal, and therein is a valuable lesson for the future.

But the tactical *role* of Cavalry does not cease here. Cavalry which has been pushed forward, if it makes adroit use of close country, should be able to hamper the march of the enemy's advance guard, and thus give to the troops they are covering the time necessary, which is so important in these days, to effect their deployment.

They can appear on the flank of the enemy's approaching column, and take obliquely the column of march of his Artillery with their fire, thus gravely delaying the enemy, which will be of great advantage to their own commander-in-chief.

But what, then, are the essential qualities for Cavalry, if they are to be equal to carrying out the complex and important duties, which fall

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to them, fraught as these may be with the gravest consequences? It demands from all their leaders—and we include here non-commissioned officers—the greatest skill in scouting, a knowledge of how to transmit reports, even for privates, then certain technical aptitudes (the use of the telegraph, signalling, work of destruction, the construction of bridges, swimming, &c.), to be skilled swordsmen; to be able to take a horse across any country and over any obstacles; to be masters of horsemanship; and, finally, last but not least in importance, good marksmen.

The training of each individual man takes the first place; his instruction in all the duties of a Cavalry-man is fundamental, because the whole body will not be effective unless each of its constituent elements is complete master of his work. But the first condition of success is the 'Cavalry Spirit,' the sterling, thorough, vigorous, happy, Cavalry spirit, which is the result of *savoir-faire*, the military instruction and education received, confidence in its own possibilities, and the determination to dare great deeds. Without this spirit, Cavalry will perform nothing. It is essential, then, that it should be developed, cultivated, and sedulously maintained. It must not be stunted by petty considerations, by the disappearance of the distinction between Cavalry and mounted Infantry. It is certain—we admit, with certain reservations—that in war there will be more occasions where Cavalry, well posted, will seize the carbine in order to co-operate in the fighting, than there will be cases where it will fling itself at the charge on the lines of Infantry or Artillery, which are hurling forth fire and death. But it will, nevertheless, do that, and it will not hesitate for an instant to do it, if it is necessary, if the situation requires it, and for this the Cavalry spirit, the first, finest, and noblest quality of the horseman, is necessary. But in addition, Cavalry must be thoroughly trained in the use of their rifles, and must know how to fight a fire-combat, because it may well happen that this form of action is the best, and the occasion for it will often arise, and the effect be decisive. So—and we again insist on this point—much as we extol the Cavalry spirit, and the special characteristics of Cavalry, do we also attach importance to training in fighting dismounted. It has become in these days an indispensable branch of instruction, because upon it depends the possibility of using Cavalry under the varied conditions of war which will be unavoidable in the future. And this complexity in employment is characteristic far more of the Cavalry than of the other arms—a splendid, weighty, but highly honourable duty. It is this which constitutes the distinguishing mark of modern Cavalry, ***and it is in this that the value of this arm resides.***

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The firing regulations for the German Cavalry, published in September, 1906, constitutes an excellent guide for the training and instruction of Cavalry in fire-combat. A great deal is required from Cavalry in this connection, and almost as much is expected from them as is obtained from Infantry. We must naturally bear in mind that the defensive action and the fire-action by itself, that is to say, in short, firing at the right range against the enemy, constitutes the main point here, because it is not probable that the attack will be resorted to often by Cavalry. It goes without saying, however, that Cavalry must be exercised in attack as well; but the main point will always be the firing itself, the movement forward by rushes, or otherwise, taking only second place.

Firing instruction rests, above everything, on continuous, thorough training, directed, above all, to the individuality of each man. The preliminary drills and the schools of musketry, where men must be brought up to comply with the conditions imposed, are valuable in this connection. An intelligent, level-headed staff of instructors is necessary, if the best results are to be obtained, thoroughly trained and specially conversant in all relating to musketry. A day should not pass without the man taking his carbine, if only for a few minutes, and practising himself in aiming. The whole operation of aiming, even such details, trifling as they may seem, as where to place the right hand on the stock, the handling of the trigger, &c., must be repeated again and again, without losing patience or neglecting the slightest detail. It is not enough that the man should come up to a certain standard, and come up to it quickly. Nothing is worse than when all that is thought about is to rush the men through the different classes, so as to make them finish with the school of musketry as rapidly as possible. If men look upon this important branch of the service as only an irksome accessory, to be hurried over, there will be no real musketry instruction. In reality, men trained in this way will be but of slight value, and disappoint not only themselves but the body of which they form a part. Under no pretext can a superficial course of instruction be tolerated.

It is clear that, as with the Infantry, the point to be aimed at is the training each individual man to be a skilled marksman. But the musketry school only constitutes a preliminary to battle firing, and in this the eye must be trained to detect rapidly small objects on the ground, up to as much as 1,200 metres, and to aim correctly at these distances, even when the objects are on the move; it is necessary, moreover, for the man to know how to judge distances and adjust his sights accurately, and to make judicious use of cover.

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After the men have been thoroughly trained individually, in all these details, they must be taught to work in groups. Here it is, above everything, important that the non-commissioned officers should be thoroughly efficient, and that the greatest care and attention should be devoted to their instruction, because it is only when the fire is well directed that a good result can be guaranteed, it being understood, of course, that the men firing have been properly taught. The instruction of the non-commissioned officers begins with exercises in the field, where they will learn judging distances; how to avail themselves of cover; to choose the object to be aimed at; the adjustment of the sights; the distribution of fire; the transmission of orders; and the observation of the effects of the fire. When these important details have been thoroughly mastered, training by groups follows, care being taken that the enemy should always be represented as much as possible at battle ranges, in various natures of country, drill cartridges, and, from time to time, blank, being used. The object to be kept in view is the scrupulous instruction of every man in the whole art of musketry, and instilling into him the necessity for the most rigorous fire discipline.

The instruction of the group is followed by the organisation for battle, and the training of sections. Simultaneously with the ballistic and tactical exercises, the exercises peculiar to Cavalry, connected with fire-combat, must be carried out, dismounting under fire, shelter for the held horses, rapid organisation of the sections into skirmishers, the duty of the horse-guards, and the remounting expeditiously and in order after an engagement. As is known, to break off an action is by no means easy, especially when time presses. It will very frequently be necessary to place the section-leaders in some situations, where the question will be of rapidly forming a resolution, of skilfully taking up a position, of directing unerringly a fire-combat. Particularly important is the instructive organisation of supplying the firing line, whether of groups or sections, with ammunition. The more attention and time is given to these exercises, the more will the men and their leaders profit.

There is a demand at the present time for whatever will enable the best results to be obtained from dismounted firing. For example, the German Cavalry are asking for the carbine (model 98) with 'S' ammunition in order to obtain greater ranges and flatter trajectories; also a larger supply of ammunition, and the attaching to the Cavalry divisions of several machine-gun detachments. It is absolutely certain that these

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three demands are quite justified. By agreeing to them the fighting power of the Cavalry will be sensibly strengthened.

The limits of this essay will not allow us to examine in greater detail the questions dealing with the organisation of the arm.

For the training of the Cavalry there is a demand for :—

1. The allocation of a larger amount of ammunition for battle firing
2. The supply of range-finders to the units ;
3. The training of a larger number of officers and non-commissioned officers at the Infantry School of Musketry, or, failing that, with Infantry units.

It is indisputable that these demands are absolutely justified. In the meanwhile, the resources at the disposal of the Cavalry are sufficient for attaining the desired result, if only the good-will and the necessary painstaking are there. The whole course of instruction must always have one great aim in view ; and let us once more repeat that this aim is, above all, the Cavalry education. In future wars the Cavalry must expect to meet that of the enemy, not only during strategic reconnaissances, but also in operations attempted against the enemy's flanks and against his lines of communication. It is here that the issues will be definitely joined, because ultimate success will depend upon defeat or victory in this duel. Consequently, the important point above everything will be the struggle with the enemy's Cavalry. The qualities of the leader, the number, and the intrinsic value of the men will be the decisive factors here. Once the enemy is swept away, the Cavalry will have to solve the most diverse tactical problems—from battle-reconnaissance up to, let us hope, the pursuit—and, brought face to face with Infantry and Artillery, will be obliged to have recourse to the carbine. Then will come the opportunity of showing their skill both as marksmen and skirmishers. ' In short,' as a distinguished German Cavalry leader recently remarked, ' we attach equal importance to the carbine and the lance, but nothing more.' The Cavalry is the ' Mounted Arm,' and that indicates clearly the line of conduct it has to follow, with all the energy at its command. War to-day demands that, in addition to its purely Cavalry method of fighting, it must be also competent to carry on an effective fire-combat with its rifles, which will be fully as important, and is at least as useful. Let it rise to the height of both duties, and the opportunities of gathering laurels in the future will no more be wanting than they have been in the past.

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THE 3rd (KING'S OWN) LIGHT DRAGOONS AT MOODKEE AND FEROZESHAH

By Captain A. E. H. Ley, *20th Deccan Horse*

In continuation of the interesting account by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., of the work of the Cavalry at Sobraon, which appeared in the Cavalry Journal for April 1911, the following account of how the 3rd Light Dragoons "covered themselves with glory both at Moodkee and Ferozeshah" may also prove of interest.

At one o'clock on the afternoon of December 18, 1845, the "Army of the Sutlej" reached Moodkee; orders for encamping were issued, but the troops were warned to be prepared to turn out at a moment's notice, and form up on their own ground; the Cavalry to unbridle and feed, but not to unsaddle, nor were the men to take off their accoutrements.

Between two and three o'clock intelligence was received that the enemy was approaching in force. To cover the formation of the Infantry, the British Horse Artillery and Cavalry were rapidly advanced about two miles to the front, where the enemy was found in position, formed up along the border of dense jungle, which covered the country for miles beyond.

Before the Cavalry could deploy, the Sikhs opened their fire, which was vigorously replied to by the British Artillery, under Brigadier George Brooke.

The British Infantry were speedily in action, when the Cavalry were ordered to attack the Sikhs on their left flank, the 3rd (King's Own) Light Dragoons being on the extreme right of the British line.

The distinguished part which this regiment took in this sanguinary

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and memorable battle may be best judged from the words of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Hugh Gough, in his despatch dated December 19, 1845. He says:—

"I directed the Cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough,* to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible.

"With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry, consisting of the Bodyguard and 5th Light Cavalry with a portion of the 4th Lancers, *turned* the left of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the *whole rear* of its Infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous Cavalry to flight."

The British Infantry now attacking, the Sikh Army was driven from position to position with great slaughter, losing seventeen pieces of Artillery, some of them of heavy calibre. Night only saved them from a worse disaster, for the last hour and a half of this stubborn conflict was fought in dim starlight, amidst clouds of dust which more than ever obscured every object.

The Sikhs retired to their position at Ferozepore, after suffering heavy loss: their strength upon going into action was about 30,000 men, whilst the British force did not far exceed 10,000, out of which they lost 207 killed and 636 wounded, amongst whom was Major-General Sir Robert Sale, the hero of Jellalabad, who died of his wounds.

The 3rd K.O. Light Dragoons went into action 494 strong and lost:

Killed.	*Wounded.*
3 Officers.	3 Officers.
5 Sergeants.	3 Sergeants.
1 Trumpeter.	29 Rank and file.
2 Corporals.	
50 Privates.	
Total 61	Total 35

5 officers' chargers and 100 troop horses killed; 2 officers' chargers and 21 troop horses wounded.

Amongst other incidents of the fight, Captain John Tritton of the

* Both these officers belonged to the 3rd K.O. Light Dragoons. Brigadier White commanded the 1st Cavalry Brigade; Brigadier Gough the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

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"Third" captured a standard; and Lance-Sergeant Hinds (who was killed at Ferozeshah on December 21), with a party of six or seven men of the regiment captured two of the enemy's guns, after cutting down the whole of the gunners.

On December 19 the enemy again advanced towards the British position at Moodkee, but finding the Army prepared to resist their attack, withdrew to Ferozeshah.

December 20 was employed in making and completing arrangements for the coming battle, which was expected to be as severe as it proved to be.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the British Army was under arms, and at daybreak commenced its advance in two columns, left in front, towards Ferozeshah, distant about ten miles from Moodkee and about the same from Ferozepore.

After marching four miles on the direct road to Ferozeshah, Sir Hugh Gough manœuvred to the left so as to avoid the enemy's position, and the Army continued its advance out of cannon shot between the Sikhs and Ferozepore, until one o'clock in the afternoon, when it was joined by 5,500 men and 21 guns, under Major-General Sir John Littler, from Ferozepore.

The troops now formed in order of battle, but the action did not commence for some time, and did not become general until after three o'clock.

The Sikh entrenchment was in the form of a parallelogram of about 1½ miles in length and ½ mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah. The shorter sides looked towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the long ones towards Ferozepore on the one side, and the flat open country, studded with trees and jungle, on the other.

By four o'clock the battle raged in all its fury, and the 3rd K.O. Light Dragoons, who were posted on the British right, received orders to attack the enemy's position at a point defended by some of the heaviest of their batteries.

As the Regiment advanced, it was assailed with round shot and shell, until within about two hundred and fifty yards, when it started to gallop under a tremendous fire of grape and musketry, which laid in the dust many a gallant soldier. Nothing dismayed, but determined on victory, the Regiment pressed forward at the charge. Now the glittering

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sabres flew from their scabbards, and never for a moment were the gallant "Third" checked in their career, until they had burst into the enemy's camp and captured the whole of the batteries opposed to them; most of the Sikh artillerymen being cut down at their guns.

It is recorded that this magnificent charge was the admiration of all who witnessed it; and it is one of the very few occasions, as at Sobraon, when Cavalry has charged and captured entrenched guns.

We are told that the Regiment advanced with as correct a line as if at a review parade, the troop leaders of the second squadron giving the base in the usual manner, until in actual contact with the enemy.

Amongst others severely wounded at the commencement of the charge was the Commanding Officer, Major C. W. M. Balders, and so the command of the Regiment during the actual charge devolved upon Captain J. R. B. Hale, who had his horse shot under him, as befell no less than eleven other officers.

Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging, and several mines having been sprung, and many of the enemy's field magazines having exploded, destroying many men and horses, the Regiment was withdrawn a short distance from the burning camp, and bivouacked.

The enemy still held a considerable portion of their position, and maintained a most harassing and destructive fire upon the wearied British, who, however, stood their ground until daylight of the 22nd, when the battle was renewed.

The Sikhs were soon driven from the village of Ferozeshah and dislodged from their strong position; but even yet the strife was not ended and the Sikhs fought doggedly on.

Early in the afternoon Tej Singh brought up fresh battalions and several fresh batteries to the support of Lal Singh, and made strenuous efforts to retake Ferozeshah.

These being beaten off, he next launched a vigorous attack against the British left flank and the captured village, which compelled the British to change their front. The fight now raged fiercer than ever, and the almost exhausted Artillery and Cavalry were again brought forward, to threaten the enemy's flanks, and were for some time exposed to a most destructive fire.

Again the 3rd K.O. Light Dragoons relieved the pressure by a brilliant charge, which the now demoralised foe did not wait to receive, but fled precipitately towards the Sutlej, leaving seventy-three pieces

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of cannon, all their field magazines, large stores of grain, camp equipage, &c., in the hands of the victors, who bivouacked on the ground they had so nobly and strenuously fought for.

The men and horses of the "King's Own" had now been without food or water for upwards of *forty* hours, during the whole time of which they had been either exposed to attack, or in actual conflict with a powerful enemy!

On going into action on the 21st, the whole of the British Cavalry did not probably muster more than 2,600 sabres; from which some had been detached to Ferozepore early on the morning of the 22nd, leaving about 2,000 on the field. These were so absolutely exhausted from fatigue, as well as the want of food and water, with the days hot and the nights intensely cold, that they were utterly incapable of further effort, and were thus unable to reap the full benefits of their victory by a vigorous pursuit.

The British Army went into action about 18,000 strong, whilst the enemy numbered at least 60,000, under Lal Singh and Tej Singh, with 155 pieces of artillery, 88 of which were in position at Ferozeshah.

Had Tej Singh, who was not more than eight miles from the scene of action, joined Lal Singh on the 21st instead of the 22nd the result might have been very different; and it was undoubtedly the brilliant and dashing charges of the 3rd K.O. Light Dragoons that went far towards winning the day. As it was the British loss was severe; viz., 694 killed, and 1,271 wounded.

The Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, who acted as second in command in this fierce battle, and who personally witnessed the prowess of the "Third," thus makes honourable mention of them in his orders to the Army, dated December 30, 1845:—

"The Governor-General offers his thanks more especially to Her Majesty's Third Light Dragoons, who, on all these occasions, sought opportunities of useful conflict with the enemy, and fought with that superiority over their opponents which skill and discipline impart to brave and determined men!"

Could any Cavalry regiment wish for higher praise than this; and do not the words "on all these occasions, sought opportunities of useful conflict with the enemy," sum up the true Cavalry spirit, and the rôle of Cavalry on the battlefield just as much now, as it did then?

The loss sustained by the Regiment, out of the *four hundred* men

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who went into action, was much heavier in proportion than at Moodkee, particularly in the number of wounded.

Killed.	*Wounded.*
2 Officers.	7 Officers.
2 Sergeants.	6 Sergeants.
1 Trumpeter.	80 Rank and file.
6 Corporals.	
44 Privates.	
Total 55	Total 93

12 officers' chargers and 98 troop horses killed; 1 officer's charger and 60 troop horses wounded; 30 troop horses missing.

The total losses thus sustained by the Regiment in four days amount to no less than :—

Killed.	*Wounded.*
5 Officers.	10 Officers.
7 Sergeants.	9 Sergeants.
2 Trumpeters.	109 Rank and file.
8 Corporals.	
94 Privates.	
Total 116	Total 128

17 officers' chargers and 198 troop horses killed; 3 officers' chargers and 81 troop horses wounded; 30 troop horses missing; making a grand total of 244 officers and men and 329 horses rendered *hors-de-combat;* in other words, nearly half the number of officers and men who paraded before Moodkee, and nearly three-quarters the number of horses.

It may not be generally known that the medal granted to the "Army of the Sutlej" bears the word "Moodkee" on it, instead of the usual form of clasp; the other actions, such as Ferozeshah, Aliwal, Sobraon, being commemorated by the usual form of clasp.

For many years the 3rd King's Own Light Dragoons were known as the "Moodkee-wallahs" on account of their brilliant exploits above narrated.

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

THE 20th HUSSARS

(Curragh—1911.)

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LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES TAYLOR.

1772–1808.

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LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES TAYLOR
(*20th Light Dragoons*)

By C. R. B. Barrett

Charles Taylor, or, as he appears in the Army List for 1808, Charles D. Taylor, was born in the year 1772, his date of baptism being December 28. He was the only child of Dr. John Taylor, a well-known physician of Reading. His mother was the sister of the rector of Tilehurst, Berks, and, as the widow of the Rev. Dr. Lyne, rector of Aynesbury, Hunts, married Dr. Taylor. Probably the second name, D——, is an error, as no trace of it can be found elsewhere than in the Army List.

Charles Taylor was admitted to Westminster School as a King's Scholar September 15, 1784, and was elected to a close scholarship at Christ Church, Oxford, in 1790, matriculating there on June 9. He took his B.A. in 1794, and in the same year (October 29) obtained a cornetcy in the 7th Light Dragoons without purchase, on the recommendation of Lieutenant-Colonel Egerton, then in command of that regiment. (This information comes from a letter in the War Office.) On June 6, 1795, Charles Taylor obtained a lieutenancy in the 29th Light Dragoons, but probably did not join that regiment, as on September 22 of the same year he purchased his troop in his old corps, the 7th Light Dragoons, *vice* Cussans, promoted to the 94th Foot. In 1797 he took his degree of Master of Arts, having apparently kept his name on the books of the College. This was in those days a rather unusual proceeding on the part of an officer, though many after the Waterloo campaign who had served both in that and the Peninsular War reversed the process and, proceeding to the University, subsequently took holy orders. With the 7th Light Dragoons Lieutenant Taylor saw some service in Flanders, though it is not possible to accurately state in which of the many engagements the regiment took part he was present. It is, however, pretty certain that he was with

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the regiment at Roubaix, again in front of Tournay, where the regiment obtained great praise, and at Breda, the passage of the Waal, and in the sortie on the batteries before Nimeguen. The Army retired through Holland to Ghent, during which it suffered great privations, and returned to England in November 1795. Four years later the 7th Light Dragoons were again in Holland, with the 11th, 15th, and part of the 18th Light Dragoons, under the Duke of York, and, amongst other affairs, fought at Bergen and Egmont op Zee, covering the retreat at the conclusion of the campaign and returning to England in December 1799. The 7th Light Dragoons were then stationed at Canterbury.

Charles Taylor obtained his majority May 16, 1801, and exchanged into the 20th Light Dragoons as Lieutenant-Colonel February 24, 1803. On July 23 of that year he married Elizabeth, eldest daughter of John Baker, Esq., M.P. for Canterbury.

After his marriage Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor served in Sicily, from which island he returned in the summer of 1807.

Proceeding to the Peninsula when the war broke out, he was present in command of his regiment at the battle of Vimiera, where he fell on August 21, 1808, at the early age of 36. Writing of his death, a brother officer tells us he died 'at the head of his regiment, in one of the most determined charges, I believe, ever made. In his death our Army has lost one of its most active and intelligent officers.'

On the day after the battle a search-party was sent out, and when the body of Colonel Taylor was found it was buried on the field. He had been shot through the body.

It appears that Taylor had but 240 men with him and no Infantry. He charged and went right through the French Infantry, but was then surrounded by a very superior force of French Cavalry. In cutting his way out, or endeavouring to do so, he met with his death. So impressed was General Kellerman by the gallantry and bravery of Taylor and his small body of Cavalry that the Colonel's charger, which had been captured, was returned to the British by him as a tribute to his bravery. Kellerman wrote: 'A very brave man,' and 'none but a very brave man would have advanced as he did.'

General Kellerman, it may be remarked, was close to Colonel Taylor when the latter received his death-wound. It appears that earlier in the day the horse of Colonel Taylor had been wounded while

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he was reconnoitring the French lines. A remark of this gallant officer on the occasion may be quoted: 'He was determined for honour for himself and his regiment on that day.' As a man Colonel Taylor appears to have been much beloved. 'Possessed of an understanding of more apparent vivacity than steadiness, with all the generous spirit and some of the foibles of a soldier (in the best sense), he attracted the love of the liberal, the warm-hearted, and those whose natural disinterestedness is enlarged by education.' In these terms a contemporary writes of the deceased officer.

A monument to the memory of Colonel Taylor was placed in the cloister of Christ Church Cathedral by the then Dean Cyril Jackson and is still to be seen there. On it—perhaps through giving the inscription a classic form—Colonel Taylor is stated to have 'formed and disciplined' his regiment. This, of course, does not mean that he raised it, for he was the seventh in the succession of Lieutenant-Colonels. It will be remembered that the 20th (or Jamaica Regiment) of Light Dragoons was raised from drafts taken from other existing Cavalry regiments, the 13th Hussars (Light Dragoons) among the number, who in the winter of 1790 were called upon to furnish a draft of twenty-six men for this purpose.

Dean Cyril Jackson was an intimate friend of Dr. John Taylor.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor left three children; one, a son Charles Cyril, godson of the Dean, entered the Army, rose to be Colonel of the 29th (Worcestershire) Foot, April 3, 1846, was created a Companion of the Bath, and commanded the 2nd Infantry Division (Brigade Staff) as Brigadier-General at Sobraon, where, like his father, he fell at the head of his regiment February 10, 1846. A monument to his memory was erected in Canterbury Cathedral. He too left at any rate one son who, following the family tradition, served his country in the Army, dying on active service in Egypt.

The portrait reproduced from an old engraving in the Royal United Service Institution is, we venture to think, well worthy of insertion. The writer desires to offer his thanks to the Very Reverend the Dean of Canterbury, the Very Reverend the Dean of Christ Church, and to J. Beach Whitmore, Esq., for so kindly furnishing him with information.

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THE SCARCITY OF HORSES IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THEIR SUPPLY FOR ARMY PURPOSES

By Lieutenant A. Q. Archdale, R.F.A.

"A horse, a horse, my Kingdom for a horse!"

(Reprinted by kind permission from the "Journal of the Royal Artillery")

To the horse lover, one of the most depressing features of the advance of civilisation is the gradual extinction, as a method of locomotion, not only of the riding, but also of the draught, horse.

Possibly it may be a pleasure to many to note the decrease in the number of half-starved and ill-used animals in the costers' and small tradesmen's carts in the street, but to all it must be a matter of extreme regret that the smart well-kept van horse and the neat butchers' ponies are rapidly diminishing in number.

To the hunting man it must be a source of still greater regret that he finds it an ever-increasingly difficult task to obtain the good three-quarter or half-bred necessary for his purpose, but it is the mounted soldier and patriot who must view with the greatest consternation the rapid extinction of the cheap riding horse and the light draught horse in this country. From these types of horse he must realise that in time of war we shall have to obtain the Cavalry chargers and the Artillery draught horse, and it is these types which apparently have disappeared most during the last decade.

Cause.—The cause of this decrease in the number of horses may be taken as two in number:—

(1) First and foremost comes the advent of the petrol-driven car, greatly increasing the business radius of all the large tradesmen, and providing even the small shopkeeper with a cheaper means of distribution of his goods, while it almost entirely supersedes the gentleman's carriage and pair.

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To a stranger returning to London after a lapse of say 15 years, the streets must present a truly strange spectacle; where before were horse buses, hansoms, horse vans, smart carriages, and equally smart dogcarts, there are now thousands of petrol-driven cars of all sorts, ranging from the motor omnibus to the small two-seated private car, or the tricar delivery van. The motor has had its effect even on the hunter, for although it has been of assistance to the hunting man through providing him with an easy means of access to his favourite sport, yet, at the same time, it has practically entirely superseded the hack class of horse, in consequence of which, where formerly the breeder could sell his hunter failures for a fair price as covert hacks, he now has to face a heavy loss on the same failures.

The apparent disproportionate decrease of the vanners and cheap riding horse is due not only to there being a smaller number of such failures put into these classes from the higher classes, but also to the fact that the breeder has now almost entirely abandoned trying to obtain this type of horse, once such a lucrative part of his business.

(2) The second and aggravating cause is probably the increase in the value of land and the consequent large rise in the expenses of pasturage, and so of horse-breeding as a whole, rendering it extremely difficult for the breeder to clear a sufficient profit from his sales. These two factors of modern times, added to the fact that foreign buyers are only too keen to take away as many as possible of the justly famed horses of the British Isles, are full and sufficient causes for the present deplorable deficiency in suitable horses for the supply of the Army in war time.

Expenses of breeding.—Before discussing the various schemes employed and proposed for remedying this evil, it would first be advisable to investigate the probable expenses of horse-breeding to the breeder. The estimate appended below is that of a prominent horse-breeder in Ireland and a member of the Department of Agriculture Committee in Ireland, in which country it may be assumed that horse-breeding is cheaper than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. The estimate is divided into two classes for convenience of discussion later on :—

(1) Horses reared up to 3 years old, and sold unbroken.

(2) Horses reared up to 5 years old, and sold mouthed and backed.

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	£	s.	d.
(*a*) Service expenses. This is an average including railway fare, &c.	3	3	0
(*b*) Keep for foaling year	5	0	0
(*c*) ,, ,, 2nd year (extra food in winter) . .	8	0	0
(*d*) ,, ,, 3rd year (2 year old)	8	0	0
(*e*) ,, ,, 4th year (3 year old)	10	0	0
Total up to 3 years old, or rising 4 years old about	£34	3	0

	£	s.	d.
(*a*) Similar expense to above up to 3 years old .	34	3	0
(*b*) Keep till rising 5 years	8	0	0
(*c*) Mouthing and backing expenses . . .	2	10	0
Total up to rising 5 years	£44	13	0

The figures given above are those for light draught horses somewhat of the Artillery stamp, and against the expense may be placed the fact that the horse will begin to earn his living by light work at three or four years old; but to adapt these figures to the hunter stamp of horse at least £10 to £12 must be added to the expenses of rearing a horse in the second class, as his mouthing and backing must be considerably increased before he is fit for sale.

Danger of misfits and their disposal.—In the estimate of the cost as above something must be allowed for the risk incurred by the breeder of not obtaining the required type of horse, and, although in the opinion of most breeders these misfits should not amount to more than 20 per cent. provided sound stallions and sound mares only are employed, this is unfortunately not the case, and so the proportion of such failures is fairly large. Such horses can be sold as light trappers, parcel vanners, &c., for £20 to £25 at four years of age, the breeder thus incurring a loss of from £10 to £15, or possibly even more.

Purchase of remounts.—At present the Government buyers only purchase horses at four years and upwards and are not allowed by regulations to give more than £40 for the troop horse or £60 for the officer's charger.

It thus becomes evident that the Government is paying only £40 for a horse which has cost about £44, or £60 for a horse which has cost £54; from which it can be seen that the profits from breeding

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for Army purposes are not such as to induce a breeder to continue the practice for long. In addition to this the remount officers prefer to buy from the dealer, where they can see a large number of horses assembled together, and in consequence in the few cases where profit is made it goes into the pockets of the dealer and not of the breeder.

Schemes for the improvement of breeding.—Before discussing the proposed remedy for the deficiency in Army types of horse, it will probably be advantageous to examine the schemes already in operation in various countries for generally improving the breed of horses in each country, and thus indirectly to increase the supply of suitable horses. The most important of these is probably that adopted by the Department of Agriculture for Ireland.

Scheme in Ireland.—The Irish Department of Agriculture's schemes comprise:—

(1) The annual registration of stallions.

(2) The purchase and resale of stallions.

(3) Service nominations to mares.

(1) Early in each year the Department issues a register of stallions selected by their inspector as being up to a high standard of general excellence and free from hereditary disease. The number of such stallions has increased from 128 in 1901, to 303 in 1909. These sires include thoroughbreds, half-breds of the hunter and Irish draught types, and a number of Clydesdale and shire stallions restricted to certain districts where the farms are large, and heavy draught horses are required for special work. Thoroughbreds and half-breds are registered for all parts of the country.

(2) In selecting stallions for registration, no regard is paid to the number of stallions already registered in the district, but the quality and soundness of the animals are the sole considerations. It therefore frequently happens that registered sires are somewhat irregularly distributed over the horse-breeding districts—in fact there might be large areas without a single registered stallion. To remedy this, stallions are sold in early spring from the Department's stallion depot to selected persons in those areas where the need for sires is most felt. The stallions kept for sale are:—(*a*) Thoroughbreds, purchased in England or Ireland during the preceding year, and (*b*) three-year-old half-bred sires of the hunter or light draught types purchased as foals and reared on one of the Department's farms; this procedure

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is necessary in order to get good half-bred sires, since it is the custom of Irish breeders to castrate their best colt foals as prospective hunters. These stallions are sold at reduced prices under the provisions of a loan scheme, by which the purchaser must accept from the Department a loan repayable in five annual instalments. This system prevents the animals being sold to other countries or districts for five years, after which time the sale is not always so easily effected as when the horses are younger.

(3) In February and March of each year, the county committees organise shows of mares to which the Department sends two inspectors, one to select the mares for general merit, and the second, a veterinary surgeon, to examine them for soundness. Preference is given to mares under six years of age, on the assumption that such action is likely to increase the number of good breeding mares, and to prevent young animals being sold out of the country. To the owners of the selected mares is given a service docket on which is written a description of the animal. The value of the docket is £2 or £3 as fixed by the local committee. The owner of the mare selects for her a stallion on the register of the Department, of the breed eligible for registration in the mare owner's particular district, and presents his service docket to the owner of the stallion at the time of service. The stallion owner in turn at the close of the season presents such dockets as he may have received to the local secretary, and gets in return the cash equivalent. In 1909, 227 shows for the selection of mares were held and 3,500 mares were selected.

Proposed amendments.—The above therefore is a rough outline of the scheme in use by the Irish Department of Agriculture for the last 10 years, and it has been eminently satisfactory so far as it goes. Owing, however, to the increasing difficulty of obtaining good thoroughbred sires at a price which the farmer can afford to pay, and to the restriction of cart-horse sires to certain districts, the prospect of improving horse-breeding by means of registered sires became far from encouraging. On reviewing the position in 1906, the Department was faced by the fact that in Ireland there were about 2200 stallions (of the types which come within the Department's schemes), standing for public service. Of these about 200 came up to the Department's standard, while little was known of the remaining 2000. The first step then was to invite the owners of these 2000 stallions to submit

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them for veterinary examination and inspection. The result was that only 367 animals were put forward, and of these only 12 were up to the standard required by the Department. It is doubtful whether the significance of this fact has yet been fully recognised. There are of course some of these 2000 unregistered stallions that are not doing any great harm, but it is equally certain that at least 1000 of them are doing a positive injury to the industry. After due investigation and consideration, the Department came to the conclusion that the substitution of good half-bred Irish sires for these 1000 unsound stallions would greatly ameliorate the class of the ordinary horse, and consequently they recommended that the existing scheme should be extended by rendering it illegal for any stallion to stand for public service unless either :—

(1) He is a thoroughbred entered in the General Stud Book, or

(2) He has been licensed by the Department.

The license should not be given unless the sire had been passed free from hereditary disease, and up to a certain standard of excellence for breeding purposes.

These recommendations are still under consideration and will probably be adopted in the course of a few years.

Supply of Army horses.—In December 1910, the Department further initiated a scheme for the improvement of Irish draught horses by offering special prizes for this type at various shows. As the type of horse which it is sought to encourage is exactly that desired for the Army, it may be advantageous to quote the words of the Department's memorandum :—

"The type of animal it is desired to encourage is one free from all trace of English or Scotch cart horse blood, standing not less than 15·2 hands high, with short clean fat legs, well set joints, and good feet, good head and rein, well laid back shoulders, and displaying throughout its conformation a sufficiency of power to warrant it doing general farm and harness work. The action should be free and light stepping."

At this point it is convenient to note the various schemes employed in two or three of the continental countries near by.

Scheme in Switzerland.—In Switzerland, no stallion may stand for public service save those which have received premiums, or have been

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approved of, or those which have been placed at the disposal of cantons by the Federal Government.

The following are also excluded from public service: colts of the saddle or harness type under four years old and draught colts under three years old.

Scheme in France.—No stallion save one approved or authorised by the Administration of the National Stud (Haras) may be employed for the service of mares other than those belonging to his owner, unless the owner has been furnished with a certificate declaring that the sire is affected neither with roaring nor periodic lung affection.

Scheme in Holland.—For the service of mares may be employed only stallions which have been approved for the province where service takes place, by an inspection committee appointed for the purpose. This rule does not apply in the case of individual owners where stallion and mare belong to the same person.

Having now discussed the schemes at present in operation, it is instructive to turn to the report of the Advisory Committee of the Hunters' Improvement Society, assembled to discuss the question of horse supply for the Army.

Report of Advisory Committee.—At a meeting of the committee in 1909, the brood mare committee was instructed to submit a report as to the best means of improving the conditions of light horse breeding in the United Kingdom. They reported in February, 1910, as follows:—

(1) The supply of light horses in the country was inadequate.

(2) This deficiency was largely due to the exportation of the best stallions and mares.

(3) In the year 1907-8, there were in the United Kingdom (including Ireland) 184,602 horses under one year old as against 208,269 in 1904-5, a drop of 23,667 horses in three years. In Ireland alone, where there are few or no cart horses, there were 57,446, as against 68,978, a drop of about 11,500 in three years.

(4) The breeding of light horses was annually diminishing.

(5) That there were insufficient horses for mobilisation.

(6) That not less than £50,000 per annum should be allocated for the purpose in view. They would point out that Germany spent £370,000; France, £185,000; and Austria, £210,000 annually on horse-breeding.

(8) They considered that the 28 King's Premium stallions allowed

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for Great Britain were wholly insufficient for the wants of the country. They noted the great use made in some districts not only of unsound weedy thoroughbreds, but also of inferior half-bred sires. They considered it important to retain in the country many of the stallions that were annually exported, and they stated that this could only be done by the Board of Agriculture on behalf of the Government.

(9) They were convinced that many parts of the United Kingdom suitable for horse-breeding should be restocked with sound brood mares.

Horse Supply Committee Report.—The above report was laid before the Horse Supply Committee, who after further discussion and consideration made the following recommendations:—

(1) That horses for the Army should be purchased at three years old at the same average price as was then given for older horses, and that if older horses were purchased the price should be increased.

(2) That as far as possible they should be purchased direct from the breeder.

(3) That a certain number of high class fillies should be purchased for the Army at two or three years old. That they should be served at that age by a thoroughbred or a registered sire, and left with the breeder till passed into the Army at four or five years old. The foal to be the property of the breeder as reward for keeping the mare. By this means:—

(*a*) A certain number of mares which might have gone abroad would be kept in the country.

(*b*) Before being put to work they would leave produce to carry on the strain.

(*c*) They would breed better in later years.

(4) That selected mares should be cast from the Army at 12 years old, or preferably sooner, and distributed to breeders as brood mares.

(5) That in order to stock depleted districts with mares, facilities should be given to breeders to acquire them:—

(*a*) By loans for the purchase of mares.

(*b*) By the purchase of mares and reselling them to breeders on easy terms.

(*c*) By leasing mares to breeders at a small annual rent.

(6) That approved mares should be given nominations to approved stallions according to the lines of the system in Ireland.

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(7) That, in order to keep in this country some of the high class thoroughbred stallions, they should be purchased by Government with a view to their resale at a reduced price, on conditions, to breeders or to their being let out to breeders.

(8) That there should be a system of loans to breeders for the purchase of sound approved stallions.

(9) That approved stallions for serving nominated mares should be registered.

(10) That the annual spring show of stallions should be continued.

(11) That entire colts (thoroughbred or registered) should be purchased, preferably as yearlings, for resale to breeders at four years old.

(12) That no stallion should stand for public service unless warranted sound by a Government inspector.

For these purposes the committee asked for a grant of £40,000 for Great Britain, and £10,000 more for Ireland, and suggested the necessary organisation. It was considered that about half the above would be reproductive expenditure, and would allow of the extension in subsequent years of the parts of the scheme which appeared most effective.

The Government's scheme.—The Government's scheme, evolved at the end of 1910, is based on this report, and provides for the encouragement of light horse breeding by means of:—

(1) The award of premiums to stallions.

(2) Grants for the purchase of half-bred working brood mares for location in selected districts.

(3) Free nominations for suitable mares for service by premium or approved stallions.

(4) The purchase for resale of stallions.

(5) The voluntary registration of stallions.

Premiums to stallions.—The premiums to be awarded are to be of two classes:—

(i) King's Premiums awarded at the annual Spring show in London consisting of—

(*a*) A fixed sum payable on the award being made.

(*b*) A service fee for each mare covered.

(*c*) A foal fee for each foal produced.

The sums awarded have been worked out to secure that the owner of a King's Premium stallion which travels a district and serves 50

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mares, will receive approximately £150 in the season, in addition to fees payable by the owners of the mare.

(ii) Board's premiums will be awarded to stallions selected either at a local spring exhibition or by the Board themselves on the application of the owner, and will consist of service and foal fees amounting to approximately £75 per season on the average. The Board also propose to award a limited number of premiums to pony stallions.

Purchase of brood mares.—The money available for this is to be expended locally and it is hoped to suffice for the purchase and resale or lease of upwards of 200 young half-bred working mares during the year.

Free nominations for mares.—In these cases a nomination will be awarded to selected mares, through the agency of county committees, for service by a premium or approved stallion, and will represent the fee which the owner of the mare would otherwise himself have to pay for the services of the stallion; and will be allocated by preference to the smaller tenant farmers and small breeders, in respect of the best of the young mares in their possession.

Purchase of stallions.—It is proposed to expend a considerable sum on the purchase of thoroughbred stallions for resale on special conditions, with a view to securing the use in the district of a stallion of somewhat higher class than could otherwise be obtained, and of providing suitable stallions in districts where at present their services are not readily available. It is hoped by this means to retain in this country a certain number of stallions that would otherwise go abroad, and although the number thus purchased in any one year cannot be large, it is believed that in course of time a substantial benefit to the industry will accrue.

Registration of stallions.—Stallions of all breeds entered in the recognised stud books will be registered free of cost to the owner, except in case of sires whose service fee exceeds £10. By this means a list will be obtained of horses up to the registered standard of soundness for breeding purposes, and the owner of the mare will be thus considerably assisted in the task of selecting the mate for his mare.

Criticisms.—The above is as far as at present known the Government scheme for improving the breeding of light horses in the United Kingdom, and thus increasing the number of horses available on mobilisation for use in the Army.

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The War Office has promised to annually purchase a certain number of remounts at three years old, and it is in this promise that the kernel of the whole matter lies, so far as regards the supply of horses for the Army. As pointed out above in the paragraph on the "expenses of horse-breeding," the cost of keeping a light draught horse up to four years old came to about £44. Allowing for a reduction in this cost owing to nominations and other Government proposals, the cost of this class of horse may be assumed to average about £38 to £40. Now it is a well known fact that the Army buyers prefer to go to a dealer who has experience as to the sort of horse they want and who can collect together a considerable number of likely horses for their inspection. By so doing their time is less likely to be wasted than if they travel about to various places to see horses in the hands of breeders, a great many of whom are disposed to think that anything unsaleable elsewhere will do for the Army.

We have therefore the Army buyer paying to a dealer the sum of not more than £40 for his remount troop horse, and consequently the dealer is not likely to pay more than £35 in taking these horses over from the breeder's, so the latter's profit vanishes altogether even when one does not take into account the various risks of loss during the horse's adolescence. To remedy this, the most important point is for the War Office to buy all their remounts at three years old and to keep them for a year or two years, either by leasing them to breeders or by the employment of some national stud farm as in France or Austria. By this means the horses will not be launched too early in their Army life, while a profit can be made on such as are suitable by the breeding scheme recommended by the Horse Supply Committee. The next most important point is to practically eliminate the horse dealer in the transaction, and thus by increasing the breeder's profits, increase the number of horses produced for the Army. By careful organisation satisfactory arrangements might be made by which breeders would have an opportunity of showing their horses to the Army buyers at convenient local centres.

At first no doubt a considerable number of unsuitable animals would be sent, but as experience was gained this number would rapidly diminish, and more and more of the horses shown would be up to the required standard. This is the method already adopted in the north of Ireland and elsewhere by the buyers for foreign armies.

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notably Austrian, Italian, and French, and results in the annual removal of all the three-year-old horses suitable for Army purposes in the districts visited.

The foreign buyers take a suitable horse at whatever age it may be offered, paying the fair market value, and consequently very few suitable horses are left for inspection a year later by the British Army buyers.

Another very important recommendation which has not been yet adopted is that suggesting that it should be rendered illegal for a stallion to stand for public service unless he is certified sound. Unless this is adopted there will always be a large number of weedy and useless animals turned out which will naturally affect the supply of good horses by cheapening the market; to most breeders this must appear one of the most important recommendations in the report.

Conclusion.—Granted that the War Office will carry out the recommendations of the committee, and if the new scheme is properly applied, the horse-breeding industry should rapidly improve, and it is to be hoped that it will be on a sound basis in a few years time. It should not, however, be forgotten that whereas continental nations spend from £200,000 to £400,000 on horse-breeding, the proposed grant in Great Britain is only £40,000. Allowing for the disparity in the size of the Army, it is surely not too much to expect that at least £100,000 should be voted for this purpose.

Nevertheless, the present scheme is a step in the right direction, and as such, will be welcomed not only by those interested in horse-breeding, but also by all those who have the real interest of the nation and its Army at heart.



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PROBLEM No. XI

(For NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.)

A MOUNTED column crosses Axeter Bridge, marching north, at 12 mid-day.

It is known that no hostile troops are in this vicinity, but the inhabitants are hostile, armed with rifles, and are moving about the country in bands. With the intention of preventing this bridge being tampered with and the column prevented from returning, Sergeant Sharp is left with his troop to hold the bridge until the return of the column in two days' time.

The river Axe is 200 yards wide, unfordable, with no boats; the banks are precipitous, and average 60 feet above the river, with the exception of the north bank east of the bridge, where the ground shelves gradually to the water's edge. There is beach 15 to 20 yards wide at this time of the year between the river and the banks. River Drome is only fordable where shown on sketch.

The bridge is 250 yards long, 20 feet wide, built of brick, supported by piers and arches, with a parapet 4 feet 6 inches high and 12-inch track.

Sergeant Sharp has with him 29 men, 31 horses, including a pack-horse with spare ammunition, 1 two-horsed waggon containing two days' forage and supplies, 10 shovels, 8 picks, 2 crowbars, 2 felling axes, 2 hand-saws, 2 wire-cutters, 2 pliers.

Sergeant Sharp further notes that Lone Tree Farm, which is deserted, is composed of a small two-storeyed brick living-house and three wooden outbuildings. He finds there 2 shovels, 2 axes, 2 crowbars, about two dozen stout 5-feet fir posts, pointed and hardened. There is a heap of broken stone for mending road on south side of bridge.

Assuming you are not attacked that day and you have still eight hours' daylight, as Sergeant Sharp, give in detail your measures for security and defence, and state how you would dispose your force in case of attack.

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PROBLEM NO. XI.



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Problem No. XI.

Open to Non-Commissioned Officers of the Mounted Branches of the Regular, Territorial, and Colonial Forces at home and abroad.

Each Solution should be as short as possible, and be attached to this page with the name, rank and address of the sender, and forwarded to

THE EDITOR,
'Cavalry Journal,'
Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.,

not later than February 29, 1912.

A Prize of a Silver Wrist Watch will be awarded to the N.C.O. whose solution is considered the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

From

Name .....

Rank ..... *Regiment* .....

Address .....

.....

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Revue de Cavalerie.—Under the title of "Pour la Manœuvre," the opening article of the June number contains something of the nature of a protest against going too far in the craving for extreme simplicity in manœuvre, and the writer quotes the great Frederick in support of his view that Cavalry should be exercised in all kinds of manœuvre in order that its ideas may be enlarged and the measure of its employment may be widened. While the manœuvre in the field of individual units may be as simple as possible, the combination of such manœuvre may well be very complex. General Canonge has an appreciative article on Colonel Montaigne's "Etudes sur la guerre," wherein great stress appears to be laid upon the moral influences affecting the conduct and issue of modern war. Captain d'Aubert presents the first instalment of a series of papers on "La Cavalerie de demain," in which he seems to complain that the tendency to the idea of employing the Cavalry in large masses has led to a wish to so reduce the divisional Cavalry as to confine the duties of the mounted arm entirely to *exploration et sûreté,* excluding it from all participation in the actual battle. He admits, with regret, the attraction of the independent rôle, but points out that *explorer et couvrir* are only means to an end, do not themselves decide a campaign, and that for the Cavalry, as for the other arms, the actual goal is the battle where the decision will be arrived at. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle begins an account of the operations of General Moinier about Fez; this is accompanied by two excellent maps. "F. de R." contributes a very interesting paper on "The Dismounted Action of Cavalry combined with Automatic Rifles." After considering the meagre effect of Cavalry fire due to the small numbers they are able to dismount owing to causes which have been repeatedly detailed, the writer lays great stress on the inability of Cavalry to derive immediate profit even from such fire effect as the dismounted men have been able to produce. He suggests, then, that the Cavalry should return their carbines or rifles to store, and that each troop (or half-troop) should be supplied with five automatic rifles, similar in construction to, though not necessarily identical with, the Rexer or the Madsen. These would be carried by turns by the rear-rank men, while the necessary ammunition would be carried in saddle-bags, distributed, to the number of 3,500 cartridges, among the whole half-troop. On the order to dismount and open fire, only the five men actually responsible for handling the rifles would dismount, the others merely handing over the ammunition required at the moment, and remaining mounted for taking immediate advantage of the fire effect produced. The writer contends that, whereas a *peloton* in the field can rarely dismount so many as thirty men, who could at best

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produce a *rafale* of 300 shots per minute, the automatic rifles (five) would give one of 750. Further, the horses of the firers are not immobilised to the same degree as with the ordinary rifles or carbines; at most these would not number more than ten, including those of men assisting with the ammunition supply. So small a number of led horses would be very handy, would not be so likely to be stampeded, and would not be so much at the mercy of a hostile attack. Moreover, it is claimed that, when several *pelotons* are acting together, the fire can readily be doubled or trebled, if necessary, without materially diminishing the numbers remaining available for shock action. The additional argument urged applies of course only to a purely short-service Cavalry like that of France—viz. that specially intelligent men only need be trained to these automatic rifles, say, to the number of twelve per half-troop at most, while the remainder can pursue the ordinary training of the Cavalry soldier.

The July number contains in its opening pages some extracts from a book about to be published by Messrs. Chapelot and Co., called "De Munich à Vilna," being an account of the career during that period of General d'Albignac, then Chief of the Staff to Gouvion-Saint-Cyr. The particular letters here quoted were written during the preparation for the campaign of 1812, and throw a curious light upon the difficulties of supply, already sufficiently heavy. Corps commanders appear to have had no scruples about seizing supplies intended for other units and helping themselves from magazines in other districts, and, in view of the resultant waste and disorder, we can hardly wonder that during the journey across Poland the Cavalry horses were reduced, *pour toute ration,* to devouring the thatch torn from the peasants' cottages. This number also includes the report by M. de Gesté, presented last June to the Congrès Hippique over which M. Emile Loubet presided. It urges the need for the maintenance in all Government horse-breeding establishments of a half-bred type of heavy-weight sire. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle continues his account of the work of the French forces in Morocco, describes the well-conducted operations of General Moinier, and has something to say about the present situation for which the action of Germany at Agadir was responsible. Captain d'Aubert offers a further instalment of his "Cavalerie de demain," wherein he appears to oppose the idea that the duties and employment of Cavalry will in future campaigns be confined merely to *exploration et sûreté,* and claims that moments will inevitably arise when Cavalry will have in their hands the fate of a whole campaign. He then proceeds to discuss by whom the *sûreté éloignée* is to be assured. He deprecates the view that this can be confided to a mass of Cavalry, and inquires how this arm can accomplish in these days of modern armament what Napoleon did not ask of his proportionately far more numerous Cavalry in 1812. Captain d'Aubert seems to consider that the *sûreté éloignée* attempted by the Cavalry mass would result in this body being sacrificed, and sums up his views by asserting that *la sûreté éloignée est donc un organe de corps d'armée, parce qu'elle opère dans la zone de manœuvre du corps d'armée.* This number concludes with an interesting description of the Concours Hippique at Turin in May and June.

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Spectateur Militaire.—With the exception of the serial which has now for some time past been running through this fortnightly, called "Une année d'instruction tactique des cadres dans un demi-régiment de cavalerie," and which was concluded in August, there is but little of interest for British Cavalrymen in the *Spectateur Militaire* during the quarter thus concluded. In the July numbers the Cavalry manœuvres held in Germany in 1898 are taken as a groundwork for instruction in *la découverte,* the authority being the pamphlet by Colonel von Unger, already reviewed in the CAVALRY JOURNAL. In "Reconnaissance d'une localité" the author, when insisting upon the importance of the advanced Cavalry having made all inquiries as to supplies, &c., prior to the arrival on the scene of the superior commander, reminds us of a point which, as he truly remarks, is very liable to be entirely lost sight of in peace manœuvres. While admitting that railways, mechanical traction, &c., will greatly facilitate in the future the provisioning *des masses,* he affirms that the difficulty of supplying small bodies of Cavalry in contact with the enemy remains as insuperable as ever. Supplies will of course be sent forward to these, but they may very well not reach them, while no opportunity may arise for their distribution. In war, then, the writer reminds the subordinate Cavalry commander that he must supplement his rearward supplies from what he should make it his especial business to find in his front. Incidentally the author gives an extraordinary account of the behaviour of the German troops which captured Rambervillers—*not* in the heat of action, but the morning after the combat. In this same action the Mobiles who defended Rambervillers retired when they had suffered a loss of no more than 4 per cent. of their effectives, while at Frōschweiler the French Regulars held on under casualties amounting, in the case of certain corps, to 75 per cent. The writer concludes with some useful hints as to how the recognition of foreign (German) units may be facilitated. The uniforms of course are different to those of the French, and all officers and non-commissioned officers should be cognisant of the variations; but Commandant Descoins reminds his comrades of the different manner in which the German Cavalry carry their lances; the different positions of the German and French squadron commanders; the different methods of deploying into line from column of squadrons. He warns the French against being misled by false calls sounded by German trumpeters, reminding them that the *timbre* and manner of sounding are different and easily distinguishable. Again, he points out that a French or German battery in column of route moves in totally different order—the German with all the six guns in front and all the wagons together in rear, the French with each of its four guns followed immediately by its wagon; the detachments are differently seated, the guns are of a different colour and of different appearance. German Infantry may be distinguished from French by companies being divided into three parts instead of four. These are matters which the author declares are insufficiently studied, and which yet are of the first importance for the reconnoitrer to know. Curious, as well as interesting, is a brief account of a book published in 1790, but apparently written prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, dealing with military hygiene. The author was evidently very much in advance of his times. Dr. Bellat writes a timely article on "Declaration of

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War," and reviews, something in the manner of Sir Frederick Maurice, the different occasions upon which war has been commenced with and without declaration. It is gratifying to find upon how many occasions—Copenhagen, for instance—he finds our action in such matters *parfaitement régulier*. The very detailed account of the battle of Coulmiers is continued through these July and August numbers. The issue under date of August 15 contains a short paper on the "Composition et Rôle de l'Avant-garde dans l'armée allemande," being a dissection of a recent article on this subject in the *Deutsches Offizierblatt*. The writer combats the view often expressed that the doctrines are wholly opposed in the two armies—that the German idea is to have very weak advance guards and trust almost entirely to the Cavalry for security of movement, and that in France soldiers advocate the employment of offensive or resisting force by means of large advance guards. He asserts that in both armies strong advance guards, mainly composed of Artillery and Infantry, are used, and that the methods of employment are practically identical.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—Numbers 106 and 107 of this periodical contain a somewhat detailed account of the work of the German Cavalry during the operations carried out by General von Goeben on the Somme, up to the battle of St. Quentin. The writer seems to lay special stress upon the following points—(1) The disadvantages under which the greater part of the General's available Cavalry force (forty squadrons) laboured in either possessing no firearm at all or only a very inferior one; (2) also that the season was winter, the country covered with snow, and the roads frozen and slippery; (3) the important results which upon at least one occasion were attained by the dismounted action of the German Cavalry; and (4) the author further directs particular notice to a fact which has perhaps hardly attracted the attention it deserves for ensuring an impartial judgment of the performances of the Cavalry—viz. that while the Infantry was still, as of old, fighting more or less shoulder to shoulder and enjoying the moral support afforded by the immediate propinquity of comrades on either hand, the Cavalry was, for perhaps almost the first time, employed in dispersed action; much of the reconnaissance and despatch work was necessarily conducted by solitary horsemen, moving, moreover, over a hostile country, where almost every male inhabitant was openly or covertly armed and on the watch for isolated patrols. The writer closes with the usual trite remarks on the future employment of Cavalry. He considers that the work has become more difficult, but not impossible of fulfilment; that while Cavalry will not play so leading a part as in the past, it may still upon occasion decide a battle; that while modern firearms have been enormously improved, men's nerves have not altered for the better; and that the mounted attack, as in the past, can and will achieve tremendous results. Running through the July and August issues of the *Militär-Wochenblatt* have been several papers, entitled "Kavalleriedienst," by Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt. These deal, naturally from the purely German point of view, with the duties of all the commissioned ranks in a Cavalry regiment, and give a good idea of the work which falls to the officer under the short-service compulsory system.

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Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—The June number of this journal opens with a tribute by Count Wrangel to Count Dénes Széchényi, who in his time did so much to improve horsemanship and horsemastership in the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, and who is also believed to have been in large measure responsible for the principles in regard to the modern training of Cavalry laid down in the "Cavalry Regulations" published in 1869. In the April number it was suggested in a paper entitled "Vollwertige Kavallerie" that the existing three Cavalry squadrons told off to Infantry Divisions as Divisional Cavalry should be reduced to two, the numbers required being made up by the addition of a body of mounted infantry; in the current issue "Major E. D." has something of a reply to this, contending that the Divisional Cavalry should not become in any measure a hybrid body, and that while many advantages would accrue from having a *permanent* Divisional Cavalry, specially trained for its particular duties, it should and must always remain Cavalry. Under the title "die Kavallerie in der italienischen Natur" is given a brief excerpt from a pamphlet recently published concerning the crossing of an enclosed country by Cavalry bodies. An anonymous writer discusses the need for a better Cavalry saddle, one that having panels made of a yielding material shall permit of their being adapted to the frame of a horse which has lost condition on service: it is not quite clear whether the writer claims to have discovered such an accommodating saddle, but it is gathered that he recommends what he describes as the "Wilhelmy Miederbock-Sattel," and suggests that the principles of its construction be studied and that exhaustive tests be carried out with it. There are unfortunately no drawings of the saddle in question, but the writer seems greatly dissatisfied with the present Austrian general service saddle for Cavalry use. It appears, however, that the Austro-Hungarian Artillery have a saddle for their drivers something after the Wilhelmy pattern. Captain Stavenhagen, whose works are well known, has a useful but highly technical paper on "Maps and the Cavalry Officer." The Imperial manœuvres of 1909 are now rather an old story, but an account of the work of the machine-gun detachments with the Army Cavalry, by Lieut. Boerescu, of the Roumanian Hussars, will be found of considerable value. An article on the development of the Russian Cavalry since the war in Manchuria is given at length elsewhere.

The next number is a double one for July and August. The opening paper is by General von Lang and contains a detailed account, illustrated by sketches, of the action of the French Cavalry at Sedan. It has for long been subject of complaint that the German Official History is wholly inaccurate in regard, for instance, to the forenoon fighting about Illy, and by no means clear in respect to that which took place in the afternoon on the plateau of Floing. General von Lang's account, presented as a tactical study, is drawn as to its facts from the well-known work by General Rozat de Mandres, who during the campaign of 1870 was a captain in the 4th Chasseurs and aide-de-camp to General Frossard. The author of the account in the Austrian *Cavalry Journal,* while giving full credit for the devotion and self-sacrifice of the French horsemen, and remarking on their indifferent training, finds that the battlefield was altogether unsuited for the movements of large bodies of Cavalry, that it was covered with obstacles, and that every yard of

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it was searched by the German guns. Major-General Buxbaum writes on what is for him a very favourite theme—" The moral value of Cavalry "—and employs it with his usual skill if he has not anything very fresh to say upon the subject. This is followed by what is probably the most valuable paper in the number—" Something about the Strategic Reconnaissance "—by Colonel Breit, of the General Staff; he divides this reconnaissance into five periods of action and lays down some rules for guidance in each, while deprecating any absolute formula for strict observance. Colonel Hellwig writes on the chief points to be observed in the field training of Cavalry—specially drawn up for the use of commanding officers; while Rittmeister Zürn discusses how and to what extent Cavalry can to-day still exert influence upon the decisive phase of an action; he lays stress, as do all writers on this theme, on the importance of the command, but considers further that the improvements in *Technik* have not only not diminished, but have actually widened the Cavalry sphere of activity, that its independence is increased by its modern armament and by the attachment of Artillery and machine-guns; while it is in combination with Cavalry that telegraphy and " wireless " are likely to yield their most valuable results. The oft-debated question, " Sword or Lance," as the Cavalry *arme blanche,* is again raised in this number under the title " Pike or Sabre," by pike the writer appearing to mean a lance, though it is not clear why he should adopt a name usually associated with an old-time Infantry weapon. He is in favour of the lance mainly because the lancer can get to work a fraction of time earlier than the swordsman; he especially favours its use against Cavalry and Artillery—its length assisting in what he calls the " *herauskitzeln* " of the gunners, an expression suggestive of the retiring winkle and the pin—while against Infantry the writer is of opinion that the effect is really produced by the horse rather than by whatever steel weapon the rider may wield. The lance, declares the writer, is the weapon for the shock of the charge, the sword that for the resultant mêlée. He discusses various methods of sword attachment, and condemns attachment to the saddle, but offers a curious explanation of his objection. He says that a man falling in the mêlée, and becoming separated from his horse, has then no weapon with which to defend himself, while if he mounts a loose horse he will find no weapon upon it either! Surely the trooper will have drawn his sword, or will still be in possession of his lance, on entering upon the mêlée, and on mounting the loose horse will have his own weapon to hand, while if swords have *not* been previously drawn he will find one attached to the loose horse. It is suggested that the sword should be worn on the rider's belt in a frog similar to that used by us, another being fixed to the near side of the saddle in front, to which the rider should transfer his sword when dismounting for the fire-fight. It is noticeable that nearly all Continental Cavalrymen—even those who agree that the sword should be carried on the saddle and not on the man—seem to disapprove of our *position* of attachment. In a paper entitled " Einheits-Kavallerie," " W." combats a suggestion made elsewhere that Cavalry should be definitely and permanently divided into Divisional and Army Cavalry, declaring that corps thus formally confined to the duties of Divisional Cavalry alone would very speedily fall below the standard aimed at by the remaining units of the mounted arm.

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In *Das Armée-pferd*, General von Damnitz, of the German Cavalry, and formerly Inspector of Remounts, has something to say in Chapter iv. about our remount methods. He commences with the statement that the total equine population of the world amounts to between 75,000,000 and 80,000,000, of which probably at least half is to be found in Europe. There are 11,000,000 horses in Asia, 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 in America, 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 in Africa, while Australia contains 2,000,000 horses. Of the 40,000,000 or so to be found in Europe, Russia has more than half —probably 22,000,000; Germany is a bad second with 4,500,000; Austria-Hungary has 4,000,000; the United Kingdom 3,500,000; France 3,000,000 horses; and Italy no more than 750,000. A horse-census of the remaining European countries gives the following number of horses to be found in each :—

Spain	400,000
Portugal	200,000
Sweden and Denmark	500,000
The Netherlands	300,000
Belgium	250,000
Switzerland	100,000
Turkey in Europe	300,000
The Balkan States	1,500,000

These figures, we are reminded, give no reliable impression of the actual numbers of horses readily available at any one time in any of these countries, since the numbers are naturally influenced by export and import, whether for the needs of agriculture and industry or for the requirements of the army, according as the supply suffices or fails in the particular country itself. Thus Germany annually imports for the needs of agriculture and industry something like 100,000 heavy and light draught horses from France, Belgium, Denmark, England, and Russia, while exporting a certain limited number of high-class and army horses to other countries.

England, says General von Damnitz, holds unquestionably the first place among horse-breeding countries. It is *par excellence* the land of the horse. The equable climate of the island-kingdom, its fruitful soil, the wealth of its inhabitants, their natural gift for raising stock of all kinds, and the love which not only the better classes, but the whole population, have for sport, has raised horse-breeding to a pitch of perfection which no other country has found possible of attainment. The English thoroughbred, raised from a breed of Eastern thoroughbreds, and which has been brought to perfection by careful selection and acclimatisation, has become the foundation of the improved breeding in almost every country. The actual predecessor of the English thoroughbred of to-day originated in the close of the seventeenth century, at which time King Charles, a great horse-lover, caused a number of Arab stallions and mares to be imported into England. The three most celebrated sires of those days were Beverley-Turk and Godolphin and Darley-Arabian, the last-named said to be a true type of the most celebrated Arab breed, the Nedschi. Although at first these Arab stallions and mares only were permitted to inter-breed, later on they bred with the horses of the country. The produce of the true Arab stallions and mares were known as thoroughbreds, while the animals produced by crossing Arab stallions

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with country-bred mares were known as half-breds. The English thoroughbred is an animal of noble shape, with clean limbs, good lungs, and deep chest—a horse whose whole development combines high speed with great powers of endurance. In England 5,500 thoroughbred mares are annually covered by thoroughbred stallions, and between 3,000 and 3,500 thoroughbred foals are dropped. In order to form an idea of the importance and significance of these figures, one should bear in mind that in Germany, for instance, the number of thoroughbred mares annually covered is no more than 700 to 750, and that the resultant thoroughbred foals do not amount to more than 500 in the year.

By means of the thoroughbred the English have managed to raise other excellent breeds of horses for draught and for hunting. Especially in Ireland is an excellent half-bred horse produced which is unapproached as a hunter. The Scotch "Clydesdale" has a very good reputation, as has also in England the "Shire" horse, while the breeding of ponies supplies the demands of polo and provides animals admirably adapted for light harness work.

While the English maintain unimpaired the purity of their breed of horses, on the other hand they thoroughly understand how to produce good general utility animals by means of judicious crossing. For instance, excellent weight-carrying hunters are got by crossing the heavy Yorkshire mares with thoroughbred stallions. The produce of other well-known crosses is the Hackney, an admirable medium-sized draught-horse, with good knee-action; further the Cob, a not big but powerful animal, up to great weight, of considerable endurance, and well-tempered.

During peace the requirements in horses of the English metropolitan Army is not great. They are purchased at four or five years and issued at once to the troops. It might be expected that these horses would be easily come by, considering the development of British horse-breeding and the vastness of the supply. But this is by no means the case. The causes may be found in the fact that in England, rich in horses as the country is, there is but little natural inclination to breed remounts suitable for Cavalry and Artillery; that the British Government exercises hardly any influence on the horse-breeding operations, and that it spends but little in prizes and premia for races, horse-shows, &c. The result often is that, while the breeders are accustomed to get the very highest prices for racehorses and hunters, the Government pays what, according to German ideas, are very low prices for remounts, and does not buy the heavier stamp of riding-horse at all—such as hackneys, hunters, and cobs—as being too expensive. This leads to an extraordinary state of things—viz. that a substantial proportion of the *personnel* of Cavalry regiments is actually horseless, while every year Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland buy in Ireland large numbers of remounts, certainly at higher average prices than are paid by the British remount agents. In the year 1908, for instance, for a strength of, roughly, 11,400 men in the regiments of British Cavalry, there were only 7,600 mounts available! This is not a state of things which favours a rapid mobilisation; and all sorts of plans have been proposed to effect some improvement. Thus, a company in Australia proposes to embark on the breeding of remounts for the Mother-country on a large scale. Then an association, called "The Ear-marking Association," has been formed for the express purpose of promoting legis-

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lation to hinder the export of horses suitable for military purposes; and to this end it is proposed that every suitable horse shall be given a certain recognisable brand, the owner receiving a premium in return for his withholding it from export. But the need is becoming every day more pressing for the establishment of an Army horse-breeding department, the Army being supplied with remounts from depôts, as is the practice in Germany. Within the last few years the British Government has appointed a Commission to concern itself with the question of a better horse supply for the Army, and to propound suggestions for the organisation of a military horse-breeding establishment. Owing, however, to the well-known objection which Englishmen have to anything like Government dictation, and to the fact that they are unaccustomed to allow military considerations to override those of sport, it is hardly anticipated that the suggestions of this Commission will have any immediate or practical result.

It must, however, be admitted that, in case of war, England has hardly ever found herself obliged to depend for remounts upon the Mother-country alone. Wide as are the possibilities in regard to theatres of operations and scope of operations of the wars waged by this Power, manifold also are the ways whereby so immeasurably rich a country, provided with immense Colonial possessions—with an equine population of some 5,000,000—can satisfy its requirements in horseflesh during war. The Boer War provides an example of this in recent times. In this campaign transport by sea from England to the seat of war was never in any way endangered, and yet the supply and demand for remounts exceeded anything which has hitherto been recorded. During the course of the war the troops actually required no fewer than 56,000 horses, but subsequent equine reinforcements amounted to 463,000 horses, not to mention 151,000 mules, out of which 360,000 horses and 56,000 mules died. Only 94,000 horses actually came from England, of which 23,000 accompanied the troops sent to South Africa, the remainder being purchased in the Colonies and in other countries. It must be conceded that in no other war in which England may in the future be engaged, is she likely to find her horse supply so unhindered as in the campaign against the former Dutch Republics.

As already pointed out, England possesses no real State horse-breeding establishment. The Government exercises only a certain minor influence on horse-breeding through the allotment of prizes. But against this we must remember that she possesses an institution which influences all other countries, and without which in these days a systematic and perfected system of horse-breeding is almost unthinkable. This is to be found in the stud-books, registers wherein all blood horses, with their pedigrees, are entered. These stud-books are invaluable for forming a judgment of the qualities of a horse, and the mere fact that he is entered therein confers upon him a certain value among outsiders.

"Story of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78." By Lt.-Col. H. M. E. Brunker. (London: Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd., 15 Charing Cross.)

Colonel Brunker in his preface states that this book does not pretend to be a complete history of the war, but is written for the benefit of the candidates for various examinations for which the campaign has been selected.

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Das Pferd (published every fortnight at Mülhausen-i-E.).—The first number of this paper, the only one devoted entirely to the horse, was reviewed in the CAVALRY JOURNAL last January. The issue now under notice contains a long article calling attention to the connection between women and horses in fact and fiction; a short sporting *feuilleton*; a paper on riding over obstacles, with numerous reproductions of instantaneous photographs, showing good and bad seats, and illustrations of saddles ancient and modern; one called "so ritt Seydlitz," containing a number of useful hints—some sufficiently obvious—as a recommendation that, "when falling, one should be careful not to do so head first"; and, finally, some remarks on riding by night, which, while having in them nothing very new, yet remind one of the little points which are so easily forgotten. In writing of anything to do with horses, German and French authors seem to show an increasing tendency to the employment of English words: *e.g.* the reviewer does not remember to have before found the word "stupid" used in a German description of equine characteristics. Surely "dumm" would have met the case!

The Commonwealth Military Journal contains amongst other articles, chiefly reprints, an excellent original article on "The Study of War," by Major C. B. White, R.G.A., in which due stress is laid on the study of military history and the moral and human factors.

The Journal of the United States Cavalry Association for July provides some very interesting reading. It is worthy of note that the majority of American Cavalry officers favour the abolition of the pistol for the men in the ranks, officers and sergeants to retain it. Amongst the reprints and translations is a very good article by Lieut.-Colonel Pickard, French Army, entitled "Remounting Cavalry and Training Army Horses for Field Service." He presents the matter in a somewhat novel manner when he states: "We must endeavour to improve the horse just as we improve the weapons." He goes briefly into the horse supply of the world and the requirements of the various nations. He is of opinion that England is no better off than any Continental nation in this respect, as she has not evolved a suitable type of Cavalry horse for even the few squadrons that she possesses, whilst the blooded horses and high priced Irish hunters are beyond the reach of the Army.

There is also a good little article by General Count Lamberg of the Austrian Cavalry on the armament and needs of modern cavalry, who states these in his résumé as:—

1. Increase of quality of horses.
2. Selection of Cavalry recruits by Cavalry officers.
3. A light sabre and a carbine of the best model with a hinged bayonet.

All our readers will agree with 1 and 2 of the above, though the question of arming Cavalry with a bayonet is open to discussion. No. 2 appears a most practical and economical suggestion. All British Cavalry officers will have had painful experience of the time, trouble, and money wasted on training the wrong sort of recruit before he is finally rejected from the Service.

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"The History of the 13th Hussars." By C. R. B. Barrett. 2 vols. 4to. Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., Edinburgh and London.) Price £3 3s.

In two handsome volumes, profusely illustrated and furnished with several maps and plans, "The History of the 13th Hussars" is now told in detail by Mr. C. R. B. Barrett.

His work adds another record to the now rapidly increasing list of published regimental histories. In its scheme, as foreshadowed in the preface, the book differs somewhat in its arrangement from that usually adopted for similar works, but we think the results amply justify the course pursued by the author.

Here the various divisions into which the book is divided are handled separately and in a most comprehensive manner.

The military history of the regiment—that is to say, the record of its services at home and abroad, whether in times of peace or when called on for active employment—occupies three-quarters of the two volumes, in all about 650 pages. The remainder being devoted to a most minute account of the changes in the uniform treated chronologically, the arms, the discarded guidons, the regimental motto, the band, regimental plate, and regimental sobriquets follow in succession, while chapters on hunting, racing (flat and steeplechasing) and polo conclude the book proper. In an appendix of eighty-eight pages a full and most detailed account of the commission dates, services, honours and distinctions of all the officers of the regiment completes this elaborate record.

It is of course impossible to compress into the limits of this notice any detailed discussion of the military history. Suffice it to say that there are certainly some new lights cast upon several portions of the history of the regiment while engaged on active service, notably on Prestonpans, for the account of which the proceedings of the court-martial held on Sir John Cope, Brigadier Fowke and other officers have been exploited with advantage.

The campaign in the West Indies in 1796-7 with its attendant horror of yellow fever is graphically narrated. In the account of the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns much use has been made of private diaries, and these supplement the ordinary published accounts. The elaborate manuscripts of Colonel Patrick Doherty, of the 13th, covers the whole of this period, while that of Captain Gubbins, who fell at Waterloo, treats only of a portion of the Peninsular War. Captain Gubbins' diary, we fancy, appears for the first time in print.

Much care has evidently been bestowed by the author on the much-discussed battle of Campo Mayor, and the Portuguese map is interesting while considering the Beresford-Long controversy relative to Campo Mayor—a controversy which broke out again years after the battle, and in which much venom and no little ink was cast about far and wide. The home service of the regiment, whether in Ireland, where it was for long years on the Irish Establishment, or in later times when on the ordinary British Establishment, does not as a rule furnish interesting reading, but we think that the insertion of this part of the history in detail is fully warranted. Here, too, we meet with events not generally known—for instance, the affray at Dolly's Brae. The same remark applies to the abortive mutiny at Bangalore

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(October 1832), a detailed account of which has previously never been printed.

Space is wanting to deal with the Crimean campaign or Canada or South Afghanistan or the recent Boer War; but it may be stated that the accounts of the services of the regiment are ample.

A word must now be said as to the illustrations; of these, six are in colour and represent not single soldiers in uniform, but episodes in the regimental history. Of these illustrations we must specially mention those of Mr. Harry Payne, whose work is so well known to readers of this Journal. The remainder of the plates are in half-tone and are reproduced from photographs, portraits, oil paintings and prints.

A miniature of Captain James Gubbins is most successful.

The account of the uniforms appears to have been done with far greater detail than in any other work of the kind which has come under our notice.

The Register of Officers is very full and most valuable, in many cases being absolutely biographical. In conclusion, the record of the 13th Hussars as a fighting regiment is well known and honoured; we may say that we believe the printed record of its exploits is worthy of that distinguished corps. May we congratulate them on the execution of the charge they committed to their author? A. L.

"The Campaign of Gettysberg." By "Miles." (London: Forster, Groom & Co., 15 Charing Cross.)

The first six chapters are devoted to a narrative of events and the last two chapters to a review of the battle and the campaign. The criticisms are very instructive and to the point. All Cavalry officers should agree with the author's deductions about our arm, viz. :—"It is surely possible for our Cavalry leaders to make their men equally efficient with the rifle and cold steel."

Again, writing of the American Militia, the author remarks :—"There is a lesson taught by this campaign, which has a special significance for our own country. It is the criminal folly of relying in a national crisis on untrained troops."

We commend this book to our readers.

"The History of the Spur." By Charles de Lacy Lacy, M.A. (Otto, Ltd., 95 Temple Chambers, E.C.) Price 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The History of the Spur" is the first book written in the English language on this interesting subject. Here we have the first attempt to trace, link by link, the gradual sequence of change in the long chain that has been handed down to us from the earliest times. Starting from the very small and simple appliances of the pre-Christian era, spurs are traced through the Middle Ages, up to the enormous and highly decorated implements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and down to the comparatively simple forms of the present day. The volume is illustrated with upwards of seventy drawings taken by the author from specimens in English and Continental museums and in private collections.

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8th (KING'S ROYAL IRISH) LIGHT DRAGOONS.

1810

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THE 9th (Q.R.) LANCERS.

1828

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NOTES

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

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Extracts from a course of lectures delivered at the Staff College, 1906.

The first points which we must consider in attempting to grasp the strategical aspect before the commencement of hostilities are:

The Political.
The Military.
The Naval.

Of these three, the Political is the most important. Whatever views the Commander-in-Chief may have had with regard to the retention of Port Arthur, there is no doubt that had he withdrawn from that citadel, upon the fortification of which so much time and money had been spent, it would not only have been very unpopular with the general mass of Russians, but it would have strengthened the hand of the peace party; it would have seriously affected the attitude of the Asiatic Russians; the wavering Chinese would have actively gone over to the other side, and finally it would have the appearance of giving first blood to the Japanese, and have as materially strengthened their position as it would have adversely affected that of the Russian Government.

Therefore it is a point certainly to be noted that no plan of campaign should be recommended that does not fit in with the views of the government; that their fears must be allowed for, and such proposals as the Commander-in-Chief shall make, *must* so be framed as to ease their anxieties, and in a like proportion increase that of the government on the opposing side. Had Kuropatkin even suggested the evacuation of Port Arthur, it is, moreover, highly probable that his proposals would have been vetoed by his government, who were not at all disposed to hand over to the enemy, so early in the war, the principal harbour on which they had spent so much money of recent years, and had, in the past, only obtained through considerable diplomatic skill.

Furthermore, the government were bent on borrowing money, which could only be obtained on reasonable terms by making a bold front, and if possible snatching the first victory, however otherwise unimportant such a success might be.

From *political reasons* therefore it is apparent that Kuropatkin had no choice *but to hold Port Arthur.*

His military reasons were no less cogent. The garrison of Port Arthur could only be described as a detachment. Now a detachment can only be tactically or strategically sound if it divides up superior forces of the enemy and keeps them from the decisive point until that position has been secured.

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Some tacticians aver, however, that a detachment is tactically unsound if it is incapable of movement, and of coming to the support of the main body when required, and that, as the garrison of Port Arthur once besieged was incapable of such movement, it was an error to keep so large a body of troops away from the main army, and that the question of their relief seriously interfered with Kuropatkin's subsequent plans of campaign.

This contention, however, cannot reasonably be accepted, provided always that the detachment is able to divert *superior* forces of the enemy, and so gain a favourable balance of troops at the decisive point. Should, however, such not be the case, the conception would be faulty in itself apart from the question of its immobility. Let us, therefore, see how far the detachment at Port Arthur complied with these considerations. The garrison of Port Arthur consisted of not more than 40,000 men, by no means all of whom were field troops; their composition being largely composed of Garrison Artillery and other troops connected with permanent fortifications.

By July, 1904, the Japanese had surrounded it by 60,000 *field* troops, who otherwise would have been engaged against Kuropatkin on the Liao-Yang; and to this must be added the casualties which occurred. These are officially enumerated as 25,000, and owing to the almost fanatical methods of the Japanese, it is safe to suppose that 15,000 of these were either killed outright, or placed beyond the possibility of taking much further part in the campaign. This brings the total to 75,000 Japanese field troops diverted from the Liao-Yang, on account of the detachment of 40,000 Russians in Port Arthur.

So much for the battle of the Liao-Yang.

At the Sha-Ho these numbers must certainly be increased to 100,000 and including losses to 150,000 at Hei-Kou-Tai. At the end of the siege there were 117,000 Japanese round Port Arthur, and on the surrender of the garrison their losses had grown to 94,000, resulting in a capture of only 40,090 Russians.

Again, there is no doubt that the Japanese advance was much hampered and delayed by having this bone of contention so long in dispute behind them, and that it seriously affected Oyama's plans throughout, as he wished before advancing to give Nogi time to secure its capture.

Therefore, from the purely military point of view, again it would seem that the retention of Port Arthur was sound both tactically and strategically.

The Naval point of view must also have been of great importance to Kuropatkin in making his decision. The Russians only possessed two harbours in the East, Vladivostock and Port Arthur. The former was only useful for five months in the year owing to ice floes, and which, therefore, much discounted its value. At the commencement of operations it would have been ice bound for the following four months, and therefore quite useless as a base for the whole fleet to work from. But still it was necessary to keep the port in their hands.

At the commencement of the war there were fifteen warships within its confines who could materially assist in keeping the command of the sea, while the harbour itself might be most useful as a base for the Baltic Fleet. But Port Arthur as a main naval base was of the utmost importance, and had the fleet taken the active part it was undoubtedly supposed to have done, it could have very seriously hampered and delayed the Japanese disembarkations,

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and have assisted very largely in averting the disaster which subsequently happened to the hastily organised and ill-fated Baltic Fleet.

Therefore, it would appear that both from a Political, Military, and Naval aspect the holding of Port Arthur was necessary to the Russians, and this opinion Colonel Kiggell ventures to maintain in spite of the opposite view held by so able a critic as the *Times* correspondent; and this opinion is undoubtedly upheld by the official reports of General Nicholson, who was on the spot at the time.

The next question, *whether the Japanese were right to attack Port Arthur at once*, or whether they should have waited till after Nan-Shan, is one of extreme complexity, and in endeavouring to arrive at a decision we must place ourselves as far as possible in their position as they were at that time, and not draw our conclusions from the light of subsequent events. Now, the first point on which we can start as a definite basis is that the command of the sea was essential to the Japanese. They were obliged to turn every endeavour to the destruction of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur before the arrival of its reinforcements from the Baltic, and the destruction of the fleet was only possible through the capture of Port Arthur itself. Starting, therefore, with this premise, the problems that the Japanese had to solve were in the main as follows:—

Should they first start by massing all their available troops against Kuropatkin and then turn back and capture Port Arthur and the fleet?

The solution to this was purely a question of time.

How long would it be before the Baltic Fleet would arrive?

How long would it take to capture Port Arthur?

How long would it take to drive Kuropatkin back?

Would they have time to do this, get back and storm Port Arthur before the arrival of the fleet from the Baltic?

The answers to all these questions could only have been vague and misleading. But that was not all. If the attack was first made on Kuropatkin and was repulsed, he could have got reinforcements and might have turned again with superior numbers on the Japanese just at the moment when they wished to turn their attention to Port Arthur. The possibility of the latter situation was again a question of time, and the point we must consider is how far were the Japanese able to gauge the situation, before making their final decision.

The position was one of extreme difficulty for the Japanese. As long as they were able to land troops in Korea, they were to all intents and purposes acting on interior lines between Kuropatkin's army and the garrison of Port Arthur, and Oyama had to decide at which point the decisive moment would first occur. But this was not the only problem for their strategy. It had at first to be definitely posited whether the command of the sea was of absolutely first importance; this could only be solved through deciding on Kuropatkin's ability to save Port Arthur. In the midst, therefore, of these complexities and in order to arrive at some conclusion as to the lines of thought through which their decision was ultimately arrived at, we must turn to the political aspect.

What was Japan's accepted policy?

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To dominate Korea, to drive the Russians back and to capture Port Arthur, upon which the Russian naval power in the far East almost entirely depended.

To this purely political aspect we must add the sentiment of the Japanese nation. They desired the early capture of the stronghold; the attitude of the Chinese demanded it as well, and it is therefore this political and sentimental side of the question that must procure for us the real solution for the final decision of Japan together with the firm insistence from the Finance Minister, who wanted to borrow money on favourable terms.

Nevertheless it is more than probable that their decision was based, even then, on a gross miscalculation. The Japanese doubtless thought that they could take Port Arthur with comparative ease. Had they known it would take seven months and cost 94,000 men it is hardly likely that they would have undertaken so costly a task. But having made up their mind, there was nothing for it but to see it through to its bitter end, and this initial error very nearly cost them dearly. Had Kuropatkin's army been well handled, the Japanese certainly should have suffered defeat at Liao-Yang, for it was entirely due to the troops round Port Arthur that they engaged the Russian army with inferior forces and that the battle was delayed as long as it was thereby enabling the Russians to collect the number of men they did.

Had they suffered defeat, what then? Nevertheless, the Japanese had the followings facts to go upon. Port Arthur was a fixed point. If they decided to attack Port Arthur the Russians could not possibly avoid the struggle. It only meant hard and desperate fighting to capture, and, as we know, they were not averse to that.

Also Kuropatkin's army was not a fixed point. His view of the situation was to avoid battle by falling back until he was strong enough to attack. Therefore, as Kuropatkin would be some time before he could get up his reinforcements, Oyama would be unable to fight a decisive battle for a similar period. Also, if Port Arthur was not seriously threatened by the Japanese, the Russian Government would certainly not have interfered with Kuropatkin's plan of campaign. Again, if the Japanese left Port Arthur alone, the Russians could go on strengthening it, while every day was bringing the Baltic Fleet nearer to the theatre of operations; and it was possible that the Japanese in the middle of attacking Kuropatkin would have had to hurry back to capture Port Arthur before its arrival, leaving only a retaining force before the Russians, who would then have had considerable numerical superiority, and they might easily then have been defeated in detail. Furthermore, the Japanese transports were always in danger as long as the Russian fleet was in being at Port Arthur, causing much anxiety at home; and this anxiety might easily cause the Japanese commander-in-chief to be ordered by his government in the midst of his other operations to capture Port Arthur at once, and so destroy the continuity of his original plans.

But there were still further reasons for Oyama's decision. He must have known that the Baltic Fleet as well as Kuropatkin himself were no source of immediate danger, and, until they were, the siege could progress which would be so much time saved; also there was always the possibility of the fortress falling in a comparatively short time; and when once captured Oyama

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would have a safe base and a free hand against Kuropatkin. All this could be gained while at the same time it would have the possible effect of dragging Kuropatkin prematurely south in order to relieve it, thereby giving the Japanese a great opportunity of attacking the Russians at a great disadvantage.

And finally, the decisive moment for the Japanese was the fall of Port Arthur, not the battle of Liao-Yang.

The Japanese wanted to hasten its capture and delay the battle against the Russian Army while on the other hand Kuropatkin's plan was exactly the reverse. It was to their advantage to attack the Japanese as soon as possible, and to delay the fall of Port Arthur to the last possible moment.

Therefore, from these facts, we can only come to the conclusion that the Japanese were, in the main, right to attack Port Arthur in the first instance. The plan, though not perfect (no plans in war are), was good and sound, and therefore they were thoroughly justified in seeing it through to the end.

The Vladivostock scheme requires little mention. It would have been a very indirect way to secure Korea. The Navy demanded the capture of Port Arthur, and therefore a division of forces was out of the question, and even if they had advanced from that side it would not have prevented the Russians from relieving Port Arthur; and therefore in few words we can dismiss this suggestion as impracticable.

Japan was more prepared for the war than her opponents, and, whatever scheme she had evolved, it was in that fact that her salvation lay.

With regard to the next question as to whether the Japanese were right to attack at Liao-Yang, we must remember that strategical considerations decide when and where and with what forces battle can be delivered, and it must be remembered that strategy is of no avail unless a tactical victory is in the end secured. But it must be remembered here, that the danger the Japanese ran at this battle, is not an argument against the blockade of Port Arthur, because that situation did not entail risking the battle of Liao-Yang.

Nevertheless, Oyama ran many grave risks in attacking at Liao-Yang. A resolute counter-attack by the Russians would have won a very decisive victory, which might have decided the whole course of the campaign. The Japanese certainly undertook an attack beyond their powers, as is well exemplified in Vol. IV. of the Official History of the War, but they certainly went " nap " on their hand, and it was successful. Now, as the situation at Port Arthur did not justify their very premature attack, we must see if the local conditions in any way can prove its justification.

There certainly were many arguments against it.

1. Strategy in its broadest aspect did not necessitate it.

2. The political situation did not demand it. Japan had already negotiated her first loan, and only raised her second two months later. Furthermore, she had the confidence of other nations.

3. The *morale* of her men did not require it.

4. Although the Japanese probably knew something of Kuropatkin's character, they had had no experience of him in supreme command in the field, and even though they might have surmised a possible lack of enterprise, they certainly could not be sure of his tactical incapacity, through which and only through which, they succeeded in securing a victory. Nevertheless, we must

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not forget that a resolute attack in capable hands often represents the least risk, and at the least cost.

5. On the other hand, the Russians had proved themselves obstinate in defence, but indifferent in attack, and therefore they certainly had greater chances of success had they allowed the Russians to attack, instead of pushing it home themselves.

6. Again, the Russians were entrenched, and an attack under such circumstances is always most costly.

7. The Russians were *probably* in superior numbers. The Japanese most likely were aware of this, as they were usually most accurately informed.

8. Further, if the Japanese pressed Port Arthur, the Russians would in all probability have had to have taken the offensive, and the Japanese could then draw the Russians on and attack them on ground of their own choosing.

9. Von Molkte says that the strongest position a commander can take is strategical offensive, and tactical defensive.

Such a situation can seldom be actually brought off in war, but here certainly was one instance of it.

With all these reasons, therefore, against the Japanese attacking at Liao-Yang, there must have been some very strong reasons to have influenced the Japanese generals, who had already proved themselves very capable. They certainly must have thought it worth it. Let us see if we can discover what their reasons were :—

1. In the first place, there was always the chance of the Russians *not* taking the offensive. But, nevertheless, they were getting stronger every day, and the assumption was that they would do so.

Reinforcements were continually arriving, and therefore such a possibility was extremely unlikely, even supposing Kuropatkin himself had been averse to such a plan, and it is more than likely the Russian Government would have forced him to act on the offensive. It is worthy of note that immediately after this battle the Japanese accepted this view.

There is one point we should note here, that at Liao-Yang the losses were fairly even, about 19,000 on each side. At the Shah-Ho, when the Russians attacked, they lost 60,000 to 16,000 on the Japanese side.

2. Again the Japanese had already defeated the Russians in several battles, often under very difficult circumstances, but nevertheless they had always won, even with superior numbers against them.

3. Great generals have never been averse to attacking superior numbers, if they see a possibility of securing their object.

4. The Russians had accumulated immense stores at Liao-Yang, and this may have been a great inducement to the Japanese. But, in any case, supposing they had ultimately defeated the Russians they could have secured these anyhow, and therefore this cannot be used as a powerful argument.

5. One of von Molkte's statements in his work on strategy is, ' Prudence incurred at the cost of victory is no art,' but that surely does not apply in this case, as it was only a question of waiting or of attacking at once. *Therefore we are forced to the conclusion that the Japanese in this case were wrong in attacking.*

Strategy, after all, must accompany the armies in the field, and must be always modified or revised according to the local conditions.

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The general advance was made on August 25 in two separate lines; the left under Oku and Nodzu, and the right under Kuroki; these two armies were divided by extremely difficult mountainous country. On the advance both armies were opposed, not to any great extent on the left, but the Russians held a strong position against the right army and actively opposed Kuroki's left. They were only driven out of this position after desperate fighting on both sides, and on the 27th he had at last captured the position. Thereupon the Russians fell back to Liao-Yang, fighting a rearguard action on the 28th. Under these circumstances the Japanese were obliged to continue the battle, whether they really wished to or not, in order to bring about the junction of the two armies. They were fighting on exterior lines, and this junction had to be completed, otherwise all the previous fighting would have been of no avail, and it is hardly to be supposed that the Japanese would decline to continue a battle already half won. The soldiers were very keen and had they not continued the attack the rank and file would have placed the wrong construction on the decision of their commander-in-chief. We can therefore say at least that local conditions *did* demand the continuance of the attack, though considerations of broad strategy *did not*.

Here we have a battle brought to a successful issue when working on exterior lines. When exterior lines meet at a point occupied by the enemy, local conditions make it very difficult to avoid the attack. It must therefore first be decided whether there is any one point of junction which, when secured, will suit the situation tactically and strategically, for the continuance of the offensive movement against the enemy's main position after the affecting of the junction. For it must be remembered it is impossible to fall back without separating again.

In this case it was certainly too difficult to fix any more southern point for this junction, and an advance round by sea was almost out of the question.

But if they really wished to attack, why should they not have advanced more rapidly on Liao-Yang? Kuropatkin would then have been much weaker, and the junction could then have been affected with most excellent results.

Whether they could or could not have done so is an open question, but probably matters of supply no doubt affected the question very seriously.

Ashmead Bartlett says in his report that they held back in order to get up the army from Port Arthur. But if this was the case it certainly showed bad strategy on their part. It would have been far better to have pushed on before Kuropatkin was ready.

There is one point which it is useful to note. As a general rule, when advancing on exterior lines, it is much better for the retreat than when on interior lines; as, in the latter instance, there is only one line of retreat which can be more readily outflanked.

But in this case it was really dangerous for the Japanese.

If Kuropatkin had fallen back further, Oyama would most certainly have been wise to delay his attack; while the Russians were unwise to accumulate stores at a point of juncture. This should not be done, as a rule, unless it has been determined to withstand a siege.

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PROGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY SINCE THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(From the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte.*)

It is an acknowledged fact that the Cavalry arm did not greatly distinguish itself during the Russo-Japanese War. From this all kinds of exaggerated conclusions were drawn, leading finally to an expression of opinion that the *rôle* of Cavalry as the main arm had come to an end. This was based upon the knowledge that in Manchuria both Cavalries fell altogether into the background, and upon the conclusion thereafter come to that in the future the technical means of reconnaissance—aeroplanes and dirigibles—would take the duties of reconnoitring upon themselves. But if one studies the course of the campaign with an open mind, it must at once be recognised that there has been no change in the actual conditions of Cavalry employment, and that the most modern technical methods of acquiring information have in no way whatever narrowed the efficacy of Cavalry in war.

If in the Russo-Japanese War the Cavalry was able to achieve but very little, this was due on the one side to the numerical weakness of the Japanese Cavalry, and on the other to the inefficiency of the Russian Cavalry, superior in strength as it was. Nothing else which may be adduced affects the case at all; the hilly character of the country in Eastern Manchuria, the enclosed nature of the western theatre of war, the attack and defence of fortified positions, the severity of the winter climate—all these excuses are of no avail if we bear steadfastly in mind that a *really good* Cavalry would be able to face all difficulties and would set itself, with all its powers, to overcome them.

In Russia, too, this has been accepted, and while reform in Army matters has been attempted from the very foundation, the hand of improvement has not passed the Cavalry by. It may be admitted that in Russia an attempt has been made to excuse the meagre performances of the Russian Cavalry in Manchuria by the statement that in the forces operating against Japan only Cossacks were employed. Of the regular Cavalry no more than eighteen squadrons of Dragoons were present—the 51st and 52nd Regiments and also the Primorski Dragoons—but which had no very special opportunities for distinction. The best work was done by the irregular Caucasus regiments, out of which twelve squadrons (six each of the Terek-Kuban and Daghestan regiments) were attached to the Fifth Siberian Corps. They were mounted on horses possessing great endurance and well fitted for work in the hilly country, and compared most favourably with the Cossacks in boldness, energy and readiness to attack.

The military authorities in Russia have admitted all this. The reforms introduced in 1906, and by this time in great measure carried through, had for their initial object the *raising of the Cavalry spirit.* After the war of 1877-78 everything was sacrificed to form one description of Cavalry, exclusive of the Guard Cavalry and the Cossacks. This was the Dragoons, who were to be Cavalry and at the same time capable of employment as a kind of Mounted Infantry. They were given a uniform which made them hardly distinguishable from Infantry, while a particular importance was laid upon

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the dismounted fight, to which a special Infantry character was imparted by the steel weapon given them and which could be fixed to the Dragoon carbine. The late war, however, convinced the authorities that they had gone much too far in this direction, and now endeavour was made to awaken interest in Tradition, to recall to the minds of Cavalrymen the great achievements of the past. Old distinctions and badges were restored, peace uniforms were made attractive, and much in fact was done with the one object of restoring to the Cavalry their former distinctiveness and glamour. All this was instituted with the view of reawakening the Cavalry spirit and pride in past actions, in order to inculcate the desire for achieving great deeds in the future.

Let us now compare the strength of the Cavalry in 1905 with that at the beginning of the present year, and we find that—leaving the Cossacks for the moment on one side—there were in 1905:

8 Regiments of Guard Cavalry
55 Regiments of Dragoons
1 Reiter regiment

By 1911 we find that the number of regiments has increased, while the composition has also changed; thus there are now:

10 Regiments of Guard Cavalry
20 Regiments of Dragoons
17 Regiments of Lancers
18 Regiments of Hussars
2 Reiter regiments
} Line Cavalry

There is thus an actual increase of three regiments.

So far as the Cossacks are concerned, while in 1905 there were 915 sotnias, there are now 988; the number of sotnias furnished by each division of Cossacks has been raised, and the Amur and Ossuri districts now supply respectively 9¼ and 6¼ sotnias; previously these were altogether unrepresented.

While for the reasons above stated every effort has been made to make the Cavalry regiments distinctive in peace, for war purposes the idea of a universal Cavalry has not been departed from. In the field the dress and armament of the whole Cavalry is the same; the regiments are only differentiated by small badges. The grey-green field uniform has been generally adopted—the Cavalry and Horse Artillery wearing blue overalls or breeches. The Cossack uniform is the same as that of the Line Cavalry with the exception of the Cossack fur cap.

So far as the organisation of the Cavalry in large bodies is concerned, the authorities have not been able to make up their minds to furnish the Infantry divisions and the Army Corps with Divisional and Corps Cavalry. As before, it has been considered sufficient to attach half a sotnia of Cossacks to each Infantry Division, and to corps in relative proportion, for general employment as escorts and convoy guards. The twelve mounted scouts belonging to each Infantry regiment are responsible for the close reconnaissance, and only in special circumstances are single sotnias or squadrons to be detached from the Cavalry Divisions to the Infantry Divisions or Army Corps. The Cavalry Divisions—of which, including Turkestan and Siberia, there are twenty-three in the whole Empire—may be placed under the

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General-kommandos or the *Armeeoberkommandos*; on this point nothing very particular is known. The forming of Cavalry Divisions into Cavalry corps has been abandoned, as it was found to lead to the employment of too large *accumulations* of Cavalry bodies. The two formerly existing Cavalry corps, whereof the four divisions were pushed forward from Warsaw right up to the German frontier at Wlozlawsk, Lomsha and Plozk, were broken up in 1906. In 1910 one and a half divisions were transferred from the neighbourhood of the Vistula to the east of the Empire, viz. the 5th Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Independent Cavalry Brigade from Wlozlawsk to Samara—a clear proof that there was no longer any idea of letting loose a torrent of Russian Cavalry across the borders of the two western neighbours in the event of the outbreak of war.

The composition of the *Ersatz* squadrons remains unaltered—in all there are sixty-four squadrons, each of which provides four service squadrons in case of war, one of which is not mounted. The "chief administration" of Cossack troops has been removed from the War Ministry, and in its place a "Cossack Department" has been established under the General Staff. A new "Army Veterinary Department" has also been established at the Ministry of War.

So far as the tactical composition is concerned, the principle has been observed of forming the Cavalry Divisions of three regular and one Cossack regiment. The authorities are keeping in view the closer connection of the Cossacks with the Line Cavalry, and the intention is to employ the individuality of the former, their mobility and independent methods of working, in the Cavalry fight of large bodies. Further, the methods of the Cossacks are now being brought more into line with the principles observed by the regular Cavalry. It is true that the Cossack pace—the rapid trot instead of the gallop—has been preserved.

Worthy of notice is the arming of the Russian Cavalry with machine guns. The Russians have adopted the principle that every Cavalry regiment should have a certain number of machine guns attached to it, and not, as is, for instance, customary in Germany with the Cavalry Divisions, that the machine guns should be united in one detachment placed absolutely at the disposal of the divisional commander. Since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War ten regiments of Cavalry (the Cossack regiments only to a partial extent) have been given each a mounted machine-gun detachment with six "Madsen" guns. This is not a machine gun in the sense that the Maxim is one, but a recoil action weapon in the form of a rifle carried by a trooper on the saddle. In action the weapon is fixed on a stand, and its rate of fire is up to 150 rounds in a minute. It can be worked by one man, and the ammunition is carried on pack-horses. Compared with the rate of fire of the Austrian and German machine-guns, that of the "Madsen" is slow, but before long a machine gun, something after the model of the Maxim, is to be introduced for use in the Cavalry, when each regiment will have its own two-gun detachment, the equipment being carried on pack-animals and the detachment being mounted.

The following have now been introduced into all Cavalry regiments:

1. An intelligence detachment of sixteen troopers from every squadron

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with an officer and two non-commissioned officers, which form the *personne* of the distant reconnoitring patrols and which undergo a very careful and thorough instruction.

2. A pioneer, combined with which is a telegraph, detachment of two officers, four non-commissioned officers, and sixteen men.

There is at present no proper pontoon equipment with the Russian Cavalry; they depend entirely upon certain floating appliances for extemporising rafts which they carry with them, and upon the natural swimming powers of the Russian troop-horse.

But over and beyond all these reforms and improvements appears a constant striving to raise the *Cavalry spirit*, which expresses itself from the highest to the lowest in versatility and coolness, intelligence and the spirit of enterprise. The present Inspector-General of Cavalry, General Ostrogradski, is trying his utmost to improve this spirit in the officers by means of sport, long-distance rides, staff rides, tactical tests, and reconnaissance exercises. The conditions of the supply of remounts are being also improved by raising the purchase price of remounts, reducing the age for casting, and by improvements in the forage ration. Take it all round, very much is being done, and all the practical good that is being achieved is also filtering through to the ranks. During the course of the Russo-Japanese War, Kuropatkin made bitter complaint that: "If only the *spirit* of my Cavalry were better than it is, I should not be left so completely in the dark, but would be in possession of accurate information about the enemy and would be able to make correct and timely dispositions." This was a harsh judgment and shows where the lever must be applied to the Russian Cavalry. In this direction measures have already been taken, and what is now wanted is to carry them tactfully and thoroughly to their proper conclusion. Upon this depends the still further progress of the Russian Cavalry.

THE LATE MAHARAJAH OF KUCH BEHAR.

1862-1911.

Widespread regret, both in this country and in India, was caused by the announcement of the death of the Maharajah of Kuch Behar, who passed away last month, in the prime of life, at Bexhill-on-Sea.

His Highness, who had been in indifferent health for the past two years, came to England, with a numerous suite, for the Coronation, and, since the middle of July, had been suffering from heart troubles and other complications. He intended to return to India at the end of September, but owing to his critical condition all arrangements were cancelled.

Colonel His Highness Maharajah Sir Nripendra Narayan Bhup Bahadur of Kuch Behar, G.C.I.E., C.B., and Hon. Aide-de-Camp to the King, was born on October 4, 1862. Before the first anniversary of his birth had been celebrated his father died, and he was called upon to succeed him. During the long minority the management of the country was vested in the hands of a British Commissioner, many far-reaching reforms being introduced.

Kuch Behar, a principality about 1,300 square miles in extent, is one of

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the many native States under the Government of Bengal, inhabited by a population numbering a little over 600,000.

The young prince received a thorough European training and education, studying at Wards' Institute Benares, Bankipur Patna, the Presidency College Calcutta, and finally in England.

In 1878 he married the daughter of the famous reformer, Keshub Chandra Sen, by whom he had four sons, all educated at Eton, and three daughters. The eldest son, Prince Raj Rajendra, who succeeds him, holds the rank of Honorary Lieutenant in the British Army, and is attached to the Westminster Dragoons, the 2nd County of London Yeomanry.

In 1880 he was created a Maharaja Bahadur, and three years later, on attaining his majority, was installed Ruling Chief, for which rank he was entitled to a salute of thirteen guns.

The family has held sovereignty over the territory for more than four hundred years.

He made many visits to England, and took a leading part in Queen Victoria's Jubilee, receiving the honours of the G.C.I.E. and being appointed Hon. Aide-de-Camp to the then Prince of Wales, who, on coming to the throne, renewed the appointment, which was continued by our present Sovereign. He also came to London at King Edward VII.'s Coronation, and for the last time this spring, to be present at King George V.'s Coronation.

Always a keen soldier, he served many years in the 6th (P.W.) Bengal Cavalry (now the 6th "King Edward's Own"), holding the rank of colonel at the time of his death. During the troubles on the North-West Frontier, he frequently offered his services to the Government. The long-desired opportunity came in 1897, when he was specially selected, and served on the staff of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, commanding the Tirah Expedition, displaying the greatest coolness and courage throughout all the various actions of the campaign, including those of Dargai and Samana. His name was frequently mentioned in despatches, and on the termination of hostilities he received the insignia of the Companion of the Order of the Bath.

A first-rate shot, a dashing polo-player, the dead ruler revelled in almost every sport. In the games of lawn-tennis and cricket he too had few equals. His shooting parties in the months of February and March each year were almost world-famous, and he possessed the largest and most varied collection of Indian sporting trophies extant. Two years ago he published a book entitled "Thirty-seven Years of Big-Game Shooting," in which he showed his bag to be 207 rhinoceri, 311 leopards, 365 tigers, and 438 buffaloes. Truly a remarkable record!

His Highness, who was deeply interested in Freemasonry, had the distinction of being a Past District Grand Mark Master of Bengal and Past Grand Senior Warden of England, the latter being an unique honour never before attained by any Indian prince.

By special command of His Majesty the King, who was represented, military honours were rendered at the funeral. The remains were cremated, and the ashes were afterwards taken back to his native land, to rest with those of his fathers.

So passed a good soldier, an enlightened ruler, and a true friend.

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AN OLD CUSTOM.

Some eighty years ago it was the custom of every officer in the King's Dragoon Guards to wear a regimental ring, and our illustration of a reproduction of such a ring shows it to have consisted of a plain hoop of gold, with an oblong signet of bloodstone, affixed to a swivel, which had engraved the arms and initials of the regiment on the one side and the crest and initials of the wearer on the other.

It would be interesting to know the origin of this custom, and the Goldsmiths' and Silversmiths' Company, Ltd., 112 Regent Street, London, W., now famous for the Regimental Badge Jewellery, are to be complimented on their enterprise in reviving a happy custom of the old days.

FOREIGN.

Austria.—The military authorities have now decided to raise for the future the price to be given for Cavalry remounts from 650 to 800 krone. It has no longer been found possible to procure remounts at the lower price, despite the fact that they were bought young and kept at the depots until considered sufficiently matured for issue to the troops. (A krone = about a franc.)

France.—The Military Commission engaged on the preparation of a new "Cavalry Training" has concluded its labours, and Part II. has been provisionally issued for trial and report. It contains instructions under the following main headings: "Instruction d'ensemble. Emploi de la cavalerie dans le combat. Principes généraux des évolutions. Le pelotin. L'escadron. Le Régiment. Emploi des grandes unités dans le combat. La Brigade. La Division. Le corps de cavalerie."

Different experiments have lately been carried out for the provision of an increased small-arm ammunition supply to the Cavalry soldier. Each soldier has been given two extra pouches, one worn on the right front, the other behind on the left side; the experiment has also been tried of issuing to five men per troop two large pouches containing a large number of rounds.

La France Militaire states that a new steel lance is to be issued to the French Cavalry, longer, but at the same time lighter and more handy, than that in present use, and having a "stop" and a hand guard. It is said that the proposed issue of this weapon to the Dragoon regiments has again been responsible for the suggestion that these regiments, of which the Corps Cavalry Brigades are at present composed, should be re-formed into Cavalry Divisions. The *France Militaire* affirms that the General Staff is much inclined to form the twelve *groupes d'exploration et de sûreté* each out of a Cavalry Division of five regiments, two cyclist detachments, two batteries, one pioneer detachment, five machine-gun detachments, and one air and telegraph detachment—these to be kept ready at all times for immediate

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action. The remaining nineteen regiments of Cavalry could then be available for use as Divisional Cavalry.

Sweden.—Some night exercises have recently been carried out in Sweden by squads of officers and non-commissioned officers respectively, drawn from the regiment of Dragoons of the Guard. In the case of the officers the distance to be covered was fifteen kilometres (between nine and ten miles); the competitors were dispatched at intervals of five minutes, they were forbidden to use the roads, but were permitted the use of electric torches. Each had to report himself at two control stations *en route*. The night was pitch dark, with rain falling, and the ground was particularly slippery; the line taken was for the most part along woodland paths. The one who covered the distance in the shortest time took forty-five minutes, although his horse had fallen with him at a bad place; the second was fifty-two minutes *en route*; none lost their way. The conditions for the non-commissioned officers were identical, except that the distance was only ten kilometres (between six and seven miles); in this case the shortest time taken was twenty-eight and the next best thirty-two minutes.

United States.—The War Department has practically concluded the purchase of 550 acres of ground at Front Royal, Virginia, for the immediate institution of a Remount Depot, and which is expected to prove one of the best in the country. Some 225 horses, ageing from three to seven years, have already been got together, and it is hoped by degrees to raise the number to 1000.

Japan.—The Rejection of the Cavalry Drill Book.—The use of the Bayonet the Point at Issue.

The Cavalry Section of the Department of Military Education and Training has been exclusively engaged upon drafting the revised Cavalry Drill Book, a committee having been constituted with the object of adapting the enlarged scope of Cavalry's duties, taking into consideration the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War. The investigations have occupied four years, and at the same time the Cavalry School was ordered to continuously carry out practical experiments, while the studies have been carried to a stage where there was no division of opinion in Cavalry circles. Some time ago, therefore, General Oshima, Director of Military Education and Training, submitted the draft to the Military Council, by whom it was unfortunately rejected.

Although there is no means of knowing any details concerning the attitude of the Military Council, the following facts have leaked out. The sole reason for the draft having been sent back for further examination appears to be the question as to whether bayonets shall, or shall not, be fixed to the Cavalry carbine (a weapon slightly shorter than the Infantry rifle). If the bayonet is fixed to the carbine, then the training as laid down in Part I. of the Drill Book, and the methods of fighting as laid down in Part II., must both be amplified—and this is why a further investigation has been ordered.

This question as to whether Cavalry shall use the bayonet or not is controversial, and was thoroughly thrashed out by the drafting committee.

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In the first place, there will be more occasions hereafter, when a larger force of Cavalry is used, and in proportion as their duties become wider and more complex, the methods of combat must be correspondingly increased. Looking at the matter from the point of view of the past character of Cavalry, we know that the fight on horseback has been their principal *rôle*, and dismounted action merely an auxiliary method of fighting for the purpose of maintaining their independence.

Should this secondary method of fighting increase in the future as compared with the past, unless the sabre be abandoned and the bayonet adopted in its place, both bayonet and sabre must be carried, which seems to be too much for the trooper to carry; his numerous weapons will resemble the "seven weapons of Benkei," and be a hindrance. This view has a large number of supporters, and in Cavalry circles the advocates of the bayonet are very few. For this reason no mention of the bayonet has been made in the new Drill Book.

On the other hand, there are many members of the General Staff who insist upon the bayonet being carried in addition to the sabre; these officers base their investigations on the tactical point of view, and assert that dismounted Cavalry actions, especially dismounted assault actions, will increase in the future, and so make the use of the bayonet essential. It appears that these officers have finally caused the General Staff and War Office to change their views, with the result that the draft Drill Book has been thrown out by the Military Council.

In my view, however, as even in dismounted actions the Cavalry are equipped with the powerful Cavalry sabre, there is no cause for anxiety. At the precise moment of the charge, the disadvantage of drawing the sword and slinging the carbine is very small compared to *always* carrying the bayonet, which means a considerable increase in the weight of the weapons carried, and other inconveniences as well.

In any case, I think it is extremely regrettable that the publication of the carefully compiled Drill Book should have been indefinitely deferred.

Assault Action will be Struck Out.—The revised Cavalry Drill Book, recently thrown out by the Military Council, has been sent back to the Cavalry Directorate of the Department of Military Education and Training for further revision. As it has been decided to omit assault actions—the bone of contention among the members of the Military Council—the manual will shortly be sent up from General Oshima, Director of Military Education and Training, for presentation to His Majesty. However, as Generals Nogi and Terauchi, and Admiral Togo (members of the Military Council), are at present all abroad, the session of the Council to discuss the book will probably not be opened till August or September.—*Jiji Shimpo.*

IMPORTANT.

The staff of the JOURNAL is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers; every effort will, however, be made to trace the movements of regiments.

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A ROYAL HONOUR.

Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Argyll has been recently appointed Honorary Colonel of the 5th The Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, Ottawa, Canada.

The Regiment is to be congratulated on such an unique appointment being conferred.

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL COMPASS.

The compass box is filled with a non-freezable liquid and is hermetically sealed; the compass, being enveloped in this liquid, is kept exceedingly steady and soon comes to rest. The compass box is divided on the outside with degrees and points, as in the service pattern compass. A revolving indicator is fitted above the glass so that the compass can be used for night marching on the well-known Verner principle. A tube containing radium compound is mounted on the indicator, and another similar tube is mounted at the north point of the compass dial. On the inside of the lid is a line treated with the same compound, so that the compass is always available for use at night time without the necessity of exposing it to sunlight or magnesium. The dial being very steady renders the compass an ideal one for cavalry officers. This compass is manufactured by J. H. Steward, 406 Strand, and 457 West Strand, London, W.C. Price, £2 15s., or £27 per dozen.

OUR YEOMANRY.[1]

What is Its Value as at Present Constituted?

By "Qui Sapit."

I have ventured to write the following article on the subject of our Yeomanry, and hope that it may find a place in the Cavalry Journal.

Having been a regular Cavalry and a Yeomanry officer, and seen three campaigns with the British Cavalry, also the work of Indian and Egyptian Cavalry, and of Irregular Corps raised in South Africa, as well as that of the first lot of Yeomanry that came out from England to South Africa, I have had the opportunity of seeing and learning something of the Yeomanry question.

On one occasion I saw five Yeomanry Brigades camping on Salisbury Plain. Neither of these Brigades had with them their Horse Artillery, though both of them had their Field Hospitals belonging to the Royal Army Medical Corps (T.F.) and their Army Service Corps (T.F.). I will begin with the different units of these brigades, and point out how each of them fall short of necessary requirements.

[1] These criticisms might probably have been fairly made ten years ago, but *not* now. Many of the suggestions are sound, particularly that the training should be for a longer period, but most of them have been generally adopted in Yeomanry regiments for some time.—C. W. T., *Yeomanry Sub-editor.*

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Perhaps the worst point in the Royal Army Medical Corps Territorial Force is their horsemanship and horsemastership. Unfortunately in the Territorial Force the Royal Army Medical Corps is not horsed and driven, as it is in the regulars, by the Army Service Corps.

The doctors themselves are excellent; but the men undoubtedly require more practical training. You cannot expect a ploughboy or a working man to be a good and efficient dresser, or to become an efficient hospital orderly. This comes from the fact that they have no knowledge, and they have *no opportunity of gaining* the necessary knowledge. Their heart is in the right place, and they endeavour to do their best; but their best is necessarily very bad when compared with the man who learns his business in hospitals.

As regards the Army Service Corps. One of the brigades that I saw had an excellent A.S.C. well horsed, equipped with suitable waggons of a uniform type, well officered, and well manned with farm carters and men who were looking after horses every day in their civilian life. Of the other brigade I am afraid I cannot speak so highly. Its vehicles seemed to have been collected from the rubbish heap of a great city. They consisted of a char-a-banc, two or three governess carts, a broken-down wagonette, a lorry with very small wheels capable of carrying ten tons of stone, in fact a general heterogeneous collection of vehicles. The horses were badly matched, and as unsuitable to the work as the carts. It was very much under-officered and the men did not know their job. Their driving was erratic, and their endeavours to put twenty-five sacks of oats into a wagon were futile.

This Army Service Corps did much unnecessary work which should have been done by the units of the brigade, and which in a regular brigade would have been carried out by fatigue parties of these units.

I consider that the A.S.C. has a better opportunity of turning out efficient men and an efficient corps than any branch of the Territorial Force; for the men have virtually no technical work to learn; and it is, often, quite possible to recruit men for this corps who are daily occupied with horses and wagons.

How this will apply to modern ideas of Army Service Corps with mechanical transport, remains to be seen; but as the number of vehicles will be decreased, and, therefore, the technical staff will become less, I believe the work will be better and more speedily carried out.

With respect to the Horse Artillery, I have had little chance of seeing these batteries, as neither of the brigades the first year that I saw them on Salisbury Plain had their Artillery with them. In the following year, however, during the September manœuvres I saw a section of one of the Territorial Royal Horse Artillery Batteries. I think the kindest thing I can say is, that as it takes three years to make a R.H.A. driver or gunner anywhere near efficient, one cannot expect a Territorial Royal Horse Artillery Battery to be efficient in eleven days. This is all the training these men get.

They have nominally fifteen days in camp, from which must be deducted two days for arrival and dispersal, and two idle Sundays. Why should not the Territorial Force assemble on a Sunday? This of course opens the question as to whether a brigade should not utilise these two valuable days out of a total fifteen in teaching the Territorial his work.

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Now as regards the Yeomanry themselves. We must divide them into four sections:

1. The Officers
2. The Permanent Staff
3. The N.C.O.s, and
4. The men.

The hearts of the officers are all in the right places. They do their utmost, and all want to learn. There are, however, two good reasons why they can never attain their object in becoming efficient officers; one is that they don't know their work and have little opportunity of learning it; the second is that they cannot speak as strongly as they wish, or in a manner that a regular officer would to the men under his command, when they see things going wrong.

While a Yeomanry officer is out with his regiment in camp, every moment is occupied in working his hardest to instruct the men under his command; consequently he has no time for learning himself. Thus the above course of so-called fifteen days (really only eleven), which our Government considers efficient to teach our Yeomanry officers their duties as Cavalry soldiers, is quite insufficient.

Soldiering is the most difficult and intricate art that exists. How can an officer learn anything of this art in the few days that he may be attached to a regiment at Aldershot, or perhaps a Yeomanry School?

Again, the Yeomanry has considerably changed during the last ten or fifteen years.

In the olden days it used to be the country squire with his tenants that created our Yeomanry; and long may this feudal system exist, provided the squire and tenant are of the right class. The ideal country squire for this work is the man of means who has been a Cavalry soldier and who has, on succeeding to his property, left the Army and settled down. This officer then generally has some control over his men, and he has the necessary knowledge to teach his men their work whenever they can find the opportunity of learning. The ordinary Yeomanry officer nowadays is a business man; and he, I think justly, says, "I cannot give up the necessary amount of my time to learn the work of a Cavalry officer unless I am paid for it as much as I earn by my business."

We all know that the pay of an officer in His Majesty's Forces will barely cover his mess bill in barracks. It is therefore only natural to find that these business men cannot, and will not, give up the time that is absolutely necessary in order to learn the duties of a Cavalry officer (vide CAVALRY JOURNAL, July 1911, pages 265 to 273).

Again, many Yeomanry officers seldom see their troops nowadays, except at training and on special occasions when the officers attend the squadron dance; naturally, then there can be no reference to military matters. The ordinary Yeomanry officer's knowledge of Cavalry work is, to say the least of it, very slight. Two of the officers commanding regiments that I saw were M.P.s, very valuable men no doubt in the House of Commons, but with very little or no knowledge of Cavalry work in the field. Another regiment was commanded by a man who was a born soldier, and who, although he has never been in the Service and had never done any soldiering except

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when attached to some regiment at Aldershot, well realises the shortcomings of his regiment and the great difficulty he has in instructing the men under his command.

Another regiment of another brigade was commanded by what we should term a country gentleman, who seldom or never leaves his country residence, and can have no knowledge whatever of military matters.

As regards the permanent staff. Everybody who has been a Cavalry soldier knows perfectly well that the adjutancy of a Yeomanry regiment is looked upon as a pleasant berth. It is generally applied for by an officer whose chances of promotion in the Army are small, and who wishes to put in a few more years in order to qualify himself for a pension.

He has little work, excepting for a fortnight before the training, and possibly for a week afterwards. The adjutant of a Yeomanry regiment, in nearly every case in Great Britain, is a married man, possibly living far from the headquarters of the Yeomanry. There is no encouragement for him from the War Office to do his work properly; he is seldom, if ever, helped by the regimental officers, whom he rarely sees, excepting in the hunting field and during the annual training.

Now as to the permanent staff sergeants of the Yeomanry. These in all cases are sergeants who have served for a considerable time in regular regiments, and are probably losing their activity and energy.

Again, there is another very great difficulty with the permanent staff sergeants of the Yeomanry regiments. The yeomen, whom they have to instruct, usually think themselves of a better social standing than these sergeants, and one can quite understand that it is an unpleasant duty for a married sergeant who comes into a small town, while associating with the yeomen, to continually find fault with them on parade or at stables during the training.

The large farmers who form one of the regiments that I am speaking of consider themselves of too high a social standing to associate in any way with the squadron sergeant-majors; and the same may be said of ordinary farmers near big market towns.

One can hardly expect a sergeant-major of a squadron to have much authority or influence over men unless they look upon him as their equal or superior in ordinary life.

As regards the Yeomanry non-commissioned officers. In a few cases a man is made an N.C.O. because he knows his work, or, I should say, knows a little more about his work than the ordinary yeoman. In the majority of cases, however, he is made an N.C.O. because he is a bigger farmer than most of the other men in the ranks. Very often it is because he wins races at the Local Hunt Steeplechases. Very worthy and excellent reasons for making a man an N.C.O. in the olden days of Yeomanry, when they were virtually a mounted police force, for the purpose, chiefly, of keeping rioters in order. The Yeomanry was then, as it should be now, a force at the disposal of the Lord Lieutenant of the County for keeping the King's peace, and not a make-believe efficient fighting force.

One must bear in mind that an N.C.O. must know something of the art of soldiering and constantly has to assume the responsibilities of an officer when that officer is not present.

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My remarks regarding the feeling of the troopers towards the permanent staff sergeant somewhat apply to the feeling of the troopers towards the N.C.O.s raised from his own class. Can we expect Farmer Jones to immediately and quickly obey the orders of Corporal Smith, when, in ordinary life, he can buy Corporal Smith up in five minutes, or out-bid him in any local cattle market?

Now as regards the men themselves.

Some Yeomanry regiments that I know well are weak in numbers of men, but have men of the right quality for Yeomanry police work; others are strong in men, but of the worse class for either police or Cavalry work.

Those of the first category are all hunting farmers who can ride to hounds and know every pathway through the coverts, every gap in every fence in the country which they are accustomed to hunt over. These men theoretically are excellent; but in practice, as soldiers, no use at all. They cannot shoot; they are not accustomed to look after their own horses; they want someone to bring their tea and food when they come in from the field; they require grooms for their horses when the day's work is over; and generally speaking they are too big for their boots. To substantiate my remarks I know that on manœuvres last year a regiment of Yeomanry had its grooms following them about in brakes and char-a-bancs.

I remember seeing on Salisbury Plain a very distinguished ex-soldier, who was a major in one of these regiments, and who has had the honour of gaining the D.S.O., and being recommended for the V.C., showing the son of a large farmer, who was a trooper in the regiment, *how to start grooming his horse.*

Again this class of man expects the officer to take off his hat to them and ask them to be good enough to join the ranks of the Yeomanry; and when an officer wishes a squadron to move in some such simple formation as "Rank past by sections at a walk," he has to say to them, "Gentlemen, would you kindly follow me four at a time?"

With some regiments of Yeomanry you get the class of town mechanics and town working men who never see a horse except during training. They do not understand horses, and have no idea of horsemanship or horse-management.

Another serious complaint I have to make against the ordinary trooper in a Yeomanry regiment is that he comes out for the training as if it were a sort of picnic. He does not in the least realise that he should be striving to learn something of the art of war, and to fit himself to be of real use when the time of trial arrives.

If commanding officers take their men where they can teach them and endeavour to instruct them in their work, the prompt remark of the men would be, "We had a rotten time last year, and did nothing but hard work all day long." Until you get the idea out of the heads of yeomen that the annual training is a picnic you will never get really satisfactory work done by them.

The interior economy of the Yeomanry seems to me to be in a state of chaos, and in some corps run entirely on the wrong lines. I was talking at mess one night to the officer commanding the Army Service Corps, who told me that he managed to feed his men excellently and save 4*d.* per diem

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out of the 1*s.* that is allowed by the Government for feeding; whereas the regiment with which we were dining was paying 2*s.* 6*d.* per day in addition to the 1*s.* for the messing of their men.

I took the opportunity of visiting the lines of his Army Service Corps, and talked on the question of food to some of his men. They decidedly gave me the impression that they were extremely well satisfied with the food. Several of them said to me, "We get meat or fish for breakfast, meat for dinner, and a good tea, which we don't get in our cottages at home."

I cannot see why the Yeomanry should not arrange their own cooks and waiters regimentally. It would do a deal of good to the young farmer who, because he can afford to hunt, thinks himself above his neighbours, if he were compelled to wait on and fag for the other members of his troop at meals.

Considerable difficulty exists on the score of interior economy owing to the fact that there are in many of these regiments big farmers who are willing to spend £5 out of their pockets for the training, working by the side of others to whom their pay is an important object. The first class of man wants to be waited on, and prefers his food arranged on the same lines as the officers, and is willing to pay the necessary money for this to be arranged. The second class of man is content with much simpler feeding arrangements, and is accustomed to plain food cleanly put before him.

The result of all this is dissatisfaction. The old class of yeomen (now rapidly disappearing) wants expensive catering arrangements, waiters, &c.; the new class of yeomen cannot afford the expense, and grumbles at 2*s.* 6*d.* per day for messing. In a good many cases there is some reason for the "grumbling," the catering arrangements being often defective, and open to comment on the score of speculation by the contractor.

It is extremely difficult to run the messing of a regiment of Yeomanry in camp on the scale of an officers' mess, as the yeomen themselves do nothing in the way of preparing their own food, and all is left to the quartermaster and his hired assistants.

The remedy for all this is obvious. The Yeomanry must give up the old idea of camp life. They must recruit and soldier under the same conditions as the average Territorial soldier. The messing should be under stricter conditions and should not exceed the 1*s.* messing grant from the State. The Yeomanry officer must look after the messing of his men in the same manner as his regular brother officers.

The best squadron would certainly be the one whose interior economy is the best managed. It always follows that good interior economy produces a contented and efficient unit.

The yeoman himself must not hanker after the old conditions. He must be prepared to do his share of fatigue work in camp. There is nothing derogatory in carrying rations or loading the forage of the unit. This and other fatigue work would have to be done on service, and yeomen must be prepared to learn that a soldier's duty comprises many other things than riding and drill.

It would be possible in a well-managed Yeomanry regiment for the trooper to receive the full grant of £5 for horse hire and his full rate of Government pay. This should be paid in two instalments during the camp. At present few yeomen, at the end of their training, receive half the above;

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moreover, it is frequently a month after the termination of camp that they get even that.

Of course I am saying nothing here on that most serious question, the horsing of Yeomanry. It is a well-known fact that the horse contractors pass on their horses from one corps to another. Were all the Yeomanry regiments of Great Britain to train at one time, I don't believe that more than one-third of them would be mounted. I should like later to have the opportunity of writing on this very important question.

Now as regards rectifying these complaints. The question I am now entering upon is of course a difficult one, and is solved only by the old, old question of £ *s. d.*

When Yeomanry regiments go out for training they should be strengthened by a considerable amount of N.C.O.s and officers from a regular Cavalry regiment, sent down in order to instruct them *how* to do their work.

The Adjutant should be allowed much more in travelling expenses and encouraged to go round to all the scattered troops and sections of his regiment, giving constant instruction to his men on every conceivable point of a cavalryman's work.

I was recently told by a newly-appointed adjutant to a Territorial Brigade of Artillery, "Oh, my work will only be half-hours on Saturday nights, thank God."

The yeoman himself should be allowed more advantages over the ordinary civilian than is now the case, and should be taught to consider himself superior to the civilian who does nothing towards the defence of his country. In the olden days this was the case, as yeomen were excused the horse tax and other small local taxes.

Much more work should be done on Sundays, and officers and men should receive more adequate pay for really efficient work. They must remember that their fortnight's training is a serious matter, and constant attention to work is necessary. So many of the men come out for the purpose of displaying themselves in uniform and endeavouring to make the public believe they are real soldiers.

I understand it is considered by the military authorities that one trained regular cavalryman is equal to three yeomen.

Therefore one Cavalry Division would equal three Yeomanry Divisions. Were I given my choice with which to meet a Continental Cavalry Division, I regret to say that my choice would undoubtedly be given to the one division of regular troops.

I feel that for the sake of our country in war the best thing to do would be to abolish altogether the mounted branch of the Territorial Army and expend the money that this branch costs the tax-payer on as many extra Cavalry regiments and batteries of Horse Artillery as the money would run to.

By this means we should have a small but efficient force instead of a large but totally inefficient collection of men.

I assert that the mounted branch of the Territorial Army is altogether inefficient; and that unless action is taken quickly, we shall find ourselves face to face with an enemy whose mounted corps do know their work and who will sweep away our Yeomanry like chaff before the wind.

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SPORTING NOTES

POLO.

In the final of the Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament played at Hurlingham, the 4th Dragoon Guards beat the Royal Horse Guards by five goals to four after extra time. The Blues were confidently expected to win, but both they and their ponies were rather stale after the many championships they had been successfully competing for. Teams: Royal Horse Guards—Capt. G. V. S. Bowlby, Capt. Lord Alastair Innes-Ker, Capt. H. E. Brassey, and Mr. J. F. Harrison (back). 4th Dragoon Guards—Capt. A. Carton de Wiart, Capt. C. B. Hornby, Major B. H. Mathew-Lannowe, and Capt. C. F. Hunter (back). Lord Roberts congratulated the winners and presented the Cup.

In the final of the Subalterns Cup, played at Roehampton, the 9th Lancers beat the 1st Life Guards by twelve goals to nil. Players: 9th Lancers—Messrs. Bovill, F. Grenfell, N. Edwards, and Lord Rocksavage (back). 1st Life Guards—Messrs. Leigh, Astor, Miller Mundy, and Hardy (back).

The Hurlingham Polo Committee have accepted the splendid offer of the Duke of Westminster to take over the America International Polo Cup Recovery Fund and ponies, and has issued a challenge to the American Polo Association to compete for the Cup in America in 1912.

Several new and promising players have come out this season, notably Capt. Ritson, of the Inniskilling Dragoons, so a strong British team should be forthcoming to do duty next year.

The Hunt Tournament Final at Ranelagh was between Mr. Fernie's Hunt and the Essex Union, the former winning by six goals to three. Teams: Mr. Fernie's Hunt—Capt. J. E. Bellville, Mr. F. A. Bellville, Capt. R. W. Morrison Bell, and Mr. H. C. M. Porter (back). Essex Union—Mr. M. C. Pilkington, Capt. G. Heseltine, Mr. E. B. Sheppard, and Mr. Raymond Courage (back).

The annual match between England and Ireland for the Patriotic Cup was played as usual in the Phœnix Park, Dublin, before a huge crowd of spectators, and proved an easy win for England by seven goals to love. Teams: Ireland—Mr. J. A. B. Trench, Mr. S. A. Watt, Capt. H. Lloyd, and Mr. L. M. Ryan (back). England—Mr. C. Nicholls, Duke of Westminster, Capt. H. Wilson, and Lord Rocksavage (back). Mr. P. Nicholls was unable to play for England, and Capt. H. Wilson took his place.

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For the All-Ireland Military Cup there was an entry of three teams only—viz. the 20th Hussars (the holders), 5th Dragoon Guards, and 5th Lancers. The 5th Dragoon Guards, captained by their new Colonel, defeated the 5th Lancers after a fast game by six goals to one, but were then beaten by the 20th Hussars in the final by four goals to nil. The matches were played in the Phœnix Park, Dublin. Teams: 5th Dragoon Guards—Mr. A. D. Winterbottom, Capt. A. M. Black, Mr. F. G. White, and Lieut.-Col. G. K. Ansell (back). 20th Hussars—Messrs. J. C. Darling, C. G. Mangles, S. Barne, and Mr. H. M. Soames (back).

Abroad.

For the Durban Polo Tournament in South Africa nine teams entered. The final between the Carabiniers (Capt. Webster, Major Watson, Mr. Kennard, and Mr. Anstruther, back) and Rosslyn (Mr. Raw, Mr. Mackenzie, Mr. A. Ross, and Mr. L. Ross, back) was a fast game, resulting in a win for the Carabiniers, who have now won four out of the last five tournaments. Three of the Rosslyn team were Natal Carbineers.

A successful three-day tournament was held in August in Montreal at Cartierville, Quebec, at which the Grenfell Challenge Cup, presented by Mr. Arthur Grenfell was played for. The final between the Back River Club (Messrs. A. E. Ogilvie, A. H. Gault, H. B. MacDougall, and G. L. Ogilvie, back) and Toronto (Messrs. D. L. McCarthy, A. Beardmoor, Capt. H. C. Bickford, and Capt. McBrien, back) resulted in a win for the Back River Club by eleven goals to two. Umpire, Capt, D. J. Ross, of Carlow, Ireland. This Cup was won in 1910 by a Ranelagh team.

Polo, we hear, is now played at Nairobi in British East Africa, where a well fought out match recently took place between the Military and the Pioneers for the Duke of Connaught's Cup. Time came with the score three all, necessitating extra time, when the Pioneers secured the winning goal. Teams: Military—Mr. Edwards, Hon. B. Cole, Capt. O'Brien, and Capt. Murray. Pioneers—Lord Cranworth, Mr. Greswolde-Williams, Mr. Loder Symonds, and Capt. Tuson.

His Excellency the Governor presented the Cup to the winning team.

GOLF.

The Army Cup Competition took place in the early part of this month at Stoke Poges. Eight teams of four players entered, and two rounds of eighteen holes each were played, the scores at the end of each round being totalled, and the team with the lowest aggregate the winner.

The result was a victory for the Black Watch, 38 holes down, being followed by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with 44, and the Army Service Corps 53. This is the third time the winners have secured the Cup.

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RACING.

On the King and Queen's recent visit to Ireland, after landing at Kingstown in the morning, their Majesties proceeded in the afternoon to the Phœnix Park races in Dublin, where an enormous crowd gave them a wonderful ovation, the cheering continuing for some minutes after they had been conducted to the Royal Stand by the stewards of the Irish Turf Club and the stewards of the meeting. The sport was interesting, and fair fields turned out. The King's Cup, presented by His Majesty, a five-furlong handicap, attracted the largest field of twenty-one to the post, and was won by Mr. J. H. Peard's Wether's Well. The same gentleman's horses also won two other races.

The King and Queen also favoured the July Meeting of the Leopardstown races, which took place in glorious weather, a large, enthusiastic and fashionable crowd being present. Escorted by the Life Guards, their Majesties were received by General Sir Arthur Paget and the stewards of the Irish Turf Club. Proceedings opened with the Royal Military Cup, presented by the King for an officers' two-mile flat race. It was won by Sir G. Abercromby's Castle Jewel, the Hon. R. Bruce riding, with Mr. A. M. Cunard's Diamond O'Neil (Mr. H. C. Alexander) second, and Major Williamson's Lorrdine (Mr. P. Hornby) third. This is the third King's Military Cup Mr. Bruce has steered to victory, and in the other instances the horses were his own property. The Farmers' Royal Cup, also a two-mile weight-for-age race for a Cup presented by His Majesty, was contested by seventeen horses and won by a head by Mr. D. Moloney's Kirkbloom (Mr. C. J. Kelly), Mr. P. Cullinan's Miss Clytie (Mr. J. W. Widger) second, and Mr. P. Cullinan's The Best (Mr. H. Assher) third.

To the general regret, His Majesty's own horses, Devil's Dyke and Mirabeau, were only able to carry the Royal colours second past the post for their respective races, the Visitors' Plate and the Dublin Plate. At the conclusion of the racing the King presented the Cups to the winning owners, Sir G. Abercromby and Mr. D. Maloney, and at the same time handed Mr. Peard the trophy won by his horse Wether's Well at Phœnix Park.

LAWN TENNIS.

The Army Championships were played at Queen's Club in brilliant weather. When the event was instituted last year fourteen players entered for the Singles and twelve pairs for the Inter-Regimental Doubles. The numbers this year were twenty-nine and fourteen respectively. The Army Singles Championship was won by Mr. A. R. F. Kingscote, R.G.A., who in the final beat Capt. E. D. Young, 1st Devon Regiment, by two sets to none (6—3, 6—2).

In the Inter-Regimental Doubles Final Capt. E. D. Young and Capt. W. N. Goodwyn, 1st Devon Regiment, beat Major Puckle, D.S.O., and Capt. A. Berger, Army Service Corps (the holders), by three sets to two (6—4, 5—7, 2—6, 7—5, and 6—2).

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DUBLIN HORSE SHOW.

The officers' jumping at the Dublin Horse Show this year was again a great success and one of the chief features of the show. In the competitions for officers quartered in Ireland, riding in uniform, twenty-five competed; many never put a foot wrong, so had to be judged a good deal on style. At last Lieut. J. C. Darling's (20th Hussars) Pigmie was placed first, Capt. J. D. Batten's Bingo second, Lieut. T. C. Harman's (20th Hussars) Mickey Free third, and Capt. H. T. Ryan's (A.V.C.) Prince Rupert fourth. There were forty-three entries in the Open Military Jumping for naval and military officers of any nationality; twenty-four turned out, all British, and the officers jumped in pairs. Unfortunately, foreign officers were absent owing to the necessary regulations regarding the Malin test for glanders. The jumping was excellent, all performing creditably. Lieut. R. N. Grubb, 3rd Hussars, was first with Tommy, Capt. C. Crawley, 5th Dragoon Guards, second with Sue, Lieut. C. Crawshay, Black Watch, third with nomination, Lieut. C. F. T. Swan, 3rd Rifle Brigade, fourth with Knocklong, and Capt. M. Ruthven, the Black Watch, fifth with The Nut, a well-known point-to-point winner.

BISLEY.

No record scores but record weather favoured Bisley this year, brilliant sunshine and not a drop of rain during the whole fortnight. The coveted King's Prize consisting of Gold Medal, Gold Badge, and £250 was won by Pte. W. I. Clifford, 10th Royal Canadians, of Toronto, with a score of 319. Lieut. Grant, late Capetown Highlanders, was second (Badge and £30), with a score of 313, and Sergeant H. Ommunsden, 4th Royal Scots third (Badge and £25) with a score of 313. The St. George's Vase was won by Pte. T. Sparks, late 21st London, Trooper Uglow of the Devon Yeomanry taking the Silver Cup for second.

The National Challenge Trophy (teams of 20).—England 1st, Ireland 2nd, Wales 3rd.

Kolapore Cup.—Mother Country.

Mackinnon Challenge Cup.—Canada.

Roberts Challenge Cup.—The Portsmouth Marines with a score of 81 beat the 3rd Rifle Brigade (the holders) who scored 72.

Yeomanry Inter-Regimental Challenge Cup.—The Middlesex Yeomanry beat the Cheshire Yeomanry after a tie.

The Loder Challenge Cup.—Sergeant W. Richards, R. N. Devon Hussars Yeomanry.

The Prince of Wales's Prize was won by Pte. W. I. Clifford, the young Canadian who won the King's Gold Medal.

At the conclusion Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener presented the prizes and on behalf of the National Rifle Assiciation thanked Major-General Lord Cheylesmore. His Lordship remarked that it was twenty-one years since he was last at Bisley at the opening meeting, and he hoped within a few years tc come again and do a little shooting himself under Lord Cheylesmore's guidance.

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BOXING.

The Royal Navy and Army Boxing Association has just come into being. All interested in boxing will be grateful to those who have given their time and trouble in its formation. It is the object of the Association to encourage and improve boxing in the Services and to act as a central body for control and appeal and to make boxing a popular form of physical training. All forms of unfair play are to be vigorously discouraged. A list of qualified judges has been formed which includes the names of about sixty officers, nearly all of whom are, or have been, fine boxers. Altogether the association is well organised for efficient work. Co-operating as it intends to do with the Amateur Boxing Association, and the National Sporting Club, it will be a great influence in purifying the game and securing the future of an essentially English sport as a clean and wholesome pastime.

ATHLETICS.

The thirty-second annual Army Athletic Meeting at Aldershot took place in glorious weather, and was an unqualified success. Two championship records were broken.

Major E. O'Brien, Indian Army, won the hurdles in 16 sec., and Corpl. Asher, 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, won the quarter-mile in 51 sec.

Two accidents marred the proceedings: Lieut. Frost, in the long jump, after clearing 20 ft. $7\frac{3}{4}$ in., dislocated his ankle, and Capt. Findlater, Royal Fusiliers, was badly hurt in the Obstacle race.

Results—Championships:

100 yds.: Corpl. Asher.
Quarter-mile: Corpl. Asher.
Half-mile: Sergt. Heaver, 2nd Lincolnshire Regiment.
One Mile: Pte. Love, 1st Coldstream Guards.
Three Miles: Pte. Love, 1st Coldstream Guards.
Hurdle Race: Major E. O'Brien.
Relay Race: 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment.
Tug-of-War: 1st Leinster Regiment.
Relay Race (teams of four): Regular Army 1, Royal Marines 2.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mrs. Lomax presented the prizes to a value of over £300 in kind to the successful competitors.

There was a keen competition at Aldershot for H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught's Shield for surmounting obstacles. Nine regiments entered, the teams from which consisted of two officers and four sections of twenty-five men and a sergeant, total 106. The course was about a circular mile, with such obstacles as walls, post and rails, water jumps, &c., which were sufficiently wide to admit of about twenty-five jumping abreast. The time limit was eight minutes. Generally speaking, the conditions were drawn up with a view to the encouraging of training a large number of men to traverse ground intersected with obstacles at a fast pace and in order. After a close struggle the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers (time 7 min. 28 3-5 sec.,

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193 2-3 points) were the winners, with the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (7 min. 30 sec., 173 1-3 points) second, and the 1st Cameron Highlanders (7 min. 50 4-5 sec., 127 2-3 points) third. The prizes were subsequently presented by Major-General H. M. Lawson—viz. Challenge Shield and Cup value £22 to the winners, Cup value £13 to the second, and Cup value £5 to the third.

Territorial Force Day at Ranelagh was a striking success. The Coaching Club visited the grounds, and society was strongly represented. Amongst those present were the Maharajah of Patiala, who presented the prizes, the Sultan of Perak, Lord Haldane, Colonel Seely, Under-Secretary for War, and Colonel Sir E. Ward, Permanent Secretary of the War Office.

Results:

Sabre *v.* Sabre: Capt. A. V. Keene, "Artists."

Tent-pegging: Lieut. R. Valentine, Warwickshire Yeomanry.

Lemon-cutting: Lieut. C. P. Stedall, City of London Yeomanry.

Riding and Jumping: Lieuts. G. S. Rowley and G. C. Cowper, Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry.

For N.C.O.s and men:

Tent-pitching and Striking: "The Rangers."

Tent-pegging (half-sections): Berkshire Yeomanry.

Army Service Corps Competition: 1st London Division A.S.C.

Driving R.F.A.: 7th London Brigade R.F.A.

Riding and Jumping (half-sections): City of London Yeomanry.

Galloping R.H.A.: Notts R.H.A.

Outpost Support Race: "Artists."

FOOTBALL.

Seventeen regiments have entered for the Cavalry Cup Competition, the draw for the first round of which is as follows:—

5th Lancers v. 5th Dragoon Guards.
2nd Life Guards v. Royal Scots Greys.
9th Lancers v. 1st Life Guards.
Royal Horse Guards v. 3rd Dragoon Guards.
16th Lancers v. Queen's Bays.
20th Hussars v. 19th Hussars.
11th Hussars v. 18th Hussars.

Byes: 4th Hussars, 3rd Hussars, and 4th Dragoon Guards.

The Indian Football Association Shield, played for at Calcutta, was a great victory for the Mohan Bagan team who in the final beat the East Yorkshire Regt. by 2 goals to 1. This is the first time that it has been won by a native team. About 8,000 Bengalis were present and the enthusiasm was great. Racial feeling was absent but an extraordinary scene took place on victory being declared, the Bengalis tearing off their shirts and waving them

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